JACQUELIEN VAN STEKELENBURG
BERT KLANDERMANS

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROTEST

INDIVIDUALS IN ACTION

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Protest is typically rare behavior, yet the first decade of the twenty-first century has been named the era of protest. Successful protests bring masses to the streets, and the emergence of social media has fundamentally changed the process of mobilization. What protests need to be successful is demand (grievances, anger, and indignation), supply (protest organizations), and mobilization (effective communication networks). Motivation to participate can be instrumental, expressive, and identity driven, and politicized collective identity plays an important role in the dynamics of collective action. This volume brings together insights from social psychology, political psychology, sociology, and political science to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of protest participation, particularly to the question of why some people protest while others do not. It is essential reading for scholars interested in the social and political psychology of individuals in action.

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Studying political protest is a challenge in and of itself. We maintain that such research requires comparative designs. In its turn, comparison implies collaborators. Through the years since *The Social Psychology of Protest* was published we have enjoyed the support and inspiration of many colleagues from all over the world. Years that were marked by some major studies of political protest involving scholars from Europe, West, South, North and East, South Africa, Latin America, and the United States. Without these studies and the inspiring collaborations this book would not have been possible. The pages to come bear witness to our joint efforts. Although they are too many to name in person, we want to thank all of those who shared our endeavors.

In the 1990s, Bert Klandermans conducted a comparison of farmers' protests in the Netherlands and Spain with Jose Manuel Sabucedo. It marked the beginning of a long-term collaboration. In the late 1990s, a group of European scholars set-out to conduct life-history interviews with extreme-right activists. Bert Klandermans, Nonna Mayer, Hans de Witte, and Bernd Simon were the senior members of the team.

A few years later, the two of us, Jacquelien and Bert, engaged in a vast study of nearly 100 street demonstrations, 28,000 demonstrators, in 7 European countries, together with Stefaan Walgrave, Joris Verhulst, Jeroen van Laer, Marie-Louise Damen, Eva Anduiza, Jose Manuel Sabucedo, Donatella della Porta, Chris Rootes, Clare Saunders, Maria Grasso, Marco Giugni, Nina Eggerts, Abby Peterson, Mattias Wahlstrom, and Magnus Wennerhag.

Finally, we conducted a study of political participation among 15,000 citizens in seven countries – in West and Central Europe and Latin America, in both party politics and movement politics – with Marcelo Rosa, Zsolt Enyedi, Swen Hutter, Arieke Rijken, Sebastian Peireyra, Teodora Gaidyte, Stephan Price, Camila Penna, Twan Huysmans, Gergö Zavecz, and Clare Saunders.

All these projects were a rich source of ideas and data that enabled us to focus on the principal question of this book, why do people protest, especially in these swift changing times they proved invaluable empirical sources – not in the least thanks to our collaborators.

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Janka Romero and Rowan Groat, our editors at Cambridge, deserve a big cheer for their support and patience. We imagine that we were not always easy to work with. But together we managed.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In 1997, *The Social Psychology of Protest* (Klandermans, 1997) appeared. Until then theories and approaches to collective action were scattered throughout psychological, sociological, and political science journals and volumes in Europe and the United States. *The Social Psychology of Protest* was an attempt to bring these bits and pieces together. A very successful attempt – it became a classic in the field. However, the two decades that have passed since its appearance have been vigorous decades in the field *and* in the world. One can see this volume – *Individuals in Action* – as an attempt to integrate the recent efforts and update the assessment of where we are today.

Since 1997, the world of protest has changed profoundly. Take the Internet, social media, email, and smartphones, which gave the world a virtual "stratum." In *The Social Psychology of Protest* there is *no single* reference to the Internet or social media. This would be inconceivable nowadays. Simultaneously, a new social fabric emerges, loosely coupled networks are added to the organization and structure of society, accelerated by ever renewing ICTs. Traditional "greedy" institutions such as trade unions and churches which made significant demands on members' time, loyalty, and energy (Coser, 1974) are replaced by "light" groups and associations that are loose, easy to join, and easy to leave. Despite this process of individualization people are still committed to common causes. Underlying this is what Lichterman (1996) calls "personalism": people feel a personal sense of political responsibility rather than feeling restricted or obligated to a community or group. These societal processes imply profound changes in protest dynamics that call for an update of empericism and theory.

Protest not only changed qualitatively, but also quantitatively, in such an order of magnitude that the first decade of the twenty-first century has already been baptized the era of protest. In 2011, *Times Magazine* even chose "the protestor" as the *Person of the Year*. Virtually every day news

media display streets and squares occupied by protesting crowds. Our times are contentious, indeed. Why do all these people protest? Why are people prepared to sacrifice wealth, a pleasant and carefree life, or sometimes even their lives for a common cause? These questions are not new, they have intrigued social scientists for a long time. Yet, for social and political psychologists this contentious era created renewed interest in collective action. As it happened, just after the publication of *The Social Psychology of Protest*, the social psychology of protest saw an explosive growth. This renewed interest is also meta-analytically confirmed (Van Stekelenburg, Anikina, et al., 2013; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). We certainly live in contentious times and social and political psychologists try to understand the psychological aspects of this social and political change.

Until 1997, answers to the question as to why people protest given by social and political psychology have been provided in terms of grievances and efficacy. However, the explosive growth added new concepts to the conceptual filing cabinet of social and political psychologists of protest. Identity, and later dual identity and politicized identity were, by then, new kids on the block. Furthermore, recent work in sociology and social psychology has brought emotions to the study of protest (Goodwin et al., 2001; Jasper, 1998; Van Stekelenburg, 2006; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). In our own work we proposed to consider ideology as another element, which comes into play when issues or events are against people's norms and values and people want to express their indignation (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2011). A final element added to the filing cabinet was social embeddedness (Klandermans et al., 2008). Studies published after 1997 showed that, in practice, all these concepts are clearly interwoven.

Hence, the social psychology of protest has expanded enormously – theoretically and empirically – since 1997. The general objective of this book is to synthesize these recent efforts and update the assessment of where we are. It aims to bring together insights on protest participation from different disciplines (e.g., social psychology, political psychology, sociology, political science) which approach protest participation from complementary theoretical and methodological angles. We deliberately aim to merge theory and will abundantly illustrate this with – often, but not always, our own – empirical material. This volume aspires to facilitate cross-fertilization and more comprehensive analyses of protest participation. We believe the time is ripe for such an intensified interdisciplinary exchange which eventually should lead to a more integrated approach to

the social psychology of protest. This chapter provides an overview of this volume, but first we will devote some words to the activity of interest: political protest.

1.1 What Is Political Protest?

Political protest is the expression of objection to a certain policy, political issue, or state of affairs. Protesters take part in protest events that are staged by citizens acting in concert to influence politics, to promote or prevent change. In other words, protest is a form of collective political action. In the words of Wright and colleagues (1990b, p. 995) an individual takes part in collective action "any time that [s/he] is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group." Obviously, this is not limited to the most prototypical of all protests, namely street demonstrations, but also includes strikes, political consumerism, signing petitions, and more radical forms of protest, such as riots and political violence. This definition implies that the act of an IS suicide terrorist can be characterized as a political protest. As can making a deliberate, well-considered choice to buy a bar of fairtrade chocolate, or signing an online petition while sitting at your kitchen table (Van Deth, 2014). Although some activities are undertaken *alone*, they still constitute collective behavior – after all people undertake them as part of a group.

Furthermore, political protest is *political* behavior. Brady defines political participation as "action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes" (Brady, cited in Teorell et al., 2007, p. 336). Such action can take place in the context of movement or party politics (Klandermans, 2015a). Social movements and political parties are the two prominent entities practicing politics in democratic systems. Movement politics centers on activities such as signing petitions, mass demonstrations, occupations of public sites, boycotts, donating money to a movement organization, strikes, violence against property and people, to mention the most common examples. Party politics involves activities such as voting, contacting politicians, campaigning, donating money to a political party, party membership, or running for office. Recently, virtual forms of action were added to the repertoire.

Van Deth (2014) designs a conceptual map of political participation. He observes that political participation is like an expanding universe. Ever more activities are incorporated as political participation, including activities that are in principle not political, but are transposed into a political act, because they are politically motivated (such as boycotts, buycotts, or

communal gardening). In guiding us through the conceptual forest of political behavior, Van Deth assigns different conceptualizations in use by scholars and citizens alike. Movement and party politics are described as noninstitutional and institutional or unconventional and conventional forms of political participation, respectively. In this book, *Individuals in Action*, we will mainly focus on what Van Deth labels noninstitutional political participation, contentious politics, etc. Some forms may not directly be observed as protest, take for instance civic engagement and community participation, as they may have the form of volunteering, but may be addressed to power holders as well, and can then be seen as forms of protest. We will include those in our discussion too.

We hasten to say that this does not imply that social psychology does not contribute to understanding why people take action in institutionalized political participation. To the contrary, a quick glance through the journal *Political Psychology* shows that social psychological approaches are used for voting *remain* or *leave* in the Brexit-referendum (Macdougall et al., 2020), or demand-side populism and political polarization (Erisen et al., 2021), and, yet another example, how political leadership communicates populist boundaries via Twitter and the effects on party preferences (Hameleers, 2021). To put it even stronger, social psychological theories developed to predict protest behavior, inspired work on institutionalized political participation. For example, politicized identity to predict voting (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2015), or so-called protest votes (Otjes et al., 2020), or, as the authors themselves say, the curious case of anger in explaining voting intentions (Van Zomeren, Saguy, et al., 2018). All-in-all, this shows that social psychological approaches are employed for noninstitutionalized and institutionalized political participation, but the focus of this book will be on political protest, and thus noninstitutionalized political actions.

Political protest, as the expression of objection to a certain policy, political issue, or state of affairs, thus starts with grievances (Klandermans, 1997). In fact, in reaction to felt grievances, people might exhibit a variety of specific behaviors depending on how they perceive their situation. Wright and colleagues (1990a) proposed a simple taxonomy based on three T-junctions people might encounter while contemplating how to react (see Figure 1.1): the first is that between inaction and action; inaction, as a matter of fact, appears the most frequently chosen option. Interestingly, the focus in most literature almost always is the participant rather than the nonparticipant. Trying to understand why people take part in collective action is the aim, rather than why they fail to do so. This



Figure 1.1 Responses to grievances

suggests that nonparticipation is simply considered the other side of participation. We maintain that, in reality, it is more complex than that and we will, therefore, provide a theoretical and empirical overview to nonparticipation in Chapter 4. The second junction is that between actions directed at improving one's personal conditions, for instance, moving to another job (individual action), and actions directed at improving the conditions of one's group (collective action). The third distinction is between noncontentious collective action, like petitioning and taking part in a peaceful demonstration, and contentious collective action, like a site occupation or civil disobedience. These distinctions are important because we may assume that the motivational dynamics underlying the different responses are different. Indeed, someone who is prepared to sign a petition might very well be unwilling to take part in a demonstration or inclined to use violence to reach his group's goals.

Engaging in social movements most of the time implies taking part in some form of collective action, and this collective action can take many different forms. Klandermans (1997) distinguished these forms of participation in terms of *duration* – ad hoc versus sustained – and *effort* – weak versus strong (see Figure 1.2). Ever since collective action has been studied this distinction has been employed. For instance (Marsh, 1977), Barnes and Kaase (1979), Klandermans (1997), and Dalton (1999) all made rankings of activities that entailed more or less costs and risks or more or less effort and resources. Some forms of participation are limited in time or of a once-only kind and involve little effort or risk – giving money, signing a petition, or taking part in a peaceful demonstration. Examples in the literature are the demonstration and petition against cruise missiles in the



Figure 1.2 Forms of participation (*Source*: Klandermans, 1997)

Netherlands (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994). Other forms of participation are also short-lived but involve considerable effort or risk – a sit-in, a site occupation, or a strike. Participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer (McAdam, 1988) and participation in the Sanctuary movement (Nepstad & Smith, 1999) are cases in point. Participation can also be indefinite but little demanding – paying a membership fee to an organization or being on call for two nights a month. See, for an interesting comparative study, Pichardo et al. (1998), who studied a variety of such forms of participation in the environmental movement. Finally, there are forms of participation that are both enduring and taxing like being a member on a committee or a volunteer in a movement organization. Examples are the members of neighborhood committees (Oliver, 1984) and the members of underground organizations.

From a social psychological viewpoint, taxonomies of participation are relevant because one may expect different forms of participation to involve different motivational dynamics. Let us give two illustrative examples. Long-term, taxing forms of participation are typically of the kind that you need a few people for it who are willing to do the job. Once you have mobilized those few you do not really need more participants. In fact, more participants might even create coordination problems. This is typically the situation where people can and do take a free ride (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). Oliver (1984) shows that the few who do participate in these activities are usually fully aware of the fact that they are giving a free ride to most sympathizers, but it doesn't bother them. In fact, this is part

of their motivation: 'if I do not do it nobody else will do it', they reason (Oliver, 1984). Compare this to a strike. For a strike you need some minimal number of participants. If this threshold is not passed, all effort is in vain. In terms of the motivation of participants, the problem to be solved is to make people believe that the threshold will be reached. This is walking a thin line. If someone expects that few will participate, his or her motivation to take part will be low. If someone feels that many people participate, s/he may conclude that he can afford to take a free ride.

Knowing that you are giving many others a free ride or knowing that a threshold must be reached are two completely different cognitions. The two examples illustrate that different forms of participation imply different motivational dynamics. Even more obvious is the impact of costs on the choice of type of activity. Higher costs will reduce participation. Discussions of political protest must thus take into account the kind of activity we are talking about. This became obvious in a study of the protests against the cruise missiles in the Netherlands, in which Klandermans and Oegema (1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994) compared taking part in a street demonstration in 1983 and signing a petition in 1985. Although the proportion of sympathizers with the protest goals were more or less the same during the two campaigns, the participation figures were very different: 56 percent of our respondents intended to sign the petition and 48 percent did indeed sign, whereas 10 percent intended to take part in the demonstration and 4 percent eventually took part. Not only was the proportion of people prepared to sign a petition much higher than the proportion of people who were ready to take part in a demonstration, the vast majority of those prepared to sign ended up signing, while more than half of those who intended to take part in the demonstration eventually did not take part (6 percent). Indeed, the much more moderate, low-cost activity of signing a petition generates much less defectors than the less moderate more costly activity of participating in a demonstration. In one of the rare comparative studies of types of movement participation, Passy (2001) found indeed that the motivational dynamics of various forms of participation were different (see also Saunders, 2014; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2016). Moreover, the internet and social media have changed the collective action repertoire even further, for example, think of post-it activism and clicktivism. The underlying motivational dynamics of these digital repertoires of activism are hotly debated in the literature (e.g., Enjolras et al., 2014; Hirzalla et al., 2010; Valenzuela, 2013).

1.2 About This Volume: Individuals in Action. A Social Psychology of Protest

The central question underlying this volume is: *why do some people protest, while others don't?* We aim to merge theory and evidence on protest politics whereby individuals always figure center stage – what are their fears, hopes, and concerns? What groups do they identify with? Are they cynical about politics or do they trust their authorities? What are the choices they make, the motives they have, and the emotions they experience? Why do they decide to stay or, for that matter, radicalize or leave the movement?

In doing so, the book takes a social psychological approach to contention. It focuses on subjective variables and takes the individual as its unit of analysis. As such, it distinguishes itself from sociological and political scientific work on contention. Sociologists and political scientists typically analyze the meso- and macro level and employ structural approaches. The social psychological approach takes the micro level as a point of departure and concentrates on questions of how individuals perceive and interpret these conditions and focuses on the role of cognitive, affective, and ideational roots of contention. Yet, the decision to protest is not taken in a social vacuum. To the contrary, we firmly believe that the political power play is – by definition – fought out in the sociopolitical intergroup context, and thus that *contestation is contextualized*. This brings us to the social psychology of protest, and the focal point of this book. The first three chapters of this book are devoted to what we mean by a social psychology of protest. It will describe its epistemology, history and methods.

The second part of the book, Chapters 4–7, deals with contextualized contestation. Many studies have drawn attention to rising levels of political protest. People protest government's economic and/or political policies, corruption, stolen votes, anti-war, pro-environment, etcetera. Indeed, grievances abound, but the translation from individual grievances into collective protest isn't always easy. Klandermans (2004) decomposes the dynamics of contextualized collective action into demand, supply, and mobilization. Protest is born out of dissatisfaction, but it also needs organizers to express this dissatisfaction, and mobilization to bring this demand and supply together. This "market metaphor" functions as the roadmap of the second part of the book.

The third part of the book, Chapters 8 and 9, is devoted to the processes underlying the formation of a mobilization potential. The perspective presented in this section holds that instances of collective action are not

independent. Indeed, a fundamental fact about collective action is its cyclicity (Koopmans, 2004). Most research on protest concerns a comparison of participants and nonparticipants in a specific instance of mobilization or participation at a specific point in time – be it a demonstration, a boycott, a sit-in, a rally, a petition, or else. It raises the question of what processes underlie the formation of a mobilization potential? In the final part we will first devote attention to sustained participation and disengagement, and focus on the question "*should I stay, or should I go?*" Moreover, as protest cycles "mobilize the organized, but also organize the demobilized" (Tarrow, 1989, p. 47), we will devote our last chapter to politicization, polarization, and radicalization, all processes steering mobilization.

All in all, the book provides three unique lenses to social movement literature, namely (1) *The individual as unit of analysis*, (2) *Contextualization of contestation*, and (3) *The individual aftermath of contention*. Next, we will elaborate each of them.

1.3 The Individual as Unit of Analysis

Protests are collective actions in which citizens are mobilized to challenge powerholders, authorities, or the whole society to redress social problems or grievances and restore critical social values. Of course, in democratic societies citizens can influence politics through elections. But what about the period between elections? What are citizens to do if they want to influence politics during those years? Moreover, political decision-makers are not the only addressees, indeed, not all protests are anti-government, but also against firms, organizations, society at large, etcetera. A brief look at the political past and present suffices to conclude that, in all democracies, citizens engage in all kinds of noninstitutional action with the objective to influence politics or to express their views – some contentious, others expressive; some individual, other collective; some political, others apolitical. In fact, protest is one of our most important democratic rights. And these actions have achieved many results. But the road to success for social movements is complex, sometimes risky, and usually lasts many years. Indeed, protesting – especially sustained protest – isn't easy. Why, then, are people prepared to sacrifice wealth, a pleasant and carefree life, or sometimes even their lives for a common cause? This question brings us to the social psychology of protest, and the focal point of this book.

The book opens with the epistemology, history, and methods of the social psychology of protest. In doing so, it will delineate the reasons and consequences of taking the individual as a unit of analysis. This

methodological point of departure reflects the attention given to the social construction of reality as a filter between contextual conditions and individual actions. Such an approach highlights the fact that all social phenomena – social structures and social causal properties – depend ultimately on facts about individuals and their social relationships. An assertion of a structure or process at the macrosocial level must be supplemented by account of how it is that ordinary citizens, situated in specified circumstances, come to act in ways that produce, reproduce, or take action against the societal structures or institutions. As social psychology explores the causes of the thoughts, feelings, and actions of people – and primarily how these are influenced by sociopolitical context – it is well-versed to do so. People – social psychologists never tire of asserting us – live in a perceived world. They respond to the world as they perceive and interpret it and if we want to understand their cognitions, motivations, and emotions we need to know their perceived and interpreted reality. A social psychological approach highlights the point that all social facts – social structures and social causal properties – depend ultimately on individual or shared perceptions of the surrounding reality. So, in order to make assertions about the causal properties of governments or civil societies, for example, how political opportunity structures affect levels of protest, we need to arrive at an analysis of the social construction of reality as a filter between sociopolitical conditions and individual action patterns.

Key to our methodological starting-point is that social outcomes need to be explained in terms of individual cognitions, emotions, and behavior; their (in)formal and virtual relationships; and their actions. However, it is important to recognize that the basic building blocks of social explanations are not mutually independent actions performed by atomistic individuals. Rather, individuals' actions are typically oriented toward others, and their relations to others therefore are central when it comes to protest. So, our account also identifies the social environments through which action is structured, planned, and projected: the social (and virtual) circles, its incentive systems, the organizations people are embedded in, and the systems of rules and laws (e.g., is demonstrating illegal or legal?).

We firmly believe that context plays a major role, be it the sociopolitical context, or embeddedness in (in)formal and nowadays virtual networks. Social embeddedness – the quantity and types of relationships with others – is the linking pin between individual and society. It can be formal relationships as in party membership or being a member of the labor union, informal relationships, such as friends, family colleagues, and virtual relationships such as active participation in blogs, social

media, etc. (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013). Indeed, the internet has created an additional public sphere; people are nowadays embedded in virtual networks as well in addition to formal and informal physical networks. These networks are where people talk politics and, thus, where the factuality of the sociopolitical world is constructed, and people are mobilized for protest.

1.4 Contextualization of Contestation

The second part of the book deals with contextualized contestation. Many studies have drawn attention to rising levels of political protest. All over the world people protest government's economic and/or political policies, corruption, stolen votes, anti-war, pro-environment, etcetera. Indeed, grievances abound, but the translation from individual grievances into collective protest isn't always easy. In fact, the central issue of organizers in their struggle between the movement and the powerholders is to win the hearts (sympathies), minds (public opinion), and active support of the people. Translated to the world of protest, this refers to "supply" and "demand" of protest. Protest is born out of dissatisfaction, but it also needs organizers to express this dissatisfaction. We understand protest as arising from an interaction between individual and collective actors such as parties, interest groups, and movement organizations. The more individuals are embedded in such organizations and networks, the more they get involved in their interactions. This approach departs from the notion that the answer to questions such as who protests, why people protest (i.e., issues), and the forms of contention (e.g., demonstrations, strikes, sit ins etcetera) lies in the interaction of individual and contextual characteristics. Klandermans (2004) decomposes this contextualized collective action into the dynamics of demand, supply, and mobilization.

This "market metaphor" – visualized in Figure 1.3 – has our special attention as it functions as the roadmap for the second part of the book. *Demand* refers to the mobilization potential in a society for protest; it relates to the interest in a society in what a movement stands for. Is the movement addressing a problem people care for? Is there a need for a movement on these issues? What personal grievances politicize and translate into political claims, and how? *Supply*, on the other hand, refers to the opportunities staged by organizers to protest. It relates to the multiorganization fields, defined as "the total possible number of organizations with which the focal organization might establish specific linkages" (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973, p. 53) and the characteristics of the movement.



Figure 1.3 Market metaphor of protest: Dynamics of demand, supply, and mobilization

What organizational forms are used? What is the movement's strength? Is it a movement people can identify with? Does it stage activities that are appealing to people? Demand and supply do not automatically come together. *Mobilization* is the process that links demand and supply. It can be seen as the marketing mechanism of the movement domain. Mobilization campaigns attempt to bring demand and supply together. The mobilizing structure organizers assemble is the connecting tissue between the supply-side of organizers and their appeals and the demand-side of participants and their motives. This makes it highly dynamic: a fit – or misfit – between motives and appeals makes for successful or failed mobilization and as such effects movement outcomes and effects.

1.5 The Individual Aftermath of Contention

Drury and Reicher (2009) suggest that protest participation generates a "positive social-psychological transformation." They argue that participation strengthens identification and induces collective empowerment (see also Klandermans, 2002). The emergence of an inclusive self-categorization as "oppositional" leads to feelings of unity and expectations of support. This *empowers* people to oppose authorities. Such action

creates *collective self-objectification*, that is, through collective action, categories become salient, it defines the participant's identity opposite the dominant outgroup (Drury & Reicher, 2009). As such, taking it onto the streets strengthens empowerment and politicization, paving the way to sustained participation. Sustained participation need not necessarily take the form of the same activity all the time. People often go from one activity to another, sometimes from one movement to another, and in so doing build activist careers.

The perspective presented in this section holds that instances of collective action are not independent. The most fundamental fact about collective action is its cyclicity (Koopmans, 2004). Protest cycles "mobilize the organized, but also organize the demobilized" (Tarrow, 1989, p. 47). Tarrow maintains that "although protest waves do not have a regular frequency or extend uniformly to entire populations, a number of features have characterized such waves in recent history" (Tarrow, 1993, p. 284). These "features of cyclicity" include "heightened conflict, broad sectoral and geographic extension, the appearance of new social movement organizations and the empowerment of old ones, the creation of new 'master frames' of meaning, and the invention of new forms of collective action." Hence, at the start of new protest cycles new movements appear on the stage, and old organizations revitalize. This renewed activity at the supply side of protest mobilizes the organized, but also organize the demobilized. As such – and important in the context of social psychological consequences of protest – new protest cycles not only affect the supply side of politics, but also the demand side of politics. And so, the ebb and flow of protest cycles know their own social psychological processes.

Just recently social psychologists picked up this fluidity dimension of collective action. They refer to it as the *volatility* of collective action, characterized by swift, unexpected changes in intensity, target, and forms (Louis et al., 2020). In this inspiring overview article, Louis and colleagues provide a detailed social psychological exploration of four reasons of this volatility. First, action is about identities which are fluid, contested, and multifaceted. As the content of groups' identities change, so do the specific norms for the identities. Second, social movements adopt new tactics or forms of collective action. Tactical changes may arise from changes in identity, but also changes in the target or opponent groups, and changes in the relationships with targets and with other actors. Factions or wings of a group in conflict may in turn form identities based on opposition or support for differing tactics. Third, social movements change because participant motivation ebbs, surges, and changes in quality (e.g., becoming

more subjectively autonomous, or self-determined). Finally, political social change occurs within sociopolitical structures; these structures implicate higher level norms, which both constrain and emerge from actions (e.g., state openness or repression). Their analysis presents idealized and descriptive models of these relationships, and a new model to examine tactical changes empirically, the DIME model (Louis et al., 2020). This DIME model highlights that collective actors can **D**isidentify after failure (giving up and walking away); they can **I**nnovate or try something new; and they can commit harder, convinced that they are right, with increased moral urgency (**M**oralization) and redoubled efforts (**E**nergization). The take home message of their overview paper is that collective action is volatile, and that social psychology has a lot to offer to understand this volatility.

Moreover, in *declining* movements with many "exiters" sustained participation can take the form of radicalization (Della Porta & Tarrow, 1986). Take for instance the violent Black Panthers, who played a short but important part in the civil rights movement. They believed that the nonviolent campaign of Martin Luther King had failed and that any promised changes to their lifestyle via the "traditional" civil rights movement would take too long to be implemented or simply not introduced. Hence, considering the declining civil right movement, both disengagement *and* radical sustained participation were observed. People's motivations, identities, and emotions change over time, and social psychologists' tool- and theory box can be helpful to understand how this effects their activism over time. The final part of this volume is devoted to this cyclicity or, as described by Louis and colleagues, volatility of collective action. We will discuss how such matters as empowerment, disengagement, and increased politicization, polarization, and radicalization prevent or promote sustained participation.

1.6 To Conclude

In the first chapter of this book, we meant to introduce the reader to the fascinating world of political protest. Or to be more precise to the social psychological reflection thereof. Additionally, we introduced the three lenses of the book, namely (1) The individual as unit of analysis, (2) Contextualization of contestation, and (3) The individual aftermath of contention.

In focusing on the individual as a unit of analysis, we differentiate protest participation from other forms of political participation. Our

emphasis in this book will be on protest politics. Protest as a mean of communication. Citizens gather to address authorities and communicate their indignation. These protests can take numerous forms and organizers make strategic decisions about which action form to choose. Citizens are more likely to mobilize for one action than the other. What factors influence their choices? Who are these citizens that occupy the streets and squares, or for that matter sign an online petition, and what motivates them to do? Research of political participation tends to neglect that even in identical circumstances individuals diverge in the ways they act politically. Important, this is not to say that party politics are absent. After all, citizens can and do take either route to influence depending on how they see that fit to their objectives. Indeed, the two forms of politics influence each other. Movements react to party politics, while parties react to movement politics. Not only do parties and movements react to each other, citizens also differ in this respect, some disenchanted citizens have turned their back on institutionalized politics, and try to influence authorities via the noninstitutionalized route, whereas others strategically opt for the one or the other arena, for them movement politics are politics with other means (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018). Such are the questions we are going to answer in Chapters 2 and 3.

With the next lens, Contextualization of contestation, we aim to merge disciplinary approaches to social movement research. Research into social movements and protests treats demand and supply for protest and mobilization as its connecting tissue as if they were separate worlds. It is precisely the relationship between dissatisfaction and organizers issuing calls to action that we focus on. Social movement studies tend to concentrate on mobilization and neglect the development of demand and supply factors. Yet, neither can be taken for granted. Indeed, grievances abound, but we must still explain how grievances develop and transform into a demand for protest. Similarly, the presence of organizations staging protest does not relieve us from the obligation to account for their formation and for how they stage opportunities to participate in them. However, the process by which societies generate demand for participation and the transformation of willingness into participation by supply factors is a thorny but underexposed issue in the literature (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Jasper, 2004; Klandermans, 2004). In Chapters 4–7 we will delve deeper into these contextual dynamics of protest participation.

Finally, we pay attention to the individual aftermath of contention. While the main section of the book will focus on social psychological antecedents of protest, a much smaller – but relatively new and

innovative – section deals with the social psychological consequences of protest. We argue that cyclicity, and thus sustained participation, is nearly absent in the social movement literature (but see Santos Nascimento, 2017). Surprisingly, because long-term participants keep the movement going, in Chapters 8 and 9, we will discuss how such matters as disengagement, empowerment, and increased politicization, polarization, and radicalization prevent or promote sustained participation.

CHAPTER 2

The Legacy of the Past

Social psychology has evolved through two branches, one in psychology and the other in sociology, with the larger of the two being the psychological branch (Farr, 1996). The two branches clearly differ in terms of the level of analysis, basic assumptions, method, and areas of research in studying collective action (Oishi et al., 2009). The roots of the *sociological* branch are European, contextual, comparative, and nonpositivistic. The roots of the *psychological* branch find their origin in the United States, where the behavioral and experimental approach became dominant (Schruijer, 2012). The social psychology of protest has been approached from both branches. They developed almost independently. While, for instance, the psychological branch was practically nonexistent in the 1950s, the sociological branch was booming (Schruijer, 2012).

This disciplinary watershed is of course not without consequences for methodological approaches. Sociological social psychologists use shared social knowledge from a macro- or meso-level culture to explain relatively enduring patterns of symbolic social interaction. They typically – though not always – investigate these matters with qualitative methods, such as discourse analysis, event analysis, interviewing, participant observation, case study, and network analysis. Psychological social psychologists, on the other hand, typically deal with the factors that lead us to behave in each way in the (imagined) presence of others and look at the conditions under which certain behavior/actions and feelings occur. In general, they prefer laboratory-based, empirical findings. However, social psychologists have come out of their laboratories and more and more protest is studied in the field, where the action takes place. Moreover, next to the quantitative methods, social psychologists employ more and more mixed methods, including qualitative methods. Each method has its own strengths, weaknesses, and challenges.

In this chapter we will first provide a historical overview of the developments of the two branches. For ease of reading, we will use the terms *sociological branch* and *psychological branch* to refer to, respectively, the sociological social psychology of protest and the social psychological social psychology of protest. To substantiate our claims, we provide meta-analytical evidence (both in terms of the changing independent variables over the years as well as the changing methods). Thereafter we will give a short overview of the most employed methods. We will discuss studies conducted with the method, present illustrative findings from such studies, and indicate the strengths, weaknesses, and challenges of the method. This should give us a good impression of the roots of the *what* (i.e., antecedents of collective action) and the *how* (i.e., the methods employed) of the social psychology of protest.

2.1 The Sociological Branch: From Collective Behavior to Collective Action

Although collective action and collective behavior are now understood as synonyms, the terms *collective behavior* and *collective action* were associated with different theoretical traditions and sometimes understood as referring to different empirical phenomena, especially from 1939 to the early 1970s (Oliver, 2013). *Collective behavior* was associated with theories that stressed the emergence of behavior in spontaneous crowds, especially violent crowds, and was studied as a topic within the sociological branch of social psychology. The term "collective behavior" came to be defined as referring to the kind of behavior that happens in crowds or other spontaneous face-to-face gatherings which, in turn, was defined as being nonroutine, nonnormative, and emergent. *Collective action*, on the other hand, was associated with theories emphasizing purposive or goal-oriented behavior in protests and social movements and was used in economics, political science, and political sociology. It referred to specific actions like strikes or protests, to labor unions generally, and to the general matter of social versus individual solutions to social problems. Especially after the 1965 publication of Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action*, which had a major impact on the thinking of political scientists and political sociologists, the term "collective action" often came to be understood as referring specifically to actions that led to the provision of public or collective goods, that is, goods that are inherently shared and cannot be restricted to only those who paid for them (Oliver, 2013).

2.2 Collective Behavior Approaches: Strain and Breakdown Theories

Gustave le Bon (1896/2002) and Gabriel Tarde (1898/1969) can be seen as the founding fathers of collective behavior studies, and their ideas are reflected in several subsequent theories. Crowds were thought to create intense and volatile emotions that drove collective behavior. They did not conceive of contentious politics in a very positive manner, perceiving crowds as primitive and irrational. They believed that individual members of a crowd submerge in the masses; they assume a sense of anonymity and lose their sense of responsibility. Today we feel that they exaggerated the violent and irrational character of crowds. In the early twentieth century, Robert Park imported these European ideas into US sociology and laid the foundation for the collective behavior tradition (Oliver, 2013). Collective behavior approaches directly linked social breakdown to collective behavior which explains why they are referred to as strain or breakdown theories. They essentially viewed discontent as the origin of protest and depicted protesters as "people who do not accept the normal political techniques of a society [and therefore] must be dangerous and irrational" (Rogin, 1967, pp. 272–273). They shared a core assumption that the object of study was behavior that was spontaneous, emergent, disconnected from "ordinary" routines and life, more characterized by emotion or simplistic thinking than by reasoned discussion. The various theorists of collective behavior agree upon a causal sequence moving from some form of structural strain (be it industrialization, urbanization, unemployment) that produces subjective tension and therefore the psychological disposition to engage in extreme behaviors such as panics and mobs to escape from these tensions (McAdam, 1982). Although they agreed upon this basic causal sequence, they differed in their conceptualization. Blumer (1951) and Turner and Killian (1987), associated with symbolic interactionism, describe social movements as phenomena emerging through interaction among dissatisfied people. Smelser (1963), on the other hand, is associated with structural functionalism, an approach that defines social movements as a process to restore equilibrium in a society. Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970), finally, brought the concept of relative deprivation to the field. To appreciate the similarities and differences underlying these various approaches, we will briefly review these approaches from a general sociological point of departure, followed by examples of collective behavior theorists who studied their topic through the lens of these approaches.

2.2.1 *Symbolic Interactionism: Interacting Disgruntled People*

The sociologists who developed the symbolic interaction perspective include Goffman, Hochschild, and Blumer. Its concern tends to be the interactions in daily life and experiences, rather than the structures associated with large-scale and relatively fixed social forces and laws. Hence, symbolic interactionism is closely tied to social practice and the study of how people interact with each other. Park, an early social interactionist, aimed to "study the structure of the social world by using the 'moving camera' of the naturalistic approach to catch life as it was happening" (cited by Wallace & Wolf, 1999, p. 195). This perspective addresses issues of socialization, interpretations of meaning and symbols, social action and interaction, and emotions. As such, it positions itself opposite macro-theoretical approaches that attempted to explain social relationships by concentrating on systems and society as a whole (e.g., Parsons, Habermas). While these macro-theoretical approaches include some discussion of individual action (Parsons) and social interaction among individuals in small groups (Habermas), they primarily focus on the structures and institutions in society as a whole and on historical change and development.

These macro approaches recognize that social relationships, institutions, structures, and society are a result of individual social action and interaction, but they concentrate their analyses primarily on the patterns and structures that emerge from these actions and interactions. Social interactionism is primarily concerned "with the joint acts through which lives are organized and societies assembled" (Plummer, 2000, p. 195), rather than focusing merely on the individual and his or her choices and actions. That is, social action is more than summing up individual decision-making and action, as may be the case in rational choice models. Rather, from the interactionist perspective, actions are always joint, with the mutual response and adjustment of the actor and others as a necessary aspect to consider. A final point of departure of social interactionists is that people interpret or "define" each other's actions instead of merely reacting to these actions. Hence, "response" is not a simple action–reaction chain but instead is based on *meaning* attached to such actions, meaning created in social interaction. This echoes the famous Thomas Theorem: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572).

Blumer and Turner and Killian examined collective behavior through a social interactionist lens. For Blumer (1951), collective behavior is largely

spontaneous, unregulated, and unstructured. It is triggered by some disruption in standard routines of everyday life that promotes contagion, randomness, excitability, and suggestibility. It is this social unrest that facilitates collective behavior in the form of crowds, masses, publics, and social movements. With an emphasis on terms emerging in social interaction, Blumer clearly takes an interactionist perspective to collective action. To Blumer, motivating forces for collective action are, next to dissatisfaction and subsequent agitation, "wishes" and "hope" for a new scheme or system of living. Thereby he dissociates himself from the notion that contentious politics are irrational acts rooted solely in agitation and frustration. Implicitly – in emotional terms – he depicts a rational, efficacious side to contentious politics. This perceived political opportunity of being able to make a difference was later described as "cognitive liberation" (McAdam, 1982) and "political efficacy" (e.g., Bandura, 1997).

Turner and Killian's (1987) emergent norm theory also roots in the social interactionist tradition. Emergent norm theory suggests that crowds come together because a crisis occurs that forces people to abandon prior conceptions of appropriate behavior and find new ways of acting (see Lemonik & Mikaila, 2013 for an encyclopedia entry on emergent norm theory). When a crowd forms, there is no particular norm governing crowd behavior, and no leader exists. But the crowd focuses on those who act in a distinctive manner, and this distinction is taken on as the new norm for crowd behavior (Turner & Killian, 1987). As this new norm begins to be institutionalized within the crowd, pressures for conformity and against deviance within the crowd develop and discontent is silenced. This silencing of alternative views contributes to the illusion of unanimity within the crowd. The norms that develop within crowds are like schemas for behavior that set limits on what is appropriate (Turner & Killian, 1987, pp. 9–11). These norms develop through either emergent or pre-existing social relationships. In fact, anything which facilitates communication among crowd participants facilitates the emergence of norms, a process Turner and Killian call "milling." The elements of contagion, excitability, spontaneity, and emotionality sharply set their approach in the social interactionist tradition.

2.2.2 *Structural Functionalism: Conflict Shapes Stability*

Structural functionalism, or simply functionalism, sees society as a complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability. Sociologists who developed structural functionalism include Spencer,

Durkheim, and Parsons. Functionalism addresses society in terms of the *function* of its constituent elements; namely norms, customs, traditions, and institutions. It looks at society through a macro-level orientation, which is a broad focus on the social *structures* that shape society. A common analogy, popularized by Spencer, presents these parts of society as "organs" that work toward the proper functioning of the "body" as a whole. In the most basic terms, it simply emphasizes "the effort to impute, as rigorously as possible, to each feature, custom, or practice, its effect on the functioning of a supposedly stable, cohesive system" (Structural functionalism, Wikipedia). An important critique directed at functionalism, particularly in the context of protest, is the fact that structural functionalism, premised on value consensus, solidarity, and the internalization of norms, could not account for social change or conflict. A further critique directed at functionalism is that it contains no sense of agency, that is, individuals are seen as puppets, acting as their role requires (Wikipedia). Hence, although Parsons took as his starting point individuals and their actions, his theory did not articulate how these actors exercise their agency in opposition to the socialization and inculcation of accepted norms. Merton (1938), an early structural functionalist emphasizing social structure and anomie, addressed this limitation through his concept of deviance. Yet, although functionalism allows for agency, it cannot explain why individuals choose to accept or reject accepted norms, and why and in what circumstances they choose to exercise their agency.

Kornhauser and Smelser investigated collective behavior through a structural functionalist lens. Both hold that political protest has its inception in strain and societal transition, as a result of industrialization, urbanization, unemployment, and so on, and derives its motivational power from dissatisfaction with the current form of life. Kornhauser applied mass society theory to the phenomenon of collective behavior. *The Politics of Mass Society* (Kornhauser, 1959) remains one of the most explicit statements of the alleged links between mass society and social movements. Mass society theory is a complex, multifaceted perspective. For this perspective, modernity promotes massive social structures and erodes intermediate groups that provide social anchors for individuals (see Buechler, 2013a for an encyclopedia entry on Mass Society Theory). Without such groups, isolation, depersonalization, and alienation prevail. As such, it revives Durkheim's concerns with anomie and egoism. As applied to social movements, the basic idea is that people who are socially isolated are especially vulnerable to the appeals of extremist movements. Kornhauser popularized the notion that people are vulnerable to the

appeals of dictatorship because of a lack of restraining social networks. He argued that Nazism erupted in Germany because Hitler had been able to appeal directly to the people due to alienation and anomie. In his own words:

> Mass movements mobilize people who are alienated from the going system, who do not believe in the legitimacy of the established order, and who therefore are ready to engage in efforts to destroy it. The greatest number of people available to mass movements will be found in those sections of society that have the fewest ties to the social order. (Kornhauser, 1959, p. 212)

This eludes to Putnam's (1993) more recent discussions of the alleged decline of social capital, but stands in sharp contrast to social movement studies that consistently show that it is people who are firmly embedded, rather than alienated, who are politically active. Indeed, "very little participation [is found] in either ordinary political activity or revolutionary outbursts by misfits, outcasts, nomads, the truly marginal, the desperate poor" (Tilly, 1986). Despite its largely discredited status among academics, "literary and journalistic proponents of this perspective enjoy a much wider and perhaps more credulous audience. As a result, mass society theory proves well-nigh indestructible despite its logical flaws and empirical shortcomings" (Buechler, 2013a).

Smelser's (1963) value-added theory (also known as social strain theory) provided a structural–functional analysis of collective behavior. It is based on the assumption that certain conditions are needed for the development of a social movement (Kendall, 2007). The concept of "value-added" was used earlier in economics, where it refers to the increasing value of product in progressing stages of production. Smelser saw social movements as side-effects of rapid social change (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Episodes of collective action, he argues, often constitute an early stage of social change, occurring when conditions of social change have arisen but before social resources have been mobilized to rebalance the sources of strain and bring back solidarity and stability. Social movements were in his view, therefore, "the action of the impatient." Smelser argued that six factors were necessary and sufficient for collective behavior to emerge and that social movements evolve through those relevant stages: structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized belief of a solution, precipating factors, mobilization, and lack of social control. Structural conduciveness is the first factor, meaning that the social structure permits some form of collective behavior to emerge; people must be aware of the problem and have the opportunity to act. Structural strain, the second

factor, refers to ambiguities, deprivations, conflicts, and discrepancies in the current social structure, such as inequality or injustice, and existing power holders who are unable (or unwilling) to address the problem. Hence, an inadequately functioning social structure generates widespread dissatisfaction. The third factor is generalized beliefs, the dissatisfaction should be clearly defined, agreed upon, and understood by participants in group action. The fourth factor constitutes precipitating events – events that become the proverbial spark, igniting the flame, and provide an immediate catalyst. Mobilization for action, the fifth factor, is the culmination of these background processes; people need to be embedded in networks and organizations allowing them to undertake collective action. The final and sixth factor is effective social controls that are in place – that is, how authorities react (or don't) – hence, the breakdown of such controls is a final determinant of political protest. With these six factors, Smelser thus weaves strain and breakdown into a macro structural theory of collective behavior.

2.2.3 Relative Deprivation

Another version of breakdown and strain theories involves relative deprivation (e.g. Gurr, 1970; Major, 1994; Martin, 1986; Runciman, 1966). Here, strain takes a social psychological form, as feelings of relative deprivation result from comparison of one's situation with a standard – which can be one's past, someone else's situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice (Runciman, 1966). If people assess their personal situation this is referred to as egoistic or individual deprivation; if they assess the situation of their group, it is called fraternalistic or group deprivation. It was assumed that fraternalistic relative deprivation is especially relevant in the context of movement participation (ibid). When changing social conditions cause people to experience "relative deprivation" the likelihood of protest and rebellion significantly increases (Gurr, 1970).

Consequently, relative deprivation has been an important concept for the sociological and psychological branch of protest. Through cognitive dissonance or frustration–aggression mechanisms, such psychological strain provokes collective behavior, be it via increased or decreased efficacy. Regarding increased efficacy, Opp and Hartmann (1989), for instance, suggested that committed activists revise their efficacy perceptions upward because of cognitive dissonance when they realize that others may abstain from collective action if they think their contributions will have little

impact. Frustration stemming from a lack of efficacy, on the other hand, may lead to aggression when the situation is seen as hopeless, this may invoke a *nothing-to-lose* strategy leading to violent protest (Kamans et al., 2011). The frustration–aggression mechanism may well be the psychological mechanism at work in Davies (1962) famous J-curve theory of political revolutions. He seeks to explain the rise of revolutionary movements in terms of rising individual expectations and falling levels of perceived well-being. Davies asserts that revolutions are a subjective response to a sudden reversal in fortunes after a long period of economic growth. According to Davies, revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of reversal (see also Chapter 3 on the Davies J-curve).

Although the theory of relative deprivation still holds some relevance, Walker and Smith (2002) conclude in their review of fifty years relative deprivation research that, by the 1980s, the construct relative deprivation fell into disfavor and disrepute, partly because of devastating reviews by McPhail (1971) and Gurney and Tierney (1982). Gurney and Tierney (1982) reached the conclusion in their review that "while the relative deprivation perspective was an advance over earlier approaches which viewed social movements as resulting from the expression of irrational impulses, the relative deprivation perspective itself was affected by too many serious conceptual, theoretical, and empirical weaknesses to be useful in accounting for the emergence and development of social movements" (p. 33). The 1990s, though, saw the rediscovery of relative deprivation and its integration into theories of collective behavior. The ways in which people interpret grievances – central to relative deprivation – are now recognized as essential to a full understanding of protest participation (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Klandermans, 1997; Simon et al., 1998; Tyler & Smith, 1998; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014). Moreover, facing an economic crisis in 2008, the likes of which had not been seen since the 1930s, revived an interest in sociological studies departing from relative deprivation again (e.g., Grover, 2011; Ragnarsdóttir et al., 2013)

In sum, heavily influenced by Le Bon and Tarde, these theories of collective behavior centered on the idea that individuals lose their sense of self and responsibility when they engage in collective behavior such as protest. Independent of whether they root in social interactionism, structural functionalism, or relative deprivation, all regard disruption of the social system as the trigger to collective behavior. Social interactionism is a micro-theoretical approach that deals with individuals and relations among individuals in small groups and in organizations, and focuses on

emergent norms, emergent meaning, and contagiousness. Structural functionalism, on the other hand, is a macro-theoretical approach which addresses the function of the constituting elements of society, norms, customs, traditions, and institutions with a broad focus on the social structures that shape society. It either describes why protests emerge as social structures erode (e.g., anomie and egoism in Kornheiser's theory) or when impatient people cannot await the rebalancing of society after initial social change (Smelser's value-added theory).

2.3 Collective Action Approaches: Resources and Opportunities

Collective behavior and collective action approaches came into conflict in the wake of the civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s. A new generation of scholars identified positively with the 1960s movements and saw them as fundamentally rational attempts to pursue clear-cut policy goals and objected to portrayals of protests and even riots as "irrational" collective behavior, arguing that protesters and rioters were no less rational than the people studying them. Moreover, in the 1960s, Western democracies were enjoying the high-water mark of the post-World War II economic growth and personal security. This contrasted with the poverty and suffering that much of the Western world saw in the 1930s and 1940s. Still, the late 1960s were marked by an enormous growth of social movement activity, where students, civil rights, peace, women, and environmental movements all flourished and protested the ruling elite and order. The collective behavior approaches developed in the 1950s were not able to account for this proliferation of social movement activity since they held that the main causal source of protest was *declining* as opposed to *growing* welfare. And finally, during this period important developments internal to the social sciences were also under way, with systematic attempts at tackling sociological problems in terms of the economic paradigm. Grappling with theoretical and empirical puzzles of a new kind, sociologists and political scientists were thus induced to take a fresh approach to social movements (Oliver, 2013).

Collective Action Theory: Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965) was a milestone. Olson conceived of people as rational decision-makers faced with a social dilemma: if the collective good is produced people will reap the benefits anyway, while the production of the collective good is not contingent on their own behavior but on the joint efforts of the collective. Collective action theory predicts that under those circumstances rational actors will choose to take a free ride, unless selective incentives (i.e., those

incentives that depend upon participation) motivate them to participate. As the decision to participate must be taken without knowing in advance the actual behavior of others, individuals must rely on expectations about that behavior (Klandermans, 1984). Yet, Oliver (2013) aptly remarks: "Actually, Olson's theoretical importance lies less in 'selective incentives' [. . .], than in his skill in throwing light on the social dilemma of movement participation itself: mobilization never is to be taken for granted." Thus, she continues "the true significance of Olson's book rested in its setting a theoretical puzzle to a new generation of scholars: how and when are social actors able to overcome the dilemma of movement participation? These attempts at solving the dilemma resulted in what is now known as 'resource mobilization' theory."

Resource Mobilization Theory: Resource mobilization scholars argued that grievances are ubiquitous, while protest is not. Consequently, in order to understand the ebb and flow of protests, they argue that the question to be answered is not so much why people are aggrieved but why aggrieved people mobilize and how they overcome the above formulated dilemma of movement participation. Oliver (2013) differentiates three distinctive ways of overcoming the dilemma of movement participation, all of which ascribe weight to "organization." The first one, which may be regarded as classic, has been elaborated by Oberschall in his book *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (1973). As Oberschall stresses in his "sociological theory of mobilization," collective protest is more likely to be present in a collectivity which has a strong organizational base (see also Fennema & Tillie, 2008; Klandermans et al., 2008), whether it is of a communal or of an associational kind (e.g. Van der Meer & Van Ingen, 2009; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2016; Wollebæk & Selle, 2002). A second way of getting over the dilemma was put forward by McCarthy and Zald (1977), who coined the label "resource mobilization." They assert that particular attention must be paid to outside support, funding, and leadership. Consequently, they dwell on the prominent part of "conscience constituents" and "adherents" on the one hand, and "political entrepreneurs" on the other. The third way of solving the dilemma perhaps is not so closely connected with resource mobilization theory; but more so to the political context in which the issue is fought out.

Political Opportunity Structure: Tilly (1978) puts as much emphasis as Oberschall or Zald and McCarthy on organization and interests, yet he also stresses the political context in which mobilizations take place. Tilly argues that changes in or differences by which political systems enable or constrain the collective expression of grievances in a given historical

context are the main explanation for the rise and decline of social movements (Tilly, 1986). The degree to which political opportunities – defined as "those dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1995, p. 85) – are open or vulnerable to political change varies across time and space. Opportunities emerge when the established order becomes vulnerable to the actions of contenders and when their costs of acting are reduced (Oliver, 2013). People need to know about such options for collective action and need to see it as an opportunity to acquire social change (Koopmans, 1999).

While both breakdown and political opportunities refer to external, variable processes that increase the likelihood of collective action, resource mobilization mainly focuses on internal social movement processes. As Buechler (2013b) aptly notes:

> The terms "strain" and "breakdown" inherently connote negative, problematic conditions to be prevented, avoided or repaired. They conveyed negative value judgments about the appropriateness of collective behavior. It was not just the notion of breakdown as a neutral causal mechanism that provoked the ire of resource mobilization and political process theorists; it was also the halo of negative value judgments surrounding the concept that drew their fire. The concept of opportunity was tailor-made for this debate. (p. 61)

On the one hand, the concept of "opportunities" provided the transvaluation sought by resource mobilization and political process proponents that allowed them to paint collective action in a positive light. Particularly in the US context, the concept of "opportunity" inherently signifies something to be sought, desired, seized, enjoyed, valued, and maximized. On the other hand, it preserved a way of talking about changes in structural conditions and cultural contexts that facilitate collective action.

2.4 The Psychological Branch: Motives and Emotions

In the 1970s, a burgeoning European social psychology got interested in large-scale group phenomena like intergroup conflict, spurred by theories on social identity like social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the social identity model of crowd behavior (Reicher, 1996a). Three decades later, followed by another surge of collective action, research spurred by group-based emotion theory (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; Smith & Kessler, 2004). Both identity and emotion perspectives brought the psychological branch back to prominence in the social psychology of

protest. It was argued that the by then dominant American social cognition paradigm was overly individualistic, reductionist, and asocial (e.g., Billig, 1976; Taylor & Brown, 1979; Turner & Oakes, 1986). This made it difficult to properly theorize about large-scale group phenomena like intergroup conflict, social protest, social change, and crowd events (Hogg & Williams, 2000). The emerging European social psychology – at the heart of which was social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) – wanted to reintroduce the collective self to the mainstream of social psychology by specifying individual cognitive processes and wider social (intergroup) processes and, most important, the way they inter-relate. This perspective helped to bring the psychological branch back to prominence in the social psychology of protest.

The dominance of the "cold" cognitive approach in the 1980s was followed by a "warm" affective turn. Concerns were raised about the relative lack of focus on emotions and motives in explaining social behavior (Franzoi, 2009). In the early 1990s, a number of social psychologists sought to establish a more balanced view by blending the traditional "hot" and "cold" perspectives into what some have termed the "Warm Look" (e.g., Evans, 2008; Franzoi, 2009). This Warm Look appears to be important in the context of protest. In fact, the cognitive component of injustice (as reflected in the observation that one receives less than the standard of comparison) has been found to have less influence on protest participation than the affective component (as expressed by such feelings as dissatisfaction, indignation, and discontent about these outcomes; Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

From the 1970s on, social psychologists have begun to investigate individual participation in episodes of collective action and political protest. Classical theories proposed that people participate in protest to express their grievances, stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind & Tyler, 1988). As we have seen in the legacy of the sociological branch, social movement scholars began to question the effects of grievances on movement participation and proposed that the question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest are aggrieved but whether aggrieved people engage in protest.

Gradually, social psychologists have explored more and more motives that stimulate people to engage in collective action and help them to overcome the dilemma of collective action. In fact, the previously described shifts from "asocial" to "social" and from "cold" to "warm" can also be observed in the paradigmatic development of the psychological

branch. Initially the focus was on the perceived costs and benefits of participation; participation was seen as an opportunity to change a state of affairs at affordable costs. It also became clear, however, that instrumental reasoning is not a sufficient reason to participate in collective action. Meanwhile, scholars such as Reicher (1984), Simon et al. (1998), and Klandermans and de Weerd (2000), began to explore the role of collective identity in protest behavior. And more recently we see a growing interest in how emotions fuel protest participation (e.g. Goodwin et al., 2001; Jasper, 1997, 1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Goodwin et al. (2001, p. 1) were wondering how "academics have managed to ignore the swirl of passions all around them in political life." As we previously discussed in the sociological branch, in the first half of the previous century, emotions were at the center of protest studies. As a reaction to these irrational and emotional explanations, the dominating academic political analyses on protest participation then shifted to rationalistic, structural, and organizational explanations. But, by reducing protest participation to a structural and rational process, researchers appear to have swung the pendulum too far in the opposite direction. As a result, emotions as explanations of protest were neglected altogether. Recently, it has been acknowledged that, with the shift from irrational to rational, the baby was thrown out with the bathwater. Indeed, the rational trend has now been reversed and we see emotions back on the research agenda of social movement scholars. Finally, a fifth element was added to the equation. In our work on migrants' protest participation we introduced social embeddedness (Klandermans et al., 2008). We argued that discussions about politics within networks increases efficacy and transforms individual grievances into shared grievances and group-based anger, which translates in protest participation. This fifth element brought the relational aspect into social psychological studies of collective action (see also Van Zomeren, 2015).

In our Social Psychology of Protest paper in *Current Sociology* (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013) we describe these approaches in terms of the five core concepts affecting protest participation: grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions, and embeddedness. Each approach gives a different answer to the question of why people participate in protest campaigns, namely, people participate: (a) because they see it as an opportunity to change, at affordable costs, a state of affairs with which they are unhappy; (b) because they identify with the others involved; (c) because they want to express their anger and indignation toward a target that has violated their values, and (d) because people are embedded in

social circles where individual grievances are translated into political claims. For this moment, we will leave it at that, as these approaches will extensively be discussed in Chapter 4, where we deal with the dynamics of demand.

2.5 Meta-analytical Proof

The downturn of the sociological branch and the upturn of the psychological branch is confirmed by a reanalysis of the meta-analysis of Van Zomeren et al. (2008). These authors meta-analyzed over sixty articles on collective action published between 1974 and 2009, incorporating over 200 studies[1]. Our reanalysis of their data shows that 69 percent of the collective action studies between 1974 and 1989 were conducted by the sociological branch, while this figure decreased to only 17 percent between 1989 and 1999. Importantly, it was not that the social psychology of protest declined in popularity overall; rather that the psychological branch increased markedly (see Table 2.1). The emerging European social psychology – at the heart of which was social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) – contributed to this increase in collective action studies. This is also confirmed by the reanalysis of Van Zomeren's data: 35 percent of the studies between 1990 and 1999 had identity as their main independent variable, against only 6 percent from 1974 to 1989 (see Table 2.1). The reanalysis also reveals that, although grievances as predictors of protest disappeared from sociological and political scientific approaches, they remain in the domain of the social psychology of protest. In fact, a stable 40 percent of the studies conducted between 1974 and 2009 adopted injustice (grievances) as their primary independent variable.

The period since 2000 saw an explosive growth of the psychological branch. Table 2.1 indicates that 173 studies (against 32 and 40 in, respectively, 1974–1989 and 1990–1999) were conducted in this period, of which 78 percent were conducted by social psychologists. In addition to an increase *and* normalization of collective action participation (Dalton et al., 2010; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998), the role of intergroup emotions theory (Smith, 1993) cannot be neglected. Mackie et al. (2000) developed intergroup emotions theory to show that intergroup relations can best be understood in terms of motivating forces elicited by emotions that group members feel about their own and other groups. After intergroup emotions

[1] We would like to thank Martijn van Zomeren and his colleagues for generously making the data available to us.

Table 2.1 *Paradigmatic development of the social psychology of protest from 1974–2009: Predictors*

	Discipline: Sociology vs. Social Psychology		Predictors: Most Important IV		
Period	No. of Studies	% Sociology	Injustice (%)	Efficacy (%)	Identity (%)
1974–1989	32	69% Soc	44	50	6
1990–1999	40	17% Soc	40	25	35
2000–2009	173	22% Soc	39	22	39

theory appeared in the social psychological protest literature, 63 percent of the studies conducted between 2004 and 2009 departed from intergroup emotions theory (based on our reanalysis of the meta-analysis of Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Hence, first social identity theory and later intergroup emotions theory helped to place collective action firmly on the research agendas of social psychologists.

2.6 Methodological Approaches to the Social Psychology of Protest

The legacy of the past has so far documented how the psychological branch gained prominence over the sociological branch in the field of the social psychology of protest. This disciplinary shift is of course not without consequences for methodological approaches, both in terms of methods employed and sampling respondents. Sociological social psychologists use shared social knowledge from a macro- or meso-level culture to explain relatively enduring patterns of social interaction, and use psychology at the micro-level, typically – though not always – investigating these matters with qualitative methods. Psychological social psychologists, on the other hand, typically deal with the factors that lead us to behave in each way in the (imagined) presence of others and look at the conditions under which certain behavior/actions and feelings occur. In general, they prefer laboratory-based, empirical findings. The volume *Methods of Social Movement Research*, edited by Klandermans and Staggenborg (2002), provides an interesting overview of the methods employed by sociological social psychologists of protest, ranging from survey research, discourse analysis, event analysis, interviewing, participant observation, case study, and network analysis. Remarkably, experiments and scenario studies are not discussed in this volume. Psychological social psychologists, on the

other hand, consider experimentation to be the way to reach causal inferences and often rely on student samples in order to assess causal claims (Greenwood, 2003). In her historical overview of the social psychology, Schruijer (2012, p. 9) describes how laboratory experiments became the norm:

> A new meaning of "experimentation" came with Lewin, for whom the experimental situation constituted a situation in which group properties and not individual properties were to be studied. Under the influence of Festinger a new meaning of experimentation emerged yet again. For him an experiment was a tool to demonstrate causal relationships between independent and dependent variables under "pure" circumstances, unconfounded by other variables. From studying real groups, social psychology shifted to studying statistical groups where individuals were randomly allocated to ad hoc groups ... By the mid-1970s laboratory experimentation had become programmatic and normative.

Following the disciplinary shift in the social psychology of protest, we would expect a decrease of survey research and an increase in experimental methods with student samples over the last four decades. Again a reanalysis of Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analytical overview provides insightful information on this historical development. Van Zomeren and colleagues categorized the 245 studies into experimental studies (involving *laboratory experiments* defined by random assignment to experimental conditions) and nonexperimental studies (not involving random assignment to conditions). Nonexperimental studies involve *scenario studies* (defined by the absence of random assignment and by the "imagined" reality of collective disadvantage), *survey studies* (defined by the absence of random assignment and by the reality of collective disadvantage), and *field studies* (defined by the absence of random assignment and by the collection of data in the context of a real protest event).

In the 1970s–1980s – when the sociological branch was dominant – 78 percent of the studies employed survey methods, while experiments were completely absent. After 2000 – when the psychological branch became dominant – 35 percent of the studies employed experimental methods (Table 2.2).

While the sheer number of all types of studies went up, the considerable increase in the share of experimental method studies is at the expense of survey and scenario studies. Field studies remain a minority throughout the four decades (perhaps biased by the somewhat stringent definition of field study as *Collection of data during protest events*). A similar shift also occurred in relation to who participated in studies of protest. Studies

Table 2.2 *Paradigmatic development of the social psychology of protest from 1974–2009: Methods*

	Discipline	Sample		Method			
Period	No. of studies Nonstudents	% Sociology	%	Experiment (%)	Scenario (%)	Survey (%)	Field (%)
1974–1989	32	69% Soc	87	0	9	78	13
1990–1999	40	17% Soc	65	28	10	62	0
2000–2009	173	22% Soc	54	35	2	54	9

conducted in the 1970s–1980s reported samples where approximately 90 percent were nonstudents, while in studies conducted after 2000 nearly half of all participants were students. Hence, the increase in the number of social psychologists in the field of collective action was associated with an increase in student samples and laboratory experiments. It should be noted, however, that while student samples and laboratory experiments are employed in 45 percent of the psychological studies of protest (60/134), this figure is still considerably lower than that for social psychology as a whole, where 80–90 percent of papers concern student samples and laboratory experiments (Henry, 2008).

This overview of methodological trends shows that, over time, experiments and survey research became the dominant approaches in the social psychology of protest. Each method has its strengths, weaknesses, and challenges. In what follows we will provide a short overview of each method, describe studies conducted with the method, present illustrative findings from such studies, and indicate the strengths, weaknesses, and challenges of the method.

2.6.1 Experiments

An experiment involves randomly assigning participants to groups (e.g., experimental and control) and the direct manipulation of one or more independent variables to determine the effect(s) on some outcome (the dependent variable) while controlling other relevant factors. Most social psychology experiments have excellent control over extraneous and confounding variables and they typically have mediating and moderating variables incorporated in the design. Consequently, most social psychology experiments are convincingly able to demonstrate sophisticated causal

patterns of relationships. An example is Simon and colleagues' experimental study on identity-affirming functions of social movement support. In two laboratory experiments they manipulated possession of identity (certain as opposed to uncertain). They found that people who strongly identified with the peace movement showed more movement support (i.e., made more monetary donations to the peace movement) under conditions of uncertain as opposed to certain possession of identity as a movement supporter. They concluded that movement support serves an identity affirming function under such conditions (Simon et al., 2008). Another example of an experimental approach comes from Van Zomeren et al. (2004). They conducted three experiments that showed that disadvantaged group members' feelings of group-based anger and group efficacy beliefs independently predicted their collective action tendencies. Experimental manipulations of procedural unfairness and emotional support predicted group-based anger, whereas an experimental manipulation of instrumental support predicted group efficacy. Based on these experiments, they concluded that emotion-focused versus problem-focused coping processes are context-dependent, and that their activation depends on the emotional and contextual resources people have available and put to use (Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

Experiments thus enable us to test causal relations that determine (intended) collective action behavior with a degree of control that is most often not feasible outside the laboratory. This strength, however, comes with the drawback of generalizability. As researchers must find a way to reduce the process or mechanism of interest to something that can be studied in a laboratory over a short period of time, phenomena are often studied within an empirical vacuum with respect to the original events of interest (Greenwood, 2003). This context-stripping may limit ecological validity, generalizability, and, consequently, the societal relevance of laboratory results (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). Experiments come with yet another weakness, as social psychologists tend to restrict their experimental methodology to that of student samples (Henry, 2008). The external validity at question here is not about the artificiality of the laboratory setting, but to what extent research findings from student samples are an accurate description of how individuals in the broader world typically think, feel, and behave (Henry, 2008; Sears, 1986). The challenge that is to a degree inherent to experiments is thus to enhance mundane experimental realism. The second challenge, not inherent to the experimental method per se but certainly associated with it through common practice, is moving beyond student samples.

2.6.2 Scenario Studies

Scenario studies are defined by Van Zomeren et al. (2008) as the imagined reality of collective disadvantage and by the absence of random assignment and are often used in social psychological experimentation. The word "scenario" is rooted in theater. It refers to a script-like characterization of an imagined sequence of future events and needs to be plausible and internally consistent to be accepted and useful (see Kirsch, 2004 for a review of scenario planning literature).

Scenario studies are much rarer than experiments, but we found an interesting example of an experiment involving scenarios carried out by Shepherd et al. (2013). In 2002, the President of the United States (George W. Bush) and the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Tony Blair) announced that American and British troops were going to be deployed in Iraq to search for weapons of mass destruction and to free the Iraqi people. It was in reference to this context that Shepherd et al. (2013) developed their scenario. They used a scenario of an aversive event that seemed plausible but had not yet taken place. Participants were informed that the study concerned their thoughts about the current situation in Iran. They read a brief report summarizing Iran's alleged nuclear missile program. This outlined the allegation that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, and described the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations, together with Britain's stance on this issue. The report said that the British Foreign Secretary stated that he would not rule out the use of military force against Iran. To make this more concrete, participants were told that British forces might bomb Iran's nuclear facilities if Iran did not start to comply with the United Nations. Shepherd et al. (2013) investigated the motivations and the role of (anticipated) group emotions that people can have to act collectively. They found that illegitimacy significantly predicted the anticipation of group-based guilt, shame and anger. Additionally, anticipated group-based shame and anger positively predicted collective action against a proposed ingroup transgression, such as the use of military force against Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the relation between illegitimacy and collective action was mediated by anticipated group-based anger and partially mediated by anticipated group-based shame.

Mundane realism scenario studies are, compared to experiments, a step in the right direction (given that the scenarios often frame "real" issues, are pretested, and are judged to be plausible and internally consistent). However, scenario studies still often involve placing participants in an

unfamiliar (laboratory) context where factors that normally affect behavior, such as social norms, attitudes, and social motives, have relatively little impact. Therefore, one must remain cautious in generalizing from this artificial environment to natural settings. An advantage of scenario studies – this time compared to field studies – is that the use of scenarios allows researchers to force the pace of the research, because they do not have to wait for natural or social events to reproduce the appropriate scenario needed to investigate a particular issue. Also, scenarios allow the researcher to select when and possibly where a study will take place. Finally, they provide an opportunity to study behavior that rarely occurs or that cannot easily be studied in another way, collective action participation being an example.

A weakness of this method, or at least of how it has been practiced, is the reduced ability of inferring causality, as most scenario studies are correlational, and no random assignment of respondents takes place. However, this weakness is in some scenario studies inventively and elegantly resolved by installing experimental conditions into the scenario. In fact, this is precisely what Shepherd et al. (2013) did in Study 3, where they manipulated both the salience and valence of anticipated group-based emotions. Another important question is whether "imagined" scenarios evoke real-life feelings and thoughts that can translate into "real" rather than intended behavior. We do not know whether imagined grievances and indignation are like "real" intergroup disadvantages. Moreover, overall levels of group-based guilt are actually generally very low in studies of it (Leach et al., 2013). Survey research attempts to tackle this issue of ecological validity.

2.6.3 *Survey Studies*

Van Zomeren et al. (2008) defined survey studies by the reality of collective disadvantage – in contrast to the imagined reality of scenario studies – and again with the absence of random assignment. Survey research is widely applied in the social sciences. The broad area of survey research encompasses any measurement procedures that involve asking questions of respondents (Oppenheim, 1992). A "survey" can be anything from a short paper-and-pencil questionnaire to an intensive one-on-one indepth interview. Survey research has changed dramatically in the last ten years. Paper–pencil surveys have partly been superseded by Internet or cell phone surveys, and a whole new variation of group interview has evolved as focus group methodology.

Both questionnaires and interviews are widely used in collective action studies. Take, for example, survey studies by Simon and colleagues (Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer et al., 2003). In these studies, members of the fat acceptance, the elderly, and the gay movements were surveyed about their motives to participate in the respective movements. Another example is a study by Smith et al. (2008) wherein, as part of a mail survey about their work experiences, university faculty members reported their emotional reactions to group inequities in faculty pay and benefits. Their results indicate that sadness, fear, and anger are distinct emotional responses to a collective disadvantage. Hence, rather than laboratory-created disadvantages, or imagined disadvantages in scenario studies, these faculty members experienced "real" collective disadvantages which evoked emotions with a correspondingly "real" intensity. Group-based anger mediated the relationship between collective disadvantage and willingness to protest, whereas group-based sadness mediated the relationship between collective disadvantage and organizational loyalty (Smith et al., 2008). The study by Linden and Klandermans (2007) on extreme right-wing activist careers provides an example of interview research. Life-history interviews conducted with thirty-six extreme right activists in the Netherlands revealed that becoming an extreme right activist was a matter of continuity, conversion, or compliance. It was this method – skillfully employed by Annette Linden – which enabled her to get access to this "inaccessible" group. The life-history interviews, which could take up to three hours, created a trustful atmosphere in which even the most suspicious activist was willing to share information[2].

The recently developed opinion-based group method (e.g., Bliuc et al., 2007) adds to the toolkit of social psychological research. The method involves bringing groups of people together who are at least sympathizers of a cause and asking them to engage in a planning session where they are to agree on strategies that can be used to further that cause. Their intentions to act in line with that cause are then measured and compared to people who did not engage in a group planning session (Bliuc et al., 2007). Through group-based interaction, processes of consensus and dissensus can be observed which are likely to resemble "talking politics" in everyday settings. This method is designed to observe and monitor how shared grievances, shared identity, and shared norms of action are created in social interaction

[2] Note that because of the quantitative focus of Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analysis, their analysis only comprises survey studies based on questionnaires; survey studies based on interviews are not considered.

rather than by surveying isolated individuals. Obviously, this is of great importance in the context of collective action, which is by definition a collective process (cf. Gamson, 1992b for more on focus groups and for a more recent approach see Saunders & Klandermans, 2019).

As surveys are about "real" collective disadvantages, mundane realism is often higher than experiments or scenario studies. However, this strength comes again with a weakness. Compared to experiments, survey research might have less control over extraneous and confounding variables. Moreover, no conclusions can be drawn on causal direction, because all measures incorporated in the design – dependent and independent variables, but also mediating and moderating variables – are often collected at one moment in time. In other words, most survey research is correlational in nature. However, some collective action studies show that clever research designs may enhance causal interpretations of the findings (e.g., the aforementioned opinion-based group method). Clever designs are characterized by the virtue of comparison (Klandermans, 2015b), such as comparison over time or between movements, demonstrations, or cross-national. Comparative research enables the examination of similarities and differences across contexts, and as such furthers our theorizing on collective action. A panel study conducted by Stürmer and Simon (2004b) on the effect of identification with the German gay movement on collective action participation provides an interesting example. These authors designed a panel study with a one-year interval and an additional follow-up telephone survey three years after the initial measurement. During the second measurement gay marriage was high on the political and public agenda, which, according to the authors, would politicize gay identity. They found that identification with the gay movement predicted participation; however, when the political conflict flared up, identification with the broader disadvantaged group (i.e., gays in general) also predicted identification. Thus, the challenge of survey research is to map out the causal sequences that determine collective action behavior of "real" people in real life situations.

2.6.4 *Field Studies*

Van Zomeren et al. (2008) defined field studies by the collection of data during a protest event and by the absence of random assignment. According to this definition, respondents are only those who participate in these protests. Accordingly, the motivational and emotional constellation of protesters versus nonprotesters cannot be compared. We therefore

slightly extend this definition of field research by defining it as research that takes place in a natural setting outside of a laboratory. In a field study, participants do not know that they are in a study or an experiment and naturally undertake the treatment or experimental conditions. Tunnell (1977) defines three theoretically independent dimensions commonly used in field designs: natural behavior, natural setting, and natural treatment. Although each of these dimensions injects a bit of the real world into psychological research, each reflects a separate aspect of reality. The natural behavior dimension concerns the dependent variable in the research design (e.g., participation vs. nonparticipation). Natural behavior is not established or maintained for the sole purpose of conducting research but is part of the person's existing response repertoire. Natural setting refers to almost any setting outside the lab, in which people "naturally" find themselves. The third dimension, natural treatment, refers to a naturally occurring discrete event to which the subject is exposed. The event (which serves as a "treatment" in design vocabulary) is natural in that the subject would have experienced it with or without the presence of a researcher. Natural treatments are temporally bounded processes and do not include variables such as gender, ethnicity, or educational level. Examples of natural treatments are mobilization campaigns, moral shocks, and suddenly imposed grievances. In correlational designs, all participants receive the same treatment, while in experimental designs using natural treatments, only a selected subset of participants receive the treatment; for example, some are reached by a mobilization campaign, while others are not (see, among others, Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).

Studies on "real" collective action behavior in natural settings are relatively rare in the social psychology of protest. A good example is Klandermans' (1984) longitudinal field study on action intentions in a labor union campaign during collective negotiations. From the end of November 1978 through July 1979 he interviewed union members about once a month, always shortly before or after an important event. The advantage of this design is that it illustrates the course of the campaign by comparing the outcomes of the successive interviews, while the effect of a single event can also be examined by comparing the outcomes of the interviews before and after that event (Klandermans, 1984). Another example is Tausch and Becker's (2013) study on student protests. These authors designed a two-wave longitudinal study in the context of student protests tuition fees in Germany, which was conducted before and after collective action had resulted in both a success and a failure. They examined how emotional responses to success and failure of collective

action relate to willingness to engage in future collective action. They found that both pride (in response to success) and anger (in response to failure) motivate future collective action. Tausch and Becker seized the opportunity of successful and failed student protests to design a quasi-experimental "before" and "after" treatment field study. This design enabled them to examine how psychological reactions to the outcomes of collective action shape motivations to engage in such action in the future, which is a blind spot in the literature. Ironically, they did use student samples *but* in field research with "real" collective disadvantages and "real" collective action.

A final example of field studies shows that the Internet can also figure as "a natural setting," where "natural behavior" is exhibited. Van Stekelenburg et al. (2010) examined polarizing public debates as they developed on the Internet over time. They employed automated content analysis to analyze posts of two opposing web forums used by native Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch youngsters between 2003 and 2005. This period encompassed several devastating intergroup incidents: the murder of Theo van Gogh and bomb attacks in Madrid and London, which functioned as "natural treatments." Their content analysis showed how the debates on the two web forums were shaped by the incidents and polarized over time. Collective identities politicized and radicalized, social judgments polarized, and emotions intensified, with hate and fear prominent. These three examples show how social psychologists of protest seize the opportunity of "real life" events to turn them into quasi-experimental study designs on "real" collective disadvantages leading to "real" collective action. As such, these studies attempt to move from correlation to causation, while securing high mundane realism.

We hasten to say, however, that the advantage of mundane realism also comes with drawbacks. First, random assignment of subjects to experimental conditions is usually not possible. Moreover, it may be hard to find a selection of comparable dependent measures across studies. Likewise, researchers need to be creative and inventive in finding appropriate comparison and control groups to ensure that the research effect is due to the natural-process treatment and not to extraneous factors. The use of standardized procedures – as in laboratory experiments – is thus of utmost importance. Therefore, although field studies are an improvement in terms of mundane realism, one should still be cautious when generalizing findings that emerge from one setting to other settings. Take, for instance, the online identification processes on populist right-wing and Moroccan-Dutch web forums: we cannot assume that these findings generalize

straightforwardly to identity processes in the offline world. Field research also tends to be more expensive and involves more resources compared to social psychological laboratory research.

The collective action literature in social psychology has been built over the past several decades on a foundation of evidence gathered largely from student samples. As rich, detailed, logical, and comprehensive as this body of literature is, what does it tell us about the reality of this form of political behavior? For example, both developmental issues (Dalton et al., 2010) as well as the liberal culture of the university (Dalton et al., 2010) may be influencing the pattern of results for these student samples. The question as to what laboratory-based studies tell us about the reality of collective action behavior is therefore still relevant. Nevertheless, this is not meant to be a call to stop using student samples in collective action research. Instead, it is a call to consider the many, varied, creative approaches that we may turn to for converging evidence that what we study goes beyond the context of students in university settings.

Possible sources beyond laboratory settings and college student responding include general population surveys (e.g., World Values Survey, Eurobarometer, etc.), archival research, and adult convenience samples (both online, like Mturk, and offline). In addition, the Internet is proving to be a valuable resource for data collection on general adult samples (e.g., Nosek et al., 2005; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010). Although many of these populations are also convenience samples with their own idiosyncratic generalizability problems, they provide converging evidence to accompany our student samples in giving us greater confidence in the theoretical ideas we test. Whether the methodology involves college students in a lab, adults surveyed or "observed" over the Internet or at a demonstration, general population data sets and their idiosyncratic operationalizations of political behavior, or nonexperimental Internet data, each methodology by itself is flawed in its own way and cannot definitively reveal the nature of any social psychological phenomenon by itself. However, each methodology also carries certain strengths and, when those strengths converge to tell a coherent story, we can make more confident claims about the *who*, the *why*, and the *when* of collective action participation.

Ultimately, the social psychology of protest seeks to understand natural political behavior following natural treatments, taking place in natural settings. This makes observing political behavior in its natural context not only an irreplaceable method for this endeavor, but one that comes with many challenges. The biggest challenge will perhaps be to integrate

both the level of control usually found in the laboratory and the natural dimensions associated with the field. We need a keen eye to recognize naturalistic dimensions and learn to exploit them. In doing so, we can also take inspiration from other disciplines, for example political scientists who conduct so-called field experimentation, a methodology that involves experimental interventions in real-world settings (e.g., Druckman et al., 2006). Experiments or quasi-experiments may also be embedded into survey and/or scenario methodology that can be more easily distributed to nonstudent samples. And finally, nonexperimental methods can rely on other techniques for making causal inferences, such as longitudinal analyses (e.g., Tausch & Becker, 2013). There is a great deal of flexibility and creativity available to those seeking to branch out beyond student sample use, also for experimentation.

2.7 To Conclude

Classic sociological theories of collective behavior describe contentious politics as spontaneous, irrational, expressive, often violent outbursts of collective action as a reaction to felt grievances, discontent, and anomie. The protesters, according to the classical approaches, were stressed, alienated, frustrated, deprived, disintegrated, and marginalized individuals affected by economic crises, unfair distribution of welfare, social rights, and normative breakdown. Right or wrong, the negative image of collective action played a major role in the subsequent decline of theories of collective behavior. Over the last decades there has been a movement back toward some of the kinds of emphases that Smelser and colleagues chose – dubbed Smelser's revenge (Chazel, 2001). More recent research has been much more about the emotional and ideational links between actions and identity, emotions and structural factors.

Perhaps it is time for an active reconsideration of the role of strain and breakdown. According to Buechler (2013b), any successful effort in this direction would require three levels of specification. Most obviously, we need greater specificity about what it is that undergoes strain or breakdown. Second, we need greater specificity about the mechanisms by which any type of strain or breakdown is translated into collective action. Third, we need greater specificity about what types of grievances and collective action are most likely to emerge from specific types of breakdown and strain. The classical collective behavior approach presumed an extremely broad spectrum of collective action, from panics, crazes, and fads to riots, rebellions, and revolutions. Recent social movement theory has fractured the spectrum

and claimed movements as its domain while paying less attention to other forms of collective action. This is precisely where a revised breakdown theory may have its greatest relevance. For example, the distinction between routine forms of collective action deriving from resource availability and nonroutine forms responding to strain and breakdown needs to be further explored if we are to specify which types of collective action are most likely to be associated with social strain and breakdown.

Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965) is viewed as an impulse for a truly paradigmatic watershed. The term "collective action" often came to be understood as referring specifically to actions that led to the provision of public or collective goods. New assumptions about agency, rationality, politics, and organization led to different questions and answers than the classical collective behavior tradition. Movements were seen as enduring, patterned, and even institutionalized expressions of political struggles over conflicting interests and scarce resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973), rather than short-lived riots, crazes, panics, or fads. These new approaches equated collective action not with deviance or social disorganization but with political or organizational conflict. The presumably rational, political nature of such actors and their interests displaced explanations emphasizing marginality, deprivation, frustration, tension, and strain. In all these ways, strain and breakdown imagery was eclipsed by new concerns with the mobilization of resources and political opportunities. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, strain and breakdown theories all but disappeared. The new generation of social movement scholars drew boundaries and distanced themselves from the term collective behavior and all it signified (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

This new theoretical focus emphasized the *structural* rather than *psychological* aspects of protest. In his *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, Doug McAdam (1982) even asserts that social movements must now be regarded as political phenomena, no longer as psychosocial ones. As a result, empirical and theoretical approaches favored resources and opportunities over breakdown and strain as *the* explanation for protest participation. In this scientific climate, the sociological branch of the social psychology of protest was pushed to the margins, while sociological and political scientific approaches became – and still are – the major paradigms in the social movement literature.

This is not to say that the sociological branch was abandoned all together: there were some isolated but influential voices. Take Bert Klandermans (1984), who argued that efficacy is the social psychological reflection of resources and political opportunities. Interestingly, but

understandable in that paradigmatic era, sociologists "accused" his work of being too psychological (Schrager, 1985). Klandermans responded that social psychological approaches are a necessity as long as people differ in their reactions despite living under similar structural circumstances. This reasoning became *the* fundamental rationale for the social psychological study of protest. Or, to give yet another example, Piven and Cloward (1977) show that people depleted from resources are roused to indignation and defiance. Occasionally "poor people" *are* politically active. In times of crisis, *declining* resources and political opportunities can go together with *increasing* protest participation. Dworkin's "capability" and "agitation" mechanisms may clarify this (Dworkin, 1981a, 1981b). The capability mechanism builds on resources and opportunities people have at their disposal, and protest participation is seen as a problem-solving strategy. The agitation mechanism builds on motivations and emotions triggered by dissatisfaction and may create a nothing-to-lose-strategy (Kamans et al., 2011). As such, the capability and agitation mechanisms focus, respectively, on the question of why people *can* and *want* to participate (Verba et al., 1995). Knowledge on the respective "working" of the capability and agitation mechanism is scarce. As social psychologists focus on motivations and emotions driving protest participation, they are well-prepared to take up this challenge. Grievances, efficacy, identification, instrumental and/or expressive motivations, anger, and embeddedness collaborate in reinforcing protest participation, but how they work together in cases of capability or in cases of agitation is a question still to be answered.

Today, theoretical approaches to protest are often categorized as based on structural and social constructivist paradigms. Examples of structural paradigms are resource mobilization and political process theory. As discussed, resource mobilization approaches analyze the meso level and put an emphasis on organizational resources, while the political process approach analyzes the macro level and emphasizes the political context of protest. The social-constructivist perspective takes the micro level as its point of departure and concentrates on questions of how individuals perceive and interpret these conditions and focuses on the role of cognitive, affective, and ideational roots of contention. Yet, the decision to protest is not taken in a social vacuum. To the contrary, we firmly believe that the political power play is – by definition – fought out in the sociopolitical intergroup context, and thus that contestation is contextualized. In Chapter 3 we will elaborate our ideas on what we mean by contextualized contestation and will, step-by-step, build our model of contextualized contestation along the lines of Coleman's boat.

CHAPTER 3

What Is Contextualized Contestation?

Social movements are phenomena that transcend the boundaries of academic disciplines. Therefore, the study of social movements is interdisciplinary. Surprisingly, however, real interdisciplinary research into social movements is rare. Sociologists and political scientists typically explore the meso- and macro-level and employ structural approaches, while social psychologists study the micro level and employ constructivist approaches. In our approach, we aspire to be an exception to this rule, by using perspectives from sociology, political science, and social psychology. To do so, we will elaborate an interdisciplinary comparative approach to protest in which both individuals *and* the context in which they decide to act feature center stage. As roving ambassadors between social psychology, political science, and sociology, it is precisely this "Contextualized Contestation" that became our trademark. In this chapter, we will develop an explanatory model which attempts to integrate aspects of sociological theories of conflict and the social psychology of protest.

3.1 Sociological Theories of Conflict

Social conflict theories emphasize the role of conflict as an integral factor in shaping social conditions and the dynamics of social interaction. To illustrate macro-sociological approaches for analyzing social conflicts, we focus on two theories, namely Lewis Coser's and Ralf Dahrendorf's classic theories of conflict. A highly recommended article by Ewa Szczecińska-Musielak (2016) serves as our inspiration in doing so. In this article, she analyzes the conflict in Northern Ireland through the lens of conflict theory.

This chapter is partly based on Van Stekelenburg (2017a). Protest voorspellen is zo eenvoudig nog niet (The problems of predicting protest). *Inaugural lecture* (delivered 16 June 2017).

Let us start with Lewis Coser's conflict theory. Coser (1956) drew heavily on Georg Simmel's (1955) work in his conflict theory. This was particularly visible in his view of conflict as part of social history, in his assumptions about the various forms that conflict may take in different social and historical conditions, and in the macro-social scale of his analysis, where conflict is seen as a homeostatic mechanism. The functional perspective of Coser's model emphasizes the fact that conflict plays a vital role in maintaining the social order. Drawing on Simmel's work, Coser maintains that the intensity of the conflict depends on whether the division of power is considered legitimate. Note that legitimization, in the form of legitimizing myths, is also forwarded by *Social Dominance Theory* (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) as an important mechanism that regulates group hierarchy oppression.. In fact, they argue that legitimizing myths is one of the answers to the puzzling issue of continuing social dominance, and thus of continuing group inequality (Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 2013; Stewart et al., 2016). Conflict theorists point to the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent bank bailouts as good examples of real-life conflict theory (Sears & Cairns, 2015). They view the financial crisis as the inevitable outcome of the inequalities and instabilities of the global economic system, which enables the largest banks and institutions to avoid government oversight and take huge risks that only reward a select few. Sears and Cairns note that large banks and big businesses subsequently received bailout funds from the same governments that claimed to have insufficient funds for large-scale social programs such as universal health care. This dichotomy supports a fundamental assumption of conflict theory, which is that mainstream political institutions and cultural practices favor dominant groups and individuals.

Szczecińska-Musielak (2016) argues that, when the basic premise of the functionalist approach – that conflict is functional for the social structure – is applied to the conflict in Northern Ireland, it could be considered controversial. From the macro-structural perspective of the wider state political system, which is based on discrimination against and exclusion of the Catholic minority, conflict legitimizes the existing social divisions, the organization of society, and the state political system. The status quo is also reinforced by constantly referring to and reminding people of the conflict, emphasizing worldview differences between the majority and minority group, organizing public rituals, such as Orange Parades, that aim to legitimize power and social identity and, finally, hostile and aggressive actions aimed at "the other," including terrorist attacks and assassinations. Doubtless, conflict is "functional" for those who benefit

from the existing order, particularly, for example, political leaders and extremist political parties. If the conflict is considered from the perspective of the Ulster Catholic minority, then conflict appears to be dysfunctional, as it has pushed them to the margins of social life in every possible sphere: political, cultural, and professional, hindering their advancement and making their daily existence difficult.

While this homeostatic mechanism from Coser's conflict theory explains continuing group inequalities, sociological conflict theory associated with (neo)Marxism explains how this group inequality can lead the oppressed group to conflict. For instance, Dahrendorf (1958) seeks to explain political and economic events in terms of an ongoing struggle over finite resources. More specifically, (neo) Marxists look for the source of the conflict in the structural–institutional situation, which appears to engulf people in the conflict. In this struggle, Marx emphasizes the antagonistic relationship between social classes, in particular the relationship between the owners of capital – which Marx calls the *bourgeoisie* – and the working class, which he calls the *proletariat*. Marx theorized that, as the working class and poor were subjected to worsening conditions, a collective consciousness would raise more awareness about inequality, and this would potentially result in revolt. If, after the revolt, conditions were adjusted to favor the concerns of the proletariat, the conflict circle would eventually repeat but in the opposite direction. The bourgeoise would eventually become the aggressor and revolter, grasping for the return of the structures that formerly maintained their dominance.

In the abstract sense, a sociological analysis of social conflict usually concerns the *relationship* between macro-conditions and macro-outcomes (arrow 4), but according to Buskens (2014), sociologists look for an *explanation* at the micro level (arrows 1, 2, and 3). This is illustrated by what is known as Coleman's boat (see Figure 3.1).

Coleman's boat, applied to explaining protest, would predict at the macro-level that riots, demonstrations, etcetera are explained by changing sociopolitical circumstances such as social inequality or economic crises (arrow 4). On the micro-level individual characteristics such as grievances, political effectiveness, emotions, and identity (arrow 2) are put forward as explanations of individual action (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Coleman and Coleman (1994) claims that one level of explanation cannot exist without the other. We second Coleman's claim for multi-level approaches, indeed, this figures centerstage in our contextualized contestation approach.



Figure 3.1 Coleman's boat



Figure 3.2 When we will observe revolutions according to (1) Marx, (2) De Toqueville, and (3) Davies

Let us explain this rather abstract multi-level explanation with an example; take the connection between economic crises and revolutions. There are two conflicting theories about this connection. On the one hand, Marx claims that revolutions are caused by increasing suffering (see box-arrow 1 in Figure 3.2). The greater the suffering of the proletariat, the more revolutions there will be. On the other hand, we have De Tocqueville, who asserts that revolutions arise from an increase in prosperity. Greater prosperity gives people more time and resources with which to protest (see box-arrow 2). These two opposing theories illustrate Coleman's claim that single-level explanations are insufficient; after all, the one macro-level theory predicts increasing suffering as an important

predictor for revolution, whereas the other macro-level theory relies on increasing prosperity as a predictor of revolutions.

Davies brings the two together in his famous J-curve and claims that revolutions occur after a long period of economic growth followed by a recession. He therefore claims that a *dent* in the gratification of needs leads to revolution, hence the "J-curve." Davies goes further, in addition to the *actual* satisfaction of needs as an explanation for revolutions, he also takes the *anticipated* satisfaction of needs into account. He finds that the explanation for revolutions lies in the combination of actual and anticipated satisfaction of needs. According to Davies, revolutions occur when the difference between the rising expectations created by a period of growth and the inability to actually satisfy these anticipated needs due to a recession becomes "unbearable." In terms of Coleman's boat, Davies' *macro hypothesis* predicts that revolutions occur when a long period of economic growth is followed by a recession. However, contrary to Marx and De Tocqueville's macro-theories on revolution, Davies also uses a *micro hypothesis* based on psychology's frustration–aggression theory. This theory states that the more frustrated individuals are, the more aggressive they become. The *relationship* between deteriorating economic circumstances and revolution is *explained* by the premise that an abrupt end to continuously increasing need satisfaction leads to frustration and aggression. Davies hypothesizes that this frustration and aggression are a fertile breeding ground for revolution. Moreover, in doing so, Davies seconds Coleman's claim for multi-level approaches, by connecting the macro-level of explanation to the micro-level of explanation.

This is exactly what we empirically confirmed in Greece at the start of the financial crisis in 2008 (Garyfallou & Van Stekelenburg, 2014). Decades of economic growth ended abruptly, leading to a discrepancy between what the Greeks expected and what they got. As the frustration–aggression theory predicts, especially young Greek were extremely frustrated because they were being deprived of something that they considered they were entitled to (see Figure 3.3). When asked what they saw as a possible solution – social reforms or revolution – many said that they saw just one solution: revolution!

But this was not the case for older Greeks. In fact, there was a striking difference between Greeks born around 1990 and those born around 1955. Those born in 1990 attained political adulthood during the economic crisis; they were known as the €700 generation, named after the income they had to make ends meet. This generation grew up in a prosperity that was brought to an abrupt end by the economic crisis.



Figure 3.3 Greek youth in 2008 visualized in Coleman's boat



Figure 3.4 Older Greek in 2008 visualized in Coleman's boat

It was this €700 generation that saw revolution as the only possible solution to the problems caused by the economic crisis. This did, however, not apply to the generation born around 1955. They reached political adulthood around 1979, during the switch from the totalitarian regime to democracy. They were known as the Polytech generation, after the university in Athens where the revolution started. This Polytech generation was also extremely worried about the 2008 economic crisis but, due to their past experiences, they did not want to give up the democracy they had fought so hard for in exchange for a revolution with an uncertain outcome. The Polytech generation was worried, but mainly perceived a system that had brought them improvements. All in all, the Polytech generation preferred social reforms to revolution (see Figure 3.4).

Our research in Greece first alludes to Coser (1956) and Simmel's (1955) view of conflict as part of social history but, and perhaps even more interesting, it also shows that people's position in society may make different social histories salient, which steers different interpretations of the same social economic circumstances. Consequently, people may interpret

the same macro conditions in different ways and these different interpretations entail different consequences for their behavior. This illuminates an important point in our explanatory model on contextualized contestation. It shows us that solely a macro-sociological theory of conflict does not provide enough explanatory power to describe individual differences. For this, we need to shift to social psychology.

There is no room for individual differences in Coleman's boat. This is where social psychology comes in useful. Social psychologists explain human behavior by the interaction between personal factors and social circumstances. Social psychology takes the individual level of analysis as its starting point. One of its most important principles is that behavior is not steered by structural conditions, but by one's *perceptions* of these conditions. These perceptions help to determine whether people undertake action to protest. Research shows that people's opinions on politics and society are strongly determined by their frame of reference, their views on humanity and society, and by the opinions they hold. This gives insight into why – when as a reaction to the same crisis – the Polytech generation espoused reform, while the €700 generation called for revolution.

3.2 The Social Psychology of Protest

Social psychology is interested in how social context influences individuals' behavior. The prototypical social psychological question related to protest is that of why some individuals participate in social movements while others do not, or why some individuals decide to quit while others stay involved. Or, for that matter, why does the one opts for radical tactics, while the other refuses to do so? The social psychological answer to these questions is given in terms of typical psychological processes such as identification, cognition, motivation, and emotion, and the influence of the ecosystems in which people are embedded. People – social psychologists never tire of asserting us – live in a perceived world. They respond to the world as they perceive and interpret it. If we want to understand their cognitions, motivations, and emotions, we need to know their perceptions and interpretations. Hence, social psychology focuses on subjective variables and takes the individual as its unit of analysis.

Taking the individual as the unit of analysis alludes to the limits of structural explanations. A shared position never provides sufficient explanation of individual behavior and even if people do display identical behavior the motivational background and the accompanying emotions may still be different. Indeed, this is what a social psychology of protest is

about – trying to understand why people who are seemingly in the same situation respond so differently. Why are some feeling ashamed of their situation, while others take a pride in it; why are some aggrieved, while others are not; why do some define their situation as unjust, while others do not; why do some feel powerless, while others feel strong; why are some angry, while others are afraid. These are the kind of questions social psychologists seek to answer. They argue that collective phenomena – such as political protest – are in the end of the day compositions of individual behavior. One may quarrel about the degrees of freedom individuals have when they choose to participate or not in protest activities, but in principle every individual *does* have a choice.

Why people who are seemingly in the same situation may respond so differently can be explained by Kurt Lewin's (1936) famous proposition:

$$B = f(P, E).$$

Whereby behavior (B) is a function of characteristics of the person (P) and the environment (E). Lewin – one of the godfathers of modern social psychology – meant that we understand behavior best when we consider it as resulting from the interaction of personal predispositions (e.g., attitudes, needs, desires, and beliefs) with characteristics of the sociopolitical environment. Yet, little social psychological protest research has focused on the 'E of environment' or the subjective experience of more objective macro-level factors (Klandermans, 1997), like level of democratization, social inequality, repression, or economic circumstances.

Hence, the core question of the social psychology of protest is *why people protest*. As we argue, dissatisfaction alone does not lead to protest (Klandermans, 1987). Many studies have shown that people are more likely to protest if they are convinced that protesting will be effective, if they identify more strongly with the protesting group, and if they want to express their view as their values are violated. All this is intensified by powerful emotions such as anger or indignation and is shaped in the networks to which people belong. For a detailed discussion on the social psychological dynamics of protest we refer the reader to Chapter 4 on the demand of protest. To be able to follow the argumentation underlying our model of contextualized contestation, we hope this short résumé suffices.

3.3 Coleman's Boat: Contextualized Contestation

Research so far, be it sociological or social psychological, has still not provided a complete answer to the question of why people protest. This

is because it either focuses on macro-processes and takes micro-processes for granted or because it focuses on micro-processes and ignores macro-processes. Coleman's boat illustrates this clearly. Sociologists are mainly interested in explaining riots, demonstrations, etc. through sociopolitical circumstances (arrow 4). An example of this is Davies's J-curve, which visualizes how the frustration–aggression mechanism, which could spark a revolution, occurs after a long period of economic growth followed by a recession. To prove his theory, Davies *studied* the relationship between recessions and revolutions and *assumed* that this relationship can be explained by micro-processes: the frustration–aggression mechanism. But he does not prove this.

Social psychologists, on the other hand, focus primarily on individual protest behavior and individual characteristics, such as grievances, effectiveness, emotions, identity, and social embeddedness (arrow 2). In doing so, they assume that individual behavior is steered by changes in the macro-context but hardly ever measure this. Take effectiveness: people protest more often if they think that protesting will make an effective contribution to solving a problem. But why do they think so? Is this because they believe their politicians are willing to listen to their grievances, or, to provide yet another example, because they think that the protesting crowd reaches a size that cannot be ignored by politicians or because they employ a tactic, for instance violence, that politicians cannot ignore? This relationship between objective and perceived political opportunities has seldom been studied. As we said earlier in this chapter, social psychologists research the relationship between micro-processes but pay little or no attention to macro-processes.

In short, the sociological macro approach is strong in its structural approaches but falls short when it comes to individual approaches. In turn, the social psychology micro approach is strong in predicting individual behavior but falls short when it comes to interpreting structural environmental characteristics. This tension is reflected in what is known as the *macro–micro transition problem* (Opp, 1992). This macro–micro transition problem is extremely relevant to research into conflicts and protests. People participate in protests if they are aimed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole and if they behave as representatives of the group. Protest behavior is *collective behavior*, aimed at achieving a *collective good* to improve *collective conditions*, carried out by *individual* citizens with personal worries and frustrations who together form a group of *collective* protesters. Therefore, in order to understand the relationship between social-political circumstances and conflicts, we must overcome the

macro–micro barrier. In this section, we will develop our model of Contextualized Contestation that attempts to do exactly that. This model describes the relationship between social-political context and conflict. Our starting point is the individual. After all, all social facts – social structure, social rifts, social inequality – are ultimately connected to individuals and their social relationships. The relational dimension (i.e., the influence of friends, family, or (action) groups to which people belong or with which people identify) is of vital importance. How we see the world around us is influenced by the people we are in contact with. In this model, we emphasize the perception of social reality as the filter between social-political circumstances and individual action. In other words: how people perceive, interpret, and process external events determines whether they want to act.

Protest requires dissatisfaction, but also the presence of action groups that express this dissatisfaction. Organizers, therefore, occupy a prominent place in our explanation of protest. This means that protest behavior can be explained at three different levels: social-political circumstances (macro level), action groups (meso level), and individual behavior (micro level). All three levels of analysis are meaningful, and their interaction in particular must be studied in detail. We are faced with the challenge of developing a theory that brings all these levels together. This is no simple task. We need to understand the entire chain of social-political circumstances, right up to action groups that facilitate individual actions to individuals that construe their social reality.

Converging anger and indignation about unjust situations into protest participation is a complicated process that can be broken down into several conceptually distinct steps. Translated to the world of protest and visualized in Coleman's boat, we must try to understand two processes: (1) under which conditions does an individual become *convinced* that socio-political circumstances are unjust? and (2) under which conditions do these individual worries and frustrations *activate* protest? These questions, visualized in Coleman's boat in Figure 3.5, refer, respectively, to core processes described in the literature as consensus formation/mobilization at the first panel and action mobilization at the second panel.

3.3.1 Consensus Formation and Mobilization

The left-hand panel of Figure 3.5 describes the process of how individuals come to understand social-political circumstances. To understand this highly complex process, Klandermans (1984, 1988) introduced the



Figure 3.5 Consensus formation and action mobilization visualized in Coleman's boat

distinction between *consensus formation* and *consensus mobilization*. Consensus formation concerns the unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures and is thus a matter of assigning meaning when people try to understand what is going on. Consensus formation arises in social comparison processes. Together with Dirk Oegema, we (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010) demonstrated this by analyzing posts on two polarized web forums. We compared posts on NL.Politiek and Marokko.nl from 2003 until 2005, turbulent times that saw the Al Qaeda attacks in Madrid and London, the murder of Theo van Gogh, and the Danish cartoon riots that made the intergroup conflict flare up. Following such violent events, more people started to post more messages and the groups drifted even further apart. After each event, a consensus was swiftly reached on what was happening and who was to blame for it. *Flaming and blaming*, the posts went back and forth, declaring "we" are good, "they" are evil, while all the time emotions ran high. For those interested in this study, we refer to Chapter 9 on politicization, polarization, and radicalization, where this study on polarizing web forums will be fully described.

While consensus formation is unplanned convergence, consensus mobilization, in contrast, concerns "the deliberate attempts to spread the view of a social actor among parts of the population" (Klandermans, 1988, p. 175). Consensus mobilization refers to dissemination of the views of the organizers and thus is a matter of convincing. Protest is communication, both with your sympathizers and with the general public and politicians. Organizing a protest is, therefore, a process in which framing is of crucial importance. Opinions of potential supporters must be in line or brought into line with the organizer's frames (see Figure 3.5, left-hand panel). Mobilization has a greater chance of success if there is a fit between what organizers announce and public opinion. In their frame alignment approach, Snow, Benford, and their colleagues elaborate consensus mobilization much further (see Benford, 1997 for a critical review; and Snow, 2004 for an overview).

A factor that is crucial to the expression of grievances is whether people hold themselves or the outside world responsible. For example, Van Doorn et al. (2013) wanted to understand why it is so difficult to mobilize young Dutch people of Moroccan descent. It is not because they don't feel aggrieved. On the contrary. But they are divided. They ask themselves *against what* they should protest, *how* they should do so, and *against whom* their protest should be aimed. Interpreting grievances entails more (Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2014). People must come to the insight that the authority that they normally accept is treating them unjustly and wronging them. People who normally think that the existing order cannot be changed must start to demand change. Finally, a realization of effectiveness must dawn on them; people who feel powerless must become convinced that they are able to influence their destiny.

The result of consensus mobilization is not only determined by the efforts of organizers. Severe criticism of the social and political order, the declining popularity of governments, the existence of large groups of marginalized people, repression, and the presence of other societal questions are all macro factors that influence the nature and scope of mobilization potential. In addition to the direct goal of a demonstration, there are many more reasons in such a situation why people leave their homes to protest. Take the Women's March of January 2017 in Washington DC. Not only emancipatory issues but worries about growing inequality and populism prompted hundreds of thousands of people across the world to march the day after Donald Trump's inauguration. In Washington even more people attended the march than the actual inauguration, and they were not only women.

3.3.2 *Action Mobilization*

The right-hand panel of Figure 3.5 describes the process of how individuals are mobilized for action. *Action mobilization* refers to the transformation of sympathizers into participants. This is a highly dynamic process: the more successful consensus mobilization is (the process depicted in the left-hand panel of Figure 3.5), the larger the pool of sympathizers organizers can draw upon for action mobilization. Consequently, a call for action will resonate stronger and spur people into action (the process depicted in the right-hand panel).

Successful action mobilization turns thinking into doing. Like consensus mobilization, action mobilization can be broken down into different processes (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). First, people must *know* about the demonstration and *want* to take part in it. Organizers inform people about an upcoming event through the mobilizing structure that they build up from event to event. Action mobilization rolls through society like a snowball (Boekkooi, 2012). It first moves from the organizers outward to people close to them (e.g., members, friends, colleagues), followed by second order mobilization, to people who are increasingly more removed from the organizers. The further removed people are from the organizers, the more likely that they will not be reached. These dynamics of the mobilizing structure have far reaching consequences. Marije Boekkooi (2012), for instance, shows that the composition of the demonstrating crowd reflects the composition of the mobilizing structure.

The intention to participate is not in itself sufficient to ensure that people demonstrate. People may be motivated but unable to come, for example, because they may have to work. Barriers that hinder a person from participating, such as sickness, lack of time, or transport, may result in that person not undertaking action. A classic study shows that this is a real knock-out competition (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). During the campaign surrounding the largest demonstration ever held in the Netherlands, a protest against cruise missiles, held in The Hague on October 29, 1983, 75 percent of Dutch citizens thought that Europe should get rid of nuclear weapons, 59 percent of this 75 percent knew about the demonstration but out of this 59 percent only 10 percent was motivated to go there and, in the end, only 4 percent went. As a reminder, with a turn-out of 500,000 this was the largest demonstration in Dutch history.

First, this shows us that it is crucial to have a large pool of sympathizers to ensure a large turn-out, and thus the importance of consensus mobilization visualized in the left-hand panel of Figure 3.5. Secondly, that action

mobilization, as visualized in the right-hand panel of Figure 3.5, is a knock-out race: people must sympathize with the objective, know about the demonstration, and be both willing and able to protest. Third, it reveals the role of organizers in both consensus and action mobilization. Whether or not they are aided by widespread dissatisfaction in society, organizers play a crucial role in convincing and activating. They are crucial to keeping an idea alive (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2016). They also ensure that minds are made receptive to a particular solution within a specific community and create a sense of empowerment. They accomplish this by *framing* their message. Organizers define a specific situation as unjust and claim that this situation *can* and, indeed, *must* be changed by collective action. Together with Daniel Blocq, we showed that demonstrators who are members of action groups that sympathize with political parties in parliament are less angry and indignant than demonstrators who were not represented politically (Blocq et al., 2012). The fact that this pattern is strongest in members who were mobilized by their "own" organization suggests that action groups play a role in "translating" political opportunities to their supporters. In other words, in overcoming the macro–micro barrier we must not forget the meso level of organizers.

3.4 To Conclude

With this chapter we have given a glimpse of the world of protest. We used Coleman's boat to describe three processes that bring "supply" and "demand" closer to each other: consensus formation, consensus mobilization, and action mobilization. To get angry citizens out on the streets, all three processes must be completed successfully. We have seen that this does not happen all by itself: on the contrary, it's a knock-out race.

We advocate studying the entire process of consensus formation, consensus mobilization, and action mobilization. Up until now, these have been separate worlds in social movement research. This research either focuses on the way in which organizations frame problems or how they call people to action. Research into action mobilization often starts after this process has been set in motion. The agitation and urge to mobilization prior to this – hence dynamics of consensus formation and consensus mobilization – is much less clear. Equally unknown is where the agitation comes from and how it can sometimes spread swiftly, or not. The differentiation between consensus and action mobilization can help us to understand the "dogs that don't bark" and "dogs that bark" puzzle (Saideman et al., 2008, p. 22), and, thus, may help us understand why,

under seemingly similar circumstances, in some places protests flare up, while in others it does not. The study by McAdam and Boudet (2012) is an interesting example. They conducted a comparative qualitative study of twenty communities that are earmarked as "risky" by an official Environmental Impact Statement for siting energy facilities in the United States, and were keen to observe how much oppositional mobilization they could witness across those twenty communities, hence, dogs that bark, and what causal conditions could explain the variation in mobilization (McAdam & Boudet, 2012).

Furthermore, there is the question of "supply" and "demand." Protest is born out of dissatisfaction, but it also needs organizers to express this dissatisfaction. Research into social movements treats these factors as if they were separate worlds. Researchers demonstrate that protest increases if there are more organizers representing the sympathizers. But there is little or no research into exactly how dissatisfied sympathizers are and how this is expressed in protest. It is precisely the relationship between dissatisfaction and organizers issuing calls to action that has a lot to teach us. Although it seems logical that organizers influence their supporters, not much research has been conducted into what exactly their influence is and how it works. There is also not much known about how "spontaneous" protests – without the involvement of organizations – arise.

A general theory about contextualized contestation is still far off. We realize that a great deal of research is needed before the questions that have been raised can be answered with any degree of certainty. We are, however, convinced that considering these puzzles in a holistic manner, using a multidisciplinary, multimethod approach will bring these answers a step closer.

In part this is a matter of the dynamics of supply, in part a matter of the dynamics of demand. Two phenomena that are getting our attention in the following chapters. Note that this takes us to the individual level of analysis. The choices individual citizens make result from interactions between characteristics of participants and the context. Collective actions are contextualized, indeed. This at the same time marks the weakness of most social psychological analyses. Theories and studies elaborating this interaction are largely missing. This requires joint efforts of the social sciences, that is social psychology, sociology, and political science, and we engage in such a collaboration in the chapters to come. Coleman will stay with us in our attempts to develop a theory of contextualized contestation which will overcome the macro–micro barrier by an emphasis on the dynamics and processes of the demand and supply side of protest and mobilization, both consensus and action mobilization.

CHAPTER 4

Dynamics of Demand

The demand side of protest concerns the grievances a movement is fighting for. Demand is what one could call the engine of a protest movement. Yet, surprisingly little attention is given to the characteristics of demand. In this chapter on demand, we aimed to build a theory of demands. Such a theory composes dynamics of grievances formation, identity, emotions, and social embeddedness. Together these components form the movement's mobilization potential. That is, the citizens that sympathize with the movement and can be mobilized for the movement's cause. A movement's mobilization potential can be characterized in terms of its demographic and political composition; in terms of collective identities, shared grievances, and shared emotions; in terms of its internal organization; and in terms of its social and virtual embeddedness in the society at large. Speaking of the dynamics of demand, we refer to the process of the formation of mobilization potential: grievances and identities politicize, environments turn supportive, and emotions are aroused.

Protesters are aggrieved people who openly contest established authorities and attempt to change existing power structures. They form the tip of larger masses who feel that their interests and/or values are violated (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). Indeed, protesting is uncommon behavior. In fact, passivity in the face of imperiled interests or violated values is more often the rule rather than the exception (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). Hence, the majority will stay inactive. Interestingly, inactivity is most often explained by the absence of theoretically renowned predictors (e.g., lack of resources, disidentification, low embeddedness), rather than theoretical approaches for nonparticipation (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2014). To fill this hiatus, we devote special attention to theories on nonparticipation.

Scholarly attention to the dynamics of demand has been limited. Perhaps social movement scholars do not bother too much about how mobilization potential is formed, as they tend to study contention when it takes place and mobilization potential is formed and mobilized already. Hence, little is known about the formation of mobilization potential in the ebb and flow of contentious politics. Basic questions, such as how consensus is formed; how individuals come to feel, think, and act in concert; why and how some grievances turn into claims, while other don't; and why and how some identities politicize, while others don't remain unanswered.

Hence, we know little about how demand is formed. A few decades ago, Klandermans introduced the distinction between *consensus mobilization* and *consensus formation* (Klandermans, 1984, 1988). While consensus mobilization concerns "the deliberate attempts to spread the view of a social actor among parts of the population," consensus formation concerns "the unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures" (Klandermans, 1988, p. 175). Both these processes can come about via the use of several information and persuasion channels (Gamson, 1992a), Nowadays, it can be expected that the Internet and social media play a crucial role in consensus mobilization and formation (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Van Stekelenburg, Anikina, et al., 2013). For an earlier example than social media, see Vliegenthart (2007), who, employing time-series analysis, demonstrated for the issues of immigration and integration in the Netherlands that – in a complex interplay between real-life events, media attention, debates in the parliament, and debates between politicians – public opinion was formed and converted into anti-immigrant party support. And to give yet another example, in our own research we investigated how, in a newly built neighborhood, demand for protest developed as a function of the development of formal, informal, and virtual networks (Van Stekelenburg, Anikina, et al., 2013).

Indeed, the formation of demand is a process that takes place in social interaction. Individuals are embedded in formal, informal, and virtual networks, which in turn are embedded in multiorganizational fields. Taylor (2013) proposes the concept of *discursive communities* to signify these settings in which consensus formation takes place. Understanding the formation of demand in a society requires insight in these processes of consensus formation and mobilization. We will return to the subject in our chapter on mobilization (Chapter 6). In this chapter we will focus on the social psychological core of the demand-side of protest, consisting of grievances, efficacy perceptions, identification, emotions, and social embeddedness (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013).

4.1 Grievances

Grievances concern "outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem" (Klandermans, 1997, p. 38). In *The Social Psychology of Protest*, while expanding on this definition, Klandermans made the distinction between illegitimate inequality, suddenly imposed grievances, and violated principles. Illegitimate inequality is what relative deprivation theory is about. The assessment of illegitimate inequality implies both comparison processes and legitimating processes. The first processes concern the assessment of a treatment as unequal, the second of that inequality as illegitimate. Suddenly imposed grievances refer to an unexpected threat or inroad upon people's rights or circumstances (Walsh, 1981), for example, a waste incinerator or a highway in the neighborhood. The third type of grievances refers to moral outrage because it is felt that important values or principles are violated. Klandermans takes the three types or grievances together as feelings of injustice, that he defines as "outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem" (p. 38). The notions of suddenly imposed grievances and violated principles, in fact, originate in the sociological social movement literature. Walsh and Warland (1983) coined the first and Kriesi (1993) the second. Suddenly imposed grievances – such as the establishment of a waste incinerator or a highway trajectory – are powerful mobilizers, as are violated principles. Illegitimate inequality is dealt with in the literature on relative deprivation and social justice. Relative deprivation theory holds that feelings of relative deprivation result from a comparison of one's situation with a certain standard – one's past, someone else's situation, or an ideological standard such as equity or justice (Folger, 1986). If a comparison results in the conclusion that one is not receiving what one deserves, a person experiences relative deprivation. The literature further distinguishes between relative deprivation based on personal comparisons (i.e., individual deprivation) and relative deprivation based on group comparisons (i.e., group deprivation; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996). Research demonstrates that group relative deprivation is particularly important for engagement in collective action (Major, 1994), but work by Foster and Matheson (1999) suggests that so-called double deprivation, that is, a combination of group and individual deprivation, is even more effective. On the basis of a meta-analysis, Van Zomeren et al. (2008) conclude that the cognitive component of relative deprivation (i.e., the observation that one receives less than the standard of comparison) has less influence on protest participation than does the affective component (i.e., such feelings as dissatisfaction, indignation, and discontent about outcomes).

Since the appearance of resource mobilization theory, grievance theories lost the attention of many a movement scholar. Grievance theories were associated with so-called breakdown theories (see Chapter 2), which were discredited for portraying social movements and movement participation as irrational responses to structural strain. Moreover, the resource mobilization approach took as its point of departure that grievances abound and that the question to be answered was not so much why people are aggrieved but why aggrieved people mobilize. Consequently, the social movement field lost its interest in grievance theory and because of the association of grievance theory with social psychology it lost its interest in social psychology as well.

Klandermans (1984) was among the first to observe that, in doing this, it had thrown the baby out with the bathwater. He began to systematically explore and disseminate what social psychology has to offer to students of social movements. He demonstrated that grievances are necessary but not sufficient conditions for participation in social movements and proposed social psychological mechanisms that do add sufficient explanation. He argued and demonstrated that there is much more available in social psychology than grievances and relative deprivation. In 1984, he presented a *social psychological expansion* of resource mobilization theory as an explanation of why some aggrieved people participate in protest, while others don't. The model is a fusion of expectancy-value theory and collective action theory.

Expectancy-value theory explains the motivation for specific behavior by the value of the expected outcomes of that behavior. The core of the social psychological expansion of resource mobilization theory is the individual's expectation that specific outcomes will materialize, multiplied by the value of those outcomes for the individual. In line with expectancy-value approaches (Feather & Newton, 1982), expectations and values stand in a multiplicative relationship. A goal might be valuable but, if it cannot be reached, it is unlikely to motivate behavior. If, on the other hand, a goal is within someone's reach, but it is of no value, it will not motivate behavior either (Klandermans, 1984).

Expectancy-value theory thus assumes a rational decisionmaker. However, collective action theory (Olson, 1965) maintains that rational decisionmakers, if they must decide to take part in collective action, are faced with the collective action dilemma. Collective actions, if they succeed, tend to produce collective goods that are supplied to everybody irrespective of whether people have participated in the production of the collective good. Thus, if the collective good is produced people will reap

the benefits anyway. Collective action theory predicts that, under those circumstances, rational actors will choose to take a *free ride*, unless selective incentives (i.e., those incentives that depend upon participation) motivate them to participate. However, if too many people conclude from that assessment that they can afford to take a free ride, the collective good will not be produced.

Klandermans (1984) argued that information about the behavior of others can help to overcome the dilemma. However, when the decision to participate must be taken it is usually not known what the others will do (but see Zhao, 1998 for an interesting example of a mobilization campaign where people did have information about the behavior of others). In the absence of information people must rely on expectations about the behavior of others. Organizers will, therefore, try to make people believe that *their* participation does make a difference. Klandermans' model, therefore, contained expectations about the behavior of others. Consequently, collective action participation is explained by the following parameters: *collective benefits* and *social* and *nonsocial selective incentives*. Collective benefits are a composite of the value of the action goal and the expectation that the goal will be reached. This expectation is broken down into expectations about the behaviors of others, expectations that the action goal will be reached if many others participate, and the expectation that one's own participation will increase the likelihood of success.

Klandermans' example was followed by a small but growing number of social psychologists. Social psychologists have for example applied social justice theory to the study of social movements (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The social justice literature distinguishes between two classes of justice judgments: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice is related to relative deprivation in that it refers to the fairness of outcome distributions. Procedural justice, on the other hand, refers to the fairness of decision-making procedures and the relational aspects of the social process, that is, whether authorities treat people with respect and can be trusted to act in a beneficial and unbiased manner (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Research has found that people care more about how they are treated than about outcomes. Based on these findings, Tyler and Smith (1998) propose that procedural justice might be a more powerful predictor of social movement participation than distributive justice; that is what we found indeed both in our research in South Africa (Klandermans et al., 2001) and among migrants in the Netherlands and New York (Klandermans et al., 2008).

Political trust and political cynicism further influence the formation of grievances. Folger (1986) argues that perceived inequalities will not turn

Table 4.1 *Strongly motivating grievances*

• Suddenly imposed grievances
• Group and double deprivation
• Procedural injustice
• The emotional component of grievances
• Violated principles or threatened interests
• Political cynicism

into discontent if people trust responsible actors (mostly authorities) to deal with the problem. Indeed, we found in our research in South Africa that relative deprivation is substantially reduced when people display trust in government (Klandermans et al., 2001). On the other hand, if people are cynical about politics, feelings of injustice are more likely to turn into contestation, as our migrants study demonstrated (Klandermans et al., 2008).

Table 4.1 summarizes what grievances are strong motivators: suddenly imposed grievances, group and double deprivation rather than individual deprivation, procedural justice rather than distributive justice, the emotional component of grievances rather than the cognitive component, violated principles and threatened interests, and political cynicism rather than trust.

4.2 Efficacy

It would be hard to deny that people who are part of a movement's mobilization potential are aggrieved, but meanwhile grievances do not provide a sufficient reason to participate in collective action, as we know. Therefore, the key question of any grievance theory to be addressed is: why do some aggrieved people protest, while others do not? The first to raise that question were the resource mobilization scholars (e.g., McAdam et al., 1996; Oberschall, 1973) and the just discussed social psychological expansion thereof (Klandermans, 1984). More recently, in a large comparative study based on World Values Survey (WVS) data, Dalton et al. (2010) found that grievances are weak predictors of protest. Rather than aggrieved people, it is those who possess political skills and resources who generally protest more, independent of their level of grievances. The underlying political psychological concept is efficacy. People are more likely to participate in movement activities when they believe this will help to redress their grievances at affordable costs (Klandermans, 1984). The more

effective an individual believes collective action participation to be, the more likely the person is to participate. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) propose efficacy as the core of what they call problem-focused coping – one of the two pathways to collective action they define, the other being emotion-focused coping, with group-based anger at its core (see Section 4.6).

Political efficacy is conceptualized as having two dimensions: (1) internal efficacy is the extent to which someone believes to understand politics and to participate in politics, and (2) external efficacy is the extent to which someone believes that political institutions will be responsive to claims made. Hence, internal efficacy measures perceptions about one's own abilities while external efficacy measures expressed beliefs about governmental responsiveness to popular demands. A lack of external efficacy indicates the belief that citizens cannot influence political outcomes because politicians are unresponsive to citizens' demands (Miller et al., 1980).

Following this reasoning, it also becomes important to conceptualize political cynicism. Political cynicism is defined as the belief that elected officials are incompetent, immoral, working in their own interest, and do not represent the people (Dancey, 2012; Schyns & Nuus, 2007). It is the absence of the belief in the reliability of authorities and having no faith in their sincerity. In the literature "political cynicism is often employed loosely or inconsistently, and ... it is often used interchangeably with other orientations such as political distrust" (Schyns & Nuus, 2007, p. 92). We deem it important to conceptualize cynicism and distrust separately. Cynical citizens are found to believe that political systems and governments themselves are corrupt and problematic (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). However, cynics not only expect the political system not to deliver or to deliver low quality (i.e., low political trust), they also question their politicians' integrity and/or morality. Political cynicism is therefore distinct from the concept of political trust in that it taps into evaluative criteria (integrity, morality) that people use to evaluate their politicians (Dancey, 2012), rather than the political system. Translated to political protest, cynical demonstrators rally not only against the measures their governments are taking, but also against the governments that are taking these measures (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018).

Conceptualized as such, political cynicism is a (negative) evaluation of politicians' integrity (Dancey, 2012), while political efficacy is an evaluation of the degree of citizens' political influence and the expected responsiveness of politicians (Miller et al., 1980). Political trust, finally, is an assessment of the probability that the political system produces preferred outcomes and the quality thereof (Gamson, 1968). Thus, political trust, cynicism, and efficacy

are evaluations of different aspects of the political arena. Political trust is an evaluation of the *political system* in which the power struggle takes place, political cynicism is an evaluation of *politicians' integrity*, and political efficacy an evaluation of *citizens' influence* and *politicians' responsiveness*.

Several studies have shown that feelings of efficacy are highly correlated with participation in protest and also meta-analytically this relation proved to be important (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2016; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Mummendey et al. (1999) propose that group – rather than personal – efficacy predicts protest participation. Furthermore, Klandermans (1984, 1997) shows that people are more likely to participate in movement activities when they believe this will help to redress their grievances at affordable costs. The relationship is straightforward: the more effective an individual believes protest participation is, the more likely she or he is to participate. Efficacious and inefficacious people take different routes to social change though: while normative forms of protest like petitioning and demonstrations tend to attract highly efficacious people, nonnormative forms of protest are more likely to attract low efficacious people (Tausch et al., 2008). Cynicism, finally, works to both *reduce* and *reinforce* action participation depending on whether it goes together with perceived unfairness (Klandermans et al., 2008). The least active are those who combine political cynicism with the feeling that they are treated fairly; the most active are those who combine cynicism with the feeling that they are treated unfairly

In a cross-national study Corcoran et al. (2012) demonstrated the significant role of efficacy for protest participation across forty-eight countries. Qualifying the assertions of political process approaches, these authors report important contextual influences. Feelings of efficacy make people more likely to participate in collective action, especially if they are faced with closed political opportunities. But for those who feel efficacious, opportunities or lack of repression don't make any difference. Efficacious people participate in collective action no matter what the opportunities are. Indeed, opportunities or absence of repression only make fatalistic people take part in collective action. The authors report that social embeddedness is of crucial importance for the generation and role of feelings of efficacy in that respect. We will come back to that in our chapter on why context matters (Chapter 7).

4.3 Identity

Protest participation is participation in collective action. Such collective action is generally assumed to root in collective identity. In the words of

Wright (2001): "It is simply obvious that in order to engage in collective action the individual must recognize his or her membership in the relevant collective" (p. 413). It doesn't come as a surprise that, next to efficacy, identity became an important concept in the social movement literature in the past 40 years. Consequently, identity deserves some extra attention in this volume. Melucci (1980) was among the first to emphasize the significance of collective identity. In the years to follow the concept began to gain prominence in the social movement literature (Stryker et al., 2000). Meanwhile, social psychologists began to explore the role of group identification in movement participation (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004b) and concluded that the more one identifies with a group involved in a protest activity, the more likely one is to take part in that activity.

Simon et al. (1998) describe identity as a place in society. A place is a metaphorical expression and concerns people's social embeddedness, that is the networks, the organizations, the associations, groups, and the categories of which they are members. People are not randomly embedded in society. Social cleavages affect social embeddedness (Van Stekelenburg, 2013a). People share interests and identify and associate almost exclusively with other members of "their" group. Hence, cleavages create "communities of shared fate" and "sameness" within cleavages and "distinctiveness" between cleavages, and as such create shared identities *and* opposing identities, referred to as in- and outgroups in social identity theory. Social cleavages may give rise to shared fate, because cleavages determine people's place in society. Social cleavages create a place shared with others, which leads to shared experiences, grievances, and emotions, and the creation of a collective identity.

Group identification seems to be the fundamental social psychological answer to the question of what drives people to engage in collective action. Identification with the group involved seems a powerful reason to participate in protest on behalf of that group, be it identification with women or workers (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Kelly & Kelly, 1994), the elderly or gay (Simon et al., 1998), farmers (Klandermans et al., 2004), former East Germans (Mummendey et al., 1999), feminists (Liss et al., 2004), or obese (Stürmer et al., 2003). These studies report consistently that group identification and collective action participation are correlated. They report moderately positive correlations between the two variables (roughly between .20 and .30): the more people identify with the group involved, the more they are motivated to participate in collective action. This

relation proved meta-analytically also to be important (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In order to understand why, we need to elaborate the concept of identity.

4.3.1 *Defining Identity*

The clearest definition of social identity that has been in the social psychological literature is presented by Tajfel. According to Tajfel (1978, p. 63), identity is "that *part* of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." The concept, thus, contains a cognitive (awareness of membership), an evaluative (the values associated with the membership), and an emotional/affective element (feelings toward one's group membership as well as others standing in relation to the group) (see Tajfel, 1978). Identity is our understanding of who we are and of who other people are, and, reciprocally other people's understanding of themselves and others (Jenkins, 2004). Hence, the notion of identity involves two criteria of comparison between people: same-ness and difference-ness. Important, though, identity is not a given fact, identity is a practical accomplishment, a process. Identifying ourselves or others is a matter of meaning, and meaning always involves interaction: agreement and disagreement, convention and innovation, communication and negotiation (Jenkins, 2004).

At the psychological heart of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) lays the assumption that people strive for a positive self-evaluation (Turner, 1999, p. 8). This self-evaluation concerns two components: personal and social identity. Personal identity refers to self-definition in terms of personal attributes, whereas social identity refers to self-definition in terms of social category memberships. Social identity is seen as a cognitive entity; that is to say, if social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, then people see themselves less as unique individuals and more as the prototypical representatives of their ingroup category. Indeed, people are inclined to define their personal self in terms of what makes them different from others, whereas they tend to define their social identities in terms of what makes them like others. In other words, it is the cognitive transition from an "I" into a "we" as a locus of self-definition that transforms personal identity into collective identity. When social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, people think, feel, and act as members of their group (Turner, 1999). In their striving for a positive self-evaluation, it is important that the membership of groups has

a positive influence on one's self-evaluation. Therefore, people want to be members of high-status groups.

Because people strive for a positive self-evaluation, membership of a low group status spurs them to undertake action in order to acquire a higher group status by leaving the group or changing its status. Tajfel and Turner (1979) formulate social structural characteristics controlling intergroup behavior. The first characteristic is *permeability of the group boundaries*, that is, the possibilities perceived by the individual to attain membership of a higher status group. When people see membership of a higher status group as a possibility, they will try to leave the lower status group. Consequently, their commitment to the lower status group declines. The second characteristic is *stability*. Stability refers to the extent to which status positions are stable or variable. People who conceive of status positions as variable perceive collective action as a possible strategy to realize higher group status. This implies that they are inclined to participate in collective action on behalf of the group. Such inclination will be fostered when the low group status is perceived as *illegitimate*. To sum up, according to social identity theory, people will participate in collective action to improve group status if they are not able to leave the group, if they believe that this status position is variable and when the low status is perceived as illegitimate.

4.3.2 Group Identification: The Link Between Collective and Social Identity

Acting collectively requires some *collective* identity or consciousness (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). Although collective identity and social identity are related concepts, they refer to different aspects of group life. Collective identity concerns cognitions shared by members of a single group (Taylor & Whittier, 1992), whereas social identity concerns cognitions of a single individual about his or her membership in one or more groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group identification forms the link between collective and social identity. Group identification can be seen as a product of *self-categorization* – a cognitive representation of the self as a representative of a more inclusive category (Brewer & Silver, 2000). This cognitive representation is accompanied by an awareness of similarity, ingroup identity, and shared fate with others who belong to the same category. Polletta and Jasper (2001), however, emphasize that group identification is more than a cognitive process, in their own words, "a collective identity is not simply the drawing of a cognitive

boundary ... most of all, it is an emotion" (p. 415). It is difficult to imagine that an identity is purely cognitive yet strongly held. The "strength" of an identity comes from its affective component. Thus, where self-categorization theory emphasizes the cognitive side of identification, Polletta and Jasper remind us of the more affective side of group identification (see Ellemers, 1993 for a similar argument).

Self-categorization theory proposes that people are more prepared to employ a social category in their social identity the more they identify with that category. Thus, the stronger the group identification, the more the shared beliefs and fate comprised in the group's collective identity are incorporated in the individual's social identity. However, individuals do not incorporate the complete picture but rather a selection of what a collective identity encompasses. These idiosyncratic remakes of collective beliefs at the individual level create a variety in the *content* of the social identity (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2017). Indeed, not all farmers, obese, workers, women, feminists, or gays have identical social identities, yet they do feel like farmers, obese, and so on.

De Weerd and Klandermans (1999) broke group identification down into an affective and a behavioral component. The affective component refers to the degree of attachment to the group (farmers in this study) or category and the behavioral component refers to membership in identity organizations (being a member of a farmers' organization). In a longitudinal study they investigated the causal relation between the affective and behavioral identity component and collective action participation. It should not come as a surprise anymore that identification with farmers stimulated collective action participation. While both the affective and the behavioral component impacted on people's willingness to participate in political protest, only the behavioral component stimulated actual participation directly. According to De Weerd and Klandermans (1999) that makes sense: "Being organized implies communication networks, access to resources, interpersonal control, information about opportunities when, where and how to act, and all those other things that make it more likely that intentions materialize" (p. 1092).

The opposite assumption, that participation strengthens group identification, was confirmed for behavioral but not affective identification. These findings suggest that, at least in the case of behavioral identification, causality between identification and action participation goes in both directions (Klandermans et al., 2002). It remains a question why farmers who participated in collective action are more inclined to participate in farmers' organizations than farmers who did not participate. A possible

answer might be that actual participation enhances feelings of belonging, and collective empowerment (Drury et al., 2005), or makes the shared grievances or claims more transparent. In other words, actually participating influences which aspects of collective identity are appropriated.

Group identification can be assessed in all kinds of ways. But any operationalization of group identification will refer somehow to what it means to an individual to belong to the group in point and will thus implicitly or explicitly refer to the pride of being a member of the group, to the symbols, the values, the fate shared by the group members. Therefore, group identification is akin to commitment to the group (Ellemers et al., 1999; Goslinga, 2002). Huddy (2001) argues that it is not group identification *per se* but the strength of such identification that influences group members' readiness to view themselves and act in terms of their group membership. Huddy (2001) criticizes social identity literature for neglecting the fact that real-world identities vary in strength; identifying more or less strongly with a group, she argues, may make a real difference, especially in political contexts. Related to this point is the fact that identity strength is related to identity choice (Huddy, 2003). Huddy distinguishes between *ascribed* and *acquired* group membership, she argues that ascribed identities are quite difficult to change, and acquired identities are adopted by choice. Group identification tends to increase in strength when it is voluntary. Membership of a social movement organization can be seen as a prototypical example of a voluntary acquired, hence strong, identity.

Identification affects collective action participation both *directly* and *indirectly* (Stürmer, 2000, cited by Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). Directly because group identification creates a shortcut to participation: participation stems not so much from the outcomes associated with participation but from identification and solidarity with other group members involved (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). The indirect link is determined by depersonalization of the self: "Through depersonalization self-categorization effectively brings self-perception and behavior into line with the contextually relevant ingroup prototype, and thus transforms individuals into group members and individuality into group behavior" (Hogg et al., 1995, p. 261). Group identification influences instrumental reasoning indirectly; it makes it less attractive to take a free ride: high levels of group identification increase the costs of defection and the benefits of cooperation. Moreover, if people identify strongly with their group, their grievances are stronger (Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Tropp & Wright, 1999), instrumental reasoning becomes more influential (McCoy & Major, 2003), threats to values are felt more strongly (Branscombe et al., 1999), as are

emotions (Yzerbyt et al., 2003), and, finally, they believe more in the collective efficacy of their group to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments (Kelly, 1993).

A complicating matter in this respect is the fact that people simultaneously hold multiple identities, while movements tend to emphasize a single identity and refer to a single place in society. As a consequence, people may experience being steered in different directions by conflicting identities (cf. Kurtz, 2002). Individuals might find themselves under cross-pressure when two groups they identify with are on opposite sides of a controversy (e.g., union members faced with the decision to strike against their own company). Indeed, workers who go on strike or movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being disloyal to the company or the country. This problem is especially relevant in the case of protest participation by immigrants, which can easily be (mis)interpreted as disloyalty to their new country of residence. González and Brown (2003) coined the term "dual identity" to point to the concurrent workings of supra- and subordinated identities. They argue that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g., ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude identification with a supraordinate entity (e.g., national identity). In fact, they claim that dual identity is a healthy configuration, as it implies sufficient identification with one's subgroup to experience basic security *and* sufficient identification with the overarching group to preclude divisiveness (see also Huo et al., 1996). There is evidence that immigrants who display a dual identity are more inclined to take onto the streets on behalf of their group (Simon & Ruhs, 2008). This is further specified by studies of Spanish and Dutch farmers, South African citizens, and immigrants in the Netherlands and New York that suggest that individuals who report holding a dual identity are more satisfied with their social and political situation than those who do not hold a dual identity (Klandermans et al., 2001, 2004, 2008). However, if they are dissatisfied, individuals who hold a dual identity are more likely to participate in protests. Dual identities, finally, direct people to moderate action, whereas identification with a superordinate entity declines, discontent more likely results in radical action, as research by Simon (2011) suggests.

4.3.3 From Social Identity to Politicized Identity

Awareness of a collective identity does not necessarily make that identity politically relevant; collective identity must politicize to become the engine of collective action. As Chapter 9 will delve deeper into the processes of

politicization, polarization, and radicalization, we will only touch upon it here. Politicization of collective identity and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group's relationship to its social environment. Typically, this process begins with the awareness of shared grievances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group's predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues. If in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national government) or the general public, collective identity fully politicizes (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

What distinguishes politicized collective identity from collective identity? The first distinction is raised consciousness: "the growing awareness of shared grievances and a clearer idea of who or what is responsible for those grievances reflect a distinct cognitive elaboration of one's worldview providing group members with a meaningful perspective on the social world and their place in it" (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 327). The second distinction is about the relation with other groups. A politicized identity provides antagonistic lenses through which the social world is interpreted. This intergroup polarization defines other groups in the social and political arena as "pro" or "con," thus as allies or opponents. The third distinction concerns the unique behavioral consequences of politicized collective identity, namely, politicized group members should be likely to engage in collective action directed at the government or the general public to force them to intervene or to take sides.

Sturmer and Simon (e.g., 2004a) show that identification with a social movement (for instance the German Grey Panthers, the gay movement, or the fat acceptance movement) is a better predictor of movement participation than identification with the broader recruitment category (the elderly, gays, or fat people). These results underscore the importance of the more politicized form of collective identification with the social movement itself. They suggest that identification with a disadvantaged group increases group members' willingness to participate in collective action only to the extent that it is transformed into a more politicized form of activist identification (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Indeed, politicized collective identities are dual identities (Klandermans, 2014). Societal groups are embedded in the same superordinate political entity (e.g., the nation-state or society at large); identification with this entity or its inhabitants comes into play because of the process of politicization.

4.4 Emotions

Politics – and especially politics of protest – are full of emotions. People are *fearful* about terrorism, *angry* about proposed budget cuts, *shocked* about senseless violence, and *proud* about their national identity. Work in sociology and social and political psychology has brought emotions to the study of social movements (Goodwin et al., 2001; Jasper, 1998; Van Stekelenburg, 2006; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). For those of us who have been part of protest events or watched reports on protest events in the news media, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of protest detached from emotions. Goodwin et al. (2001, p. 13) argue that "emotions are socially constructed," but that "some emotions are more [socially] constructed than others, involving more cognitive processes." In their view, emotions that are politically relevant are more than other emotions at the social construction end of the scale. For these emotions, cultural and historical factors play an important role in the interpretation (i.e., perception) of the situation by which they are generated. Emotions, these authors hold, are important in the growth and unfolding of social movement and political protest. Indeed, emotions permeate protest at all stages: recruitment, sustained participation, and dropping out (Jasper, 1998).

Obviously, emotions can be manipulated. Organizers work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented. They must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional package of attitudes. Also in the ongoing activities of the movements, emotions play an important role (Jasper, 1997, 1998). People might be puzzled by some aspects of reality and try to understand what is going on (Marcus, 2010). They may look for others with similar experiences and a social movement may provide an environment to exchange experiences, to tell their stories, and to express their feelings. Clearly, there is an emotional component in how people react to their social and political environment. Yet amazingly little is known about how emotions exactly influence movement participation. In collective action research emotions are a novice with a long history.

The first half of the previous century, as discussed in Chapter 2, emotions were at the center of collective action studies. Protest was seen as an irrational response to discontent and emotions were equated with irrationality. As a reaction to these approaches, the dominant academic analyses on protest participation shifted to rationalistic, structural, and organizational explanations. Such phenomena as moral shocks (Jasper,

1997) or suddenly imposed grievances (Walsh, 1981) were primarily approached from a cognitive point of view, whereas few researchers paid attention to the complex emotional processes that channel fear and anger into moral indignation and political activity. Frame alignment is yet another example of an approach that deals entirely with the cognitive components (but for an exception see Robnett, 2004; Schrock et al., 2004). As a result, emotions as they accompany protest were neglected altogether. The rational trend has now been reversed and we see emotions back on the research agenda of protest scholars (Goodwin et al., 2001, 2004; Jasper, 1997, 1998, 2018; Van Troost et al., 2013; Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

To understand engagement in protest, one must understand emotions – what they are, how they work, and how they interact with grievances, motivation, identification, and social embeddedness. Over the past several decades, emotions have become an important topic for research in social psychology. Some of this research concerns the nature of emotion itself: types of emotions, their causes, and their properties. Other research concerns how emotions influence social phenomena: their effects on thought and behavior, their social functions. The purpose of Section 4.4.1 is to provide some background about the study of emotion and its importance in protest. We will explain why emotions and protest are inextricable phenomena and summarize social psychological emotion theories and research on emotions that – in our view – might be of help by explaining protest behavior and describe some exemplary studies of the influence of emotions on the dynamics of protest.

4.4.1 Social Psychological Perspectives on Emotion

The study of emotions has become a popular research area in social psychology. Such was not always the case. As rational approaches were the state of the art, emotions were often regarded as some peripheral "error term" in motivational theories. But emotion states and their influence on motivation were not about to be so easily explained away. Indeed, emotions have the power to override even the most rational decisions.

Marcus and colleagues translated this line of thought into political psychology with the theory of affective intelligence that describes the role of emotions in the making of political judgments (Marcus, 2010; Marcus et al., 2000). They believe that emotional responses to political candidates cannot be modeled simply by attaching an affective tag to cognition, they assume that emotions are the result of a dual process: a behavioral

inhibition system (i.e., a surveillance system) and a behavioral approach system (i.e., a dispositional system, Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). The theory of affective intelligence adopts a dynamic view of judgment and, further, argues that anxiety is the emotion that shifts people from one mode of judgment to the other (and back). When anxiety is low, the disposition system allows people to rely on existing "heuristics" or "predispositions" because low anxiety signals that the environment is safe, familiar, and predictable. On the other hand, when anxiety is high – signaling that the environment is in some fashion uncertain and unsettling – reliance on prior learning with its presumption of predictable continuity would not be a strategically sound course. In such situations, it would likely be potentially dangerous to ignore contemporary information and to rely thoughtlessly on preexisting courses of action. The surveillance system pushes people to eschew reliance on existing predispositions, turn to consideration of contemporary information, and make a judgment.

Marcus et al. (2000) tested these assumptions using evaluation of political candidates and National Election Studies data. They show that political candidates generate emotions and, in conditions where anxiety is generated, learning is enhanced. Enthusiasm, on the other hand, does not lead to greater learning or make individuals more careful in processing information. The authors did find, however, that enthusiasm led to greater campaign involvement. It would be worthwhile to investigate under what conditions anxiety or enthusiasm lead to protest participation. Indeed, this dual system of emotion approach suggests a more complex set of relationships, with different emotion systems having different impacts not only on the expression of feelings but on various aspects of cognition and behavior (Marcus, 2003).

People are continuously evaluating or "appraising" the relevance of their environment for their wellbeing and appraisals help account for different emotions (Arnold, 1960). Lazarus (1966) proposed the distinction between "primary appraisal" of an event's implications for one's wellbeing and "secondary appraisal" of one's ability to cope with the situation. After a fast and automatic evaluation of the first two appraisal dimensions that establish the impact of the event on the person's general wellbeing, the other appraisal dimensions are evaluated: How does the event influence my goals? Who or what caused the event? Do I have control and power over the consequences of the event? Are the consequences of the event compatible with my personal values and (societal) norms? Two persons can thus appraise the same event totally differently and have different emotional responses.

A growing body of appraisal theories of emotions has emerged, each specifying a set of appraisal dimensions in an attempt to better predict the elicitation and differentiation of emotions (see Roseman et al., 1996 for a theoretical overview and integration). Nerb and Spada (2001) conducted three experimental studies to investigate the relation between the cognitive appraisal of environmental problems, the development of distinct emotions (anger and sadness), and the resulting action tendencies. The participants in their studies read a fictitious but realistic newspaper report about an environmental problem (a tanker running aground in a severe storm and spilling oil into the North Sea). Different experimental conditions were realized: (a) the tanker did not fulfill the safety guidelines; the damage could have been avoided (high controllability); and (b) the tanker did fulfill the safety guidelines; the damage could not have been avoided (low controllability). It turned out that the more controllable the event the angrier people were and important for our discussion, the more willing to participate in a boycott. However, if the participants were to believe that the damage could not have been avoided, they were sad, which did not translate into action preparedness.

Van Zomeren et al. (2004) also took appraisal theory of emotion as their point of departure, inspired by coping styles. Lazarus (2006) makes a distinction between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping. According to Lazarus (2001, p. 48), a person engages in problem-focused coping when s/he "obtains information on which to act and mobilizes actions for the purpose of changing the reality," while "the emotion-focused function is aimed at regulating the emotions tied to the situation." Van Zomeren and colleagues show that people taking the instrumental pathway to protest engage in problem-focused coping, while those taking the so-called group-based anger pathway engage in emotion-focused coping. In addition to emotional coping (i.e., emotion regulation) we emphasize another function in our work for how emotions impact on protest behavior. We hold that emotions function as *accelerators or amplifiers*. Accelerators make something move faster, and amplifiers make something sound louder. In the world of protest, *accelerating* means that, due to emotions, motives to enter, stay, or leave a social movement translate into action faster, while amplifying means that these motives are stronger (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009; Van Troost et al., 2013).

Appraisal theory was developed to explain personal emotions experienced by individuals. Yet, "the self" implicated in emotion-relevant appraisals is clearly not only a personal or individual self. If group membership becomes part of the self, events that harm or favor an ingroup by

definition harm or favor the self, and the self might thus experience affect and emotions on behalf of the ingroup. With such considerations in mind, Smith (1993) developed a model of intergroup emotions that was predicated on social identification with the group. Since collective action is by definition a group phenomenon and group identification appears to be an important factor in determining collective action, we will elaborate on the possible implications of group-based emotions on protest behavior.

The main postulate of intergroup emotion theory (as spelled out by Smith, 1993) is that, when a social identity is salient, situations are appraised in terms of their consequences for the ingroup, eliciting specific intergroup emotions and behavioral intentions. In three studies Mackie et al. (2000) tested this idea. Participants' group memberships were made salient, and the collective support apparently enjoyed by the ingroup was measured or manipulated. The authors then measured anger and fear, anger and contempt, as well as the desire to move against or away from the outgroup. Participants who perceived the ingroup as strong were more likely to experience anger toward the outgroup and to desire to take action against it. Participants who perceived the ingroup as weak, on the other hand, were more likely to experience fear and to move away from the outgroup. The effects of perceived ingroup strength on offensive action tendencies were mediated by anger. Results confirm that, when a social identity is salient, appraisals of events in terms of consequences for the salient ingroup lead to specific emotional responses and action tendencies toward the outgroup.

These studies suggest that the same emotion processes (i.e., appraisals, emotions, and action tendencies) operating at the individual level and in interpersonal situations operate in intergroup situations as well. Moreover, people do experience emotions on behalf of their group membership. Since intergroup emotion theory is based on the presumption that the group is incorporated in the self ("the group is in me," thus "I feel for us"), one would assume that the more the group is in me (i.e., the higher the group identification) the more people experience group-based emotions. Yzerbyt et al. (2003) showed that, indeed, emotional reactions fully mediated the impact of categorization context and identification on action tendencies. In other words, the salience of similarity was found to generate angry feelings among participants only to the extent that they strongly identified with the relevant category. Thus, people will experience group-based emotions when the social category is salient *and* they identify with the group at stake (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014).

Emotions can be avoidance or approach oriented. Fear, which makes people refrain from taking action, is an example of an avoidance-oriented emotion. Anger is an approach-oriented emotion and is known to be an antecedent of protest participation (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). There appears to be a relation between emotions and efficacy. When people do not feel efficacious, they are more likely to experience fear; feeling efficacious, on the other hand, is associated with experiencing anger (Mackie et al., 2000). Findings from our study among migrants confirm this: feelings of efficacy reinforced anger and reduced fear, while in their turn anger fostered protest participation, while fear undermined it (Klandermans et al., 2008). Van Zomeren et al. (2004) show that anger is an important motivator of protest participation of *disadvantaged* groups. Leach et al. (2006) examined readiness for political action among *advantaged* Australians to oppose government plans to redress disadvantaged Aborigines. They found that symbolic racism and relative deprivation evoked group-based anger, which in turn promoted willingness for political action. But advantaged group members can also perceive the ingroup advantage as unfair and feel guilt and anger about it. Anger related to ingroup advantage, and to a lesser degree guilt, appears to be a potent predictor for protest (Leach et al., 2006).

Anger, guilt, and fear are not the only emotions relevant in the context of movement participation; indeed other emotions such as hope and despair are proposed as well (Gould, 2008; Stürmer & Simon, 2009; Taylor, 2013). This work shows that anger moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities than subordinate emotions such as shame and despair (Taylor, 2009) or fear (Klandermans et al., 2008). In explaining different tactics, efficacy appears to be relevant, too. Anger is mainly observed in normative actions where efficacious people protest. However, in nonnormative violent actions, contempt appears to be the more relevant emotion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch et al., 2008). This suggests two emotional routes to protest (cf. Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010b): an anger route based on efficacy leading to normative action, and a contempt route when legitimate channels are closed (Wright et al., 1990a) and the situation is seen as hopeless, invoking a "nothing to lose" strategy leading to nonnormative protest (Kamans et al., 2011).

Finally, there is an inspiring social psychological emotion approach to outcome and/or effect studies of social movements. Tausch and Becker (2013) designed a two-wave longitudinal study in the context of student protests against tuition fees in Germany, which was conducted before and after collective action had resulted in both a success and a failure. They

examined how emotional responses to success and failure of collective action relate to willingness to engage in future protest. They seized the opportunity of successful and failed student protests to design a quasi-experimental "before" and "after" treatment field study. This design enabled them to examine how psychological reactions to the outcomes of collective action shape motivations to engage in future action.

This brief overview suffices to demonstrate that emotions matter. They warn people of threats and challenges and propel (collective) behavior. Indeed, demands for change begin with discontent. Moreover, affective measures, such as affective commitment (Ellemers, 1993) and affective injustice (Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Van Zomeren et al., 2008), have the largest impact on someone's (collective) behavior. As mentioned previously, phenomena such as moral shocks (Jasper, 1997) or suddenly imposed grievances (Walsh, 1981) are primarily approached from a cognitive point of view. Indeed, few researchers have paid attention to the complex emotional processes that channel fear and anger into moral indignation and political activity.

In closing this section, we want to allude to a potentially interesting direction research is taking. Rahn (2004) has argued that people also experience mood as a result of group membership. This so-called public mood provides feedback to people about how the group (i.e., the political community) is faring. Research has demonstrated that people in a positive mood display more self-efficacy, are more optimistic, and show more associative cognitive processes, while a negative mood, on the other hand, is related to higher risk perception, pessimism, and more rule-based cognitive processes (Forgas, 2001). In other words, the "emotional barometer" in a country might trigger different (risk) perceptions, cognitive styles, and emotions. This suggests that public mood might influence the claims social movement organizations make, the way problems are framed, the emotions that are experienced, and the motivations to participate in protest.

4.5 Social Embeddedness

Social embeddedness plays a pivotal role in the context of protest. Social embeddedness – the quantity and types of relationships with others – can have a form of formal relationships as in party membership or being a member of the labor union (cf. Klandermans et al., 2008), or informal relationships, such as friends, family colleagues, and virtual relationships such as active participation in blogs, on social media etcetera (Van

Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013). Networks provide space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of authorities, and provide a way for active opposition to these authorities to grow (Paxton, 2002). Discursive processes take place to form consensus that makes up the symbolic resources in collective sensemaking (Gamson, 1992b). The more political discussion occurs in social networks, the more people are able to gather information and the more they will participate in politics (McClurg, 2003). Klandermans et al. (2008) provide evidence for such mechanisms; immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to participate in protest provided that they were embedded in social networks, which offer an opportunity to discuss and learn about politics. People are informed of upcoming events and social capital as trust and loyalty accumulate in networks to provide individuals with the resources needed to invest in protest (Klandermans et al., 2008). Hence, in their networks people talk politics by which the factuality of the sociopolitical world is constructed and people are mobilized for protest.

The concept of social capital has important implications for advancing our understanding of the role of social embeddedness in protest participation. Lin (1999, p. 35) defined social capital as "resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions." Paxton (2002, p. 257) argued that associational life accumulates social capital, which "provides space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of the present government, and it provides a way for active opposition to the regime to grow." Exploring the impact of social capital takes into account the social context in which the decision to participate or not is taken. As a set of relationships, social capital has many different attributes, which are categorized into three components: a structural, a relational, and a cognitive component (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).

The *structural* component of social capital refers to the presence or absence of network ties between actors, and it essentially defines *who* people can reach. Structural social capital encourages cooperative behavior, thereby facilitating mobilization and participation. The *relational* component of social capital concerns the kinds of personal relationships people have developed through a history of interaction (Granovetter, 1973). It focuses on the particularities of the relationships people have, such as respect, trust, and friendship. The structural position may be necessary, but it does not appear sufficient to help individuals overcome the collective action dilemma. Relational capital implies *what* people are actually able to receive in terms of informational, physical, and emotional support. When trust is built between people, they are more willing to engage in

cooperative activity through which further trust can be generate (on trust: Lind & Tyler, 1988; on respect: Simon & Sturmer, 2003). The third – *cognitive* – component is defined as those resources providing shared representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning. It constitutes a powerful form of social capital in the context of protest, and, in fact, in politics in general, as Huckfeldt et al. (2013) argue. The cognitive dimension is in protest literature referred to as raised consciousness – a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of an awareness of similarity (Gurin et al., 1980). Consciousness raising takes place within social networks. It is within these networks that individual processes such as grievance formation, strengthening of efficacy, identification, and group-based emotions all synthesize into a motivational constellation, preparing people for action and building mobilization potential. Both resource mobilization theory and political process theory emphasize the structural component, the role of social networks, especially as mobilizing structures (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Kitts, 2000; McAdam et al., 1996). Social constructivist approaches put more emphasis on the relational and cognitive component.

Van Zomeren (2015) proposes to reconceptualize collective action as social interaction that *regulates* social relationships (i.e., which relationships are individuals regulating, and how?). He argues that this reconceptualization facilitates an integrative understanding of the different motivational profiles for activists and nonactivists and developed *a new relational hypothesis* about how nonactivists become activists. He argues that nonactivists turn into activists through two specific changes in relational models with one's ingroup and outgroup, authority, or system, in response to taboo violations in social interaction. These promising ideas are just waiting to be tested.

In a study on protesting youth we found the first empirical proof of these ideas (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). We compared participants and nonparticipants in street demonstrations of high school student protesting educational policy and assessed whether a pupil's social environment was supportive or unsupportive to participation and what the consequences are of such approval or disapproval. Our results show that most of the respondents stayed in line with their group norms. A large majority of the participants – 71 percent (first demonstration) and 75 percent (second demonstration) – came from *approving* milieus, while a large majority of the *non*participants – 62 percent and 66 percent, respectively – came from *disapproving* milieus. These diverging group norms influenced the dynamics of mobilization. First, pupils from approving milieus were

Table 4.2 *Regression of motivational strength on motives for nonparticipation*

	Nonparticipation 1st demonstration	Nonparticipation 2nd demonstration
My parents didn't allow me to go	.04	.07
No grievances	−.15*	−.17*
Not efficacious	−.25***	−.41***
Riotous atmosphere	−.05	−.01
Barriers	.05	.19+
R^2	.09	.12
N	218	195

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; standardized Betas.

more often targeted and influenced by significant others. Furthermore, pupils embedded in approving milieus were stronger influenced by friends, classmates, etc., than pupils embedded in disapproving milieus.

Table 4.2 shows that approving or disapproving social environments also influence the motivational dynamics of participation. The motivational patterns for participants and nonparticipants clearly differed depending on whether they came from approving or disapproving milieus. The patterns for the two demonstrations are fairly similar. Participants from approving milieus identify with other participants, are ideologically motivated, and, seeing how they rate the efficacy of the demonstrations, they are also instrumentally motivated. They are aggrieved and angry and are highly motivated to take part in the demonstrations. The opposite holds for nonparticipants from disapproving milieus. They do not identify with other high school students; they are neither ideologically nor instrumentally motivated. They are not aggrieved; they are not angry and are not at all motivated to take part in either demonstration.

Social psychologically more interesting are the participants from disapproving milieus and the nonparticipants from approving milieus. In the case of disapproving milieus, 29.3 percent for the first demonstration and 25.9 percent for the second demonstration deviated from the group norm and participated in one of the two demonstrations. In the case of approving milieus, 37.8 percent for the first demonstration and 34.5 percent for the second demonstration deviated from the group norm and did not participate. What are for these deviates – nonparticipants from approving milieus and participants from disapproving milieus – the motivational

dynamics that made them break with the norms of their milieu? Participants from disapproving milieus appear both ideologically and instrumentally motivated. That explains why they are relatively high on motivational strength. Nonparticipants from approving milieus in the first demonstration are low on all motivational variables. They are simply not motivated. Finally, nonparticipants from approving milieus in the second demonstration are low on identification with the high school students and low on ideological motivation. In sum then, ideological motivation and identification with other students or the lack thereof played an important role for those respondents who deviated from the norms of their group.

People's social environment is not a neutral mobilizing context. Occasionally it might be but more likely people are embedded in approving or disapproving social milieus. Indeed, most nonparticipants are from social environments that disapprove participation, while most of the participants are from approving environments. Approving and disapproving environments impact on the motivational drivers of participation such that people from disapproving environments are not motivated to participate. Yet, there are people who go against their environment: they participate or refrain from participating despite the norm in their social environment.

Our final words on social embeddedness are devoted to how the ever more individualizing and virtualizing world changes forms of connectivity and how that affects dynamics of contention. Various social media, such as Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, and Facebook, make it rather easy to be linked in a virtual network. Previously this was time-consuming and effortful and, thus, costly. Social media have given people a set of tools that allow them to create and find these groups. They reduce the costs of participation by lowering communication and coordination costs and facilitate group formation, recruitment, and retention. As such, they make organizing without organizations feasible (cf. Earl & Kimport, 2011; Klandermans et al., 2014; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). They can also foster collective identity across a dispersed population, as we could observe in the worldwide Black Lives Matter protests following the death of George Floyd, or, yet another example, the worldwide Ukraine-solidarity protests following the Russian invasion. Social media encourage the perception among individuals that they are members of a larger community by virtue of the emotions, grievances, and the feelings of efficacy they share. And, finally, they create networks. These sites – which have attracted millions of users worldwide since their introduction – make it possible to relate to people who share interests and activities across

political and geographic borders. What makes them unique is not that they allow individuals to virtually or in reality meet strangers, but rather that they enable users to publicly display their connections and make visible their social networks (boyd & Ellison, 2007). The internet and social media created a new virtual stratum; individuals move around in *virtual* networks in addition to (in)formal *physical* networks. This creates all kinds of new research questions for a social psychology of contention.

4.6 Motivational Constellations

In the former sections we discussed grievances, efficacy, identities, emotions, and social embeddedness. Strikingly, a comprehensive framework integrating them into a single model was lacking for a long time. Over the last twenty years, however, several scholars have attempted to build such models. The three models these authors have offered have in common that they distinguish various pathways to collective action. While Simon et al. (1998) distinguish an instrumental and identity pathway, and Van Zomeren et al. (2004) distinguish between an emotion- and a problem-focused pathway, Van Stekelenburg et al. (2009, 2011) and Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2014) distinguish instrumentality, identity, ideology, and anger as determinants of participation in collective action. Central to all three models are processes of identification; in order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions that characterize demand, a shared identity is needed. Similarly, all three models include an instrumentality component with efficacy as a key aspect. In this section we discuss these approaches which combine these concepts into dual pathway models (see Klandermans et al., 2008 for empirical evidence combining these explanations; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013 for a theoretical overview; and Van Zomeren et al., 2008 for a meta-analytical overview).

Simon et al. (1998) were the first to propose a *dual path model* to collective action participation. They distinguished between an instrumental pathway, guided by calculative reasoning that concentrates on the costs and benefits of participation and an identity pathway guided by processes of identification. The calculation pathway is represented by Klandermans' (1984) instrumental model. Identity is elaborated in the context of social identity theory and is conceived in terms of Tajfel's (1978, p. 63) definition of social identity: that is, the cognitive importance of the membership, the personal evaluation of the membership, and the emotional significance (Stürmer et al., 2003). Two levels of identification were measured. The

first concerned the broader social category from which a social movement typically recruits its supporters, the second the specific social movement organizations themselves. It was expected that identification with the social movement organization would be a better predictor than identification with the broader social category.

In a series of studies exploring participation motives for various movements, Simon and his collaborators find empirical support for their concept of a dual pathway to social movement participation (for an overview see Simon, 2004; Stürmer & Simon, 2004a). Be it in their previously mentioned studies of identification with the Fat Acceptance Movement (Stürmer et al., 2003), the older people's movement, or the gay movement (Simon et al., 1998), both calculation and identification made unique contributions to the prediction of willingness to participate. Rather than replacing instrumentality as an explanatory paradigm, identity added to the explanation as a second pathway. The studies clearly confirmed the hypothesized role of both instrumental and identity motives (Simon et al., 1998).

Interestingly, the notion of a dual pathway was also proposed by Van Zomeren et al. (2004) in their approach to collective action participation. These authors propose instrumentality and group-based anger as two pathways to protest participation. Central in their model are so-called group-based appraisals. On the instrumental pathway, *group efficacy* and *action support* play a central role. Group efficacy is the belief that group-related problems can be solved by collective efforts. When people take the instrumental path to political protest, they participate "for the purpose of changing reality" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 48). Collective action is seen as an instrumental strategy to improve the situation of the group. Action support implies the perceived willingness of other group members to engage in collective action. That increases a sense of efficacy.

In the group-based anger pathway, *unfairness* and *social opinion support* play a central role. In line with social psychological grievance literature, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) hold that people are more upset about unfair procedures than unfair outcomes. In addition to perceived procedural unfairness, social opinion support is proposed as a mechanism that helps to define the experienced unfairness as shared. Social opinion support refers to the perception that fellow group members share the experienced unfairness. Appraisals such as unfairness and social opinion support are believed to promote collective action because they evoke emotions such as anger. Action participation allows people to regulate their emotions through action, which makes participating in collective action with a group-based anger motive a goal in itself.

In our own work we combined instrumental, identity, and expressive motives with emotions. Thereto we integrated the three pathways that were accepted by social psychologists those days (instrumentality, identity, and emotions) into one single model. Moreover, we extended the model by adding an expressive pathway. This pathway refers to a longstanding theme in the social movement literature and to a recent development. In classic studies of social movements the distinction was made between instrumental and expressive movements or protest (cf. Gusfield, 1963; Searles & Williams, 1962). In those days, instrumental movements were seen as movements that aimed at some external goal, for example, the implementation of citizenship rights. Expressive movements, on the other hand, were seen as a goal in and of itself, for example, the expression of anger in response to experienced injustice. Movement scholars felt increasingly uncomfortable with the distinction, because it was thought that most movements had both instrumental and expressive aspects and that the emphasis on the two could change over time. Therefore, the distinction lost its use.

In our conceptualization we argue that expressive motivation refers to people's values and the assessment that these values have been violated (Kutlaca et al., 2019; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). A fundamental assumption on which this motivation relies is that people's willingness to participate in political protest depends to a significant extent on their perception of a state of affairs as illegitimate (see Van Zomeren et al., 2004), in the sense that it goes against fundamental values. An individual's personal set of values is believed to strongly influence how, for example, a proposed policy, its ends, and means, is perceived and evaluated. Values are matters about which people have strong feelings. They defend them and react strongly when their values are challenged (Feather & Newton, 1982). Indeed, "values are standards employed to tell us which beliefs, attitudes, values, and actions of others are worth challenging, protesting, and arguing about, or worth trying to influence or change" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 13). Participating in collective action is one of the possible reactions to a perceived violation of one's values.

The model we developed assigns a central, integrating role to processes of identification (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009, 2011). In order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions, a shared identity is needed (Figure 4.1).

The dependent variable of the model (*the strength of the motivation to participate in protest*) results from emotions and grievances shared with a group that the individual participants identify with. The more people feel



Figure 4.1 Integrative model accounting for protest motivation (*Source*: Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009; 2011)

that interests of the group and/or principles that the group values are threatened, the angrier they feel and the more they are motivated to take part in protest to protect their interests and/or to express their indignation. The model reveals that people participate in protest because they see it as an opportunity to change a situation they are unhappy with at affordable costs (*instrumental route*), because they identify with the others involved (*identification route*), or because they want to express their values and their anger with a target that violated their values (*expressive route*).

The importance of these concepts in explaining protest participation is also meta-analytically demonstrated. Van Zomeren et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of 172 independent studies and their findings entered the literature as the so-called SIMCA model: the Social Identity Model of Collective Action. Three areas of subjective perception are deduced from the social psychological literature on protest: perceived injustice, perceived efficacy, and a sense of social identity. At least three important conclusions can be drawn from this meta-analysis. First, senses of injustice, efficacy, and identity each have an independent, unique effect on collective action. Second, politicized measures of identity resulted in stronger effect sizes than nonpoliticized measures (cf. Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2004a). The third conclusion is that the affective component of injustice is more predictive of collective action than the cognitive component of injustice. This relates to another important development in the social psychological injustice and relative deprivation literature that shows the same, namely, that emotions play a crucial role in predicting collective action participation.

4.6.1 Motivations and Free Riders

In the beginning of this chapter, we discussed Klandermans' social psychological expansion of resource mobilization theory and, within that context, we referred to the debate about the free rider dilemma. Having discussed the three other routes to participation, we are able to reconcile the free rider debate. Within the instrumentality framework there are two ways to overcome the dilemma – selective incentives and optimistic but not too optimistic expectations about the behavior of others.

The identity, expressive, and emotion framework implies additional ways to overcome the free rider's dilemma. In all three frameworks the working of inner drives functions to neutralize the dilemma. In the case of identity, identification with others involved generates a felt inner obligation to behave as a "good" group member (Stürmer et al., 2003). These authors show that, when self-definition changes from personal to social identity, the group norm of participation becomes salient; the more one identifies with the group, the more weight this group norm will carry and the more it will result in an "inner obligation" to participate on behalf of the group. Expressive motives create a sense of inner *moral* obligation for reasons of moral integrity maintenance (Van Stekelenburg, 2013b). Maintaining one's moral integrity incites an inner moral obligation to oneself, as compared to an inner social obligation to other group members incited by group identification. Group-based anger, finally, points to emotion regulation or catharsis, yet another mechanism to overcome free riding. After all, "the emotion-focused coping function is aimed at regulating the emotions tied to the situation" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 48), and one way to regulate these personally experienced emotions is to participate in collective action. Therefore, emotion-focused coping makes free riding less likely, because one might take a free ride on the production of a *collective* good, but one cannot take a free ride on regulating one's own *personal* emotions. The free rider literature tends to focus on external pull factors, such as goal achievement and selective benefits, but neglects these internal factors that push individuals toward participation.

We close this section on motivational constellations with consensual issues. Consensual issues root in suddenly imposed grievances which evoke a communal sense of repulsion and indignation. Examples in place are the death of a child caused by drunk driving (McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996) or senseless violence (Lodewijkx et al., 2008; Walgrave & Manssens, 2000). Such tragic events crudely put consensual issues on top of public and political agendas, and discussions easily converge on a general standpoint.

Who, after all, can be against safe traffic or safe societies? This raises the question of why people would participate in so-called silent marches (for instance, following incidents of senseless violence). Findings indicate dual pathways to such marches, all associated with reactive, angry empathic concerns (Lodewijkx et al., 2008). These angry empathic concerns, on their turn, influence other-directed expressive motivation through (re-) establishing the belief in a just-world, or through more fearful, self-directed moral cleansing reactions. This notion of self-directed and other-directed motivation is interesting, and might also apply to solidarity protests (Klandermans et al., 2015; Stewart et al., 2016; Subasiç et al., 2008).

4.7 Why People Don't Participate

Social movements are made up of multiple collective actions. Why do some people participate in collective action, while others who are seemingly in the same situation don't? Interestingly, social scientists focused their attention almost always on the participant rather than the nonparticipant (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2014). Trying to understand why people take part in collective action was our aim, rather than why they fail to do so. And this while inactivism is the type of reaction to grievances or injustice that we observe the most. Moreover, it suggests that nonparticipation is simply considered the flip side of participation. We maintain that it is more complex than that. It was Verba et al. (1995) who once aptly concluded that people don't participate in political action because they *don't want*, because they *can't* or because *nobody asked* (our emphasis). Hence, one of the suggested ways to highlight why individuals don't participate is through looking at mobilization dynamics, as nonparticipants were apparently not convinced throughout the process.

Failing mobilization is an important reason why people fail to participate in collective action. Mobilization is a complicated process that can be broken down into several, conceptually distinct steps. Here we will discuss them briefly, to facilitate our argument of nonparticipation, whereas in Chapter 6, on Mobilization, we will elaborate on them extensively. Klandermans (1988) proposed to break the process of mobilization down into consensus and action mobilization. *Consensus mobilization* refers to dissemination of the views of the movement organization, while *action mobilization* refers to the transformation of those who adopted the view of the movement into active participants. The more successful consensus mobilization has been, the larger the pool of sympathizers a mobilizing movement organization can draw from. This makes failed consensus

mobilization an obvious reason for nonparticipation. Individuals might lack sympathy for the movement's cause from the beginning, thus they have no reason to join forces, especially if repression has existed for long, nourishing fear and apathy within people, as our PhD student, Fatma Khalil, shows in her studies on Egypt.

Compared to consensus mobilization, action mobilization is a short-term process. Organizers do not take years to stage some collective action. An action mobilization campaign doesn't usually last long enough to encompass consensus mobilization. As a consequence, the degree of success of the consensus mobilization campaign defines the limits of the action mobilization campaign. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) broke down the process of action mobilization into four separate steps: (1) people need to *sympathize* with the cause, (2) they need to *know* about the upcoming event, (3) they must *want* to participate, and (4) they must be *able* to participate. Each step brings citizens closer to participation in collective action. With each step people drop out and, thus, *fail* to participate eventually. The first step – the number of sympathizers – accounts for the results of consensus mobilization. It distinguishes the general public into those who sympathize with the cause and those who do not. A large pool of sympathizers is of strategic importance, because for a variety of reasons many a sympathizer never turns into a participant. The second step is equally obvious as crucial; it divides the sympathizers into those who have been the target of mobilization attempts and those who have not. Targeting sympathizers is easier said than done. How does one know who are the sympathizers and where they can be found? Chances that an individual will be targeted depend on how s/he is embedded in the social and organizational networks of society. People who are not embedded in organizers' networks are less likely to be targeted than those who are embedded in those networks. The third step concerns the social psychological core of the process. It divides the sympathizers who have been targeted into those who are motivated to participate in the specific activity and those who are not. Absent grievances or the feeling that nothing can be done are potent reasons to refrain from any action. As collective action presupposes shared grievances, some degree of identification is needed for shared grievances to evolve. Therefore, the development of some collective identity is crucial. Note, that it concerns motivation to engage in a specific activity. An individual citizen might be motivated to take part in the one activity (e.g., signing a petition) but not necessarily in the other, for instance, taking part in a street demonstration. Unappealing activities are major reasons to defect. Finally, the fourth step differentiates the people

who are motivated into those who eventually show up at the event and those who do not. This last step is a thorny one. What is an organizer to do in such a case of nonparticipation? The person is sympathizing with the cause; has been targeted, is motivated; yet fails to participate. Organizers might try to take barriers away; they may try to foster people's motivation, and they may try to influence people's social environment. The net result of these different steps is some (usually small) proportion of the general public that participates in the collective action. With each step smaller or larger numbers drop out, but the better the fit between people's desire to act and the opportunities offered the smaller the number of dropouts.

This last step, where individuals might have failed to overcome barriers toward participation, also shows how the context can hinder activism through curbing the efforts, for instance in the case of repression, of those interested individuals who are willing to participate. Hence. different structural and/or contextual factors can increase the cost of participation considerably that individuals consciously choose to stay inactive. For instance, the closeness of the political system, its high ability of oppression, and the absence of strong allies for the different contentious movements/groups pose major threats on individuals for being active (Tarrow, 2011). Using indoctrination as a tool for repressing citizens tend to succeed through manipulating some human tendencies, using them in favor of sustaining inactivism. Tendencies such as the belief in a just world, and the belief in social dominance (assumption of the legitimacy of hierarchy and status differences) affect the cognitive and affective processes upon which people decide to stay aloof (Jost & Burgess, 2000). Individuals need to believe in the goodness and justice of the surrounding world "so that they can go about their daily lives with a sense of trust, hope and confidence" (Lerner, 1980) p. 14). This pushes them toward justifying the existing system, not to break their perception of its goodness (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000). The same happens with their acquired belief that hierarchy, social dominance, and differences among groups are normal through constant social indoctrination (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). These tendencies, in turn, subside any motive for protest participation and keep many citizens inactive.

What further encourages individuals to remain politically inactive is fear (Khalil et al., under review). Fear is a strong emotion that pushes individuals away from any action that might bring about uncertainty (Klandermans et al., 2008). Individuals need to feel in control, reducing any feelings of uncertainty and threat, which pushes them to appreciate the world as it is. This includes defending the existing system for being

structured, predictable, stable, and unthreatening (Rankin et al., 2009). The end result is having those suffering from the existing system defend, rationalize, and justify the status-quo, eliminating any feelings of injustice and discomfort they suffer from or any probable willingness they might have to change the status-quo. Kay and Jost (2003) go further with the metaphor of "sour grapes & sweet lemons" to explain how individuals train themselves to embrace the idea that repressed and deprived individuals are actually happier than those unrepressed and rich. Although being inactive while endorsing such tendencies makes individuals enjoy a palliative effect, decreasing any sense of anxiety, still uncertainty and threat are not guaranteed to disappear. That's because threat is more related to repression, which makes it a continuous feeling for citizens under authoritarian regimes. This implies that a vicious circle starts where authoritarian contexts sustain individuals' uncertainty and threat feelings, even when they are not politically active.

In addition to failed mobilization, demotivating context being embedded in unsupportive social milieus plays a crucial role in nonparticipation as well (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2014). Individuals follow the members of surrounding social networks, family, friends, and colleagues (Raafat et al., 2009). Thus, individuals whose friends and family are inactive have a higher chance of not being a sympathizer, let alone a participant. We demonstrated these ideas empirically in our previously described study on protesting youth (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). Most of our respondents stayed in line with their group norms. That is, a large majority of the participants – between 71 and 75 percent – came from *approving* milieus, while a large majority of the *non*participants – between 62 and 66 percent – came from *disapproving* milieus. These diverging group norms influenced the dynamics of mobilization and motivation, in the section of social embeddedness of this chapter we described these findings in detail, for here it suffices to say that pupils from disapproving milieus were less targeted and influenced by friends, classmates, etcetera, than pupils embedded in approving milieus. Additionally, the social milieus influence the motivational dynamics of participation. Pupils from disapproving milieus did not identify with the demonstrators, were not aggrieved, were not angry, and were not at all motivated to take part in the demonstrations. The opposite holds for participants from approving milieus. In terms of nonparticipation, disapproving environments thus impact on the mobilizing and motivational drivers of participation, such that chances of participation reduce considerable.

4.8 To Conclude

The demand side of protest concerns the characteristics of the organizers' mobilization potential. Speaking of the dynamics of demand, we refer to the process of the formation of mobilization potential: grievances and identities politicize, environments turn supportive, and emotions are aroused. This implies that grievances must be translated into political demands. This is a process that is more complicated than one would imagine. A weakness of the social movement literature is the lack of theorizing and research into the dynamics of the demand side. This is partly because research on social movements usually starts too late to study the formation of mobilization potential, as the demand for protest has already materialized. But meanwhile, social psychological scholars began to empirically study group-based emotions and politicized collective identity, adding social psychological items to the toolkit – as witnessed by this volume.

Furthermore, in terms of formation of demand, the Internet and social media have become increasingly central to the formation of demand and the emergence of collective action. This changing form of connectivity affects the dynamics of demand dramatically. Take, for instance, identity formation, be it inductive or deductive, that seems to be changed considerably by social media. This raises questions on the sustainability of these identities and how they politicize, polarize, or radicalize. Social media can also foster collective identity across a dispersed population; they encourage the perception among individuals that they are members of a larger community by virtue of the emotions, grievances, and the feelings of efficacy they share. Facilitated by social media, conflicts literally thousands of kilometers away might politicize identities at home as well. Indeed, the death of George Floyd politicized identities worldwide, creating "explosive import products," leading to Black Lives Matter protests all over the world. All in all, the changing form of connectivity facilitated by social media creates all kinds of new research questions for the dynamics of demand and, thus, the development of a mobilization potential.

Understanding the dynamics of the demand side of protest and, thus, the development of a mobilization potential, is a showcase of our social psychological approach to contention. We focus on subjective variables and take the individual as its unit of analysis. As such, it distinguishes itself from sociological and political scientific work on contention. Sociologists and political scientists typically analyze the meso- and macro-level and employ structural approaches. The social psychological approach takes the

micro-level as the point of departure and concentrates on questions of how individuals perceive and interpret these conditions and focuses on the role of cognitive, affective, and ideational roots of contention.

Note that we take the mobilization potential *not* the general population as our point of reference in the demand of protest. As it concerns mobilization, a mobilization potential is never fully converted into action. In fact, the mobilization potential is the result of the combined impact of *consensus formation* and *mobilization*. Mobilization presupposes actors that set out to organize and mobilize. Such actors put a lot of effort in *consensus mobilization*, that is, disseminating their views and in gaining support for it, but whether the frame resonates, that is, whether people are susceptible for the frame that organizers try to disseminate, depends also on the more diffuse process of *consensus formation* as it takes place in the networks of everyday life. *Action mobilization*, that is, the transformation of potential into action, is a process that is both analytically and empirically to be distinguished from the formation of that potential.

We argue that insight in the composition of mobilization potential is needed in order to assess which part of a movement's potential ends up in the demonstration, and thus for dynamics of mobilization and supply of protest. Indeed, the composition of a mobilization potential has all kinds of implications for the chances of the supply-side of protest and the process of mobilization to be successful. The challenge of the study of the supply-side of protest and of the mobilization process is to try to understand who of the mobilization potential ends up participating, how (s)he is mobilized, and why (s)he takes part (see also Boekkooi et al., 2011). Klandermans' work on the peace movement with Dirk Oegema (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994) demonstrated that non-conversion and erosion – as they labeled it – is not random. Depending on the composition of mobilization potential, matters such as communication channels, multi-organizational fields, action repertoires, etc. vary. In Chapter 5 on the Dynamics of Supply, and Chapter 6 on Mobilization we will delve more into these thorny issues.

CHAPTER 5

Dynamics of Supply

Dynamics of supply are about social movement organizations and the opportunities to act they stage. Dynamics of supply in our framework concern opportunities offered to citizens to vent their grievances. Supply is the counterpart of demand without which no protest activity would materialize. However, this is not all there is to say. To be sure, social movements consist of fields of connected organizations but at the same time are what Gerlach and Hine already in 1970 referred to as loosely coupled networks. Social movements are networks of networks (Neidhardt, 1985). It has always been that way, but with the arrival at the scene of the Internet and social media the dynamics of supply has expanded dramatically. Obviously, the opportunities offered will have diverging shapes – street demonstrations, petitions, site occupations, strikes, boycotts, active involvement in a social movement organization, etc. and, therefore, people's readiness to participate varies. Note that it is not only activities that vary, the collective action frames movement organizations advocate vary as well.

Social movement organizations are more or less successful in satisfying demands for protest participation, and we may assume that movements that are successfully supplying what potential participants demand gain more support than the movements that fail to do so. Movements and movement organizations can be compared in terms of their effectiveness in this regard. This is not to say that it is easy to assess (Giugni, 1998; Giugni et al., 1999). Measures of effect differ (e.g., impact on and access to polity, impact on public opinion, attention of mass media) and movement organization's effectiveness can also be assessed on its ability to provide selective incentives (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oliver, 1980). Nonetheless, movement organizations try to convey the image of an effective political force. They can do so by pointing to the impact they have had in the past, or to the powerful allies they have. Of course, they may lack all this but, then, they might be able to show other signs of strength. For instance, a

movement may command a large constituency, as witnessed by turnout on demonstrations or by membership figures or large donations. It may comprise strong organizations with strong charismatic leaders who have gained respect, and so on.

An important element of the supply side of participation is the provision of information about the behavior of others. Social networks – real and virtual – are of strategic importance in this respect, because it is through these networks that people are informed about the behavior or intentions of others (Kim & Bearman, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994; Passy, 2001, 2003). In his paper on the Chinese student movement of 1989, Zhao (1998) gives a striking illustration of this mechanism. He describes how the ecological circumstance that most students in Beijing live in the same part of town made the success of the movement in terms of mobilization visible in the streets in front of the dormitories. It goes without saying that in these days of the virtual world, social media such as Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok do the same (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). We will discuss social networks as a part of social capital in Chapter 6 on mobilization.

Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one's group. This is most attractive if people identify strongly with their group (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004b). Interestingly, these studies show that identification with the more exclusive group of movement participants is far more influential than identification with the more inclusive category. Indeed, in addition to the opportunity to act on behalf of the group, collective political action participation offers further constituents of identification, for instance the leader of the movement; the movement's cause; the people in the movement, the movement organization, or the group one is participating in. Not all these sources of identification are always equally appealing. Movement leaders can be more or less charismatic, or the people in the movement can be more or less attractive. Moreover, movements and movement organizations may be, and in fact often are, controversial. As a consequence, movement participants are frequently stigmatized (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006; Linden & Klandermans, 2006). Within the movement's network, this is, of course, completely different. There the militant does have the status society is denying him or her. Indeed, it is not uncommon for militants to refer to the movement organization as a second family, a substitute for the social and associative life society is no longer offering them (Orfali, 1990; Tristan, 1987). Movement organizations not only supply sources of identification, they

also offer all kinds of opportunities to enjoy and celebrate the collective identity, like marches, rituals, songs, meetings, signs, symbols, and common codes (see Stets & Serpe, 2019 and Stryker et al., 2000 for an overview).

Moreover, social movements play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). Rochon (1998) makes the distinction between "critical communities," where new ideas and values are developed, and "social movements," which are interested in winning social and political acceptance for those ideas and values. "In the hands of movement leaders, the ideas of critical communities become ideological frames" (Rochon, 1998, p. 31). Through processes such as consensus mobilization (Klandermans, 1988), framing (Snow et al., 1986), or dialogue (Steinberg, 1999), movements seek to disseminate their definition of the situation to the public at large. Such definitions of the situation have been labeled "collective action frames" (Gamson, 1992a; Klandermans, 1997). Collective action frames can be defined in terms of injustice – that is, some definition of what's wrong in the world; identity – that is, some definition of who is affected and who is responsible; and agency – that is, some beliefs about the possibilities of changing society. We may assume that people who join a movement or take part in actions staged by the movement come to share some part of the movement's ideas and values.

Social movements do not invent ideas from scratch; they build on an ideological heritage as they relate their claims to broader themes and values in society. In so doing they relate to societal debates that have a history of their own, and that history is usually much longer than that of the movement itself. Gamson (1992a), for example, refers to the "themes" and "counterthemes" that in his view exist in every society. One such paired theme and countertheme he mentions is "self-reliance" versus "mutuality," that is, the belief that individuals must take care of themselves versus the belief that society is responsible for its less fortunate members. In a study of the protests about disability payments in the Netherlands we demonstrated how in the Netherlands these two beliefs became the icons that galvanized the debates (Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996). While "self-reliance" became the theme of those favoring restrictions on disability payments, "mutuality" was the theme of those who defended the existing system. Another example is what Tarrow (1998) calls "rights frames": human rights, civil rights, women's rights, animal rights, and so on; in other words, collective action frames that relate a movement's aims to some fundamental rights frame. For decades Marxism has been such an ideological heritage movement identified with, positively by embracing it,

or negatively by distancing themselves from it. In a similar vein, fascism and Nazism form the ideological heritage right-wing extremism must come to terms with, either by identifying with it or by keeping it at a distance.

Roggeband and Duyvendak (2013) raise the question of whether the supply-side of mobilization has changed over the last decades, due to "(1) the emergence of 'light' communities, which results from processes of individualization and globalization and are facilitated by the proliferation of the Internet; (2) the shift from identity politics to light identities and issue-oriented politics; and (3) the homogenization of light communities, which may lead to processes of exclusion and the reproduction of inequalities" (p. 95). The authors observe that traditional networks and organizations (political parties, unions, churches) have lost much of their mobilizing force in many Western countries. More "porous" bonds (Wuthnow, 1998) and a dissolving civil society (Putnam, 2000) produce lighter communities. Whereas greedy or heavier institutions and communities created strong bonds and loyalties and promoted strong socialization processes resulting in profiled collective identities. These light communities are far more informal, open, temporary, and flexible, resulting in loose ties, short-term engagements, and lower identification (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp, 2004). The clearest example of such a global fluid system is the Internet and social media, which has resulted in an increasing pervasiveness of virtual networks in sociopolitical life. The authors hold that these are one of the clearest examples of the new light communities to which they refer (Wellman & Gulia, 1999; Wellman et al., 2001). The authors argue that more and more people avoid heavy, long-term engagements and leave more formal institutions for looser engagements in informal, sometimes temporarily, or issue-specific networks (Schudson, 2006).

If such changes are taking place what, then, would that mean for the Multi Organizational Field (MOF) of social movements, which turn into a fluid configuration of loosely coupled groups and individuals? And what are the consequences of the digitalization and hybridization of networks for (collective) identities. Both the old and new social movements were strongly identity based (workers, women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians) and, therefore, unintentionally reinforced ethnic, gender, sexual, and class boundaries. New networks such as the global justice movement are more often issue-based and allow for a more diverse constituency. This change from identity politics to issue politics also implies a change from strong (collective and organization) identities and more greedy and intensive forms of participation toward lighter identities and looser, less obliging forms of participation and strategy. The supply-side of protest may, thus,

become more diverse and invaded by a wide range of different actors, organizational forms, and repertoires.

This chapter will be about the supply side of collective action and the way it impacts on participation. We will discuss how the issues the actions are aiming at and the various forms they might take impact on their appeal to potential participants. Next, we will introduce the concept of multi-organizational field (from now on MOF) and discuss what role embeddedness in MOFs plays. We will close the chapter with a discussion of the mechanisms at work in the supply side of protest, that is, embeddedness and patterns of identification. We will argue that linked to embeddedness are patterns of identification which make people more or less susceptible to the appeals of the one social movement organization rather than the other.

5.1 Issues and Multi-organizational Fields

Two prominent supply factors are the *issues* of the collective action and the *organizational fields* the movement organizations are embedded in.

Issues: Different protest issues appeal to different people (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014). Verhulst defines issues as "subjects, processes or situations that affect particular groups in society," which, through these group's shared interpretations of these problems and the grievances they evoke, have the potential to mobilize these groups into action (Verhulst, 2011, p. 20). He makes a distinction between "particularistic" and "universalistic" issues. Particularistic issues concern the interests of a specific group (cf. a raise of registration fees for university students, or a cut on health care for health care workers). Typically, particularistic issues bring people who are affected by the issue onto the streets. Universalistic issues, on the other hand, have a much broader scope (e.g., global warming, racism, peace), they concern whole populations or segments of a population, while their grievances deal with moral, cultural, and lifestyle issues. Obviously, different issues attract different people. A demonstration against abortion, a demonstration against raising registration fees, a strike in response to lay-offs, Occupy–all draw significantly different individuals into action.

Together with our Spanish colleagues (Sabucedo et al., 2017), we provided empirical proof for this. We studied the organizers and their claims in anti-austerity demonstrations surging through Spain in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Since the financial crisis started, governments have instituted unpopular austerity measures, generating what Bergstrand (2014) calls "loss" or "commission" based grievances.

That is, grievances based on the loss of something valued by the actions of some authority. We argued that those anti-austerity mobilizations could be divided into two categories depending on their claims and organizers. On the one hand, there are those mobilizations addressing particular issues, making opposition against specific austerity measures taken by the national government or under demand of European Union requirements (opposing a new labor reform, protesting specific cuts in education, health system, etc.). These mobilizations, referred to as particularistic, were organized mostly by trade unions (traditional social movement organizations), characterized by a traditional leadership in a top-down manner. Consequently, the leadership of the unions framed the issue, formulated the claims, built coalitions, and assembled mobilizing structures (Boekkooi et al., 2011). They protest particular problems, but do not question the system which they are part of.

On the other hand, there are those mobilizations against the state that take those austerity measures. They are protesting behind more fundamental claims, questioning the legitimacy of the government. These types of universalistic demonstrations are represented by Occupy/*Indignados* demonstrations, which have a different organizational structure, without obvious leaders, and without a link to traditional political parties and social movement organizations (e.g., Manilov, 2013). They are less defined than the labor unions, and open to several ideologies and social classes. As they define themselves: "We are ordinary people devastated by a crisis we did not cause. Our political elite has chosen to protect corporations, financial institutions and the rich at the expense of the vast majority" (Occupy London, https://occupylondon.org.uk/). Occupy/*Indignados* question not only the austerity measures but all the establishment actors (traditional left- and right-wing parties and unions) and develop new forms of participation, such as the occupation of public squares. They are mobilized by universalistic claims and attract a much more diverse population into their protests (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2016).

Note that these different organizers with their different claims brought different crowds to the streets (cf. Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014). Even though the grievances were based on the same issue, that is, anti-austerity measures, some organizers framed their claims around these measures, while others focused their attention on the governments and systems initiating the measures. In this study we show that the relation between the demand and supply of politics is highly dynamic. In Spain in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the mobilizing context comprised of different organizers who supplied opportunities to protest. They emphasized different aspects

around the same issue. These diverging claims on their turn resonated with a different segment of the mobilization potential and thus brought a different segment of the demand of protest onto the streets.

Multi-organizational Fields: Movement organizations are embedded in MOFs (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973; Klandermans, 1992). MOFs can be defined as the total possible number of organizations with which the movement organization might establish specific links. A social movement organization's MOF can be broken down into sectors that are supportive, antagonistic, or indifferent. The first we describe as the movement organization's alliance system, consisting of groups and organizations that support it; the second as the organization's conflict system, consisting of groups and organizations that oppose it – including countermovement organizations. Alliance systems provide resources and create political opportunities; conflict systems drain resources and restrict opportunities. The boundaries between the two systems remain fluid and may change during events. Organizations that tried to keep aloof from the controversy may choose or be forced to take sides. Coalitions can fall apart and former allies can become opponents.

The composition of a movement's organizational field is not random but relates to existing social cleavages in a society (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), be it class, religion, ethnicity, Left–Right affiliation, or the environment. Long before a controversy develops into an open conflict, various groups and organizations exist within a society, each with its own position and opinion. Depending on the issue one can predict which groups and organizations will end up at what side of the controversy (Verhulst, 2011). Take the class cleavage. At the one side of the class cleavage are the workers in various categories, the labor unions, workers' parties such as socialist parties, and social democratic parties. At the other side are the employers/the capitalists, employers' organizations, and conservative parties. When a social movement organization and its allies begin to mobilize, chances are that in response its "natural" opponents begin to mobilize as well. Cleavages, therefore, operate as fault lines along which opposing identities and grievances emerge and organizational fields break up, cleavages thus generate both a demand and supply for protest. Social cleavages are more or less salient at different points in time and in different countries. This reflects in the issues participants are mobilized for (Verhulst, 2011). The cleavage an issue is rooted in defines along which fault lines people tend to mobilize. People and organizations position themselves, the MOF polarizes, while initially indifferent organizations and individuals (are forced to) take sides.

We revealed empirically that social cleavages and protesting crowds align (Damen & Van Stekelenburg, 2019; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014). The alignment gets materialized in terms of the three crucial elements identified by Bartolini and Mair (1990) for a political division to be called a *cleavage*; that is social class, political values, and organizational embeddedness. The basic idea of a cleavage is that sharing a structural position in society (e.g., social class) aligns fears, hopes, and dreams into shared political norms, values, and interests. That is why social groups in society have shared norms, values, and interests, which may develop into collective demands. This is what we, in Chapter 4, describe as the demand side of protest. Important though, "cleavages cannot be reduced simply to the outgrowths of social stratification; rather, social distinctions become cleavages when they are organized as such" (Bartolini & Mair, 1990, p. 216). When people start to organize these groups or get organizationally embedded within these groups, the supply side of the cleavage forms. We argue that specific cleavage structures in society "bring" a specific demand and supply for protest on the streets.

To examine these ideas, we employed data from the *Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation* (*CCC*)[1] study, a comparative study of street demonstrations in eight European countries (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic). To test our alignment-hypothesis we used data based on nineteen bread and butter demonstrations and on sixteen sociocultural and political demonstrations out of four countries (The Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Great Britain) that were covered between November 2009 and June 2013. A total of 7,750 participants completed questionnaires distributed during these thirty-five street demonstrations. We compare the percentages of members in trade unions with members of new social movement organizations (consisting of women's, environment, LGBT, peace, anti-racism ,and human rights organizations). If crowds and cleavages align, we would expect that trade union members are overrepresented in anti-austerity demonstrations, while NSMO-members are overrepresented in sociocultural and political demonstrations. Table 5.1 shows that this is indeed the case. Of the participants in Anti-Austerity demonstrations (AA), 58.8 percent are members of a trade union, compared to 29.1 percent of the participants of the Social Cultural and Political demonstrations (SCP). Regarding the NSM organizations, this is the opposite: 48 percent of the participants of the SCP demonstrations are member of

[1] A detailed description of the project and its tools can be found in Van Stekelenburg et al. (2012).

Table 5.1 *Organizational embeddedness: Demonstrators' anti-austerity issues vs sociocultural and political issues (% membership)*

	AA	SCP	Total	T-value
Trade union	58.8	29.1	43.5	27.6**
NSM*	37.6	48.0	43.0	−9.4**
Women	6.2	6.2	6.2	.03ns
Environment	19.7	23.5	21.7	−4.0**
LGBT	4.3	6.2	5.3	−3.7**
Peace	19.1	23.6	21.4	−4.9**
Anti-racism	7.4	10.9	9.2	−5.5**
Human rights	14.4	18.7	16.6	−5.1**

Note: * NSM consists of membership of women's organizations, LGBT, peace, anti-racism and human rights organizations.
** $p < .000$.

a NSMO, while this is true for 37.6 percent of the participants of an AA demonstration.

These findings clearly reveal that cleavages and crowds align. Opinions about social issues develop within subcultures of groups and networks of individuals who already share many attitudes and agree on certain principles. Shared fate is a strong motivator. The direction in which these opinions develop suggests the initial contours of the MOF of a would-be challenger. Individuals, organizations, and groups may be antipathetic, sympathetic, or indifferent toward the issues at hand. In this situation, persuasive communication by a challenger resonates first among individuals from those sectors who have some sympathy or affinity for the challenger's viewpoint. Many a persuasive campaign never goes beyond these sectors.

Social Movement Industries: Different social movement organizations have different but overlapping conflict and alliance systems. The greatest overlap will exist among organizations from the same social movement industry (for instance the women's movement or the environmental movement), but organizations from different movement industries will also have overlapping conflict and alliance systems (for instance groups from the women's movement and the environmental movement may coalesce in anti-war protest). The specific makeup of the MOF will vary over time and with the particular movement and situation. The proportion of the field engaged in one of the two systems expands or contracts according to the cycles of protest. At the peak of a protest cycle initially

indifferent organizations can be forced to choose side, while in a downturn organizations may drop off. Although other movement organizations constitute a major part of the alliance system of a social movement organization, almost any kind of organization can become engaged in it: youth organizations, student organizations, women's organizations, organizations of conservationists, businesspeople, consumers, community organizations, as well as political parties, unions, churches, social welfare, and neighborhood organizations. The principal components of a social movement's conflict organization are its targets: governmental institutions, employer's organizations, elites, political parties, countermovement organizations, and so on.

The concept of MOF provides us with a way of looking at the mobilization of individual citizens (Fernandez & McAdam, 1989). Individuals are embedded in MOFs and, depending on their positions within these complex fields, they become a more or less likely target of mobilization attempts and thus involved in the events. The social construction of protest takes place within the context of a community's MOF – in the groups, networks, and organizations the MOF is composed of. It is there that grievances are interpreted, means and opportunities are defined, opponents are appointed, strategies are chosen and justified, and outcomes are evaluated. Such interpretations and evaluations are as a rule controversial. As a social movement organization competes to influence public opinion or the opinion of its constituency, its MOF determines its relative significance as an individual actor. Because of the complex makeup of MOFs, individuals are objects of persuasive communication emanating not only from movement organization A but also from competing organization B, opponent C, countermovement organization D, and so on. The individual's embeddedness determines what impact these different sources have.

5.2 Mechanisms Constructing the Supply

Now that we have introduced the key-factors at the supply-side of protest, we expand our treatment of the supply-side with a discussion of the mechanisms that construct the dynamics of supply. First, we will discuss *embeddedness* – citizens, networks, and organizations are embedded in MOFs. Depending on how they are embedded and on the characteristics of the MOF they are embedded in, the dynamics of participation vary. We will discuss how overlap between mobilizing structures and MOFs and the organizational density of the MOF influence embeddedness and,

therefore, participation. Next, we will discuss how supply factors influence processes of identification and vice versa how identification influences dynamics of supply. Finally, we will show how a varying supply of activities triggers varying responses.

5.2.1 Embeddedness

In the Fall of 2009 we surveyed a street demonstration in Rotterdam against a proposal by the Dutch government to restrict retirement rights.[2] Eighty-five percent of the participants were members of the labor unions that staged the demonstration, while 15 percent were not. A few months later we covered a demonstration against austerity measures in the cultural sector of the Dutch society. This time, we observed the opposite pattern. No more than 11.5 percent of the participants were members of organizations that staged the event while 88.5 percent were not. The literature on protest participation is very clear regarding the impact of affiliation to organizer networks on the dynamics of protest participation. Citizens who are affiliated to the networks of the organizers are likely to be targeted by mobilization attempts of the organizers, to be persuaded by their appeals, and to participate (e.g. Boekkooi et al., 2011; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014). But what if people are *not* affiliated? Fifteen of every hundred participants in the retirement demonstration and close to ninety in the culture demonstration were *not* affiliated to the organizers' networks. How did *they* got involved? Were they mobilized *without* organizations? These questions are especially interesting as it is suggested in the literature that mobilization without organization is the recruitment process of the future (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). These authors propose that increasingly traditional "collective action" mobilized via social networks and organizations is replaced by "connective action" mobilized via social media and virtual networks.

Why is it that some street demonstrations comprise more unaffiliated participants than other? We hold that this originates in two supply characteristics: (1) the extent to which the mobilizing structure organizers assemble overlaps with the organizational fields potential participants are embedded in; and (2) the organizational density of the potential the organizers are trying to mobilize.

Organizers forge mobilizing structures from the organizational fields in society (Boekkooi, 2012; McAdam et al., 1996). Theoretically, every

[2] This section is based on Klandermans et al. (2014).

citizen is unaffiliated to the organizers at the start of a campaign. They become affiliated because organizers assemble mobilizing structures which comprise organizations and networks citizens are embedded in. Boekkooi (2012) emphasizes that mobilizing structures are not given, but must be assembled over and again, although not from scratch as abeyance structures and existing organizations may function as starting nodes. Individuals who are not embedded in the parts of the organizational field organizers succeed to co-opt unwittingly end up remaining unaffiliated to the organizers (Verhulst, 2011).

At the same time, the organizational density of mobilization potentials varies. Next to formal organizations, informal, loosely coupled networks exist within a MOF (Diani, 2013). Such formal and informal structures serve as the connecting tissue between organizers and participants (Ohlemacher, 1996). Street demonstrations address issues and grievances the participants share. Some grievances may concern single-identities, others multiple-identities. Most single-identity protests are reactions to identity politics that affect specific groups – women, students, migrants, farmers, etc. Multiple-identity protests react to issues that affect a broad range of citizens – for instance, environmental issues, peace and war, or global justice. The single-multiple identity distinction is akin to Verhulst's (2011) previously discussed distinction between particularistic and universalistic issues. As they are not rooted in specific groups, multiple-identity protests tend to mobilize more heterogeneous, less densely organized crowds than single-identity protests. Therefore, we expected more unaffiliated demonstrators in multiple-identity protests.

We hold three mechanisms responsible for variation in the number of unaffiliated participants between demonstrations: (1) organization, (2) identification, and (3) communication. First, as mobilizing structures are assembled from the organizational fields in society, individuals who are little embedded in those organizational fields are more likely to remain unaffiliated. Second, unlike single-identity protests, multiple-identity protests have no reference to specific social groups; therefore they tend to comprise relatively high proportions of unaffiliated participants, The third and final mechanism focusses on persuasive communication, unlike densely organized mobilization potential where organizers can rely on closed communication channels, staging protest with loosely organized mobilization potential can, by definition, only rely on semi-open and open communication channels.

Regarding the first mechanism, we hypothesized and found that the less demonstrators are embedded in the multi-organizational fields of their

society the more likely that they remain unaffiliated to the mobilizing structures of the demonstrations. Indeed, 43.7 percent of those participants who are embedded in multi-organizational fields remain unaffiliated, as compared with 72.8 percent of those who are not embedded in the organizational fields of society. The odds that participants in ritual parades and especially participants in anti-austerity demonstrations remain unaffiliated appear much lower than those for participants in sociocultural demonstrations. That is, sociocultural demonstrations have the highest number of unaffiliated participants (65.7 percent), followed by ritual parades (49.3 percent) and anti-austerity protests (34.5 percent). This is what we hypothesized as we argued that ritual parades and anti-austerity demonstrations are more likely to mobilize densely organized mobilization potentials than sociocultural demonstrations. Ritual parades are staged by organizations that are historically associated with these events, such as unions, environmental organizations, women's organizations, and LGBT organizations.

Moreover, and testing the second mechanism of single- vs multi-identity protests, we found that anti-austerity demonstrations are more likely to be single-identity events that tend to be staged by identity organizations that defend the interests of the citizens affected by the austerity measures. Mobilizing structures that fail to comprise parts of a society's multi-organizational field and mobilization potentials that are sparsely organized are responsible for large numbers of unaffiliated demonstrators; mobilizing structures that overlap with a society's organizational field and encompass densely organized mobilization potentials make for low numbers of unaffiliated demonstrators.

Finally, for the third mechanism, we focused on the dynamics of persuasive communication. Unaffiliated and affiliated demonstrators were reached via different channels. Unlike affiliated demonstrators, who were primarily reached through closed channels, unaffiliated demonstrators were reached via open channels and to a lesser extent via semi-open channels. This has serious consequences for the dynamics of participation. As a matter of fact, unaffiliated protesters were reached later than affiliated protesters and decided later to take part in the demonstration. These findings replicate Boekkooi's (2012) study, which similarly reports that the timing of the decision to participate is related to the social distance between organizers and participants.

These days we see more and more organizing without organizations. Some organizers mobilize densely organized mobilization potentials, while others encounter potentials that are hardly organized. Much depends, of

course, on the coalition that organizers have been able to forge (Boekkooi, 2012). Mobilization without organization implies challenges for organizers. Our study suggests that they encounter that challenge more often than one is inclined to believe. Mobilizing densely organized mobilization potential requires other mechanisms in terms of organization, communication and identification than mobilizing sparsely organized potential. Social embeddedness of individual citizens and organizational density of mobilization potentials define the situation. Semi-open and open channels are more difficult to control. Organizers who misinterpret the situation underestimate the time needed to mobilize the constituency or might fail to mobilize substantial numbers. And, finally, mobilizing hardly organized potentials implies a process of collective identity formation which is bottom-up rather than top-down. Mobilizing sparsely organized potentials implies that one must calculate with strong identification with other participants and weaker identification with organizers. Let us delve a bit deeper into these different forms of identity formation and its consequences.

5.2.2 *Identity Formation*

Part of what organizers supply is constituents of identification. Politicization of identities is key to the dynamics of contention (McAdam et al., 2001). Salience of a collective identity does not necessarily make that identity politically relevant; collective identities must politicize to become the engine of collective action. Organizers do their utmost to make that happen (Van Stekelenburg, 2013a). Politicization of identities begins with the awareness of shared grievances for which an external enemy must be blamed. Next, claims for compensation must be leveled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues. If in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national government) or the general public, identities fully politicize (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Protest movements are built on politicized identities, and they are populated by people with politicized identities. Hence, politicization of identities is simultaneously a characteristic of collectivities *and* people.

There exists a division of labor between students of politicization of identities. Sociologists tend to study politicization at the collective level on the supply side of contentious politics, while social psychologists typically focus on the individual level of politicization at the demand side of politics

(cf. Klandermans, 2004). The politicization of the supply side of protest refers to the characteristics of protest movements. Is it a movement people can identify with? Is a movement able to frame personal problems into political claims? The politicization of demand refers to the potential of protestors in a society. It relates to the problems people perceive in a society and whether people attach political meaning to these problems. For a discussion of the politicization of demand we refer to Chapter 4 on the dynamics of demand and Chapter 9 on the process of the politicization of identity.

Here we elaborate the sociological approach to the politicization at the collective level on the supply side of politics, starting with Melucci. He conceived collective as an emergent group phenomenon. Melucci (1985) also defined a collective identity as: "an interactive, shared definition of the field of opportunities and constraints offered to collective action produced by several individuals that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals to groups" (p. 793). Hence, identity is not a given fact; identity is a practical accomplishment, a process. Identifying ourselves or others is a matter of meaning, and meaning always involves interaction: agreement and disagreement, convention and innovation, communication and negotiation (Jenkins, 2004; Van Doorn et al., 2013). Taylor and Whittier (1992) show how strong bonds existing in social networks contribute to the formation and politicization of collective identities. Within these networks, individuals come to see themselves as part of a group when some shared characteristic becomes salient and is defined as important. As a result, *boundaries* are drawn between "a challenging and a dominant group" (Taylor & Whittier, 1992, p. 175). These boundaries are not clear-cut, stable, and objectively given, but exist in the shared meaning attributed to group membership by group members. The second component is *consciousness*. Consciousness consists of both raising awareness of group membership and the realization of the group's position within society, in comparison to other groups. This position must be perceived as illegitimate or unjust to make group membership politically relevant. The third component is *negotiation*. Within their networks, people negotiate in order to change symbolic meanings of daily life's thinking and acting, "the politicization of daily life."

The politicization of identities unfolds as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group's relationship to its social environment. Hence, collective action can be an important instrument to change collective identities. As the Elaborated Social Identity Model

(Reicher, 1996a, 1996b) holds: "identities should be understood not simply as a set of cognitions but as practical projects." In this account, "identities and practice are in reciprocal interaction, each mutually enabling and constraining the other." In other words, collective identities are constantly "under construction" and collective action is one of the factors that shape collective identity. Taylor (2013) therefore conceives of social movements as *discursive communities* held together not only by common action and bonds of solidarity, but by identities, symbols, shared identity discourse, and practices of everyday life that attribute participants' experiences to particular forms of social injustice. In movements that frame injustice in terms of identity politics, *identity strategies* provide a crucial link between individual and collective identity (Taylor, 2013). Identity strategies include "individual or group disclosure of identity with the aim of producing change in how individuals understand and feel about their identity, in how the group is defined in the larger culture, or in the politics of state and other institutions" (Whittier, 2011). Politicization of identities and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group's relationship to its social environment, whereby the tactical choices are again shaped by identity (Polletta, 2009).

The fact that people have many collective identities raises the question of why some collective identities become central to mobilization while others do not. People have many identities that remain latent most of the time. Probably the most powerful factor that brings group membership to mind is conflict or rivalry between groups. Sociopolitical conflicts don't emerge randomly, but in the context of ongoing, unequal power relations rooted in structural and cultural cleavages in society. As we mentioned previously in the context of multi-organizational fields (MOFs), these cleavages operate as fault lines along which opposing identities emerge and organizational fields break up, and thus create a demand and supply for politics. Why do sociopolitical conflicts emerge in the context of social cleavages and, important for our discussion of collective identities, how do organizers seize opportunities to politicize their collective identity? This can be explained in terms of salience, embeddedness and shared fate, and movement–countermovement dynamics.

Salience: The more salient a cleavage, the denser the multi-organizational field linked to that cleavage and the more "ready" its mobilization potential is to act in response to that cleavage. In fact, the salience of a cleavage reflects a strongly elaborated supply and a well-defined demand of protest. Hence, identities rooted in cleavages are often organized identities

and organized identities are more likely to mobilize than unorganized identities (Klandermans, 2014). According to Klandermans and De Weerd (2000), this makes sense because being organized implies communication networks, access to resources, interpersonal control, information about opportunities when, where, and how to act, and all those other things that make it more likely that intentions materialize. Facilitated by a collective memory on who "we" are, what "we" are prepared to fight for, and, perhaps most important, how "we" usually take arms. That is why anarchists fight the police during summit protests while unionists strike in the face of factory closings and mass redundancies (Taylor, 2013).

Embeddedness and Shared Fate: Social cleavages may give rise to shared fate, because cleavages determine people's place in society (Simon, 2004). A place shared with others, which leads to shared experiences and grievances. People share interests and identify and associate almost exclusively with other members of "their" group. Hence, cleavages create "communities of shared fate" and "sameness" within cleavages and "distinctiveness" between cleavages, and as such create identities *and* opposing identities. The more salient a cleavage, the more organizers will attempt to politicize the shared fate of people embedded in that cleavage. Organizers play a crucial role in this transformation of "readiness" into action. In order to mobilize potential constituencies, organizers must develop master frames that link a conflict to "their" cleavage. Hence, organizers may frame the same conflict in different terms. Inequality, for instance, can be framed in terms of "class" or "ethnicity." The more salient a cleavage and the better organizers align the conflict to "their" cleavage – the more their frames "resonate" – the more successful their mobilization attempts. Traditionally, mobilization emerged around social divisions between class, religion, and region; separate collective identities emerged, and divided sections of political and social organizations developed. But Western societies have undergone far-reaching social and cultural transformations. In contemporary Western societies, traditional cleavages are replaced, complemented, or cut-across by new cleavages such as post-materialism versus materialism and the "winners" versus the "losers" of modernity. In addition to the "old" cleavages, new identities and grievances evolved around these new cleavages and politicized into new social movements.

Movement–Countermovement Dynamics: There is substantial evidence that cleavages alter conflict behavior via increased ease of identification and mobilization. The argument is typically given as follows. If conflicts flare up, the locus of self-definition shifts from "I" to "we" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The opposing groups develop their ideas and

actions in reaction to each other and the perceived opposition. Both groups assert that what "we" stand for is threatened by "them," tribute has been paid to ingroup symbols and values, and the outgroup is derogated. In such conflicts group members define themselves in (an opposing) relation to other conflicting groups. Take for instance the pro-life and the pro-choice movement and how they have "kept each other alive." Movement–countermovement dynamics can shape a movement's collective identity (Einwohner, 2002). First, the presence of powerful opponents makes identities more salient for activists. Second, polarization induces a strategic reformulation of "who we are." Einwohner (2002), for instance, shows how animal rights activists responded to opponents' claims that they were overly emotional by presenting alternate identity characteristics to the public, while in private they often embraced the "emotional" characterization. Thus, the more salient a cleavage the more polarized the multiple organizational fields and the stronger politicized its related collective identities (Damen & Van Stekelenburg, 2019).

Embeddedness is key in the dynamics of supply. However, the pace and global character of social change force us to be more reflexive about processes of action and embeddedness. In late modern societies people are becoming increasingly connected as *individuals* rather than as members of a community or group, they operate their own personal – physical and virtual – networks. Traditional "greedy" institutions such as political parties, trade unions, and churches which made significant demands on members' time, loyalty, and energy are replaced by "light" groups and associations that are less demanding, easy to join, and easy to leave. It is, thus, arguable that society is becoming increasingly organized around networked individuals rather than groups or local solidarities, and connections are more flexible than fixed. Despite this process of individualization, people in late modern societies *are* still committed to collective causes. Underlying this is what Lichterman (1996) calls "personalism": people feel a personal sense of political responsibility rather than feeling restricted or obliged to a community or group. Personalism affects the "greediness" of organizations or groups, because the individual rather than an organization or network determines the level of "greediness." Hence, concepts such as "traditional" versus "new," and "formal" versus "informal" do not automatically align with being either less demanding or greedy. In fact, some informal groups such as anarchist subcultures can be greedy, while membership of some formal traditional groups such as "checkbook membership" of political parties can be less demanding. So, what matters is the

strength of the identity rather than whether a group is traditional or "new," or formal or informal (Boekkooi, 2012; Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013). Although our understanding of the traditional collective identity–protest link is rather elaborated, it is unclear whether researchers should revise their understanding of collective identity and the supply of protest to meet these challenges.

5.2.3 A Study on Identity Formation

It is generally assumed that movement participation strengthens identification with the movement that is staging the protest (Klandermans, 2014; Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000; Simon et al., 1998). But what and who is the movement? The social movement organizations that are mobilizing, the fellow-participants with whom one is in the streets, or both? To answer these questions, we conducted research that shows how the dynamics of mobilization and participation influence identity formation (Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2019). A distinction between "top-down" and "bottom-up" identity formation proposed by Tom Postmes and colleagues (Postmes, Spears, et al., 2005; Swaab et al., 2008) might help us understand how.

In the case of "top-down" identity formation, a common identity is supplied by the organizer – for example, "union member" or "student" (a *deductive identity*). However, a collective identity may also emerge "bottom-up" from the interaction between like-minded individuals, sharing some grievance (an *inductive identity*). Although Postmes and colleagues studied identity formation in small groups, we assume that similar mechanisms apply for the crowds that populate street demonstrations. The distinction Postmes and colleagues introduced is akin to a distinction we make in our studies between identification with the organizers of a protest event and identification with the other participants. Identification with the organizers is a form of deductive identity formation, and identification with the other participants is a form of inductive identity formation. Top-down identity formation presupposes organizations that set out to mobilize. A movement organization reaches out to its supporters, fostering and shaping the supporters' collective identity. These are dynamics of mobilization. Bottom-up identity formation, on the other hand, can be characterized as dynamics of participation. It presupposes individuals who get together to express their indignation regarding some shared grievance or fate.

Protest events are rooted in social cleavages that sometimes have a long history, such as class or religion or, more recent, gender or "losers" and "winners" of globalization (Van Stekelenburg, 2013a). Such cleavages

might be dormant, but "real world incidents" might make them salient (cf. "Black Lives Matter"). During protest campaigns the cleavage becomes salient, the issue politicizes, and the political landscape is reshaped into allies and opponents. Organizations and individual citizens are forced to take side. In terms of identification, the process of politicization strengthens the identification with the organizers, the other participants, or both. We employed our Caught in the Act of Protest study (CCC) among 16,597 protesters taking part in eighty-one demonstrations in eight European countries to explore two possible answers to that question: do protesters identify with the organizers of the protest event and/or with the others taking part in the event? Two thirds of our respondents appeared to identify with the organizers. Three quarters identified with the other participants. Three-fifths of our respondents identified with both the organizers and the other participants. One-fifth of the demonstrators identified with the other participants only, while a bit less than one-tenth identified with the organizers only. One-in-six of our respondents appeared to identify with neither the organizers nor the participants. They came with friends, relatives, or partners. In that respect, they were not different than other participants. Yet, they failed to identify with the two constituents of identification included in our study.

We argued that, in terms of how they are formed and function, the two types of identification are qualitatively different. Identification with the organizers is formed in a top-down manner. An organization of whom someone is a member reaches out to mobilize the membership. The participant brings that identity to the protest event. They identify with the organizers to begin with. In turn, the mobilization campaign reinforces the strength of identification. Next to the motivation that brings people to the streets, the embeddedness in networks of the mobilizing organization (s) brings people to the demonstration. Identification with the other participants, on the other hand, is formed in a bottom-up manner. Individuals who share grievances come together and take part in a street demonstration. While they are taking part in the demonstration an activist identity emerges. For them it is predominantly the shared grievances that brought them to the streets. Hence, depending on the constituent of identification, the factors which strengthen identification vary. Organizers are visible actors that have a history. Depending on that history and the relationship the protester feels (i.e., the embeddedness) they are more or less appealing to would-be participants. In that sense identification with the organizers is a matter of social embeddedness. Participants are far more diffuse as an identifying object. In fact, until the actual

demonstration takes place it is difficult to know who will participate and what that means in terms of identity formation but one thing is clear, they care for the case as well, hence there is shared fate to begin with. In that way, identification with the other participants is a matter of shared fate. For organizers this is an important message: for their own constituency it is mainly social embeddedness that strengthens the identification, whereas for the larger population it is shared fate.

Identification is a matter of inclusion and exclusion, as we already mentioned in Chapter 4 on demand (see also Roggeband & Duyvendak, 2013). In the process of identification, a person engages with a certain community and distances him/herself from others. In the context of societal conflict, identification inevitably implies taking a side. The organizers of a demonstration might estrange potential participants. People who are not a member of the mobilizing organization or who decline identifying with that organization might stay away from the demonstration, although they sympathize with the goals. Similarly, people might stay away from a demonstration because of the reputation of the organizers. Moreover, as demonstrations may result in confrontations with the police people may decide to stay home, again despite their sympathy for the goal. Hence, identity formation plays a crucial role in the answer to the question of who participates and who does not.

Identification is a crucial factor in theory and research on political activities. Knowing how it emerges is important for understanding the social psychological dynamics of protest. In an era where political protest has become common practice and part of everyday life, understanding how identification works and influences protest behavior is of great significance. Especially in times where we see more and more nonorganizational protests. For instance, how will inductive and deductive identification work for these organizers, that is, do identification processes differ if the organizational density of mobilization potentials varies? Although each demonstration has organizers and participants people can identify with, demonstrations are expected to differ in terms of patterns of identification. Future research could sort this out.

5.3 Opportunities to Participate

In real world events the supply of opportunities to take part in collective action comes in greater or smaller variety. Van Deth (2014), for example, distinguishes more than sixty different types of collective action. Each action carries its own cost–benefit balance and the fact that someone is

willing to take part in the one collective action does not mean that (s)he is willing to take part in any other action. This is neatly illustrated in a study we conducted a few decades ago among Dutch citizens who were persuaded to participate in protest against the deployment of nuclear weapons on Dutch territory (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994).

In the early 1980s, the Netherlands – and not only the Netherlands – was under the spell of cruise missiles. NATO's decision to deploy nuclear cruise missiles and Pershings II in Europe stirred European politics and the peace movement worldwide for quite some time. The Achilles heel of NATO's decision was that each European government had to decide individually whether and where to locate the missiles. This gave national movements a concrete goal – the prevention of the deployment of cruise missiles in their country and a target to concentrate on – the national government which would ultimately have to take a decision.

The movement against cruise missiles in the Netherlands comprised of four national organizations (The Interdenominational Peace Council, related to the protestant church; Stop the Neutron Bomb, related to the Communist Party; Pax Christi, related to the Catholic church; and Women for Peace) and a few smaller groups. Hundreds of active local action groups formed the base of the movement. As over half of the communities in the Netherlands had at least one active peace group, the movement had at its disposal a network extending into the furthest reaches of the country. Local action groups played a key role in the mobilization campaigns and were capable of mobilizing unprecedented support: 1.2 million signatures against the neutron bomb in 1978; 400,000 participants in an Amsterdam demonstration in 1981; 500,000 participants in a 1983 demonstration in The Hague; 800,000 participants in local peace week activities; and finally, 3.75 million signatures against the deployment of cruise missiles in 1985 (to appreciate these figures, the Netherlands had in those days a population of 14 million).

We researched the mobilization and participation of the second street demonstration in the Hague in 1983 as it evolved in *Smalltown*, a community south of Amsterdam, and the campaign for the petition in 1985 in four cities in the Netherlands.

5.3.1 *Taking to the Street*

As for the demonstration, we conducted telephone surveys among a random sample of the population of Smalltown in the week before the



Figure 5.1 Street demonstration 1983: Mobilization and participation

event.[3] Next to questions regarding mobilization and motivation, respondents were asked if they intended to participate in the demonstration. In a follow-up interview the week after the demonstration, they were asked if they had been to the demonstration. Figure 5.1 summarizes the findings in terms of four steps toward participation. An impressive three quarters of the sample sympathized with the cause, which made the cruise missiles close to a so-called consensual issue (Verhulst, 2011). One quarter did not sympathize with the issue – an obvious reason for nonparticipation. In terms of consensus mobilization, the cruise-missile campaign had been very successful, as the results of study of the petition-campaign to be discussed in Section 5.3.2 will confirm. To be sure, taking the next step toward participation the organizers failed to target part of those who sympathized with the cause. Nonetheless, in terms of mobilization effectiveness the campaign worked out very well; close to 60 percent of our sample was reached by mobilization attempts. The major drop-out we encountered in the next step on motivation: half of the sample did not intend to take part in the demonstration, leaving only one tenth of the respondents who were prepared to go to the demonstration. Eventually, two-fifths of those (4 percent of the sample) actually took to the street. This may seem little but note that it amounted to a demonstration of over 500,000 participants, the largest the country ever had.

An intriguing finding is the substantial number of those who intended to participate in the demonstration but failed to do so. Sixty percent of

[3] This section is based on Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg (2014).

those who said that they would go to the demonstration ended up not going. Compared to those who ended up going, those who stayed home were less motivated to begin with, but importantly their friends made the difference. If their friends were going, they were going as well. Apparently, it was people's friends who kept them to their promises. This finding alludes to the impact of someone's social environment on protest participation (see also Chapter 4, on the influence of approving and disapproving milieus on protest participation).

5.3.2 *Signing the Petition*

Two years later in the Netherlands the struggle was still going on. Rather than another demonstration, it was decided to organize a petition. We studied the petition-campaign, applying a slightly modified framework and design. The campaign for the petition was scheduled to start after Summer (August) 1985. We conducted telephone interviews with samples of citizens from four Dutch cities before Summer (late May/early June) and again in the first half of November when the petition campaign was over. Eventually, half of our respondents signed. One-fifth did not sign because they did not sympathize with the cause. The remaining 30 percent did not intend to sign or missed the opportunity to sign. Interestingly, 13 percent of our respondents (italics in Figure 5.2) changed their minds, they intended to sign before Summer but did not sign and no longer intended to sign after Summer.



Figure 5.2 Signing a petition, 1985

Before we comment on these findings, one more comparison is of interest, namely that between activities (demonstrating versus signing a petition). Not only is the proportion of people prepared to sign a petition much higher than the proportion of people who are ready to take part in a demonstration, the vast majority of those who were prepared to sign ended up signing. Indeed, the more costly activity of taking part in a demonstration generated much more defectors than the less costly activity of signing a petition.

5.3.3 Four Cities, Four Mobilizing Contexts

A major element of the petition campaign was the ambition to have "card-collectors" literally calling at every postal address in the country. It was estimated that some 30,000 card-collectors were needed for that. In that respect, recruiting card-collectors was a mobilization effort in and of itself (see Boekkooi et al., 2011 for a similar argument regarding a demonstration in 2003 against the war in Iraq). Some local groups were more successful in mobilizing card-collectors than other. The more card-collectors local organizers were able to recruit, the less sympathizers failed to sign because they were not targeted.

Built into our design was a comparison of four cities. We encountered three modes of nonsigning: (1) people who were from the very beginning unwilling to sign (opponents); (2) people who were initially willing to sign but changed their mind (erosion of support); and (3) people who were willing to sign but failed to do so (nonconversion of support). The three modes of defection varied between the four cities in a meaningful way, see Table 5.2 for an overview.

As a matter of fact, Zuiderstad had the most effective operation of the four cities, as evidenced by the very low level of nonconversion. Close to every person who intended to sign had the opportunity to do so.

Table 5.2 *Sources of nonsigning*

		Percent			
	n	Not prepared	+ Erosion	+ Nonconversion	= Nonsigning
All	224	31.2	+ 12.5	+ 8.3	= 52.0
Zuiderstad	62	24.8	+ 12.1	+ 2.8	= 39.7
Randstad	63	27.0	+ 10.4	+ 8.4	= 45.8
Kleinoord	50	30.0	+ 16.5	+ 12.3	= 58.8
Grootland	49	46.9	+ 11.2	+ 11.2	= 69.3

Grootland, on the other hand, failed to establish an effective organization. Consequently, it experienced a relatively high level of nonconversion. Kleinoord was the town with the most virulent countermovement which translated into a high level of erosion, that is to say, former sympathizers who changed their minds. The initial readiness to sign appeared to reflect the political composition of a town's population, as reflected in voting patterns. Of the four cities, Zuiderstad was the most oriented to the left, while Grootland was the most leaning toward the right. Therefore, much larger numbers in Grootland than in Zuiderstad were early on unwilling to sign. The result of these various mechanisms was that, in Grootland, 30 percent less of the sample signed the petition than in Zuiderstad. This alludes to the importance of supply factors in models explaining protest participation. Had we not taken the differences in first order mobilization card-collectors into our design, we would not have been able to explain the differences in outcome, signed petitions, in this study.

5.4 To Conclude

The supply side of protest acquires its meaning in interaction with the demand for such protest. Demand of protest is not sufficient reason for protest to emerge. As mentioned, demand and supply engaged in a multiplicative relation. Consequently, if one of the two is "zero," hence either no demand for protest or no supply to organize the protest, the result is zero and, consequently, there will be no protest. As it concerns activities like demonstrations or sit-ins in the open supply is the most visible part of collective action. And, therefore, it receives arguably the most scholarly attention. Supply takes all kinds of forms of activities, from peaceful to violent and from modest to massive. Not everybody is prepared to engage in any kind of activity. Nor is any activity equally efficacious. In that sense, the choice of a specific activity is a strategic choice.

Supply is the result of movement activity. Organizers join forces and make an effort to bring supply and demand together. Consequently, the supply side of collective action is not static or a constant. In fact, a mobilizing structure must be constructed again in every mobilization campaign (Boekkooi, 2012). McAdam et al. have defined this phenomenon as *mobilizing structures*, which are "those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 3). Mobilizing structures are the connecting tissue between organizers and participants.

It is often argued that the dynamics of supply are changing due to changes in the organizational embeddedness and virtualization. Yet, there is still a lot to be understood. Take Minkoff (2013), who maintains that the relevance of such changes for transforming potentiality into action continues to merit greater specification. In her own words:

> Whereas the idea of a secular shift from the dominance of formal organizations to more informal/loose networks, with an attendant move from strong collective/organizational identities coupled with more greedy/intensive forms of participation to "lighter" identities and looser/lower cost kinds of involvement (note the many analytic conflations), there is by no means a consensus on this issue – or agreement about how this might matter for structure in action. (p. 198)

However, as Minkoff continues

> There is, in contrast, more agreement that the spread and increased deployment of ICTs by social movements needs to be taken into account in theorizing contemporary activism. But, if we are focusing on the supply side of mobilization, the relevant question seems to be: how do ICTs function with respect to supplying social movement activities to aggrieved groups? Do they serve as a unique infrastructure for mobilizing individuals, creating new or reinforcing existing collective identities, and/or providing new opportunities for engagement and forms of action?

Further, are the mechanisms by which they serve these functions substantially different from the mechanisms by which informal networks and formal SMOs promote collective identities and political action, either via face-to-face interactions or more mediated ones? Although virtual networks are unlikely to create solidarity and purposive commitment to the same extent as being in the trenches, they can get people there, a starting point for the processes of grievance definition, collective identity formation, and joint action that are integral to sustained social movement activity. Further, in the absence of access to "the trenches," ICTs can provide meaningful, if primarily symbolic, opportunities for affiliation and creating activist identities. Finally, Minkoff argues, there is also a pressing need for systematic empirical studies on exactly how new technologies matter. The link between such collective identities and collective action, and the role that ICTs play in mobilization, remain critical areas of comparative analysis. We could not agree more with Minkoff and maintain that focus on the individual as a unit of analysis and, thus, the toolkit of the social psychology of protest might be of help here.

CHAPTER 6

Dynamics of Mobilization

Mobilization is the process that gets a movement going and that links a certain demand for protest among the population in a country to a supply or offer in terms of protest opportunities in that country. Demand and supply would remain potentialities, if processes of mobilization were not to bring the two together. This makes it understandable why so much of the literature on social movements is devoted to mobilization processes. Yet, it would be a mistake to neglect demand or supply factors. Mobilization is only possible based on some demand *and* supply being developed in the course of time. If neither demand nor supply exist in a society, mobilization would be inconceivable and in vain.

An individual's participation in a social movement is the outcome of processes of mobilization. Within a society, consensus formation sets the stage for consensus mobilization. Together these two processes build a movement's mobilization potential for a specific issue. The more successful consensus formation and mobilization has been, the larger the pool of sympathizers a movement can draw from. In a final step, action mobilization turns sympathizers into participants. Each of these processes obeys a separate theoretical framework. In this chapter we will subsequently elaborate consensus formation, consensus mobilization, and action mobilization. In doing so, we will depart from the explanatory model along the lines of Coleman's boat, as introduced in Chapter 3.

6.1 Consensus Formation

We argue that people respond to sociopolitical circumstances as they perceive and interpret them. This reasoning is visualized by the solid arrow in Figure 6.1.

This is not to say that these perceptions and interpretations are the result of exclusively intrapersonal processes. To the contrary, they are more often the result of social rather than intrapersonal processes. Individuals are



Figure 6.1 Consensus formation: How individuals generate meaning

embedded in formal, informal, and virtual networks. It is in these networks that people talk politics (e.g., Gamson, 1992b; Saunders & Klandermans, 2019; Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013). These networks are in turn embedded in discursive fields. In discursive fields contested issues are debated and discussed among various sets of interested actors, via meaning-making processes such as framing and narration (Snow, 2004). Indeed, consensus formation is an embedded process that takes place through social interaction. We will argue that three levels of analyses are relevant for the study of consensus formation: the macro-, the meso-, and the micro-level. We describe, on the macro-level, how sociopolitical circumstances shape social cleavages in society that set the stage for intergroup conflict. Cleavages create discursive fields in which meaning is created. Discursive opportunities determine which meanings and ideas will be diffused in the public sphere and which not (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). On the meso-level, we will focus on the role of networks in generating meaning. Taylor (2013) holds that it is in such *discursive communities* where consensus formation takes place and individual grievances turn into shared awareness. Finally, we will devote attention to how individuals at the micro-level construct reality and develop a sense of shared awareness. To do so, we take a little detour to the social cognition literature – the study of the cognitive processes that are involved when we think about the social world.

6.1.1 Macro-level: Setting the Stage

Macro sociopolitical factors set the stage for consensus formation within certain social networks, of a common definition on a particular (supposedly unjust) situation. Sociopolitical circumstances shape social cleavages

in society that set the stage for intergroup conflict. Social cleavages may give rise to shared fate, because cleavages determine people's place in society. A place shared with others, which leads to shared experiences and grievances and thus shared meaning. Facilitated by a collective memory on who "we" are and what "we" are prepared to fight for. People share interests and identify and associate almost exclusively with other members of "their" group. Consequently, protests don't erupt randomly, but in the context of unequal power relations rooted in social cleavages in society (Kriesi et al., 1995).

Traditionally, sociopolitical conflicts evolved around divisions between classes, religions, or regions; fault lines along which opposing identities emerged and organizational fields broke up (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). But Western societies underwent far-reaching social and cultural transformations. Traditional cleavages were replaced, complemented, or cut-across by newly-drawn cleavages, resulting from schisms between "winners" and "losers" of modernization (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), globalization, and denationalization (Kriesi et al., 2008). Along these new cleavages, new identities and grievances developed and crystallized into organizational fields. These cleavages operate as fault lines along which opposing identities emerge and organizational fields break up, and thus create a demand and supply for politics. As such, cleavages create discursive fields in which meaning is made. Discursive opportunities create the boundaries of which meaning will resonate or not. Hence, cleavages create "communities of shared fate" and "sameness" within cleavages and "distinctiveness" between cleavages, and as such create identities *and* opposing identities, and thus opposing discursive fields.

Discursive Fields: Snow (2004) referred to the field in which contested issues are debated and discussed, via meaning-making processes such as framing and narration, among various sets of interested actors as "discursive fields." Discursive fields, like the kindred concepts of organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), identity fields (Benford, 2013), and multi-organizational fields (Klandermans, 1992; Rucht, 2004), are constitutive of the genre of concepts in the social sciences that can be thought of as "embedding" concepts in that they refer to broader enveloping contexts in which discussions, decisions, and actions take place and consensus is formed. Discursive fields evolve during discussion and debate, sometimes but not always contested, about relevant events and issues. These fields encompass cultural materials (e.g., beliefs, values, ideologies, myths) of potential relevance and various sets of actors (e.g., targeted authorities,

countermovements, media) whose interests are aligned, albeit differently, with the issues or events in question and who, thus, have a stake in how those events and issues are framed and/or narrated. These do not emerge randomly; normative themes and oppositional counterthemes (Gamson, 1992b) shape the discursive repertoire people draw upon and thus which narratives are appropriated in trying to make sense of their complex sociopolitical surrounding. Discursive opportunities, on their turn, determine which frames and narratives will resonate and, thus, how consensus is formed.

Discursive Opportunities: For protests to start, citizens must recognize political opportunities. This idea is at the roots of various recent theories of social movements. In Chapter 2, we described how the structural approaches took the mobilization of resource and political opportunities as the main predictors of protest. Koopmans and Olzak's (2004) discursive opportunity theory holds that political opportunities affect protest participation only when they are perceived as such by (potential) movement activists (see for a similar argument, Gamson & Meyer, 1996). This is in contrast to framing theory, which emphasizes the *internal* perspective of movements' own meaning-making strategies. Thus, as Koopmans and Olzak (2004) argue, framing theories have difficulty in explaining why some such strategies meet with favorable responses while others do not. In the public sphere, activists communicate messages to fellow activists and potential adherents, and they thereby gain crucial information about the actions and reactions of authorities, political opponents, allies, and sympathizers. To capture this role of the public sphere, and to link political opportunity structure and framing perspectives, Koopmans and Olzak develop the notion of *discursive opportunities*, defined as the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message's chances of diffusion in the public sphere. They distinguish three elements of discursive opportunity – differential public visibility, resonance, and legitimacy – that affect protest. They explore their ideas in Germany and examine how discursive opportunities amplify the rate of some types of radical right violence against some types of target groups while diminishing or leaving unaffected the rate of other types and target groups (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004).

To conclude, social cleavages and their related discursive fields set the stage for consensus formation delineated by discursive opportunities. Together they determine what consensus is searched and reached for where, when, and by whom. It is a process in which social and political actors, media, and citizens jointly interpret, define, and redefine states of affairs.

6.1.2 Meso-level: Connecting and Translating

Consensus formation takes place within social networks. It is within these networks that individual-level processes such as grievance formation, strengthening of efficacy, identification, and group-based emotions all synthesize into a motivational constellation preparing people for action. Social networks function as communication channels, and discursive processes take place to form consensus that makes up the symbolic resources in collective sense-making (Gamson, 1992b; Klandermans, 1988). Moreover, people are informed of upcoming events and social capital as trust and loyalty accumulate in networks to provide individuals with the resources needed to invest in protest (Klandermans et al., 2008).

Taylor (2013) acknowledges the importance of contentious networks, she refers to them as *discursive communities*, held together not only by common action and bonds of solidarity, but also by identities, symbols, shared identity discourse, and practices of everyday life that attribute participants' experiences to particular forms of social injustice. In these "spaces of contention," that is, small-scale settings or networks, removed from the direct control of dominant groups, they generate the counter-hegemonic ideas and identities associated with political mobilization (Polletta, 1999; Tilly, 2000).

Embeddedness and Identity Formation: Social embeddedness plays a pivotal role in the context of contention, consequently we discussed it elaborately in Chapter 4. People's social environment and their networks also play a large role in consensus formation. Networks provide space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of authorities and provide a way for active opposition to these authorities to grow (Paxton, 2002). Another important element in the formation of consensus is the formation of collective identity and eventually the formation of politicized collective identity. Based on a collective identity, shared beliefs are formulated, interests are redefined and the notion of a coherent political actor is fostered. The symbolic and ritual confirmation of a collective identity serves as the central mode of generating consensus and establishing an overarching frame of reference by which social reality is interpreted.

Postmes et al. (2005) suggest that there are two theoretically distinct pathways to the formation of shared identity which are of interest regarding our distinction between formal and informal networks. The classic perspective on shared identities is that they are inferred deductively from the broader social context within which the group members act. A shared identity can, thus, be deduced through recognition of superordinate

similarities such as categories like ethnicity or gender but also membership of the same organization. However, a sense of shared identity can also be induced by intragroup processes in which individuals get acquainted with one another on an interpersonal basis and form inductively a sense of shared identity. Thus, we may find people who deduce a collective identity in a top-down manner from categories such as ethnicity or gender, or their membership of an organization next to people who induce a collective identity in a bottom-up manner from their interaction with likeminded people, for instance via opinion-based groups (Bliuc et al., 2007) or issue-specific networks (Schudson, 2006).

6.1.3 Micro-level: Reality Construction and Awareness

We argued that consensus formation is an embedded process that takes place through social interaction where the macro-, meso-, and micro-level of analyses are all relevant. We have described, at the macro-level, how sociopolitical circumstances shape social cleavages in society that set the stage for intergroup conflict. At the meso-level, we focused on the role of networks and identity formation in generating meaning. In this section, at the micro-level, we devote attention to how individuals construct reality, and develop a sense of shared awareness.

Reality Construction: What kind of information do people pay attention to? When does political discourse raise enough above the abundance of messages for people to be noticed? Three broad types of information are identified that may be of special concern to people as they form opinions about their social and political environment: (1) the material interests that people see at stake, (2) the sympathies and resentments that people feel toward groups, and (3) commitment to the political principles that become entangled in public issues (Sears & Funk, 1991; Taber, 2003). Previous research also showed that attention is automatically allocated to negative information or information inconsistent with existing schemata (Stangor & Ruble, 1989), unexpected events (Wyer & Srull, 1986), or information that activates the (social) self (e.g. Bargh, 1994). Moreover, people tend to base their inferences on information from people they trust; interpersonal trust creates an information shortcut (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002).

Characterizing social cognition as learning what matters in the social world highlights the fact that social-cognitive principles exist because they are adaptive, even necessary, for human survival. They provide essential *benefits* to self-regulation and social regulation. But this is not the whole

story. The principles come with *costs* by producing errors and biases in memory, judgments, and decision-making (Higgins, 2000). Taber (2003) relates these costs and benefits to information processing and political opinion and concludes that "there is little question that people use heuristics to simplify their information processing; there is considerable question that such short-cuts allow them to behave competently" (p. 459). Taber is one of those scholars who conclude that human beings are incapable of analytically interpreting, analyzing, storing, and using political information, and instead rely on a variety of heuristics, which reduce their competence.

Other authors hold that people are very well capable of conducting political debates and employing political cognition. These authors reason that opinion formation is not only a result of employing individual heuristics to interpret, store, and remember social and political information, but that people are constantly and actively engaged in a complex and socially situated process of reality construction. Gamson (1992b) is an example of the latter authors in the field of protest studies. He wonders how it is that so many people become active in social movements if people are so generally uninterested and badly informed about sociopolitical issues. Gamson designed a study to explore the process of consensus formation. He studied the construction of political understanding, and how that may or may not support participation in protest. He conceives of reality construction as a socially situated process; therefore, he collected data created in a socially situated setting: focus group discussions. He asked groups of friends and acquaintances to discuss such issues as the Israeli–Arab conflict and affirmative action. One of his most interesting findings was that in these conversations people use any kind of information source available: newspapers, movies, advertisements, novels, rumors, their own and other experiences, and so on.

Gamson claims that a mix of experiential knowledge, popular knowledge, and media discourse develops into so-called collective action frames. In Gamson's (1992b) words, a *collective action frame* is "a set of action-oriented beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns" (p. 7). They are comprised of three components: injustice, agency, and identity. The *injustice* component refers to moral indignation. It is not just a cognitive judgment, but also one that is laden with emotion (i.e., a hot cognition). The *agency* component refers to the awareness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action. The *identity* component refers to the process of defining a "we" and some "they" that have opposing interests and values.

Combination of the mix of information sources revealed that media discourse provides information about who is to be blamed for the situation. Experiential knowledge helped to connect the abstract cognition of unfairness with the emotion of moral indignation.

Gamson has pioneered new approaches to the study of consensus formation and political understanding, developing new conceptual and methodological tools for thinking about how groups formulate shared political understandings. Instead of treating media content as a stimulus that leads to some change in attitude or cognition, it is treated as an important tool or resource that people in conversation have available, next to popular wisdom, and experiential knowledge. In doing so, Gamson emphasizes both individual and social aspects in the formation of consensus, and a discursive repertoire in relation to protest.

Shared Awareness: Identification with a group or category makes people share ideas, feelings, and interests, yet this does not necessarily imply readiness for action. Indeed, a sense of belonging to a group can induce participation *and* nonparticipation (see our study on protesting youth (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b) we described in Chapter 4). This study shows that embeddedness in approving milieus *increases* the chance of being asked, influenced, and motivated by significant others, while embeddedness in disapproving milieus *decreases* the chance of being asked, influenced, and motivated by significant others. A sense of belonging can, thus, promote *and* prevent a readiness for action.

To become ready for action, group members must experience a growing *awareness*, they must form consensus on their grievances and a clear idea of who or what is responsible for those grievances. Awareness refers to a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of this awareness of similarity (Gurin et al., 1980, p. 30). It involves identification in one's group or category and the location of that group in the social structure, as well as a recognition that one's group's interests are opposed to those of other groups. Tajfel (1974, cited by Gurin et al., 1980) stresses that the transformation of this social categorization into a more developed state of consciousness is enhanced by conflict and structural factors. The view of Gurin et al. is that people will engage in several cognitive reinterpretations that provide the critical components of consciousness if mobility out of a socially devalued category is structurally constrained.

So far, we have treated the three levels of analysis as separate entities in describing the processes of consensus formation. Of course, we can learn something of value from work that focuses on a single level, but "neither is adequate by itself if we want to understand the kind of political

consciousness that affects people's willingness to be quiescent or to engage in collective action" (Morris, 1992, p. 65). Taken alone, both the individual level approaches and the collective level approaches seem incomplete. As Gamson (1992a, p. 67) puts it: "students of social movements need a social psychology that treats the formation of consensus as the interplay between two levels – between individuals who operate actively in the construction of meaning and sociocultural processes that offer meanings that are frequently contested." Following Duncan (1999), Foster and Matheson (1999), Gamson (1992a), and Mansbridge and Morris (2001), we propose political consciousness as a useful concept of bridging these levels of analysis.

6.1.4 *Consciousness: The Interlock Between Individual and Context*

Political consciousness represents a shift from a victim perspective, through which people accept their status, to a sense of discontent and withdrawal of legitimacy from the present social or political situation. Political consciousness is defined as politicized identification – that is an identification with a category coupled with a collective political ideology around issues concerning that category (Duncan, 1999). The concept of consciousness is related to Tajfel et al.'s (1971) concept of *social change orientation* (solving group problems through group actions), in that it indicates the process of investing the self in the group and can be understood as a form of collective identity that underlies group members' explicit motivations to engage in such a power struggle. The same process is described as cognitive liberation (McAdam, 1982). A first clear conceptualization of this interlocking concept was proposed by Simon and Klandermans (2001), who referred to it as politicized collective identity.

Salience of a collective identity does not necessarily make that identity politically relevant; collective identities must politicize to become the engine of collective action. Politicization of identities begins with the awareness of shared grievances for which an external enemy is blamed. Next, claims for compensation must be leveled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues. If in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national government) or the general public, identities fully politicize (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Politicization of identities and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group's relationship to its social environment, whereby the tactical choices are

again shaped by identity (Polletta, 2009). This clear conceptualization was an important step in bringing this concept into the equation to understand protest; however, a valid and reliable operationalization was still missing. That's precisely what Felicity Turner (2016) did. She developed an innovative measure to assess changes in identity content due to politicization. Chapter 9 discusses her work extensively.

Consensus formation lays the groundwork for consensus mobilization. It builds the mobilization potential a social movement is based on. The movement's social capital waits to be invested in the movement's activities. In the remains of this chapter we will elaborate on the mobilization process.

6.2 Consensus Mobilization

In contrast to the *unplanned* convergence of meaning in consensus formation, consensus mobilization is the *deliberate* attempts of organizers to spread their view among parts of the population (cf. Klandermans, 1988). Through processes such as consensus mobilization (Klandermans, 1988), framing (Snow et al., 1986), or dialogue (Steinberg, 1999), movements seek to disseminate their definition of the situation to the public at large. Organizers work hard to turn grievances into claims, to point out targets to be addressed, to create moral outrage and anger, and to stage events where all this can be vented. They weave together a moral, cognitive, and ideological package and communicate that appraisal of the situation to the public at large. In doing so, organizers play a significant role in the process of construction and reconstruction of collective beliefs and in the transformation of individual discontent into collective action. In other words, and back to our explanatory model (see Figure 6.2), they attempt to mediate the process of reality construction of individuals. Social movement



Figure 6.2 Consensus mobilization: How organizers convince individuals

organizations, and nowadays sometimes individual organizers (cf. Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), play a significant role in the process of construction and reconstruction of collective beliefs and in the transformation of individual discontent into collective action. This important mediating role of organizers is visualized by the solid arrows in Figure 6.2.

Social movements and organizers play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). Rochon (1998) makes the distinction between "critical communities" where new ideas and values are developed and "social movements" that are interested in winning social and political acceptance for those ideas and values. "In the hands of movement leaders, the ideas of critical communities become ideological frames" (p. 31), said Rochon. Rochon further argues that social movements are not simply extensions of critical communities. After all, not all ideas developed in critical communities are equally suited to motivate collective action. Social movement organizations, then, are carriers of meaning. Through processes such as consensus mobilization or framing, they seek to propagate their definition of the situation to the public at large. A study of flyers produced by the various groups and organizations involved in the protests against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Berlin neatly shows how the content of the flyers was crafted such that the ideological frame of the organizers of the demonstration and that of the participating organizations (for example women's organizations) fit into a shared definition of the situation (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992).

Organizers are embedded in multi-organizational fields. Chapter 5 discusses multi-organizational fields in terms of embeddedness. To understand consensus and action mobilization, the concept is important too. This is because the social construction of protest takes place within the context of a community's multi-organizational field – in the groups, networks, and organizations the multi-organizational field is composed of. It is there that grievances are interpreted, means and opportunities are defined, opponents appointed, strategies are chosen and justified, and outcomes are evaluated. Such interpretations and evaluations are as a rule controversial. As a social movement organization competes to influence public opinion or the opinion of its constituency, its multi-organizational field determines its relative significance as an individual actor. Because of the complex makeup of multi-organizational fields, individuals are objects of persuasive communication emanating not only from movement organization A but also from competing organization B, opponent C, countermovement organization D, and so on. The individual's embeddedness determines what impact these different sources have (Gould, 2009).

Mobilizing consensus thus refers to the process of turning bystanders and opponents into adherents to the goals of a social movement and its associated organizations. In this process of mobilizing consensus, *framing* and *frame alignment* play a crucial role. The framing perspective, as it has evolved in the social movement literature since the mid-1980s (e.g., Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992b; Snow, 2004; Snow et al., 1986), focuses attention on the signifying work or meaning construction engaged in by social movement organizers and participants and other actors (e.g., antagonists, elites, media, countermovements). In 1986, Snow and colleagues coined the specific concept of frame alignment, defined as "the linkage of individual and organizers' interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and organizers' activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464). In order to mobilize consensus, organizers develop collective action frames, that is, their interpretation of "what's going on?," "who is to blame?," and "how are we going to solve it?" These *collective action frames* – the "products" of the framing activity of organizers – resonate more or less by their constituency and translate consequently more or less in individuals' actions. Note that framing and frame alignment are visualized in Figure 6.2. Where framing is the meaning construction of sociopolitical circumstances by the organizers, frame alignment is represented by the arrow from organizers' collective frames to individual's actions.

6.2.1 Framing

Framing is a process whereby "communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a particular manner. Frames operate in four key ways: they define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies" (Kuypers, 2006, p. 8). Framing is one of the activities that organizers do on a regular basis. That is, "they frame, or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). This interpretation process is key and, by doing so, organizers are given agency in the process. In the words of Snow (2004): "In contrast to the traditional view of social movements as carriers of extant, preconfigured ideas and beliefs, the framing perspective views movements as signifying agents engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders" (p. 384).

In order to mobilize consensus, organizers develop *collective action frames*, that is, their interpretation of "what's going on?," "who is to blame?," and "how are we going to solve it?" These components root in the three core framing tasks as identified by Snow et al. (1986) and the degree to which they determine participant mobilization. The three tasks are:

1. diagnostic framing for the identification of a problem and assignment of blame;
2. prognostic framing to suggest solutions, strategies, and tactics to a problem; and
3. motivational framing that serves as a call to arms or rationale for action.

Collective action frames, like picture frames, focus attention by punctuating or specifying what in our sensual field is *relevant* and what is *irrelevant*, what is "in frame" and what is "out of frame," in relation to the issue. Collective action frames perform this interpretive work via the focusing, articulation, and translation. But in ways intended to activate adherents, transform bystanders into supporters, exact concessions from targets, and demobilize antagonists. Thus, collective action frames not only perform an interpretive function in the sense of providing answers to the question "What is going on here?," they are also decidedly more agentic and contentious in the sense of calling for action that problematizes and challenges existing authoritative views and framings of reality.

Our study on how identification brings organizers' appeals and motives together (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014) is an empirical illustration on how organizers' interpretations of sociopolitical circumstances affect protest activity. In this study participants in two demonstrations were compared. The demonstrations took place at two different squares in Amsterdam, on the same day, opposing the same governmental policy. Everything was the same except the organizers and their appeals: labor unions with an appeal in terms of threatened interests, on the one hand, and an anti-neoliberalism alliance with an appeal in terms of violated principles on the other. We hypothesized that social cleavages shape mobilizing structures and mobilization potentials. Thereby this study takes an important yet rarely tested assumption in social movement literature seriously; namely that grievances are socially constructed. If indeed grievances *are* socially constructed, one would expect that organizers rooted in different cleavages issue different appeals that resonate with different motives. What made individuals who were protesting the same governmental policy participate at the one square rather than the other?

Organizers weave together a moral, cognitive, and ideological package and disseminate that among their mobilization potential. These appeals "snowball" through the assembled mobilizing structure (Boekkooi, 2012). The more persuasive and convincing these appeals, the more people will be motivated to take part in the events (Snow et al., 1986). Different organizers may, however, emphasize different aspects of the problem or the solution. In doing so, they play a significant role in the construction and reconstruction of collective beliefs and in the transformation of individual discontent into collective action. Grievances can be framed in terms of violated *interests* and/or violated *principles*. Following Van Stekelenburg et al. (2009), we hold that, depending on which emphasis is taken, a campaign appeals to different motives. We employ Turner and Killian's (1987) description of action orientations to distinguish appeals: (1) *power orientation*, or an orientation toward acquiring and exerting influence; (2) *value orientation*, or an orientation toward the goals and the ideology of the movement, and (3) *participation orientation*, whereby the activity is satisfying in and of itself. Thus, in the campaign's organizers stage, they may emphasize a specific action orientation that translates into an appeal to some motives rather than others. Following this reasoning we expect that campaigns that emphasize the violation of interests resonate with instrumental motives while campaigns that emphasize the violation of principles were expected to resonate with ideological motives.

To test the role of organizers in framing the issue instigating people to protest, we conducted surveys at both demonstrations. Survey-questionnaires were randomly distributed (response: anti-neoliberalism 209/42 percent, union 233/47 percent). The findings supported our assumptions regarding the influence of the diverging mobilizing contexts on the dynamics of protest participation. Figure 6.3 shows that the labor unionists were more instrumentally motivated, while the anti-neoliberalists were more ideologically motivated.

Moreover, the findings reveal a crucial role of identity processes in the resonance of mobilizing messages. Figure 6.3 also tells us that the participants in the two demonstrations must be distinguished between those who identify strongly with the organizations staging the demonstration and those who identify weakly. For those who identified strongly the appeals issued by the organizers resonated with instrumental motives for the union demonstration and ideological motives for the anti-neoliberals. Consequently, anti-neoliberals who identified strongly with organizations staging that event were highly ideologically motivated (left-hand panel). In fact – as



Figure 6.3 How identification with the organizers make appeals and motives align

the right-hand panel reveals – high levels of identification *reduced* the instrumental motivation among anti-neoliberals. On the other hand, union-respondents who identified strongly were highly instrumentally motivated.

People and movements are embedded in society (Klandermans et al., 2008). This holds equally for the mobilizing structures organizers assemble during their campaigns. This study clearly showed that different organizers command diverging mobilizing structures and that, therefore, the composition of the crowds they manage to mobilize varies both in terms of sociopolitical characteristics and in terms of motivational make-up. Indeed, they mobilize different subsets of the mobilization potential. Depending on their organizational embeddedness individuals are more or less likely to be targeted by specific organizers. The more individuals are embedded in the organizer's networks, the more likely that they are targeted and the more they identify with the people and organizations in those networks, the more likely that their frames of reference resonate with the mobilizing frames of the organizers.

These processes are highly contingent: a specific appeal works for a specific audience but not for another, while a specific audience is more likely to be approached by appeals they are susceptible for. Moreover, it can tell us about the success factor of a movement. Social movements are said to be successful when the frames projected align with the frames of participants to produce resonance between the two parties. This is a process known as *frame alignment*.

6.2.2 *Frame Alignment*

Protest is communication, both with sympathizers, the general public, and politicians or authorities. A now extensive literature on collective action framing examines the ways in which social movement actors define grievances and construct social reality to motivate collective action (see Benford & Snow, 2000 for a review). As Snow and Benford (2000) have argued, collective action frames punctuate the seriousness, injustice, and immorality of social conditions while attributing blame to concrete actors and specifying the collective action needed to generate social change. To be effective, organizers must engage in highly skilled frame alignment work to create frames that resonate with the culture and experiences of the aggrieved population or other relevant actors (see Snow et al. 1986). Following Snow and colleagues, four frame alignment processes are identified and elaborated:

1. *Frame bridging* is the "linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 467). It involves the linkage of a movement to "unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters" (p. 467) of people who share similar views or grievances but who lack an organizational base.
2. *Frame amplification* refers to "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469). This interpretive frame usually involves the invigorating of values or beliefs.
3. *Frame extensions* are "a movement's effort to incorporate participants by extending the boundaries of the proposed frame to include or encompass the views, interests, or sentiments of targeted groups" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469).
4. *Frame transformation* is a process required when the proposed frames "may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 473). When this happens, new values, meanings, and understandings are required in order to secure participants and support.

The basic underlying premise is that frame alignment, of one variety or another, is a necessary condition for participation, whatever its nature or intensity, and that it is typically an interactional and ongoing accomplishment. The reasoning goes that, to be effective, organizers must engage in

highly skilled frame alignment work to create frames that resonate with the culture and experiences of the aggrieved population or other relevant actors (see Snow et al., 1986). Hence, one of the most appealing features of frame alignment theory is that it connects the meso-level of protest organization with the micro-level of protest participation. Yet, although the foundational framing studies were focused on micro-mobilization (see e.g., Gamson et al., 1982; Snow et al., 1986), scholars have up to now mainly analyzed framing as a meso-level phenomenon and primarily stressed the strategic use of frames by organizations (Johnston, 2013; Williams, 2004). The frame alignment approach brought individuals only seemingly back in. This is remarkable because alignment by definition involves both senders and receivers. An appropriate design should investigate both levels at the same time, according to Ketelaars et al. (2014).

Ketelaars and colleagues argue that, in most framing literature, frame alignment is treated as a kind of self-evident precondition for participation (Snow et al., 1986). People participate in events they agree with, not in events they do not share the goals and aims of. Hence, the basic underlying premise of the frame alignment approach is that frame alignment is a necessary condition for participation (Snow et al, 1986). Ketelaars et al. (2014), however, address it as something that should be empirically examined. They study to what extent the frames of protest organizers and protest participants aligned. In doing so, they argue that frame alignment is not a binary phenomenon with an operational cut-off point that distinguishes people who are aligned from people who are not. Rather, they maintain, frame alignment is a matter of degree. They investigate whether the degree of alignment differs across the previously discussed core framing functions diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation. That is, after convincing potential adherents of what is at stake and what the possible solutions are, organizations must convince them that attending the event is worthwhile. Ketelaar and colleagues study frame alignment by drawing on data collected during twenty-nine demonstrations in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The degree of frame alignment is measured by comparing the extent to which a participant's reasoning corresponds with the organizations' framing regarding the diagnoses (what is the problem and who is to blame?) and prognoses (what should be done?). Their study shows that many participants, perhaps surprisingly, are only partially aligned.

Our third and last empirical illustration is about *emotional* frame resonance. Snow and colleagues speak about frame resonance when there is *cognitive* alignment between a movement's ideology and the beliefs of an

adherent (Snow & Benford, 1988). But frames also evoke emotions (Gamson, 1992b), as frames generally work only when they have an emotional impact on people (Goodwin et al., 2000). Scholars who have examined this aspect of framing introduced the term "emotional resonance" to refer to the emotional alignment between a movement's ideology and the emotional lives of a potential recruit (Robnett, 2004). Following studies on emotion management and emotion work, we show that organizers who are less politically embedded are more inclined to evoke or appeal to anger (Blocq et al., 2012). Using data from protest surveys conducted at demonstrations regarding climate change in Belgium and the Netherlands in 2009, we find that protestors who are members of more politically embedded social movement organization, defined as having more ties to the political establishment, are generally less angry than protestors who are members of less politically embedded organizations. The finding that this pattern is especially strong among members who heard about the demonstration through "their" organization confirms the assumed role of organizers in the management of emotions.

To conclude, mobilization has a greater chance of success if there is a fit between what organizers announce and public opinion, and thus to what extent consensus has formed on an issue (i.e., consensus formation). Consensus mobilization activities by organizers are important, as it distinguishes the general public into people who sympathize with the cause and people who do not. The more successful consensus mobilization has been, the larger the pool of sympathizers a mobilizing movement organization can draw from. A large pool of sympathizers is of strategic importance, because for a variety of reasons many a sympathizer never turns into a protest participant. This transformation of those who adopted the view of the movement into active participants is referred to as *action mobilization*.

6.3 Action Mobilization

Action mobilization refers to the transformation of sympathizers into participants. This is a highly dynamic process: the more successful consensus mobilization is, the larger the pool of sympathizers organizers can draw upon for action mobilization. Consequently, a call for action will resonate more strongly and spur people into action. In other words, and back to our explanatory model, in attempts to mobilize consensus, organizers try to mediate the process of reality construction of individuals. Subsequently, they will do their utmost to transform this individual discontent into collective action, this process is depicted in the solid arrows



Figure 6.4 Action mobilization

in Figure 6.4. Note that, with consensus mobilization, organizers interpret, shape, and frame the sociopolitical circumstances, while in the case of action mobilization they instigate individuals to collective requests for social change, hence organizers play a crucial role in the previously mentioned macro–micro transition problem (Opp, 1992). As this macro–micro transition problem is extremely relevant to research into conflicts and protests, we want to invite collective action scholars to give organizers a key position in their research.

Successful action mobilization turns thinking into doing. Like consensus mobilization, action mobilization can be broken down into different processes (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). In these authors' study, conducted a few decades ago among Dutch citizens who were persuaded to participate in protest against the deployment of nuclear weapons on Dutch territory (Klandermans & Oegema 1987; Oegema & Klandermans 1994), the process of action mobilization was broken down further. In Chapter 5, we have discussed this study extensively, so here we will briefly describe those aspects which are important for this chapter on mobilization.

Klandermans and Oegema broke down action mobilization into four separate steps: (1) people need to *sympathize* with the cause, (2) they need to *know* about the upcoming event, (3) they must *want* to participate, and (4) they must be *able* to participate (see Figure 6.5). Each step brings the supply and demand of protest closer together until an individual eventually takes the final step to participate in an instance of political protest. The first step accounts for the results of consensus mobilization. It distinguishes the general public into those who sympathize with the cause and those who do not. A large pool of sympathizers is of strategic importance, because for a variety of reasons many a sympathizer never turns into a participant. The second step is equally obvious and crucial; it divides the



Figure 6.5 The process of action mobilization
(*Source*: Klandermans & Oegema, 1987)

sympathizers into those who have been the target of mobilization attempts and those who have not. The third step concerns the social psychological core of the process. It divides the sympathizers who have been targeted into those who are motivated to participate in the specific activity and those who are not. Note that the fact that people are willing to participate in the one activity (let's say a demonstration) does not necessarily mean that they are prepared to take part in any other activity (let's say occupy a building). Finally, the fourth step differentiates the people who are motivated into those who end up participating and those who do not.

The net result of these different steps is some (usually small) proportion of the general public that participates in protest. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) found that three quarters of the population of a community south of Amsterdam felt sympathy for the movement's cause. Of these sympathizers again three quarters were somehow targeted by mobilization attempts. Of those targeted one sixth was motivated to participate in the demonstration. And, finally, of those motivated one third ended up participating. Hence, with each step smaller or larger numbers drop out, but the better the fit between demand and supply the smaller the number of dropouts. For an elaborate discussion of this study, we refer to Chapter 5. Organizers inform people about an upcoming event through the mobilizing structure that they build up from event to event. Action

mobilization rolls through society like a snowball (Boekkooi, 2012). It first moves from the organizers outward to people close to them (e.g., members, friends, colleagues) followed by second order mobilization, to people who are increasingly more removed from the organizers. The further removed people are from the organizers, the more likely that they will not be reached. These dynamics of the mobilizing structure have far reaching consequences, Marije Boekkooi (2012), for instance, shows that the composition of the demonstrating crowd reflects the composition of the mobilizing structure.

6.3.1 Micro–Meso Mobilization

Protest events do not spontaneously occur, they need to be organized and mobilized (but see Snow & Moss, 2014). This involves two steps of mobilization: mesomobilization followed by micromobilization. Mesomobilization refers to the efforts of an initiator(s) of a campaign, trying to mobilize other organizers to jointly set up and organize the event (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992), while micromobilization refers to the joint effort of the organizers to mobilize participants for the event (McAdam, 1988). The mobilization process thus involves two steps: the mobilization of other organizers by the initiators and the mobilization of participants by the organizers.

Mesomobilization: Mesomobilization involves building mobilizing structures, in which organizers cooperate and negotiate to set up a strategy to jointly mobilize participants for the event. Mobilizing structures are defined as those "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam et al., 1996: 3). At any time, all kinds of groups, organizations, and networks that exist in society can become part of a mobilizing structure. However, none can be taken for granted and assumed to automatically become part of it. Networks need to be adapted, appropriated, assembled, and activated by organizers in order to function as mobilizing structures. Even networks whose primary goal is movement mobilization (e.g., SMOs) might need hard work to be activated to participate in a particular campaign. Many times, social movement organizations decline to participate in a campaign and, thus, do not become part of the mobilizing structure. On the other hand, networks with very different goals, such as a network of colleagues, friends, neighbors, or the parent–teacher association, might become involved in the campaign and thereby become part of the mobilizing structure. Some of these informal networks are especially helpful in

building a mobilizing structure, because they consist of activists in "abeyance." Although invisible, networks of activists may continue to exist. They are "submerged" in everyday life but can reemerge and become active when a specific issue arises. Between upheavals these groups are in "abeyance"; they no longer stage large-scale activities, but keep a network and a minimum of organization going (Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Rupp & Taylor, 1987), which can be reactivated when a new campaign starts.

Micromobilization: Despite these hurdles, organizers need to set up their campaign and decide on a mobilization strategy. Then micromobilization can start. Micromobilization entails the further expansion of the mobilizing structure because, if organizers want to mobilize widely, they will need to appropriate additional bonds and turn those networks into a mobilizing structure for themselves. When organizers use mass media to spread their message, these media have become part of the mobilizing structure, the same goes for other channels. These channels through which one tries to reach out to potential participants are an important part of the mobilizing structure, as is the network of organizers. Both the shape of the network of organizers and the mobilizing strategy that they choose, therefore, determine who can be reached and mobilized.

6.3.2 Strong and Weak Bonds and Open and Closed Channels

In order to mobilize participants, organizers can use strong and weak bonds and open and closed channels. The strength and weakness of bonds refer to how much is invested in them, the strength of identification, and the influence the bond can exert (Granovetter, 1973). Open and closed channels refer to who can be reached by the channel (Walgrave & Rucht, 2010). Closed channels target only the own group, examples are organizational meetings or newsletters. Open channels, on the other hand, target potentially everyone; the mass media is the clearest example. We would like to add to this semi-open (or semi-closed) channels, that target beyond the own group, for example the Internet. Websites of organizations, forums, blogs, and mailing lists are not exclusively for members of one specific group, but they usually only attract those people who are already interested in the topic and likely to agree. They, thus, have a wider reach than closed – organizational – channels, but not as wide as the mass media. The distinctions between open and closed and strong and weak are related. Granovetter (1973) noted that strong bonds exist mainly within a group, while it is the weaker bonds that form a bridge between various groups. Thus, closed channels tend to target the people with whom organizers have

strong bonds. They are expected to be efficient mobilizers. Open channels, on the other hand, create weak bonds, which will usually not change people's opinions but, when consensus has formed in society, such channels can mobilize people by letting them know an event will be staged.

It is thus easiest for organizers to mobilize their strong bonds, that is to say, the members of their group, organization, or network. These strong bonds do not have a wide reach, but the more successful the mobilization of organizers has been (i.e., the more all-embracing the mobilizing structure), the more people can be reached through strong bonds. It is thus important to build an encompassing mobilizing structure; by involving a central member of a group the entire group can be mobilized (so-called en-bloc mobilization, Oberschall, 1973) and coalition formation becomes a shortcut to mass mobilization. In addition, those mobilized by the organizers can in their turn start mobilizing the people with whom they have strong bonds, such as their friends, family, or colleagues. Extra-movement interpersonal bonds of members are an important asset for mobilization, as shown many times (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993).

Organizers will usually want to reach beyond those with whom they are directly or indirectly related. In the case of mass demonstrations, it is not enough to reach a critical mass; organizers need to reach as many people as possible. To reach beyond the circles of people with whom they are directly or indirectly connected, the organizers need to use open channels and weak bonds. Weak bonds and open channels are the only way to inform people that do not belong to the organizers' own and indirect networks. However, to get media attention is often not easy for social movements, they are either expensive to employ or hard to control. Nonetheless, weak bonds diffuse information most effectively, because they connect people from different groups, and consequently enable individuals to spread and receive new information (Granovetter, 1973). The most common examples of weak bonds are the mass media. Although weak bonds are not sufficient to change opinions or spur motivation, such an impact might not always be necessary. Some groups in society may already agree with the message and be convinced that action should be taken, so that they need to only hear about the imminent demonstration (Walgrave & Manssens, 2000).

6.3.3 Mobilization with Minimal Organization

Sometimes the demand for protest can be so overwhelming that very little is needed to bring large numbers onto the streets. In the context of the

massive indignation regarding the kidnapping and serial killing of children by Dutroux and judicial errors in Belgium in dealing with it, television and newspapers sufficed as mobilizing actors (Walgrave & Manssens, 2000). Yet, the mobilizing power of the media should not be overestimated (Kingdon, 1984). They only have the power to mobilize in cases of so-called consensual issues (Verhulst, 2011), that is, issues that root in suddenly imposed grievances which evoke a communal sense of repulsion and indignation. Examples are the death of a child caused by drunk driving (McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996) or senseless violence (Lodewijkx et al., 2008). The salience and the consensual character of the issues compensate for the lack of organizational brokerage making mobilization via the mass media possible. Similarly, Walgrave and Klandermans (2010) report findings from the anti-Iraq war demonstration revealing that appeals via mass media were the more effective in countries with high levels of opposition against the war.

Mobilization with minimal organization has become more effective with the appearance of virtual networks and social media. In November 2007, we conducted a study on protests staged in the absence of any form of organization (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). That November, 20,000 Dutch secondary school pupils took onto the streets protesting the deteriorating quality of their education. It took the shape of protests by several groups geographically scattered and diffused over a period that were *in promptu* mobilized and short lived. They were initiated by the stereotypical guy-next-door, Kevin, whose call for action was "virally" spread via face-to-face personal and virtual networks (e.g., MSN, social network sites). Via mobile phones unrest was uploaded on YouTube and the YouTube films facilitated frame-alignment. In nearly real-life time *would-be* protesters came to share grievances and emotions with *actual* protesters. Questions related to expected participation of others were instantly answered by the uploaded films and instant messages. Social media, smartphones, and YouTube facilitated organizing without organizations.

The secondary school protests are examples of mobilization without organization (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). Mobilization attempts move from one person to another – individually, as part of a larger Cc. list, via a listserv, or social network such as Facebook, Instagram, or YouTube. In a process that continues to reproduce itself, the message is copied and redistributed. An original sender cannot know where or when the message stops traveling, stops being copied and redistributed, stops being translated. Messages with higher degrees of resonance will be

dispersed in greater densities. Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, Arabian revolutions from Tunisia to Syria, and earlier the Green Movement Protests in Iran are all examples of the power of mobilization without organization. The working of these new forms of mobilization is far from clear. It sometimes turns out that what seems mobilization without organization at first sight, in hindsight appears to be more organized than presumed. For the time being, there are more questions than answers.

6.3.4 The Role Mobilization Patterns Play

Do mobilization patterns influence the behavior of the participants? For example, do they influence when participants take the decision to participate, whether they go with others or alone, how far the participants travel, and so on? Or do mobilization patterns influence who is going to demonstrate in terms of age, gender, education, and political attitudes? In other words, do different patterns of mobilization produce different demonstrations. Oegema and Klandermans (1994, p. 705) believe that mobilization processes make a difference: "Mobilization attempts, incentives and barriers do not occur randomly throughout a population, but coincide with characteristics of movement organizations, campaign characteristics, specific actions, characteristics of individual communities, and social categories." In Walgrave and Rucht's (2010) study of arguably the first worldwide organized demonstration, against the imminent war on Iraq, most of the factors associated with different mobilization patterns are held constant: it concerns the same movement, the same campaign, and the same action form. This gave the opportunity to focus entirely on the characteristics of the participants possibly associated with mobilization patterns as such.

In all countries most of the participants came with family or friends. Colleagues and comembers of movement organizations were companions in much smaller proportions. One tenth of the participants came alone. Although the patterns in the eight countries are very similar, we observe some interesting variation. In the Netherlands, for example, compared to the other countries almost twice the number of participants came alone. In Spain more than anywhere else the demonstration resembles a family fair. In Italy and Germany, on the other hand, friends were the most common companions. Members of movement organizations were relatively frequently accompanying participants in Italy, Belgium, and the United States.

Overall, one can conclude that accompaniment to the demonstration is influenced by mobilization patterns. However, the influence is not the

same for each type of company. The analyses reveal a main effect of ties for colleagues and comembers only. Stronger ties more often make people come to the demonstration with colleagues and comembers of movement organizations. The strength of ties does not have an influence on whether people come with family or friends, or on their own. Follow-up analyses show that people who are mobilized via closed channels are more likely to come with comembers, while people who are mobilized through open channels are more likely to come alone or with family or friends; the latter two especially if they are mobilized by family or friends. Having no ties to movement organizations and being mobilized via mass media makes it much more likely for people to come alone, while having strong ties and being mobilized via organizations makes it much more likely for people to come with comembers of movement organizations. Obviously, these effects do not fully explain the country variation and future research could focus on the interaction between these contextual characteristics and organizers in shaping their mobilizing structures.

6.4 To Conclude

Mobilization is the movement in action and is, thus, the most visible activity of a movement. No wonder that movement scholars concentrate on processes of mobilization and their outcomes. However, we maintain that, in order to understand the dynamics of collective action, we should focus on the interaction between demand and supply to fully understand mobilization and its outcomes. In fact, protest participation is not just a matter of people who are pushed to act by some internal psychological state (the demand-side of participation), nor is it a matter of movement organizations pulling people into action (the supply-side of participation). Mobilization is the final step during the process of activation about a cause, bringing demand and supply together. Jointly, dynamics of demand, supply, and mobilization account for instances of participation. The reason why often no collective action takes place despite widespread discontent is that there is no viable movement organization to stage any action. At the same time, when present a movement organization does not get very far if there are no people who are concerned about the issues the organization tries to address. Finally, without effective mobilization campaigns, supply and demand may never meet. As in economics, there is an intriguing interplay of demand and supply. Sometimes an attractive, well-timed action attracts an enormous turnout, that is to say, the supply reinforces the demand. Sometimes massive discontent generates a strong movement:

demand triggers supply. But, of course, most of the time demand and supply reinforce each other. Mobilization is the process that makes the two meet.

Mobilization is a complex process, akin to persuasive communication. Individuals are more or less susceptible to the message of the organizers, be it consensus mobilization or action mobilization. Mobilization is a process that proceeds in steps. Each step obeys a theoretical framework which accounts for how the process of mobilization takes place. The susceptibility to the movement's message is in a way the result of the movement's own efforts. Organizers mobilize in order to draw attention to the grievances their constituencies share. They offer opportunities to protest. Success of mobilization cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, mobilization is a matter of turning sympathizers into participants, a transition that cannot be taken for granted. Being aggrieved does not automatically mean being prepared to participate in collective action. Sympathizing with a movement's cause does not necessarily mean to be ready to take part in any kind of action. Nor does involvement in the one activity imply readiness to engage in another. Embeddedness in social networks is the main factor explaining success and failure of mobilizing campaigns. Social embeddedness defines which networks and channels will be used in recruiting and how successful those will be.

Various social media, such as LinkedIn, MySpace, Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook make it rather easy to be linked in a virtual network. They offer tools to create networks. These sites – which have attracted millions of users worldwide since their introduction – make it possible to relate to hundreds of people who share interests and activities across political and geographic borders. What makes them unique is not that they allow individuals to virtually meet strangers, but rather that they enable users to publicly display their connections and make visible their social networks. Social media obviously facilitate cooperation and help to overcome the start-up problems of collective action by forming small groups and coalitions that share similar attitudes (Centola, 2013). They reduce the costs of participation by lowering communication and coordination costs and facilitate group formation, recruitment, and retention. As such, they may influence the dynamics of consensus formation and mobilization, and make organizing without organizations feasible (cf. Earl & Kimport, 2011). Previously this was time-consuming and effortful and, thus, costly.

Moreover, the link between the use of social media and spontaneous protests is begging for academic scrutiny. Do we observe more spontaneous protests nowadays (often asked by journalists and police) and, if so,

what is the role of social media? To explain what we mean by spontaneous protests, we refer to the classic distinction between collective behavior and collective action that we discussed in Chapter 2. The term *collective behavior* came to be defined as referring to the kind of behavior that happens in crowds or other spontaneous face-to-face gatherings which, in turn, was defined as being nonroutine, nonnormative, and emergent. The term *collective action*, on the other hand, was associated with theories emphasizing purposive or goal-oriented behavior in protests and social movements and was used in economics, political science, and political sociology. Hence, spontaneous protests can be defined as being nonroutine, nonnormative, and emergent, and often with no organizer. The intriguing "Protest on the Fly" article by Snow and Moss (2014) could be a strong start. They reexamined spontaneity as an important, albeit neglected, mechanism in collective action dynamics and elaborated on its operation and effects in protest events and social movements. Snow and Moss do not presume that spontaneity is routinely at play in all collective actions. Rather, they contend that spontaneity is triggered by certain conditions: nonhierarchical organization; uncertain/ambiguous moments and events; behavioral/emotional priming; and certain ecological/spatial factors. They conclude by elaborating why the activation of spontaneous actions matters in shaping the course and character of protest events and movements and suggest that spontaneity be resuscitated in the study of collective action. We wholeheartedly support their claim and would like to devote special attention to dynamics of consensus formation and action mobilization facilitated by social media and the Internet.

CHAPTER 7

Context Matters, But How?

This chapter is devoted to the sociopolitical context of protest. We firmly believe that the political power play is – by definition – fought out in the sociopolitical intergroup context. In fact, we hold that the contextual opportunities and constraints shape the dynamics of demand, supply, and mobilization we discussed in Chapters 4–6. In short, *Demand* is the mobilization potential in a society, and the personal grievances that translate into political claims. *Supply* refers to the mobilizing context, and the opportunities staged by organizers to protest. Dynamics of mobilization, on their turn, signifies the mobilizing structure organizers assemble as the connecting tissue between the supply-side of organizers and their appeals and the demand-side of participants and their motives. Thus, the dynamics of Demand, Supply, and Mobilization which we elaborated in Chapters 4–6 take – along the lines of Coleman's boat – place underwater (see Figure 7.1). This chapter, in contrast, focuses on the factors above water, namely how sociopolitical circumstances shape the dynamics of demand, supply, and mobilization. Hence, contextualized contestation. By "contextualization" we mean that appeals of organizers whose attempts to persuade citizens to act are more or less successful depending on the socioeconomic and political situation citizens and organizers are in. Indeed, context matters, but how? Although the significance of contextualization is acknowledged, very little systematic research has been done into it.

This chapter is devoted to the context of political protest. We will reveal how context influences demand, supply, and mobilization, and how citizens are influenced by these factors. The chapter consists of three parts. The first part concerns the context proper. We will describe the different structural layers the context comprises of. The second part pictures how citizens are trying to find their way through the layers as described in the first section, that is Section 7.2. The third part is an illustration. Employing data from a large comparative study of movement and party



Figure 7.1 Dynamics of demand, supply, and mobilization along the lines of Coleman's boat

politics, we will show how contextual variation marks people's political participation. But first we devote attention to an important methodological issue and that is on the need for comparative research designs in investigating how the sociopolitical context influences citizens' political participation.

7.1 Comparison Across Issues, Countries, and Time

Variation in protest events results from differences in the context and how participants interact with these contexts. This requires comparative research designs that are rare in studies of contentious politics. Yet, as Klandermans and Smith (2002, p. 6) argue, "Comparative research of movement participation is important. It tells us that what holds for a participant in one movement, or at one point in time, or at one place is not necessarily true for a participant in another movement, or at a different time or place." Comparative designs allow us to examine the dynamic

process by which the micro-level participation of individuals is coupled with the macro context, thereby generating demand and supply of participation by means of a meso-level that channels the willingness to participate in a specific event. The links between these levels of analysis are among the most important but thorny problems in the literature on social movements and protest participation (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Klandermans, 2004; Opp, 1992).

7.1.1 Comparisons Across Space

The most common comparison is across space, when the same movement in different locations is examined. A classic example is Walsh's (1981) study of citizens and activists in four communities in the neighborhood of Three-Mile Island. His study demonstrates that contention is shaped by characteristics of the local communities in which the movements are embedded. Had Walsh neglected to make this comparison – either by restricting himself to a single community or by simply analyzing aggregated data – he would erroneously have believed that the contention in each community was the same.

So far, the most ambitious study comparing similar demonstrations in different countries and taking diverging social and political contexts as key independent variables is Walgrave and Rucht's (2010) study of the February 15, 2003, worldwide demonstrations against the imminent war in Iraq. This was arguably one of the first globally organized Days of Action we see nowadays more often, take for example the Friday's for Future (Wahlström et al., 2019). The most important finding of the study was that the size and composition of the anti-Iraq war demonstrations, the motivation of the participants, and their mobilization trajectories strongly varied between countries. Although the different protests were organized on the same day, were staged within an internationally collaborative framework, employed the same action repertoire, and dealt with the same clear-cut issue – opposition against the same war – remarkable differences *across* nations were found. Mobilization, coalitions, protest turnout, demonstration composition, and the features, attitudes, and mobilization trajectories of the individual protesters all varied considerably. The key variable to account for these differences between countries was the stance regarding the war of government and opposition in a country. In a follow-up study, Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) found that, in countries where both government and opposition parties were opposed to the war (e.g., Germany and Belgium) – countries with a "favorable" political context, so

to speak – the diversity of the people demonstrating against the war was systematically higher than in countries where government and/or opposition supported the war (for example, the United States and the United Kingdom). All this is to say that protests on the same general issue, occurring at the same point in time, which are even precipitated by the same events, attract different publics if the context differs. This work shows that protest is shaped not only by the demand for protest opportunities but also by the very context that generates this demand (see Klandermans, 2004).

7.1.2 Comparisons Across Movements and Issues

Comparisons across movements and issues enable us to answer different questions. The most common of which concerns the similarities and differences among participants. These differences regard demographic characteristics, motivations, identity, attitudes, and mobilization trajectories. As an example, research by Van Stekelenburg and colleagues shows how context influences participant's motivation (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2014; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009, 2011). Van Stekelenburg and colleagues' research alludes to the context-dependency of motivational constellations, showing that demonstrators in a protest staged by labor unions are more instrumentally motivated while demonstrators in a protest staged by an anti-neoliberal alliance were more expressively motivated. Indeed, different movements appeal to diverging motivations (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009, 2011). Verhulst (2011) compared an array of different-issue demonstrations in Belgium and found substantial differences in motivation. People taking to the streets to support asylumseekers, for example, are very different from people taking to the streets to protest layoffs. They have different levels of education, different ages, display different ideological leanings, etc. Verhulst claims that the issue at stake strongly affects the composition of the event and the motivation and mobilization trajectories of the participants.

7.1.3 Comparisons Across Time

Comparisons across time examine the same movement over a certain time span. Movements expand and contract in phases of mobilization and demobilization. Although we know in which stages of a protest cycle demonstrators are likely to feel and behave more radically or rather moderately (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004; Tarrow, 1995), we do not know much

about the extent to which the composition of the crowd and its motives change over the life course of a movement and what causes this variation.

These examples of research, comparing protests across space, issue, and time, show the advantage of comparative designs and the kind of questions they can help to answer. Indeed, context matters, and people's fear's, hopes, and political activities cannot be seen as independent from context, thus most of these discussed approaches/analytical levels of collective action directly or indirectly hint to the role of contextual social and political factors. Why, for instance, are people in some countries more politically active than people in other countries? This brings our attention to contextual factors and how they shape the relationship between important individual characteristics and political engagement.

7.2 What about the Context?

Several studies have already suggested that contextual characteristics, like perceived corruption (Olsson, 2014), type of political regime (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014), institutional effectiveness, inequality, and economic growth (Christensen, 2011; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Van Deth & Elff, 2004), and other institutional conditions, like the level of political (de)centralization and a form of government (e.g., Van der Meer & Van Ingen, 2009; Vráblíková, 2013) matter for individuals' decision to engage in a collective action. In short, people experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting, which translates into specific grievances. The context also provides an array of a possible collective response to these grievances. We will now elaborate on the most prominent contextual factors that may influence individuals' decisions to protest, namely socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors.

7.2.1 Socioeconomic Factors

Two contrasting causal explanations could be applied to the effect of the socioeconomic factors on protest participation – one is related to resources and the other to grievances. A dominant perspective of political participation argues that a country's economic growth and prosperity gives people "the luxury" to participate, because, on the one hand, it reduces material insecurities and, on the other hand, enables people to invest more of their time in political issues – this is also what the post-materialist thesis suggests (Inglehart, 1981; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). It is argued that the process of economic development leads to social change that also alters the political

culture of a nation and that is associated with the rise of new forms of political participation. Empirical studies suggest that, with increases in the supply of material resources, the general level of protest participation increases naturally, even among the relatively poor (e.g., Dalton & Van Sickle, 2005; Dalton et al., 2010; Inglehart, 1990). One argument for this is that rich countries generally implement extensive social welfare systems that not only facilitate the development of civic engagement, but also make citizens feel safer (because the system guarantees basic socioeconomic needs) and consequently make them more willing to take political action (e.g., Lancee & Van de Werfhorst, 2012).

Inequality is another contextual socioeconomic indicator that affects protest participation (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Uslaner & Brown, 2005; Van Deth et al., 2007). Again, regarding resources, in more equal societies, more people are enabled to embark on collective action. As Lancee and Van de Werfhorst (2012) notice, in more unequal societies people tend to abstain from participation because they feel more disadvantaged and more anxious than they would have been in more egalitarian societies. In their empirical study, they find evidence that, independent of individual resources, higher inequality indeed diminishes social participation. Uslaner and Brown (2005) support the argument by saying that, in unequal societies, people think that they are not represented; they feel powerless and, therefore, they engage less in protests.

On the other hand, from the perspective of grievances, the opposite logic seems more applicable. Increasing socioeconomic inequality and economic crisis in general could lead to more grievances and also motivate demonstrations, as, for instance, happened with a huge wave of the anti-austerity protests and the Occupy movement (Van Stekelenburg & Gaidytė, 2021). The worsening economic situation of a country and perceived deprivation might as well bring people to the streets (Giugni & Grasso, 2016; Grasso & Giugni, 2016). Della Porta (2015) distinguishes movements of crisis, driven primarily by the victims of the crisis and often being more spontaneous and violent, from movements of affluence, which are primarily composed of conscience participants, better organized, and less violent. She points out that a new social class, the "precariat," made of unemployed or part-time employed educated youths with no or few social protections, was the main actor in the Indignados movements against inequality and corruption (Della Porta, 2015, p. 4). In each context, protesters possess a different set of resources – individual or provided by social movement organizations – that affect their efficacy of participation. Using the demand and supply metaphor, we may assume

that grievances and mobilization potential (social networks) become more relevant for motivation to protest than the supply side and shift the whole protest demand curve up. In other words, aggrieved individuals are ready to protest more at any participation cost (e.g., risk) it might imply.

7.2.2 Political Factors

Political institutions and people's perceptions of the political context greatly influence individual's willingness to protest (Christensen, 2011; Gaidyte, 2015; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Marien & Christensen, 2013; Vráblíková, 2016). Following Lijphart (1999), a basic distinction is frequently drawn between power sharing and power concentrating democratic systems (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, p. 991). The power sharing democracies value inclusion and the representativeness of the political powers and, therefore, aim to generate governments that are representative of a wide array of interests. Power concentrating democracies prioritize accountability and the rule of the majority and, therefore, aim to produce efficient majority governments with clear responsibility for decision-making. The extent of power sharing or institutional openness plays an important role in determining how easy it is for citizens to influence the political decision-making between elections (Christensen, 2011, pp. 59–61). In line with this reasoning, Vráblíková (2016) demonstrates that states with more veto points – more "checks and balances" on political leaders – have higher levels of individual protest participation. In a system with more checks and balances, decision making is less decisive and slower, and protesters can hope to be successful with their demands.

From the contextual perspective, perceived political corruption is known for two-sided repercussions for collective action. On the one hand, some claim that corruption is a counter-motivator of political participation, including protest, because high levels of corruption decrease perceived political efficacy, making people believe that their actions will not bring about change (Rothstein, 2013; Uslaner, 2002). According to Kostadinova (2012), this negative effect of corruption on protesting is observable in countries that are less or not at all democratic. This moderation effect implies that, in less democratic countries, the high levels of corruption would deter from protesting while, in advanced democracies, perceived levels of political corruption would be a mobilizing factor bringing people to the streets (still, the former countries would score higher on corruption levels compared to the latter). However, more recent examples in Belarus and Russia show that aggrieved individuals still take a chance to protest,

instead of relying on electoral routes to affect politics, even against those corrupt regimes. Nevertheless, these protest activities are generally not long lasting, and mobilize only a small number of brave protesters.

Finally, the democratization of a country is also an important determinant of collective action. Drawing from Western countries' experience, participation in social movements increases rather than decreases when societies democratize and governments become more responsive to citizens' claims (Goldstone, 2003; Klandermans & Van Stralen, 2005). This is congruent with Inglehart's thesis: in democracies citizens develop awareness and criticism against hierarchical institutions and thus are more likely to engage in elite-challenging activities. The opposite is observed in non-democratic countries. Repressive political environments may increase the costs of participation considerably: people may lose friends, they may risk their jobs or otherwise jeopardize their sources of income, they may be jailed, and they may even lose their lives (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Davenport et al., 2005; Honari, 2018; Honari & Muis, 2021).

7.2.3 Cultural Factors

A third set of effects stresses that citizens are exposed to their cultural environment and specific values may lead to more elite-challenging participation (e.g. Della Porta & Diani, 2020; Schwartz, 2006). The cultural context could be defined as the shared beliefs, and meanings commonly found at a place and time. It could be perceived as a collective cognitive apparatus which people need to orient themselves in the world, and which, in turn, constraints or fosters collective action. Activists' interpretation of their situation, their perceptions of what is worthy and unworthy, and their guiding principles of life are all important to define individuals' capacity to act and their tactics of collective behavior (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 64).

From this perspective, certain value orientations and resources, like social trust, are a property of contexts, not only of individuals; on the aggregate level they create a contextual climate (Kawachi et al., 2008). Almond and Verba (1963), in their study *The Civic Culture*, claim that political culture influences whether and in what way individuals will engage in politics. Their study, for instance, concludes that even those who possess a lower socioeconomic status are inclined to actively participate when a democratic civic culture is prevalent. In environments dominated by participatory attitudes, people feel more efficacious about political participation.

In a similar vein, Putnam (1993, 2000) argued that social trust serves as a "public good" with positive spill-over effects on collective action. His study of the Italian regions pointed out that democratic engagement works better in an environment of high social capital: "Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibrium with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement" (Putnam, 1993, pp. 111, 177). That said, even poorly connected individuals benefit from a well-connected community (Putnam, 2000, p. 20). The reverse is also true, societies can also be locked in a self-producing process of distrust that inhibits participatory motives.

In advanced industrial societies, people participate in new social movements to express post-materialist values of the new middle class. The cultural shift in these societies puts emphasis on such values as self-actualization, quality-of-life, and expression of collective action (Melucci, 1989). By protesting, individuals engage in so-called New politics, which demands democratization of everyday life, equal rights, recognition, and acceptance of difference (Martin, 2015). As examples in place, concerns related to climate change and rising inequality create a new demand, mobilizing potential for social movements in Western democracies.

In sum, the economic, political-institutional, and cultural context adds to our understanding of why some individuals engage in collective action while others do not. Context should be part of the explanation because it shapes the way in which social and political processes occur (Tilly & Goodin, 2006, p. 6). However, context should not be overestimated in models predicting protest, because it would carry a risk of misunderstanding the essence of political phenomena, in this case – collective action – located in it. The context should be treated as a surrounding, an affecting condition, rather than a direct cause and the phenomenon of interest itself (Ancelovici, 2021; Collier & Mazzuca, 2006). We maintain that the economic, political-institutional, and cultural context combined shapes the contextualization of the social psychology of protest. Hence, the demand and supply of protest is shaped by these contextual factors, as well as whether protests are mobilized and, if so, what types of protest.

Yet, we miss one important aspect in this focus on protest participation, and that is that citizens have more options to affect politics and to seize their influence in the political power play. Indeed, in addition to the protest arena, the sociopolitical context comprises the arena of party politics. Together these spheres of political influence constitute two routes to seize political influence, namely via party politics and/or movement

politics (see also Jenkins and Klandermans' 1995 diamond model). In Section 7.3, we will elaborate on this aspect of choice in the political arena.

7.3 Participation in Movement Politics and Party Politics

We maintain that in the end of the day each citizen has issues (s)he cares so much for that (s)he would engage in politics. That raises the questions of for *which issues, what action would they take, and why?* Generally speaking, citizens have four options when it comes to influencing politics: refrain from any influence attempt, engage in party politics only, engage in movement politics only, and engage in both party and movement politics. Therefore, we have argued in favor of studying participation in movement and party politics as *choices* individuals have. We seek the answer in the integration of dynamics at the micro, meso-, and macro-level. What are the motives people have? To what extent do political parties and movement organizations appeal to these motives; and what are the opportunities and constraints regimes impose? Such a framework comprises dynamics of demand, dynamics of supply, and mobilization, wherein social movements and political parties act as the major intermediaries between citizens and the state. Figure 7.2 maps the layout of the dynamics. Whether and how mobilization attempts reach individual citizens depends on how they are embedded in the multi-organizational field in society. The more organizers succeed in appealing to the motives that drive participants, the more people will be prepared to engage in politics. Which type of political activity they end up choosing depends inter alia on the context they are embedded in. Consequently, research with a *comparative design* is needed



Figure 7.2 Contextualized dynamics of movement and party politics combined

comparing political participation by individual citizens over time and place to understand these dynamics.

Most political participation takes place in national contexts determining the characteristics participation acquires (Vráblíková, 2013). Obviously, those national contexts are not identical. Therefore, citizens who want to influence politics must cope with varying circumstances defined by the context they are embedded in. Countries differ in terms of socioeconomic indicators. As one may imagine, this reflects in the mobilization potential. Social economic factors, political systems, and multi-organizational fields all contribute to the formation of a sociopolitical system that impacts on the electoral and the protest arenas. Regimes, institutions, and social cleavages define the opportunities and constraints imposed by the *socioeconomic and political context*.

Movements and parties are two forms politics might take in democratic systems. Comparative studies reveal that countries differ widely in terms of the level of political activity of their citizens (Dalton et al., 2010; Teorell et al., 2007) both quantitatively (number of activities) and qualitatively (types of activities). Activities in the two arenas differ significantly. Party politics is far more institutionalized than movement politics; elections are held at regular intervals, at predefined local, national, or supranational levels, passing along according to preset rules. Movement politics, on the other hand, is far less predictable. Movement politics can always take place as there is no institutionalized rhythm prescribing when and how protest events should occur. It is also less clear who takes part in movement politics in what roles and with what impact. Usually, only small percentages of a population take part in movement politics, while much larger proportions take part in elections (Teorell et al., 2007), although other forms of party politics, such as party membership, campaigning, and voluntary work, do not involve large numbers either. As for the issues people are mobilized for, party politics tends to mobilize for broad ideological packages, while movement politics is usually more issue-specific.

The fact that participation in movement politics and party politics differs does not mean that the two are unrelated. However, the evidence on how is inconclusive. While Barnes and Kaase's (1979) classical study found that participation in party politics and movement politics correlate, a more recent study by Teorell et al. (2007) suggests that the two are unrelated. These authors report low or statistically insignificant correlations between electoral and nonelectoral political activities. In any event, neither study suggests that political activities are crowding each other out, as the correlations between diverging political activities are not negative,

but insignificant or positive. Hutter (2014) reports an interesting qualifier of the interaction between demand and supply. People who are oriented to the right will only participate in movement politics if there is no supply of party politics; whereas people who are leaning toward the left will participate in movement politics and party politics alike. However, recent evidence seems to show that this is no longer true (Ashe et al., 2020). These dynamics thus clearly need further research.

Several authors observe that movement politics has become more frequent over the last forty years (c.f., Dodson, 2011; but see McCarthy et al., 2013 for diverging figures on the United States). Indeed, many social movement scholars argued that social movements became a regular phenomenon in democratic societies (e.g., Goldstone, 2004). At the same time, a decline of participation in party politics is observed (Dalton et al., 2002). Some labeled this trend "movimentization of politics" (Neidhardt & Rucht, 1993), while others coined the term "movement society" (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). McAdam and Tarrow (2010) theorize about the various ways in which movement politics influences election campaigns, see also a recent book by Tarrow (2021) on the critical connection between movements and parties. Movements can introduce new forms of collective action in the campaign; they can join electoral coalitions or even become a party; they can engage in electoral mobilization, and they can polarize parties internally (Heaney & Rojas, 2007; Hutter, 2014). The suggestion that social movements have become commonplace concerns the relative significance attributed to social movement organizations and political parties as intermediaries between citizens and the state. Thus conceived, an increased importance of one of these players necessarily implies a change in the significance of the other (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995). As Giugni et al. (1999) reason, when party politics fails, movement politics takes over. Or, to give yet another example, movements can take office, hence start in the movement arena and may run for office in later elections, and thus create for citizens yet another route to influence the state, examples in place are the ANC in South Africa (Klandermans et al., 1998), Prodemos in Barcelona, Spain (Anduiza et al., 2013), or Yesh Atid in Israel (Atmor et al., in preparation).

The handful of comparative studies of movement and party politics within a single framework published since Barnes and Kaase's (1979) classic work all come with limitations. They rarely take the individual as their unit of analysis, or issues people care for as their point of departure. They include a small number of countries (Hutter, 2014; Teorell et al., 2007), only Western democracies (Hutter, 2014; Morales, 2009), or a

limited set of independent variables (Norris, 2011; Teorell et al., 2007; Van der Meer & Van Ingen, 2009). There was clearly a great need to update Barnes and Kaase's study, a quest which we took up with a large international comparative study – nicknamed POLPART – on different forms of political participation, both institutionalized (e.g., voting) and noninstitutionalized (e.g., street protest) forms of political participation. We will close this chapter on contextualized contestation with empirical illustrations from POLPART.

7.4 Contextualization: Lessons from POLPART

Sections 7.2 and 7.3 were devoted to how context steers participation in social movements and political parties. In what follows we will empirically illustrate how the sociopolitical context citizens are embedded in shapes the political paths they embark on by means of sharing some results of POLPART. The central research question of POLPART was how people influence politics and why. Almost 10,000 people took part in a survey conducted in eight countries: the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Romania, Argentina, and Brazil. We asked our respondents to choose from a list of fifteen issues the three issues which bothered them most in their country. In a follow-up question we asked whether they were prepared to engage in four possible political activities to do something about these issues. We asked about two forms of party politics (voting, contacting a politician to express one's view) and two forms of movement politics (signing a petition, and taking part in a street demonstration). Voting and signing a petition were chosen as two low-cost activities and contacting a politician and taking part in a demonstration as more tasking activities.

In order to shed light on the question of how people's political participation is influenced by sociopolitical contextual variation, our study was designed as a comparison of "old" and "new" democracies and among the new democracies as a comparison of post-communist and post-authoritarian democracies. Four countries were "mature" democracies: the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; two were "new" post-communist regimes: Hungary and Romania; and two were "new" post- authoritarian regimes: Brazil and Argentina.

Table 7.1 compares grievances among citizens of old and new democracies. It shows that breaking down the sample into "old" and "new" democracies reveals some significant, meaningful, and interesting differences between the two sociopolitical contexts. Interestingly, health care

Table 7.1 *Grievances among citizens of old and new democracies compared (percent)*

	Old	New		Old	New
Health care	44.3	41.6	Pensions	22.7	10.9
Unemployment	14.1	31.2	Political system	11.3	21.9
Poverty	18.1	31.7	Taxation	11.6	12.9
Corruption	5.6	50.6	Terrorism	29.1	2.4
Educational system	23.8	30.1	Environment & climate change	22.9	5.5
Immigration	40.7	8.4	Housing	13.8	6.0
Inflation	20.0	21.6	Inequality between men and women	6.2	1.8
Crime	15.8	23.2			

remains high in both old and new democracies, unlike unemployment and poverty, which are predominantly experienced in the new democracies. This is even more so regarding corruption. Almost every respondent who forwarded corruption as one of the three most important issues their country is facing was living in a new democracy. Immigration, on the other hand, reveals the opposite picture. This time almost all respondents who mention immigration as one of the three most important issues are from the old democracies. Worth mentioning as well are pensions, terrorism, and environment and climate change, each predominantly mentioned by citizens from old democracies. The political system and crime, on the other hand, are mentioned more by citizens from new democracies. Regarding each of the three issues chosen from the list of fifteen, we asked our respondents "If you wanted to do something about this issue, how likely is it that you would engage in the following political actions: vote, sign a petition, join a demonstration, contact a politician to express your view." They could respond on a 5-point scale from 1 "not at all likely" to 5 "very likely."

Table 7.2 presents our respondents' propensity to engage in these political activities to do something about a specific issue. The table consists of six panels, each presenting data on political engagement regarding the six issues that were chosen the most. The first two rows of a panel present the proportion expressing readiness among the respondents from "old" and "new" democracies, respectively; the last two rows are further breakdowns of respondents from "new" democracies into "post-communist" and "post-authoritarian" regimes.

Before we go into the details of the separate issues, a few global observations can be made. First, the figures in the table are high.

Table 7.2 *Contextualized political engagement per issue (percent)*

	Vote	Sign	Demonstrate	Contact
Health care				
Old	81.6	70.2	19.8	20.4
New:	85.8	80.4	56.9	39.7
Post-communist	86.4	78.1	53.4	31.9
Post-authoritarian	84.5	85.2	64.2	56.0
Unemployment				
Old	67.4	51.6	21.7	22.3
New:	81.9	74.8	53.6	45.0
Post-communist	78.8	62.2	43.6	35.7
Post-authoritarian	83.2	79.9	57.6	49.7
Poverty				
Old	77.9	70.6	26.1	26.5
New:	82.5	77.9	56.7	42.1
Post-communist	80.8	76.2	56.0	38.1
Post-authoritarian	85.1	80.7	58.0	48.3
Corruption				
Old	65.2	68.2	36.3	31.5
New:	85.2	81.9	58.7	38.4
Post-communist	85.6	79.4	57.5	30.8
Post-authoritarian	84.8	84.7	59.9	46.7
Educational system				
Old	79.8	68.2	22.2	19.1
New:	88.0	82.1	54.6	43.0
Post-communist	87.9	79.9	52.7	33.8
Post-authoritarian	88.1	84.0	56.2	48.8
Immigration				
Old	75.8	80.4	56.9	39.7
New:	82.0	70.8	37.1	37.9
Post-communist	80.7	69.3	36.7	35.4
Post-authoritarian	90.2	80.4	39.2	52.9

Note: This was assessed in pre-Corona time. The first two rows of a panel present the proportion of the respondents from "old" and "new" democracies; the last two are further breakdowns of respondents from "new" democracies into "post-communist" and "post-authoritarian" countries. The remainder of the analyses employ the six issues that are mentioned most.

Obviously, one should not expect similar figures for actual participation. People are expressing intentions and previous studies have shown that intentions do not always translate into actions (cf. Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Rather than the absolute level, it is the relative level of

participation in the four activities in response to the issues in the types of democracies that are telling. Second, taking a comparative approach, voting and signing a petition reveal much higher figures than demonstrating and contacting. Obviously, voting and signing are low-cost activities, which explains the high figures. Joining a demonstration or contacting a politician is more of a challenge and effort, which translates into much lower numbers. Third, citizens in new democracies are consistently more likely to become actively involved in politics than citizens in old democracies. In that respect, the literature is inconclusive (Brils et al., 2022; Gaidytė, 2013). Our findings differ from previous studies in that we ask about specific activities in response to specific grievances. They suggest that people in new democracies who are upset about an issue are more likely to engage in politics to change the situation. Fourth, although less consistent and with smaller differences, citizens in post-authoritarian countries are more prepared to be politically active than citizens in post-communist countries. Fifth, we observed the opposite pattern for people who stated that it would be "very unlikely" that they would take part in the political action in point. That is to say, relatively low levels of outspoken nonparticipation for voting and signing a petition and relatively high levels of outspoken nonparticipation for demonstrations and contacting politicians. Finally, contacting politicians is the least popular activity in both old and new democracies and in post-communist and post-authoritarian democracies.

The remaining discussion concerns the six issues that were mentioned most: health care, unemployment, poverty, corruption, the educational system, and immigration.

Health care: Health care is the issue that was chosen most as one of the important issues the country and its people are facing. The propensity to engage in politics of any kind in response to issues they care for is much lower among respondents in old democracies than among respondents in new democracies. Clearly, those who chose health care – be it citizens of old or new democracies, or of post-communist or post-authoritarian countries – opted for voting to influence politics. Signing a petition came a close second. The real drop down comes with joining a demonstration and contacting a politician, especially among citizens of old democracies. Only one in five of the proponents of better health care is prepared to engage in these political actions. The least popular among proponents of better health care is contacting a politician. This was witnessed also by the large number of respondents from whatever type of democracy who are not at all inclined to contact a politician.

Unemployment: Unemployment was chosen as one of the three most important issues by roughly a quarter of our respondents. Fitting into the overall pattern, citizens in old democracies are compared to citizens from new democracies substantively less prepared to engage in political action. Breaking down the new democracies' samples into a post-communist and a post-authoritarian sample reveals that citizens from the latter are inclined to engage more in political action than citizens from the former. Voting and signing a petition are less attractive as political action than demonstrating and contacting a politician to redress unemployment in post-communist and post-authoritarian democracies. Half of the respondents in post-authoritarian countries who chose unemployment as a major issue are inclined to take part in demonstrations or to contact politicians.

Poverty: People who mention poverty as the main issue of their country engage in large numbers in voting and signing petitions. Half of the respondents who chose poverty as one of the major issues of their country intended to take part in demonstrations if they were from new democracies (especially post-authoritarian democracies). Respondents from old democracies who mentioned poverty as one of the main issues are, like the others, not drawn strongly to joining a demonstration or contacting a politician.

Corruption: Again, citizens from old democracies who point to corruption as one of the most important issues are less attracted to fight corruption by all four political activities. On the other hand, citizens from new democracies are more attracted to joining a demonstration than contacting a politician. Indeed this makes sense, as clientelism often turns into corruption (Gaidytė, 2013).

Educational System: Very high proportions of respondents who chose the educational system as one of the most important issues intended to vote or sign a petition to influence the situation. Yet again we observed significantly lower proportions of the respondents from old democracies. Joining a demonstration and contacting a politician were both opted for by one fifth of the respondents who chose education as an issue. Joining a demonstration was intended more often than contacting a politician.

Immigration: Interestingly, immigration is the only issue where respondents from the old democracies engage more in political action than respondents from the new democracies. This demonstrates how much of a contentious issue immigration is in the old democracies of Europe.

To summarize the POLPART findings on issues and countries, the same issues generate different responses in old and new democracies. This is both in terms of how aggrieved people are and of how these grievances translate into political action. As a result, citizens in the old democracies

reveal different patterns of grievances than citizens of new democracies. Of the four activities people were asked about, voting was the most frequently chosen, again depending upon country and issue, while contacting a politician was the least chosen. Why would that be? Lacking trust in the government certainly plays an important role. People from new democracies – building on the political experience of their ancestors – distrust any given political institutions. Moreover, if one wants to understand citizens' political behavior, one must appreciate that people live in a perceived world. Their thoughts, their emotions, their acts all are embedded in the social world as they perceive it. This is as much an "article of faith" for social psychologists. Therefore, we maintain that, while context matters, perceptions of the context matter even more.

7.5 To Conclude

Eventually, it is the context of a protest event that determines who takes part in the protest, why they take part, and how they are mobilized. As the context varies, demand, supply, and mobilization vary as well depending on place, time, issues, and actors. We conclude once more that context matters.

This chapter outlines the necessity of employing an integral methodological framework between the disciplines of political psychology, sociology, political science, and communication science to enable a more holistic understanding of collective action. Future research could try to integrate different levels of development of collective action, by combining micro-, meso-, and macro-perspectives and how these underlying mechanisms are featured in different disciplines of studying social movements. Combining the different levels of analysis provides more comprehensive perspectives on which issues, which mechanisms, and which contexts bring individuals to protest.

This chapter is arguably our loudest call for comparison, followed by a discussion of what are relevant comparisons to be made. The outcome of a comparison is dependent on the terms of the comparison as convincingly demonstrated by the examples discussed. Yet, comparative studies are needed for an understanding of movement activities. Especially, to show how citizens are varying in how they engage in political activities. As expected, issues and countries make a significant difference. Importantly, what people react to is the world as they perceive it. Indeed, what is perceived has more impact than the actual context. Importantly, what people evaluated is the world as they perceive it.

People who for whatever reason want to influence politics have a choice from a variety of political activities. The stronger people's readiness to take part in political action, the more susceptible they are to appeals by political actors, be it political parties or social movements. The choices they end up making depend, next to their individual characteristics and preferences, also on the supply of political activities they encounter. Which are the issues that are on the political agenda, which actors are active in the political arena, how appealing are these actors and the activities they are staging? In this context, Elster's (1979) two-filter model is relevant. Elster argues that human action, including political action, can be understood in terms of two successive filtering processes. In the first process, structural constraints reduce the universe of possible alternatives open to somebody to a relatively small subset of possibilities – the so-called feasible set. In the second filtering process, the individual chooses one from the feasible set of alternatives. The supply of politics an individual is aware of and chooses from is such a feasible set. Actors – both individuals and organizations – have action repertoires, that is to say, a range of things they are prepared to do. Repertoires of political participation comprise available activities affecting politics. While organizations make strategic choices steered by opportunities and constraints (Tilly, 1978), individuals' choices are guided by motivational dynamics (Klandermans & Stekelenburg, 2013; Simon et al., 1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Elster's two-filter model might be a theoretical point of departure for future research that aims to bridge the macro–micro barrier in contextualized contestation. How does repression, trust in politics, external political efficaciousness, or corruption for instance effect the first filter and, for that matter, the second filter? And to what extent is the relation between the first and the second filter a dynamic one? Take, for instance, outraged indignation following severely repressed demonstrations. How will individuals react? How will this affect their two successive filtering processes? Indeed, these intriguing types of questions – given in Elster's two filter model – that attempt to bridge context and individual, await empirical scrutiny.

CHAPTER 8

Should I Stay or Should I Go?

While the bulk of scholarly work focuses on social psychological and political science approaches of mobilization and participation – the antecedents of political participation – a much smaller section deals with the consequences of protest for individuals. The perspective presented in this chapter holds that instances of collective action are not independent. The most fundamental fact about collective action is its cyclicity (Koopmans, 2004). A study by Granberg (2013) on the types and occurrences of collective actions reveals this cyclicity of collective action. He analyzed data from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) on general strikes, riots, anti-government demonstrations, and revolts spanning the period 1919–2012 in eighteen Western democracies (see Figure 8.1). These data not only show the cyclicity of protest but also that, since 2009, the contention spiked to the level of the mythically roaring 1960s. Moreover, the type of contention changed over the years. While in the 1960s rioting was prevalent, (anti-government) demonstrations are at present by far the most employed repertoire of contention.

This increasing number of protests since the beginning of the worldwide financial crisis reflects what Tarrow (1989) calls a *protest cycle*. Protest cycles "mobilize the organized, but also organize the demobilized" (Tarrow, 1989, p. 47). Tarrow maintains that "although protest waves do not have a regular frequency or extend uniformly to entire populations, a number of features have characterized such waves in recent history" (Tarrow, 1993, p. 284). These "features of cyclicity" include "heightened conflict, broad sectoral and geographic extension, the appearance of new social movement organizations and the empowerment of old ones, the creation of new 'master frames' of meaning, and the invention of new forms of collective action" (p. 284).

This chapter deals with the social psychological consequences of protest. In doing so, we employ identity, embeddedness, and emotions as analytic lenses. Sustained participation encapsulates the phenomenon in which



Figure 8.1 Anti-government demonstrations, revolts, riots, and general strikes in eighteen Western democracies from 1919 to 2012 (*Source*: Granberg, 2013)

people develop an identity, an activist identity (e.g. Barr & Drury, 2009; Flacks, 1990; Louis et al., 2016), seen not as a static individual psychological property but as a dynamic social process responsive to external contexts and to experiences within movements (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Sustained activism is in need of a social network and embeddedness in a successful organization that promotes its members' empowerment to reinforce attachment to activism and develop an activist identity. Within their networks and organizations, activists perform emotional labor to sustain their activism. It is this emotional dimension that allows them to become deeply embedded in interpersonal networks, contributing to their sustained activism over time (Bosco, 2006). This chapter takes the literature on identity, embeddedness, and emotions as entry points for examining the dynamic individual and contextualized processes of sustained activism, and disengagement.

8.1 Should I Stay … Sustained Participation

The Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) is a long-established group of human rights activists formed by mothers of people "disappeared" (illegally detained, kidnapped, tortured, and killed) as a result of state-sponsored terrorism in Argentina from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. The group's origins can be traced to the gathering in Buenos Aires in 1977 of a small group of middle-aged women who were demanding the return of their disappeared sons and daughters through innovative public displays of civil disobedience. Over the years, the Madres' mobilization expanded beyond their demands for truth and justice regarding the disappearances of their sons and daughters. Today, the Madres are involved in the struggle for human, civil, and political rights in Argentina, Latin America, and beyond. Among the distinguishing, well-known features of this social movement community are the weekly silent walks and marches in plazas around the country that they continue performing after almost thirty years of activism (Bosco, 2006).

Some of the mothers of Argentina's Plaza de Mayo have sustained their activism for an impressive thirty years. Although impressive, we can observe this kind of devotion in more movements, take, for instance, Brazil's Landless Workers Movement, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, in which some activists live and work for decades (Santos Nascimento, 2017), or the Monday demonstrations, Montagdemonstrationen, that toppled the former East-German regime (Pfaff, 1996). Indeed, one of the puzzling dimensions of the mothers of

Argentina's Plaza de Mayo, Brazil's Landless Workers Movement, and East-German's Monday demonstrators – and long-term activists in general – is the duration of their activism. A movement has only a limited number of such core activists. Most core activists are perfectly aware of the fact that they are giving a large share of the movement's supporters a free ride, but do not care. On the contrary, this is what seems to motivate them to take the job (Oliver, 1980). They are the true believers who care so much for the movement's cause that they are prepared to make that effort knowing that most others will not.

Bunnage (2014) defines sustained participation as the likelihood of, and process by which, activists decide to continue their social and political activities. She employs the term *retention*, other scholars use the terms activist *persistence* (Downton & Wehr, 1991, 1997) and *sustainability* (e.g., Brown & Pickerill, 2009; Santos Nascimento, 2017) to convey the same notion. It is common for people to engage in social movement activity very briefly in a specific context and then stop. For instance, a worker who is a member of a labor union may be called to go on strike. A student may attend a student's demonstration out of sheer curiosity. A parent may join with other parents to challenge a school shutdown (Uba, 2016). However, long-term activist participation is neither ensured nor predictable solely from these experiences (see also Fisher et al., 2017).

Sustained participation is difficult to define, partly because activists' political participation can vary over time (Bunnage, 2014). In response to this, scholars refer to ongoing participation in different ways. Klandermans (1997) outlines a theoretical model of engagement in social movement organizations that includes three stages – initial engagement, sustained engagement, and disengagement. These three stages illuminate the processes whereby individuals join and leave specific movement organizations. Through positive or negative group experiences, individuals decide to stay in or leave organizations over time. However, over the course of their lives, many individuals engage in this process several times, joining and leaving many different groups or campaigns. In a study on trajectories of participation over the course of thirty-two years, Corrigall-Brown (2011) shows that about half of those who engaged in protest politics in 1965 persisted in their participation over time. In contrast, 9 percent of her respondents who were active at one point in their lives followed an abeyance trajectory of participation, meaning that they were involved, left participation for some time, and then reengaged at a later point. An additional 42 percent disengaged after a period of participation. It is clear that there is real diversity in the pathways of social movement

experience over the life-course in general, and in disengagement more specifically. Corrigall-Brown argues convincingly that we have largely overlooked the impact of individuals who have engaged but participate more intermittently or disengage after a period of participation.

Saunders et al. (2012) focus on protest experience, both in terms of intensity (participation in the past year) and persistence (lifetime participation). They divide protesters into the following categories: *Novices* (who had never participated in demonstrations), *Returners* (who participated in between one and five protests in the past year and between one and five protests in their lifetimes), *Repeaters* (who had participated in between one and five protests in the past year and six or more protests in their lifetimes), and *Stalwarts* (who had participated in six or more demonstrations in each category). This approach enables us to examine how biographical–structural availability and/or psychological–attitudinal engagement relates to differential intensity and persistence of the same political activity. It, therefore, emphasizes the importance of assessing the contributions of diverse factors to sustaining protest politics. By using the notion of *activist career*, Fillieule (2010) also focuses on fluctuating engagement over time, however he adds distinct types and methods of engagement to the toolbox. This concept enables recognition of considerable dimension and intensity regarding political participation by considering the way the past attitudes and behaviors of activists continually shape them at each biographical stage across the entire life cycle.

Paths to sustained participation vary. *Biographical continuity* describes a life history whereby participation appears as the logical result of political socialization from someone's youth onward, as a right-wing extremist who is raised in a xenophobic milieu (Roth, 2003). *Conversion*, on the other hand, implies a break with the past, for instance after someone is fired, s/he decides to join a populist right organization. Critical events are supposed to play a crucial role in both situations. In the context of biographical continuity, the event means the last push or pull in a direction in which the person is already going, whereas in the context of conversion the event means an experience that marks a change of mind. Obviously, such conversion does not come out of the blue. It is rooted in a growing dissatisfaction with life as it is. The critical event is the last push toward change. Teske (1997) describes the example of a journalist who ends up in front of the gate of a nuclear weapons plant and whose experience with the authorities' suppressive response to that demonstration turns him into an activist. The story of this journalist made clear the importance of path-dependency – on the one hand it was no accident that he ended up at that

gate, but on the other hand had the demonstration not taken that dramatic turn it would not have had this impact on his life.

Becoming a long-term activist is to a large extent a matter of biographical availability. After all, sustained participation requires discretionary time for an extended period. The concept of biographical availability was proposed by McAdam (1988) in his study of participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer. The Mississippi Freedom Summer was a campaign launched in June 1964 to attempt to register as many African American voters as possible in Mississippi, which had historically excluded most blacks from voting. Well over 1,000 students mostly from universities as Yale and Stanford participated in this project. McAdam shows that college students are uniquely free of life-course impediments to activism, the Freedom Summer applicants were freer still. And the actual volunteers were the freest of all (Goldstone & McAdam, 2001). Indeed, participants in the Mississippi Freedom Summer Campaign were students who were biographically available and were embedded in supportive social environments. In what follows we will discuss the *personal consequences* of sustained participation through the analytic lens of social embeddedness, identity, and emotions.

8.1.1 Embeddedness and Networks

Social relationships and political forms that express ideas of empowerment and community help produce a sense of agency and long-term commitment (Gamson, 1991). Part of the question as to what spurs sustained activism thus lies in the organizations and networks people are embedded in.

Commitment and social–emotional engagement increase with early participation through a gradual development of social ties. Political science literature discussed how newly created social ties and strengthened previously existing ones tend to increase the tendency of the individuals to politically participate (Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993; Welzel et al., 2004). Social ties can be familial relationships (Smith, 1999), voluntary associations (Almond & Verba, 1963; Verba et al., 1995), religious participation (McVeigh & Smith, 1999), or religious group membership (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010) or online social networks' relationships (Alberici & Milesi, 2015; Anduiza et al., 2013; Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Harlow, 2011; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013; Velasquez & LaRose, 2015). This is, in social psychological terms, referred to as social embeddedness.

Over time, early participants become socially embedded, attracting more individuals from their networks, targeting them with calls for

participation. This way novices gradually become sustained participants, through the process of frame-alignment where different individual grievances and activism objectives get aligned together during participation, leading to congruency and 'frame resonance' (Benford & Snow, 2000). Then the cycle starts over again in repetition; early participants get more committed to participation with growing social–emotional attachment to their colleague-activists, then widening their target group to include non-active individuals from their other social networks. That is why part of the literature highlights the importance of structural availability to sustained activism – defined as the "presence of interpersonal networks which facilitate recruitment to activism" (Schussman & Soule, 2005, p. 1086). The more the existing mobilizing structures are successful, the better the opportunity of the individuals to participate and vice versa.

We investigated the role of embeddedness in civic organizations in sustained activism (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2016). We employed data from the *Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation* (*CCC*)[1] study, a comparative study of street demonstrations in eight European countries (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic). To examine the role of embeddedness in sustained participation we used data on seventy-one demonstrations that were covered between November 2009 and June 2013. A total of 14,787 participants completed questionnaires distributed during these street demonstrations. We examined three dimensions, namely (1) the *type* of voluntary organization (leisure, interest, and activist organizations, for instance a soccer club, trade union, or animal rights organization), (2) the *scope* of involvement (few versus many affiliations), and (3) the *intensity* of activity (active versus passive membership, meaning, for instance, board member versus checkbook membership), and assessed how each is associated with political activities. We distinguished institutional activities (i.e., voting) from noninstitutional activities (see also Van Deth, 2014), and differentiated between *collective* activities (e.g., demonstrations, strikes) and *individualized* activities (e.g., political consumerism, signing petitions). We argued that it is essential to treat these political activities separately, as they are differentially affected by type, intensity, and scope of civic participation. Individualized noninstitutionalized activities such as contacting a politician, signing a petition, or buying or boycotting a product can be deployed individually at any given

[1] A detailed description of the project and its tools can be found in the project-manual by Klandermans et al. (2010); and Van Stekelenburg et al. (2012).



Figure 8.2 Type of political activity by type and intensity of civic involvement

moment. This contrasts with collective activities such as strikes and demonstrations, that must be coordinated, organized, and need the mobilization of participants. Hence, collective activities require more coordination, organization, and mobilization of resources and, thus, essential organizational networks than individualized, noninstitutionalized activities. We maintained that, as coordination, organization, and mobilization take place in civic organizations, and especially in interest- and activist organizations (Van der Meer & Van Ingen, 2009), members of interest and activist organization will be more involved in collective noninstitutionalized activities than members of leisure organizations.

Indeed, as Figure 8.2 reveals, members of interest and activist organizations were more politically active than members of leisure organizations, both in institutional and noninstitutional individualized *and* collective activities. Note that members of interest and activist organizations embarked more on collective activities than members of leisure organizations. Intensity of civic participation also affected political activity. That is, active members of interest and activist organizations were more involved in collective noninstitutionalized activities than passive members. Hence, active members were more involved in collective activities, especially those actively involved in interest organizations. Finally, we observed that the scope of affiliation affects political activism – that is, political activism increased with increasing affiliations – especially for interest and activist organizations, and for collective rather than individualized activities.

What explains the pivotal role of civic organizations in sustained activism? Civic organizations are assumed to fulfill a central role in stimulating political activities, as they are seen as "workplaces" where "apprentice" citizens learn the virtues and skills of democratic citizenship (Norris, 2003; Putnam, 1993; Rüdig & Karyotis, 2013). Civic participation is a stepping stone to political activity, in terms of quality and quantity (Paxton, 1999). Civic participation is said to create an informed, reasoned, and rational–critical informed public opinion. Civic participants develop civic mindedness, enhancing the quality of political activity. Civic mindedness, defined as a tendency or disposition, reflected in an orientation toward the common good in the sense of participating in the community and acting responsibly (Bringle & Steinberg, 2010), nurtures trust and respect for opposing viewpoints, raises political interest, and reduces political cynicism (Paxton, 1999). Regarding quantity, civic participation creates feelings of duty and develops political efficacy, and these civic skills in turn produce more proficient and politically engaged citizens (e.g., Barnes & Kaase, 1979). Thus, civic participation is expected to influence political activity by affecting civic mindedness and skills. According to Lichterman (2005), civic involvement stimulates political activity via a so-called social spiral: citizens obtain the civic virtues and skills necessary for participation in a democracy and build a broader and more varied social network. In the end, members of civic organizations are more likely to be politically active as they have obtained the skills, the mindset, and the network to be so.

Taken together, we expected civic participation to nurture civic mindedness and civic skills. Figure 8.3 provides an overview of the standardized means of civic mindedness and skills per type of involvement. Those involved in civic organizations were, as expected, more civic minded (i.e., more political interest and political trust) and they possessed more civic skills (political efficacy). However, this was only the case for those involved in interest and activist organizations. Hence, those involved in leisure organizations were only more trusting than the noninvolved, but do not differ from the noninvolved in terms of political interest and efficacy. Thus, civic participation nurtured civic mindedness and skills, but only for those involved in interest and activist organizations. Those involved in leisure organizations trusted politics more than the noninvolved but were no more interested in politics nor more efficacious than the noninvolved.

This study reveals the role of social embeddedness in sustained participation, particularly interest and activist organizations, and especially for active rather than passive activists. In addition to these structural connections to social movements, people's psychological connections to social



Figure 8.3 Standardized means of civic mindedness and skills per type of involvement (*Source*: Van Stekelenburg et al., 2016)

movements, their identities, and commitments also play a central role in sustaining their activism.

8.1.2 Identity and Commitment

Drury and colleagues (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Drury et al., 2005) have begun to investigate the individual consequences of participation in collective action. Drury and Reicher (2009) suggest that participation generates a "positive social-psychological transformation." They argue that participation strengthens identification and induces collective empowerment. The emergence of an inclusive self-categorization as "oppositional" leads to feelings of unity and expectations of support. This *empowers* people to oppose authorities. Such action creates *collective self-objectification*: that is, it defines the participant's identity opposite the dominant outgroup (Drury & Reicher, 2009).

Hunt and Benford (2004) consider solidarity and commitment to be part of collective identity and they argue that a consistent finding in the literature is that collective identities facilitate commitment by enhancing the bonding to leadership, belief systems, organizations, rituals, cohorts, networks, and localities (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 448). For Hunt and Benford, collective identity is both a precursor of protest participation and a product of sustained participation.

In their study of long-term union participation of women union leaders in the United Kingdom and United States, Kirton and Healy (2013) take Gordon et al.'s (1980) definition of union commitment as a starting point for exploring long-term participation. Union commitment, as defined by Gordon et al., emphasizes ideological beliefs as distinct from instrumental incentives: a desire to remain a member of the union, a willingness to take part in the union, and a belief in and acceptance of the goals of the union. Gordon et al.'s (1980) commitment construct seeks to describe union commitment, whereas social movement scholars offer a more multi-dimensional and dynamic approach. For example, Klandermans (2003) explains long-term commitment to social movement participation despite decline because of the strong initial commitment combined with *positive and gratifying experiences* within the movement strengthening commitment. As such, the participation process itself becomes a central aspect of commitment (Kirton & Healy, 2013).

It is important to note that the consequences of protest are not always positive. In their study on the social consequences of industrial conflict, Akkerman and Torenvlied, together with their PhD students, show that strikes may *negatively* affect relations on the work floor for a prolonged period (Thommes et al., 2014). They distinguish between two different norms associated with a collective action problem such as a strike: a *solidarity norm* that prescribes that workers should participate in collective protest when called for, and a *free rider punishment norm* which describes whether and how violators of the solidarity norm should be treated. They argue that, while the former itself theoretically does not impact intra-group social relations, the latter one does. And indeed, their results show that adherence to the free rider punishment norm significantly increases a fear for deterioration of social relations with colleagues after a strike, while adherence to the solidarity norm does not.

In the context of sustained participation, Polletta and Jasper's (2001, p. 296) point that social movement participation generates biographical transformations among "people whose active participation was of long duration or high intensity" is relevant. Such sustained participation, however, need not necessarily take the form of the same activity all the time. People often go from one activity to another, sometimes from one movement to another, and in so doing build activist identities. In a recent study, Horowitz (2017, pp. 11–12) asks the question: What is an activist identity? He interviews seventeen activists and concludes that:

> On the one hand, activist identity involves role-based expectations and responsibilities, which are supported and reinforced by relationships with friends and family (Stryker et al., 2000). By providing support for the activist's

> beliefs and actions as well as creating a sense of obligation due to personal loyalty, activist identity occurs by internalizing the expectations of a social role and its associated tasks. On the other hand, activists ground their activity in a social category, a collective identity that involves defining a relationship between a social identity and an injustice frame (Gamson et al., 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The relationship between the social identity and the injustice frame varies considerably across movements and personal backgrounds, and this study identifies three different narratives that represent collective identity. In the first story (**legacies**), the narrator tells how a group has suffered injustice but has fought and partially won; future resistance is required to ensure fairness. In the second story (**boundary adjustment**), the narrator tells how a group has suffered injustice but that their group has not necessarily resisted; the narrator belongs to a smaller, more select group that has decided to fight this inequality. In the third story (**conscience constituent**), the narrator draws a relationship between a group of "them" who suffer (the outgroup) and a group of "us" who fight on the outgroup's behalf.

First, an activist identity demarcates who belongs to "us" and "them" (Taylor & Whittier, 1992); in other words, it includes a social identity where a person recognizes they belong to a larger category of individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Moreover, the social identity needs to be politicized so that belonging to the group entails adopting grievances and working for change (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Taylor & Whittier, 1992; Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2017). As a result, activist identity involves a relationship between a social identity and an injustice frame (Gamson, 1992b). Horowitz (2017) argues that the answer to the question: "What is an activist identity?" is important to several areas of social movements research, as activist identity has a strong influence on micro-mobilization (see Chapter 6 on meso- and micro-mobilization and Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995), as well as organizational forms and tactical choices (Jasper, 1997), and, as we argue on sustained participation. The study of Horowitz (2017) demonstrates that activist identity is considerably more complex than standard treatments of collective identity by showing how collective identity is the intersection of a social identity and injustice frame and forms an intriguing interaction between role-based identities and collective identity. Horowitz's research is an exciting start, and other research designs that look at changes in identity over days, months, or even years could potentially help to understand how combinations of people's role-based and category-based identities work together.

8.1.3 *Emotions and Emotional Labor*

Most people do not protest and, *if* they protest, they do not do that every day. As a matter of fact, protesting is minority behavior (Van Stekelenburg

& Klandermans, 2017a). Yet, protest activity can be a powerful sometimes even transgressive experience (Corrigall-Brown, 2012; McAdam, 1988). By the physical copresence of other participants, protesters realize that they are part of a greater whole. As Randall Collins argues: "The focus of attention becomes a mutual focus of attention. Each participant becomes aware of each other's awareness, and thus of each one's unity at this moment with each other. This is a crucial process, the shared sense of a group as focusing together, that creates what Durkheim called 'conscience collective', fusing cognitive, emotional and moral unity" (Collins, 2001, p. 28). According to Collins, there are two kinds of emotional transformations in collective gatherings. One involves the amplification of the initiating emotion. The second kind involves "the transmutation of the initiating emotion into something else: the emotion which arises out of being entrained within a collective focus of attention" (Collins, 2001, p. 29). A successful collective gathering of a social movement is a process of transforming emotions such as anger into joy, shame into pride, fear into hope, creating enthusiasm and solidarity.

Protest events offer a possibility for social movements to create or strengthen emotional bonds between their adherents and to establish or strengthen a collective identity (Eyerman, 2005). Collective identities are forged by solidarity. Solidarity forges bonds and a feeling of togetherness; together we are stronger than the sum of our parts. Protesters who identify with others involved, share the feeling of "we-ness," "your problem, is my problem, is our problem," thus evoke *solidarity*. Bonds between movement members are likely to be strengthened by the shared experiences, leading to greater commitment to and solidarity within the group. The feeling of solidarity makes people willing to come together and stay close to each other (Van Troost et al., 2013).

Tausch and colleagues were among the first to report empirical findings on how emotions affect the dynamic nature of protest participation. They show that protest participants experience more outgroup-directed anger and contempt and self-directed positive affect. Outgroup anger and contempt, rather than self-directed positive affect, inspire future collective action (Becker et al., 2011). In yet another study – a two-wave longitudinal field study – they examined how emotional responses to success and failure of collective action inspire future collective action (Tausch & Becker, 2013). They found that both pride (in relation to success) and anger (in response to failure) motivated future collective action. While anger stemming from failure predicted future protest directly, pride resulting from success enhanced feelings of efficacy that inspired future actions.

Gould (2009) also strongly emphasizes the importance of feeling proud for a movement to be able to move forward. One of many examples that she gives in her book on Act Up, the social movement organization fighting against AIDS, for instance refers to a movement communiqué which states "We as an entire community can be proud . . . of the cooperation within all segments of the gay and lesbian community" (Gould, 2009, p. 69). Indeed, organizers of protest will always attempt to claim a success, to provide their activists with a strong and positive identification.

Van Leeuwen et al. (2016) examined demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions (i.e., demonstrators' affective state, which is induced by the protest environment), why they feel so, and whether atmosphere perceptions influence inspires future actions. They tested their reasoning on two Dutch protests, staged by the LGBT+ movement and anti-monarchists. Analyses revealed that demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions diverge on a dimension of pleasure, and relate to identification, empowerment, and for anti-monarchists, grievances. A pleasant atmosphere perception inspires future actions directly, and indirectly via identification and empowerment. Hence, protest participation reinforces identification, empowerment, and politicization, paving the way to sustained participation (Van Leeuwen et al., 2016).

In his paper on emotions during activism, Juris (2008) describes how different tactics may induce different emotions (see also Brown & Pickerill, 2009). Juris suggests that distinct types of protest produce different emotional responses amongst activists, and that the emotions of a direct action, where one's body is literally put on the line, are very different to those evoked by more "institutionalized" rallies and set-piece marches. His study of the September 2000 direct action-oriented protests in Prague against the IMF and World Bank reveals that activists can often be cynical about the efficacy of mass demonstrations that follow a pre-negotiated route, and the experience of that protest is highly mediated by who one is marching with – quiet, contemplative marchers, a boisterous chanting crowd, a samba band, or the "black bloc." There are different emotions involved in being in the crush of a crowd, feeling the pressing physical copresence of others with a (perceived) common cause, compared to being part of a tiny autonomous band, more isolated and exposed in their resistance. Taking the aforementioned findings of Van Leeuwen et al. (2016) on how the protest atmosphere affects future protest intentions, it might be interesting to examine how different emotional experiences *during* protest affect future protest intentions.

Moreover, collective rituals bring activists together with some consistency and revitalize the kind of emotional ties that keep people involved

(Jasper, 1998). Bunnage (2014) quotes Snow and Phillips' (1980) study of the US Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement, which reveals that the way powerful and passionate social bonds are created during participation plays a key role in conversion, which leads to sustained engagement. Success breeds success, also for social movements. What is more, social ties offer emotional support that enables participants to endure through particularly difficult campaign moments (Hirsch, 1990). Social ties are

> critical to the development of sustained activism because it helps to ensure that individuals will continue to participate, even when the costs of activism increase, out of a sense of loyalty to fellow political organizers. The sense that "we are in it together" may pull an individual activist through a rough patch, in which the rewards of activism seem few and the demands high. (Bunnage, 2014, p. 438)

We finish this section on sustained participation with whom we started: the mothers of Argentina's Plaza de Mayo, who have sustained their activism for thirty years. Bosco (2006) examined the emotional dimensions of the Madres' activism that have allowed them to become deeply embedded in interpersonal networks, contributing to their sustained activism over time. Women shared both the pain of having lost their children and the joy and strength that arose as the result of finding others like themselves and their experiences. They shared their grievances and felt empowered, and such empowerment became the basis for activism. In fact, much of the process of social movement mobilization is performed by activists as *emotional labor* that involves "channeling, transforming, legitimating and managing one's own and others' emotions and expressions of emotions in order to cultivate and nurture the social networks that are the building blocks of social movements" (Taylor & Rupp, 2002, p. 142). "What began as spontaneous groups of grieving mothers and what (at first) looked like informal self-help groups soon turned into a hotbed of activism and resistance, and later into a large social movement community within the Argentine human rights movement" (Bosco, 2006, p. 15).

Literature addressing emotions of protest mainly focuses on the role of emotions in processes of mobilization and participation – in other words, emotions as antecedent or byproducts of protest. Emotions as consequences of protest, however, are an untouched area in the literature. The mentioned few examples are an excellent start for the years to come; taking the dynamic nature of protest and activist networks seriously will shed light on the many unanswered questions related to sustained participation – and indeed on another question: Protest, and then what? Activists often connect and stay connected with others by means of shared

imaginings of communities and networks based on emotion cultures and shared affection – even if actual physical interactions are minimal. Specific attention to emotions is critical to explain how activists maintain their embeddedness in social networks that extend across space and over time, and in online and offline activism.

8.2 Or Should I Go … Disengagement

Yugihara, a left-wing professor at Kyoto University, in 1933 was fired from his job due to his leftist views, which lead to a general strike by university students across Japan. Among the leaders of the strike at Kyoto University are Noge and Itokawa, two students who are also suitors for Yukie, the daughter of the fired professor Yugihara. The student strike is crushed by the increasingly oppressive hand of Japanese fascism. Itokawa responds to the course of events by leaving activism behind and becoming an ordinary middle-class businessman. Noge, on the other hand, redoubles his efforts as an activist and member of the underground anti-war left. Yukie, Yugihara's daughter, responds to this by marrying activist Noge (from the Japanese film *No Regrets for Our Youth* (1946) directed by Akira Kurosawa).

Stereotypical images of activists call-up pictures of individuals like Noge, who courageously persist in their engagement over time regardless of changes in the oppressive regime. However, in this section on disengagement we will show that this kind of participation is as common as the disengagement demonstrated by Itokawa. In fact, these stereotypes of activists conceal the fact that at least half of those who engage in political protest either disengage or follow a more intermittent pattern of engagement, moving in and out of activity as a result of life-course factors such as changing family status and resources (Corrigall-Brown, 2011, 2012).

All in all, little work has been directly interested in disengagement, as an intermittent pattern of activism, or as a process per se rather than a moment in time. Research has centered on the determinants of disengagement, or the future of ex-activists, but rarely on the social psychological process of disengagement. According to Fillieule (2010) this might be due to the fact that, by definition, "ex"-activists are no longer there at the time of study, and very often organizations do not keep or make readily available the membership files that would offer hope of finding people who had defected. Furthermore, there is the difficulty in moving from snapshots of reality to a processual perspective, which in cases of this sort requires longitudinal studies, whether retrospective or, ideally, prospective (Fillieule, 2010).

Corrigall-Brown (2012, p. 19) defines disengagement as "the process of permanently leaving contentious political participation." Disengagement is not always voluntary. It may result from the natural dissolution of a collective (Gottraux, 2002), from the decline of a movement, producing orphans in a cycle of mobilization, as Verta Taylor (1989) illustrates with regard to post-war American feminism; from exclusion, from an activist burn-out, or even from a forced exit through exile or, say, a prison sentence. Disengagement is not always simple. The costs of leaving relate primarily to the way organizations frame defection through various constraints. Forms of defection are extremely variable. They may be isolated or take place collectively, such as when a group splinters or an entire affinity group leaves.

Between persistence and disengagement lies the third trajectory – what Corrigall-Brown (2012) terms *individual abeyance* – that captures the often intermittent and undulating nature of activism. While many individuals remain ideologically committed to movements and their goals, conflicting demands and changing life circumstances can make participation in contentious politics difficult. The concept of abeyance has its roots in Taylor's (1989) work on *movement abeyance structures*, which highlights the continuity in social movement organizations and movements as a whole. In the women's movement, for example, the push for women's suffrage, the Equal Rights Amendment, and pay equity are often seen as distinct movements. However, Taylor argues that these were not discrete or isolated; rather, these mobilizations were tied together by overlapping networks of individuals, ideologies, goals, and tactics – that is, abeyance structures. These structures work to sustain movements under circumstances that are unfavorable to mass mobilization, and they provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another. Recurrently they are then the pacesetters of a new cycle as observed in for instance the women's movement (Taylor 1989, cited by Corrigall-Brown, 2011) and the peace movement (Downton & Wehr, 1991; Klandermans, 1994).

In a similar way, episodes of participation for many individuals are not discrete or isolated; rather, they are often tied together by individual abeyance structures consisting of networks of friends, repertoires of tactics, and ideological commitments that were fostered from earlier activity. Activists who take time off – often in family or career prime time – come back if their activists networks remain intact during the break (Corrigall-Brown, 2012). Intact networks bring activists back into the movement, but large-scale protests may do the same. Fisher et al. (2017) find clear evidence that large-scale protest events are bringing new people – including passive

members of social movement organizations and disengaged sympathizers – to the streets and into the movement again. They argue that this mechanism of mobilizing passive members of social movement organizations and disengaged sympathizers through large-scale demonstrations is an important element of social movement expansion and, as we argue, to bring activists in abeyance back into the folds again. Individual abeyance can be observed by disengagement from radical organizations as well, as observed by Della Porta (2009). She shows that many former terrorists return, both in prison and subsequently outside, to activities involving social and political commitment. Membership of voluntary associations (particularly those active in the fields of social exclusion and marginalization) and political groups is common among many former activists of underground organizations.

According to Corrigall-Brown (2011), there are three explanations for why an individual might leave a group behind: the group may change, the individual and their interests may change, or the context may change. For example, a group may disband or begin focusing on different issues. Alternatively, an individual may move to a new city or, due to changing circumstances or maturation, may develop interests in new groups or activities. Sociological rational choice approaches described individual characteristics that influence the calculation of the costs and benefits of participation which can then be balanced against those of other potential alternatives. Research on the most intense forms of participation have looked at the biographical availabilities in what Olivier Fillieule (2005, p. 21 cited by Della Porta, 2009, p. 79) ironically defined a paradigm of the "acne crisis." While youth, with little life structure, makes intense commitment possible, as adults both family (marriage, children) and professional commitments (career developments, transfers, etc.) can lead to political commitment being abruptly interrupted (Della Porta, 2009). Finally, the political and social context may change, for instance increased repression, but also making certain issues and groups more or less salient and/or increased. Exit strategies are influenced by the efficiency of repression (Della Porta, 2009). However, it has been observed that repression in itself does not lead to abandoning action. If repression is perceived as being too "harsh," it can perversely create feelings of solidarity: in Germany, for example, a second wave of recruitment to the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction, RAF) occurred (Della Porta, 1995). Or, to give yet another example, Honari and Muis' (2021) study on Iranian Green movement activists reveals how repression might for the one lead to refrainment, while for the other the indignation might lead to enforced motivation to

fight social injustice. Note the narrative of the Japanese film *No Regret for Our Youth*, in which Noge and Itokawa took these opposing activist paths.

Finally, Fillieule (2010) traces three broad directions in social movement research on disengagement. The first being the future of 1960s American activists. What did the protesting students become once they became adults and entered the workforce (e.g. McAdam, 1986, 1988)? At the same time, in Europe, the literature focuses mainly on communist disengagement (e.g. Pudal, 1988, cited by Fillieule, 2010). Finally, starting in the 1990s, disengagement is instead envisaged through the question of a hypothetical "crisis of political participation," whether via macro-social approaches aiming to situate individual defection in terms of long-term trends or social cycles (Hirschman, 1983, cited by Fillieule, 2010) or on the basis of survey questionnaires, notably with regard to deunionization (e.g. Klandermans, 1997). In parallel, research began on the succession and coexistence of "activist generations" (Fillieule, 2010; Taylor & Whittier, 1992, 1995). Additionally, we have recently seen a strand of literature focusing on leaving radical, extremist groups (e.g., Bjorgo & Horgan, 2008; Della Porta, 2009; Fillieule, 2010). In what follows we will discuss the *social psychological causes* of disengagement through the analytic lens of social embeddedness, identity, and emotions.

8.2.1 Embeddedness and Networks

Conflict within a social group can generate negative feelings or distrust, which may lead to a rupture in an activist network. This is especially likely to happen when an individual is confined to a particular organization or location such that if those relationships sour, there are fewer or no ties connecting the individual to the broader movement. If group activities in the social movement environment make interactions *less* satisfying for people, this can lead to reduced participation levels (Klandermans, 2001). Debates over central movement goals and identities are common and can result in fracturing the social ties that can compel some activists to disengage (e.g. Sani & Reicher, 1998). In fact, though it is less common in the literature, network analysis not only studies how social networks may contribute to an investment in, or comfort with particular activist sites, but also work against ongoing participation in some capacity. Fisher and McInerney (2012) explore the relationship between pathways to mobilization and retention. Surprisingly, they find that those activists who were mobilized with personal connections were less likely to be working for the movement organization a year later versus those who came to the

organization as strangers through their own volition. It seems as if self-directed intrinsic motivation fuels the flame of participation longer than extrinsic other-directed motivation.

Long-term commitment relates not only to socialization toward some values but also with the connection between the three main spheres of life: family, professional, and political (Passy, 2001; Passy & Giugni, 2000). Passy and Giugni (2000) argue that social networks and the connectedness of the varying parts of an individual's life are the critical factors accounting for continued participation. Their work indicates that sense of self and social networks must be connected to activism for participation to be sustained (Bunnage, 2014). Exit is more likely when the three spheres of politics, family, and work become more distant from one another. On an individual level this increases the opportunity to find a circle of support which is sympathetic toward possible signs of abandonment. Sustained activists are those who managed to interweave into their life project commitment to a movement, emotional life, and a professional career. However, and especially in radical groups, the group becomes one's single circle, that, in case of effective repression may erode. Take the following excerpt from an Italian radical activist:

> Nearly all the people I knew were in prison, that is the people I had started out with were no longer there, there were no more links, there was nothing, everyone ended up in prison . . . at that moment I understood what had happened – the fact that really we had nothing to present, nothing to propose. (Della Porta, 2013, p. 275)

Above all, exit paths from underground organizations appear to be influenced by the social relationships of individuals (Della Porta, 2013). Growing fractionalization and sectarianism of underground groups creates a crisis in emotional relationships and solidarity, which may incite an individual or collective exit path. Although departure is easier if there is a wide circle of support – and activism in underground groups normally restricts these circles – departure is made easier when collective paths are favored. In these cases, changing from extremism to refusing violence can be facilitated – instead of being obstructed – by group solidarity (Della Porta, 2013).

8.2.2 *Commitment and Identity*

Forms of disengagement have often been linked to types of previous commitment, both as it regards the individual position and the



Figure 8.4 The dynamics of disengagement
(*Source*: Klandermans, 1997)

characteristics of a group. In general, the greater the price of admission, the greater the price – be it material and/or psychological – of defection (Della Porta, 2009).

Figure 8.4 depicts a simple model of how insufficient gratification in combination with declining commitment produces a growing intention to leave (Klandermans, 1997). Eventually, some critical event tips the balance and makes the person quit. Obviously, the event itself only triggers the final step. Against that background its impact may be overestimated. After all, it was the decline in gratification and commitment that causes defection, the critical event only precipitated matters.

Insufficient Gratification: Although it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of social movements, it is obvious that for many a movement the goal is never reached. Opp (1988) has argued that indeed people are very well aware of the fact that movement goals are not always easy to achieve, but that they reason that nothing happens in any event if nobody participates. Leaving the Dutch peace movement behind in the second half of the 1980s was explained by, amongst other things, the clear inability of the protest not only to have a bearing on decisions to deploy nuclear NATO missiles, but also to bring about electoral losses for the parties that had supported it (Klandermans, 2005). In addition to not being achieved, movement goals may lose their attraction to people. They may lose their urgency and end lower at the societal agenda. Finally, the individual costs or risks of participation may be too high compared to the attraction of the movement's goals. Repression adds to the costs and might make participation too costly for people (Tilly, 1978).

Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one's group. This is the most attractive if people identify strongly with their group. But the composition of a movement may change – for instance from self-help groups around battered women to radical feminist-ideology groups – and

as a consequence people may feel less akin to the others in the movement (Whittier, 1997). Schisms are another reason why movements fail to satisfy identity motives. Sani and Reicher (1998) demonstrate that schisms result from fights over the core identity of a movement and that exiters no longer feel that they can identify with the movement. Finally, people occupy a variety of positions in society, and consequently identify with a variety of collectives. A change in context may make the one collective identity more and the others less salient and, therefore, identification with a movement may wither. For example, in our study of farmers' protest in the Netherlands and Spain, Klandermans et al. (2002) observed that in Spain during a campaign for local and provincial elections the identification with other farmers declined. In the rural areas of Galicia, the farmers identity is a highly salient identity, however, in times of elections, the most important politicized identities in Spain – Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) – suppress the farmers identity.

Social movements provide the opportunity to express one's views. This is not to say that they are always equally successful in that regard. If, for instance, an activist feels deeply invested in wanting to make social change but feels powerless and perceives the movement as too conflicted or the work to be ineffective, then the likelihood of activist burnout becomes high and may lead to disengagement (Marwell & Oliver, 1993; Opp, 1988). Activist burnout – the act of involuntarily leaving activism or reducing one's level of activism – can cause people to step down (Rettig, 2006). Note the word "involuntarily." Someone who makes a conscious decision to engage less in activism, either because life priorities have changed or because they are tired and need to take a break, is not burning out: they are making a wise choice. But most people seem to leave activism involuntarily and, as Rettig argues, that's a problem on many levels. When an activist burns out, they typically derail their career and damage their self-esteem and relationships. They also deprive their organization and movement of their valuable experience and wisdom. The worst problem, however, may be that, when an activist burns out, they deprive younger activists of a mentor, thus making them more likely to burn out. And so, it's a vicious circle, with burnout leading to more burnout.

Declining Commitment: Movement commitment does not last by itself. It must be maintained via interaction with the movement and any measure that makes that interaction less gratifying helps to undermine commitment. Downton and Wehr (1997) discuss mechanisms of social bonding which movements apply to maintain commitment. Leadership, ideology, organization, rituals, and social relations which make up a social

network each contribute to sustaining commitment and the most effective is, of course, a combination of all five. Although not all of them are equally well researched, each of these five mechanisms is known from movement literature as factors which foster people's attachment to movements. For example, it is known from research on union participation that involving members in decision-making processes increases commitment to a union (Klandermans, 1992). Taylor and Whittier (1995) demonstrated how rituals in lesbian movement groups strengthen the membership's bond to the movement. Movement organizations have developed all kind of services for their members to make membership more attractive. These selective incentives may seldom be sufficient reasons to participate in a movement, but they do increase commitment.

The Role of Precipitating Events: When gratification falls short and commitment declines an intention to leave develops. Yet, this intention to leave does not necessarily turn into leaving. Many participants maintain a marginal level of participation for extended periods until some event makes them quit. Goslinga (2002) calculated that a stable 25 percent of the membership of Dutch labor unions considered leaving. As the event is the immediate cause of disengagement it draws disproportionate attention as explanation of exit behavior but note that the event only has this impact in the context of an already present readiness to leave. Such critical events can have many different appearances, sometimes even appear trivial. When some decades ago Dutch labor unions changed to a different system of dues collection and members had to sign to agree with the new system quite a few members chose not to sign. Also changing address may be seized as an opportunity to leave the movement simply by not renewing contacts in the new place of residence. More substantial reasons might be a conflict with others in the organization, disappointing experiences in the movement, a failed protest, and so on. Such events function as the last drop that makes the cup run over.

8.2.3 Emotions and Emotional Labor

Scholarship on emotional ties shows that they can be *divisive* as well as *cohesive* (e.g., Bunnage, 2014; McAdam, 1988; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017b). For example, Goodwin (1997) finds that affective ties and sexual relationships can erode the larger group solidarity and cease participation. Social ties that remain intact can hasten an individual's departure in other ways. For instance, Sandell (1999) found that people often exit movements when their close friends do, which can create a larger

negative bandwagon effect. On the other hand, disengagement will be more complex and difficult for groups that – like underground organizations – are exclusive/totalitarian and place importance on emotional ties with a group, not only through rigid controls but also through affiliation rituals (Della Porta, 2009).

8.3 To Conclude

We started this chapter on the social psychological consequences of protest by quoting Koopmans (2004), who argues that the most fundamental fact about collective action is its cyclicity. Protest cycles "mobilize the organized, but also organize the demobilized" (Tarrow, 1989, p. 47). As such – and important in the context of social psychological consequences of protest – new protest cycles not only affect the supply side of politics but also the demand side of politics. Hence, the ebb and flow of protest cycles know their own social psychological processes, and this chapter was devoted to this cyclicity. We discussed sustained participation and disengagement, both through the analytic lenses of commitment and networks, commitment and identification, and emotions and emotional labor. In doing so, we brought together a large body of research on these trajectories. Indeed if this research teaches us one thing, it is that remaining active or for that matter deciding to leave the movement is definitely not an on–off event, these are processes that need processual theories, concepts, and methodologies.

At the start of new protest cycles new movements appear on the stage, and old organizations revitalize. This renewed activity at the supply side of protest mobilizes the organized, but also organizes the demobilized. As such – and important in the context of social psychological consequences of protest – new protest cycles not only affect the supply side of politics, but also the demand side of politics. Renewed activity at the supply side mobilizes demonstrators with different mobilization histories, some of them being regulars and others occasional or even novices (Sabucedo et al., 2017). Regulars are people with a long participatory trajectory in collective action; occasionals, contrarily, only participate from time to time, while novices are the new kids on the block. At the start of a new protest cycle, we can expect more novices and occasionals in the streets, novices as new kids on the block, and occasionals awakening from their abeyance (Corrigall-Brown, 2011).

Follow-up studies of activists of the 1960s show the important *sociological* consequences of their activism on their later lives (e.g., Fendrich, 1993;

Marwell et al., 1987; McAdam, 1988). It reveals the powerful and enduring impact of participation on the biographies of participants. Activists tend to continue to espouse leftist attitudes, continue to define themselves as liberal or radical, and remain active in contemporary movements and other forms of political activity. Former activists are concentrated in the teaching and other helping professions; have lower incomes; are more likely to have divorced, married later, or remained single; and are more likely to have experienced an episodic or nontraditional work history.

The *social psychological* consequences of protest, on the other hand, are surprisingly untouched in the literature (see for a similar observation, Louis, 2009). However, precisely in this process of participation and its aftermath we may be able to find the answers to one of the most intriguing questions in protest participation: that is the paradox of persistent participation. This paradox is made up of the question of why activism frequently persists despite pessimism regarding the action's ostensible goals (Louis, 2009).

Long-term participants keep the movement going. Obviously, it is important to attract "new blood" to social movements, however, long-term participants are also valuable as they provide continuity, experience, memory and stability in unstable times (Kirton & Healy, 2013). To address any significant social problem at its roots, a social movement requires the ongoing participation of people who understand how to make social change and who are willing to accept the costs and consequences of making those changes happen. Organizations that do not retain activists are unlikely to create long-term change because, as the organization recedes, any impact it had becomes easy to unravel and forget (Bunnage, 2014). Hence, long-term participants are the engine of civil society. They pursue causes, set out improving living conditions, and prick our conscience (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2016). For Dalton (2008) they are "supercitizens," people who demonstrate political knowledge, an understanding and interest in political matters and comprehension of the options and the working of the political system. They watch debates during an election, attend a town hall meeting for public discussions, and attend political rallies and demonstrations. What spurs sustained participation of these long-term activists? We discussed a few factors and argued that future research could focus on these social psychological correlates of sustained participation.

The dynamics of sustained participation in social movements have a clear counterpart, namely, the dynamics of disengagement (Nascimento et al., 2021). Indeed, turnover and consequently defection is a fact of life

that many a social movement organization faces (Fillieule, 2010; Khalil et al., under review). And again, compared to the abundant literature on why people join movements, literature on why they exit is almost nonexistent (Fillieule, 2010). In Fillieule's own words: "Most fields that *have* considered disengagement are interested in defection from either 'greedy institutions' or 'high-risk' activism, suggesting that we should pause and recognize the diversity of phenomena to which this term refers." All in all, little work has been directly interested in disengagement per se, that is as *a process* rather than a moment in time. Moreover, people tend to hop-on and hop-off activism, that is to say, over the life course they may go into *individual abeyance* and then come back again (Corrigall-Brown, 2011). Research has centered on the determinants of disengagement, or the future of ex-activists, but rarely on the disengagement process. Indeed, the process of disengagement is highly likely to vary as a function of what provokes it, the costs of disengagement, the manner in which it takes place, and therefore what becomes of those who leave (Fillieule, 2010).

Interestingly, social movement scholarship pays very little attention to the consequences of political participation. Nonetheless, enduring activities are crucial for the survival of a political organization. Similarly, we know little about the reasons why people quit activism. We were able to provide an overview of the literature on what makes participants give up participation. This does not necessarily mean that they don't support the movement anymore. Indeed, quite a few return to activism at a later point in time.

A final word about identification, so important in contentious action. Why does an identity become the constituent of a collective identity; and why does a collective identity politicize or lose its contentious angle? To be sure, there is still a whole lot to be learned. Future research must map the dynamics involved. Chapter 9 will elaborate on the matter as we discuss politicization, polarization, and radicalization.

CHAPTER 9

Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization

Today's societies are increasingly described in terms of uncertainties and threat (Moghaddam, 2008), fears (Bauman, 2006), and risk (Beck, 1992). Such collective fear enhances politicization, polarization, and radicalization (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). Perceived threat and social exclusion fuel such political participation, especially if citizens do not trust their government to solve their problems. Globalization and migration create dynamics that serve to include some and exclude others in a connected but polarized global context. It results in salient identities and ensuing clashes of ideologies (Moghaddam, 2005, 2008). In societies where "threat is in the air" (Moghaddam, 2005, 2008), prejudice is high (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), just like hate toward other groups (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010), which fuels (radical) conflict behavior.

In addition to the key question of social psychological approaches of protest of why one protests while another doesn't, a second key question would be: *When do people go beyond moderate collective action to choose more extreme, radical forms of action*? Research on both conventional collective action and political violence suggests that radical forms of action are usually preceded by more moderate forms of support. In Chapter 6, we discussed Klandermans and Oegema's (1987) four stages model of social movement engagement, from being a sympathizer to becoming an active participant. Similarly, in the political violence literature, scholars have emphasized the incremental nature of engagement in radical action, utilizing a staircase metaphor (e.g., Moghaddam, 2005). Indeed, in both the social movement and political violence literatures there has been a well-articulated need to understand commitment to collective efforts to bring about social change *as a process* (Horgan, 2008). In their research on the Sea Shepherds, Stuart et al. (2013) argue that there are two transformations relevant to understanding the process of becoming a (radical) activist, more specifically: (1) the shift between sympathy and active support (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987); and (2) the shift between support for

moderate collective action and more extreme strategies. In this chapter we attempt to show that three processes are particularly useful for describing these shifts, respectively *politicization*, *polarization*, and *radicalization*. In doing so, we argue that politicization and polarization are interrelated but different processes, both nested in the process of radicalization (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010a).

Politicization of identities is key to the dynamics of contention. Protest movements are built on politicized identities and they are populated by people with politicized identities (Klandermans, 2014). Politicization of identities is, thus, simultaneously a characteristic of collectivities and people (Klandermans, 2014; Van Stekelenburg, Van Leeuwen et al., 2013). This brings us the process of polarization. Polarization defines other groups in the social and political arena as allies or opponents. When groups polarize, a strict distinction between "us" and "them" evolves. Both groups assert that what "we" stand for is threatened by "them," tribute is paid to the ingroup's symbols and values, and the outgroup is derogated. An external enemy is blamed for the group's predicament and claims for compensation are leveled against this enemy. Polarization can be seen as an instance of movement/countermovement dynamics in which the in- and outgroup "keep each other alive" (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). The ingroup and outgroup mutually reinforce each other, identifying themselves in opposition to each other and regarding the other as the main target of their actions. The more polarized group relations are and the more politicized its members the more likely they will engage in (radical) collective action directed at the government or the general public to force them to intervene or to take sides.

Identification is crucial in the process of politicization, polarization, and, thus, radicalization. In particular, the following two identity processes – spurred by strong group identification – can be held responsible (Turner et al., 1987): social categorization (seeing oneself as similar to some group of people and different from others), and, in the context of radicalization most importantly, self-enhancement (seeing one's own group as positive in relation to relevant outgroups). Social categorization is a cognitive tool for the ordering of the social environment in terms of groups and helps people to define their place in society (Turner et al., 1987). Self-enhancement, on the other hand, is a reaction to threatened social identities. Group members try to enhance their social self-esteem by searching for positive group distinctiveness, because any threat to the position of the group implies a potential loss of positive comparisons (Haslam et al., 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group members attempt to "repair" their self-esteem

through ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Haslam & Turner, 1995; Turner et al., 1987). By portraying "us" as good and "them" as evil, bipolar group relations create a push for distinctiveness by which the groups drift apart and polarize and simultaneously radicalize.

In these processes – politicization, polarization, and radicalization – identification has a steering role. As for politicization, group identification not only strengthens shared grievances but also entails identification on a higher societal level. A politicized identity is by definition a nested identity in that it involves both identification with the aggrieved ingroup and identification with the more inclusive entity that provides the context for shared grievances, adversarial attributions, and the ensuing power struggle for social change. Identity processes also play a crucial role in polarization. Research demonstrates that threats from countermovements can shape a movement's collective identity (Einwohner, 2002). First of all, the presence of powerful opponents makes identities more salient for activists (Van Dyke, 2003). Secondly, polarization implies a split in terms of friends and foes. Polarization, finally, also induces a strategic reformulation of "who we are." for instance, Einwohner (2002) shows how animal rights activists responded to opponents' claims that they were overly emotional by presenting alternate identity characteristics to the public, while in private they often embraced the "emotional" characterization. Finally, on radicalization, Konaev and Moghaddam (2010) showed how President Bush of the United States and President Ahmadinejad of Iran influenced both ingroup and outgroup through their actions, resulting in a process of mutual radicalization. In doing so, these two leaders radicalized each other as well as their respective constituencies over time.

This final chapter of the book will be devoted to a description of the social psychological antecedents and consequences of these three processes. In doing so, we will pay extra attention to the development of these processes over time. Indeed, in the case of protracted bipolar conflicts as for instance pro-life and pro-choice movements, each new incident starts off the whole process again. Important though, from incident to incident, social identification becomes stronger and ideas and feelings become more radical (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010).

9.1 Politicization

Awareness of a collective identity does not necessarily make that identity politically relevant; collective identity must politicize to become the engine of collective action. Politicization of a collective implies that people

"intentionally engage, as a mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives thereof), in a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly" (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). Politicization of collective identity and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group's relationship to its social environment. Typically, this process begins with the awareness of shared grievances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group's predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues. If in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national government) or the general public, collective identity fully politicizes (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). When conflicts are augmented by involving society (or even the world) at large, the societal context is differentiated into opponents and (potential) allies. Bystanders are forced to choose sides in a conflict, which no longer allows the comfort of neutrality. Hence, you are either with us or against us. They become allies or must accept the consequences of being deemed an enemy.

What distinguishes politicized collective identity from collective identity? The first distinction is raised consciousness: "the growing awareness of shared grievances and a clearer idea of who or what is responsible for those grievances reflect a distinct cognitive elaboration of one's worldview, providing group members with a meaningful perspective on the social world and their place in it" (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 327). The second distinction is about the relation with other groups. A politicized identity provides antagonistic lenses through which the social world is interpreted. This intergroup polarization defines other groups in the social and political arena as "pro" or "con," thus as allies or opponents. The third distinction concerns the unique behavioral consequences of politicized collective identity, namely, politicized group members should be likely to engage in collective action directed at the government or the general public to force them to intervene or to take sides.

Simon and his students (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008) have argued that a politicized collective identity is by definition a dual identity. Some sense of identification with the superordinate political entity seems to be a basic requirement of social and political mobilization in that it ensures that this entity is acknowledged as *one's own* social or political habitat or arena. More specifically, to the extent that one identifies with the superordinate entity, one should feel entitled to make political

claims, because identity confers rights. Similarly, one should feel motivated to get actively involved in the political game, because it becomes one's own game, and one should feel encouraged to approach third parties as potential allies, because they can be viewed as group members at the superordinate level (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2017).

In 2001, Simon and Klandermans coined the term *politicized collective identity*. Nevertheless, the concept remained relatively dormant for 10/15 years. As Van Zomeren, Kutlaca et al. (2018, p. 127) argue:

> Simon and Klandermans' (2001) insightful analysis of what politicized identities are and how they develop basically entails an analysis of changing identity content. The empirical research that followed, however, simply operationalized politicized identity – evinced when "they engage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on behalf of their group knowing that it is the more inclusive societal context in which this struggle has to be fought out" (Simon & Klandermans, p. 319) – by asking individuals about their identification with the relevant group ... Thus, identity content is too often assumed but not assessed, and interpreted but not actually tested.

As such, we know to what extent participants identify as social movement members, but not what this means to them and how this fits within the broader social psychology of collective action. Little is known about the dynamic processes of politicization of the collective identity and how this may change the *content* of the social identities. As discussed in Chapter 4, politicized identities are crucial to explain how individuals get involved into protest. Yet, the politicization of identity has been mainly studied in terms of identification *strength*, whereas less is known about what makes an alignment between the personal and the politicized identity possible within an individual, namely identity *content* (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2015). Given that, in order to motivate action on behalf of one's group, an overlap between personal and political identities must take place, it is of paramount importance to understand what makes this integration possible. Indeed, as proposed by Turner-Zwinkels and colleagues, the politicization of identity does not only involve an increased identity strength (i.e., quantitative shift), but also a proper transformation within a person's actual, substantive *content* of identity (i.e., a qualitative shift), showed by the interiorization of group norms, ideology, and meanings within the identity content. Consequently, Turner-Zwinkels and colleagues understand politicization of identity as the way in which "identity content changes (...): political goals and ideologies which may have been separate from the self, are internalized as the individual takes on the

personalized goal of achieving social change" (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2015, p. 435). She proposes a bridging-mechanism, the psychological process of *politicization of identity*, that is "a process of qualitative change in the self-concept" through which "the structure and semantic content of identities develops in order to integrate the political activist identity into the self-concept" (Turner, 2016, p. 11). A focus on (politicized) identity content may offer new insights into what it means to be part of "us." In fact, a focus on identity content is important as the process of politicization is often argued to reflect a qualitative transformation of identity, through which sympathizers come to see themselves as activists (e.g. Klandermans, 2014; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subasiç et al., 2008). Turner-Zwinkels and colleagues developed a novel measure exploring changes in identity content within individuals over time. In the following paragraphs, we elaborate two of their research projects that both used longitudinal data around the 2012 US presidential elections – a type of political context in which individuals can become active party members during the campaign and thus become politicized. Each project focused on distinct aspects of identity content. The first project (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2015) examined how politicized identity content becomes integrated with one's personal identity when an individual comes to see him- or herself as an activist. By contrast, the second project (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2017) explored whether moral content might be more important than nonmoral content in defining politicized identities.

In the first project, Turner-Zwinkels et al. (2015) employed their novel identity content approach to investigate US citizens' politicization during the 2012 elections, which was defined as switching from not self-defining to self-defining as an active political party supporter. To explore qualitative changes in overlap between personal and politicized identity traits, longitudinal data were collected tracking whether and how personal and politicized identity content developed: two months before, immediately before, and two months after the election. To measure the (change in) qualitative fit between personal and politicized identities, they used an associative recall task. This task allows individuals to freely list up to twenty different words (e.g., "determined") or concepts (e.g., "good in moments of crisis") that they associated with their personal identity (i.e., the unique me) and politicized identity (i.e., party activists for the party they supported). The key dependent variable was a count of the absolute amount of overlap (i.e., words/concepts that were repeated) between the personal and politicized identity. Their results show that identity content indeed matters: personal and politicized identity content became more strongly overlapping over

time, and that such identity integration, in turn, predicted political activism as an indicator of collective action. Note that only politicizers showed this greater integration between their personal and politicized identity content over time. The authors argue that this emphasizes the importance of achieving such an increase in the fit between political and personal identities, so that political goals that were initially irrelevant to the nonpoliticized became personal and were taken on as self-relevant and put into action over time. In this way, "these results suggest that politicization is a psychological process of qualitative change, through which the political quite literally becomes personal" (Van Zomeren, Kutlaca et al., 2018, p. 143).

The second project aimed to examine whether politicized identities are more likely to be moralized (Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2017). Thus, activists' politicized identities would contain more moral content than those of nonactivists, and a stronger moral overlap between personal and politicized identities would predict seeing oneself as a party activist and engaging in collective action. Again, participants completed the associative recall task, both for their personal and politicized identities. This was coded for moral content and counting the total number of moral words, three key content-specific dependent variables were derived: (1) moral content counted within personal identity (e.g., I am trustworthy), (2) moral content counted within the politicized identity (e.g., Democratic activists are trustworthy), and (3) moral content counted overlapping across personal and politicized identities (i.e., if both identities were characterized as trustworthy). Findings supported the moral content hypothesis. For those with politicized identities, moral content defines and distinguishes politicized from nonpoliticized identities in ways that nonmoral content does not. Moral traits not only seemed to define individuals' politicized identity but also had a unique function in predicting whether they saw themselves as a party activist. This fits with the idea that politicized identities may have a moral basis that defines who we are and what we stand for. Specifically, politicized identities, as compared to nonpoliticized identities, are more likely to contain moral content (e.g., honest, sincere, trustworthy), which confirms that politicized identities are, in a way, moralized identities. Unexpectedly, a link between perceived group morality, as detected in identity content, and collective action was absent. Turner-Zwinkels and colleagues interpret this in terms of politicized identity, consisting of both a normative and action-oriented basis that motivates action engagement, and argue that their identity content

measure tapped into the normative but not the action-oriented basis. We second their call for future research to test the validity of these explanations.

9.2 Polarization

We live in polarized times. Take Trump, Brexit, vaxers versus anti-vaxers, or Black Lives Matter protesters clashing with the police. Intergroup conflicts take place in a wider, more inclusive societal context. We conceive of polarization as an instance of movement/countermovement dynamics in which the in- and outgroup keep each other alive (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Ingroup and outgroup mutually reinforce each other, identifying themselves in opposition to each other and regarding the other as the main target of their collective actions. When groups polarize, a strict distinction between "us" and "them" evolves. Both groups assert that what "we" stand for is threatened by "them," tribute is paid to the ingroup's symbols and values, and the outgroup is derogated. It is a *cyclic process* that evolves over time, fueled by intergroup incidents.

Polarization – in the sense of opposing opinions – belongs to a democratic society. It gives voice to interests and emotions and facilitates group formation, and then it is emancipating. However, the balance may tilt, sharpened oppositions lead then to conflict, and polarization is threatening rather than enriching. The ideological twentieth century has been replaced by an identitary century, Boutellier (2021) observes. As such, identity provides anchorage and security in a society with a lack thereof, according to Boutellier. He explains the intensity of identity need and resentment in society with *thymos*, a concept from Greek antiquity that has to do with the craving for recognition and with the emotion released when it is not realized. The moment you think in terms of identity, you also think in terms of difference. I am who you are not and not who you are. That is not a bad thing. That's diversity. But difference quickly leads to antagonism, superiority, conflict. Identity politics, according to Boutellier, is a rebellion against an indifferent "pragmacracy," his term for a society centered on market thinking, effectiveness, and efficiency that leaves many people feeling like they don't belong or have nothing left to fight for. As just mentioned, polarization belongs to a democratic society, but different movements employ different identity politics, compare for instance the white hate groups versus Black Lives Matters. Hence, polarizing identity politics can be *against* equality and engage in exclusive identity politics, or

they can, in contrast, fight for equality, and thus engage in inclusive identity politics.

Bernd Simon (2020) introduces an interesting new perspective organized around the principal working hypothesis that many intergroup conflicts, especially those in modern, culturally diverse societies, can be fruitfully understood as politicized struggles for recognition. Hence, like Boutellier, he observes that recognition and respect are of utmost importance, and he might well agree with Boutellier's observation that this is especially relevant in the identitary century. Simon's new perspective shifts researchers' attention to the multi-level nature of intergroup conflict and to the novel concepts of recognition and identity as a different equal and these intriguing observations await empirical testing.

The social sciences approach polarization from different vantage points. As a consequence, what constitutes polarization remains unclear (Esteban & Schneider, 2008). Political scientists primarily investigate the political arena and focus on *political polarization* at the level of political parties. "For parties to be polarized, they must be far apart on policy issues, and the party members must be tightly clustered around the party mean" (Poole & Rosenthal, 2001, p. 105) or at the level of citizens (e.g., DiMaggio et al., 1996; Mason, 2015). Sociologists, conversely, focus on the social and conceive of *social polarization*. They focus on structural segregation along ethnic, religious, and class lines in global cities like New York (Sassen, 2016), Amsterdam, and Rotterdam (Hamnett, 2001; Van der Waal & Burgers, 2009). Social psychologists, finally, study polarization as a phenomenon "in people's mind." They describe it as *group polarization* and emphasize sharpening of group-based attitudes, ideas, norms, and group identification (e.g., McGarty et al., 1992). Obviously, these arenas are intertwined. Indeed, political polarization extends to social arenas, it erodes social trust (Martini & Torcal, 2016), and takes on the same processes of exclusion, rigidity, and confrontation present in the political struggle (McCoy et al., 2018). Hence, one cannot study the one form of polarization and neglect the other.

Continuation of conflicts is materialized through sustaining mistrust (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2009). This makes *trust* a core concept in polarization. This is indeed what we found in a pilot study among citizens of Rotterdam (Van Stekelenburg, 2018); the more polarized a neighborhood the more conflicts were reported (recorded by Police Central Control Room). But neighborhoods with high levels of trust in local politicians, police, and each other reported *less* conflicts despite similar levels of societal polarization. This suggests that interpersonal and institutional trust

enhance resilience to the effects of polarization, and their vital role in curbing polarization.

9.2.1 Polarizing Web Forums[1]

Cleavages between ethnic Dutch and migrants, between "us" and "them," seem to enlarge and clashes between the two opposing groups easily flare up. This intergroup conflict is not only fueled by local and national conflicts, but certainly also by "explosive import products" such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or the war in Iraq (Etty, 2009). In the Netherlands the polarization between ethnic Dutch and Muslims has provided fertile soil for radical actions. The dynamic is dramatically demonstrated by the murder of Theo van Gogh by a young Moroccan, shortly after he directed a film about repression of Islamic women. In response to this attack, rightist racists burned Mosques and Islamic schools. Equally alarming, though less visible, is the polarization of the public debate. Consider, for instance, the sharp and hot public debates on headscarves, the Danish cartoons, the movie Fitna of populist Wilders, and especially about the murder of Van Gogh.

We assign identification processes a prominent role in the polarization of public debates. We assume that identity-threatening incidents spur social identification. On the one hand, social categorization makes people more aware of their group membership, which strengthens their social identification. On the other hand, due to processes of self-enhancement, group members attempt to "repair" their self-esteem through ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, which subsequently strengthens their social identification. By portraying "us" as good and "them" as evil, the debate radicalizes and simultaneously create a push for distinctiveness by which the groups drift apart and polarize. In the case of a protracted intergroup conflict, one may assume that each new incident, like a terrorist attack, will start off the whole process again. Important though, from incident-to-incident social identification becomes stronger and ideas and feelings radicalize. This cyclical mechanism may radicalize the debate and widen the cleavage between groups. In terms of polarizing public debates this implies that opinions and feelings within the respective groups politicize and radicalize while the debates between the opposing groups polarize. How do we examine such processes as they evolve?

[1] This section is based on "No Radicalization without Identification: How ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslim Web Forums Radicalize over Time," by Van Stekelenburg et al. (2010).

The Internet – particularly web forums – is a "place" where dynamics of radicalizing public debates can be observed. Newly-developed techniques make it possible to study the content of group discussions as they evolve on the Internet over time. What is more, the social structure in society tends to be reflected by the social structure of the web forums, that is Muslims interact on Islamic forums, and ethnic Dutch on nationalistic forums. Computerized content analyses of opposing web forums provide a suitable method to examine radicalizing public debates in society over time. We examine the content of two opposing Dutch web forums (ethnic Dutch versus Dutch Muslims). Opposing forums are computer mediated conversational arenas that can be seen as a digital reflection of – or even part of – public debates. On these web forums, ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims discuss, converse, and quarrel about – among other themes – sociopolitical issues such as immigration and integration. We examined the content of these two forums from October 2003 till April 2006. This time period includes several severe incidents (e.g., the murder of van Gogh and the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London) which made the intergroup conflict flare up. This enabled us to examine *when* ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims felt the urge to discuss political issues as integration and immigration, and *what* they talk about. In other words, to assess how the respective public debates change as a function of the ebb and flow of a protracted intergroup conflict.

We collected thousands of postings from an ethnic Dutch web forum (40,051 postings of NL.politiek) and a Dutch Muslim web forum (17,768 postings of Marokko.NL). NL.politiek counted more than 40,000 participants and the content of the forum suggests these are mostly younger white males with a high involvement in politics with predominantly rightist, conservative preferences. Marokko.NL counted 89,000 participants and was especially popular among young Dutch Moroccan students (90 percent of the registered participants were between fifteen to thirty years of age, Marokko Media, 2004).

Inspired by agenda setting research on issue salience, we started with coding words as representative of a concept. The presence of coded words is used as an indicator to characterize the debate (e.g., the presence of words such as "Dutch" and "Muslims" indicates social categorization, the occurrence of "We as Muslims" indicates identification). We employed computer assisted content analysis to find and count the coded words. By simply counting how often such words appear on the respective forums over time, the occurrence and change over time of a specific concept is measured. The dynamics of radicalizing debates can thus be observed by

mapping the presence of coded words over time, with a special focus on critical events. Mean attention for objects on both forums during the week of an event and the three following weeks is contrasted with the mean number in all other weeks. This procedure is applied for four events: the attack in Madrid, the one in London, the murder of van Gogh, and the Danish cartoons. In order to facilitate comparison, the changes are expressed as the percentage of increase or decrease after the events.

Figure 9.1 visualizes the number of words following the events that took place in the period under study. Obviously, the online discussion shows a strong response to the three major terrorist attacks during this period. The attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004, introduced large-scale terrorism to Western Europe. The line for Marokko.NL shows a slight but clear peak at this point in time. The murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by the Dutch Moroccan Mohammed B. – a participant on Marokko.NL – on November 2, 2004, introduced terrorism in the Netherlands and clearly dominates the debate for a long period and generates a strong, lasting growth of the Moroccan forum. The third, more modest peak is observed after the attack on the London metro. The memorial of the murder of van Gogh leads to another peak, especially on NL.politiek, and the Dutch Muslims react especially to the "provocation" of the Danish cartoons in the first months of 2006. People are clearly more strongly motivated to air their views and to find out what exactly happens after an incident. Moreover, from incident to incident the ethnic Dutch and Moroccan debates appear to drift more and more apart. This can be inferred from the fact that, after an incident, participation levels peak and that they do not return to a lower level than before the incident. Especially for the Dutch Muslim forum the cleavage between Dutch Muslims and ethnic Dutch seem to widen from incident to incident.

First and foremost, after a critical incident people want to reach consensus on the definition of the situation: "What is going on?" Therefore, one may expect that both for ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims their degree of participation, expressed as the mean number of words that is exchanged by a group in a week, increased. And indeed (see Table 9.1), after an incident the degree of participation increases strongly for both groups: 55 percent for the ethnic Dutch, and as much as 98 percent for the Moroccan Dutch. Also, the number of participants in the discussion boosts, a 43 percent increase for NL.politiek but especially for Marokko.NL (86 percent). People also interact at a slightly higher pace (an



Figure 9.1 Attention for immigration and integration issues on two opposing web forums (number of words)

Table 9.1 *Change in content of the discussion before and after incidents (in percent)*

	MAROKKO.NL (%)	NL.POLITIEK (%)
# Words	+ 98	+ 55
# Participants	+ 86	+ 43
Negative outgroup	+ 33	+ 19
Positive ingroup	+ 24	+ 31
Hate	+ 39	+ 11
Anger	+ 26	+ 1
Fear	+ 9	+ 17

individual sends 10 percent more posts per week on Marokko.NL and 14 percent more on NL.politiek). This obviously says nothing about the content of the debates. Do people indeed try to repair their identities, that is do they indeed portray "us" as good and "them" as evil after an incident? That is indeed what we observe, both web forums write more about us being good and them being evil after incidents. This is infused with an increase in the use of emotional terms such as hate, anger, and fear. The more prominent role of fear in the ethnic Dutch discussions may reflect the fact that all terror attacks are targeted at the ethnic Dutch, not at the Moroccans. These results suggest that polarizing public debates are inherently emotional.

This study is an example of the big data studies Louis et al. (2020, p. 51) propagate as "One exciting new area of research involves using opportunities provided by big data to map the social networks by which protests spread." It shows that the Internet can also figure as "a natural setting," where "natural behavior" is exhibited. The period under study encompassed several devastating intergroup incidents: the murder of Theo van Gogh and bomb attacks in Madrid and London, which functioned as "natural treatments." Content analyses showed how the debates on the two web forums were shaped by the incidents and polarized over time. Collective identities politicized and radicalized, social judgments polarized, and emotions intensified, with hate and fear prominent. This shows how social psychologists of protest can seize the opportunity of "real life" events to turn them into quasi-experimental study designs on "real" collective disadvantages leading to "real" collective action. As such, these studies attempt to move from correlation to causation, while securing high ecological validity (Van Stekelenburg, Anikina et al., 2013).

9.3 Radicalization

Tselentis, a former member of 17 November (17N) – Europe's longest-running and most dogmatic revolutionary terrorist organization (1975–2002) – began to lose confidence in the ability and willingness of the mainstream left parties to push for meaningful change. It had become "obvious to the naked eye that the existing left had accepted the idea of playing by the bourgeois political rules and were not interested in the fundamental change of the social status quo. I then became convinced that the remedy for the inequities and malfunctions of Greek society could only come through violence against the state apparatus" (Kassimeris, 2011, p. 558).

When do people like Tselentis go beyond moderate collective action to choose more extreme, radical forms of action? Research on both conventional collective action and political violence suggests that radical forms of action are usually preceded by more moderate forms of support. If the targets – government, bosses, CEOs – remain deaf to the protesters' claims, they may decide to use more forceful tactics. Another reason to choose more extreme forms of action is decreasing strength of a movement. When a movement is in decline many activists quit, particularly when there are arguably fewer incentives to participate. But becoming inactive is not the only response to movement decline. Indeed, radicalization has been described as an alternative response (Della Porta, 1995). Sánchez-Cuenca and Aguilar (2009) argue that we often examine the emergence of radical groups when the movement is in decline. They argue that violence is a tactic to compensate for the weakness of numbers, that is more radical members of the movement try to compensate for the loss of overt support with violence. Although violence tends to appear from the very beginning of a protest cycle, the more dramatic forms of violence seem to occur when the mass phase of the protest cycle is over (Della Porta, 1995). Such violence as mobilization declines, is attributed to people's dissatisfaction with protest outcomes and their attempts to compensate for the "reduction in numbers" with increased radicalism (Della Porta, 1995), reinforced by a repression apparatus which becomes more effective toward the end of a cycle. These decisions are not easily taken. In fact, moderate social movements are often internally fragmented along radical and moderate lines over what constitutes appropriate means and desirable ends (Tarrow, 1998). Take for example the violent Black Panthers which played a short but important part in the civil rights movement. They believed that the nonviolent campaign of Martin

Luther King had failed and that any promised changes to their lifestyle via the "traditional" civil rights movement would take too long to be implemented or simply be not introduced at all. Hence, considering a declining civil rights movement, and thus many "exiters," both disengagement *and* radical sustained participation were observed. More generally, a focus on the volatility or cyclicity of collective action raises an underexplored issue, namely when and why do activists resort to more radical tactics (Thomas et al., 2014)?

But first a conceptualization, what is political violence? For Wilkinson (1986, p. 30), political violence is the "deliberate infliction or threat of infliction of physical injury or damage for political ends." Della Porta (1995, pp. 3–4) prefers to define political violence as a "particular repertoire of collective action that involves physical force, considered at that time as illegitimate in the dominant culture." While Wilkinson and Della Porta both focus on the repertoire of action, Moghaddam (2005) and Doosje et al. (2016) focus on radicalization as a *process* and thus focus on the *when* of radicalization.

Moghaddam (2005) conceives the process of radicalization as a multistory building with a staircase at its center. People are located on different floors of the building, but everyone begins on the ground floor. Thoughts and actions on each floor are characterized by particular psychological processes. The ground floor starts with subjective interpretations of material conditions, perceptions of fairness, and adequacy of identity. Only some individuals move up from the ground floor to the first floor, in search of ways to improve their life conditions. These individuals attempt to improve their own situation and that of their groups. On this floor – the floor of politicization – they are particularly influenced by options for individual mobility and voice. When people feel their voice is heard during the decision-making process, they "buy into" the system. However, when they feel they have no voice, they become more dissatisfied and detached and may climb up to the second floor – the floor of polarization – where they come under the influence of persuasive messages telling them that the cause of their problems is external enemies. Some individuals keep climbing up to reach the third floor, where they adopt a morality supportive of radicalization. Gradually, those who have reached the third floor become separated from the mainstream norms and values of their society, which generally condemn radical activism. They take on a view supportive of an "ends justify the means" approach. Those individuals who continue to climb up to the fourth floor adopt a more rigid style of categorical "us versus them," "good against evil" thinking. Their world is now

unambiguously divided into "black and white"; it is seen as legitimate to attack "the forces of evil" in each and every way feasible. Eventually, some of these individuals move up to the fifth floor and take part in and directly support terrorist actions.

The higher people move up the staircase to radicalization, the lower the degrees of freedom (Moghaddam, 2005). Individuals on the ground floor have a wider range of behavioral options. After people have become part of a terrorist group or network and reached the highest floor, the only options left open to them are to try to kill or be killed or captured. Radicalization is thus, as a collective intergroup process, rooted in fear and frustration about group-based feelings of social exclusion and perceived threats. People do not radicalize on their own but as part of a group and through the socially constructed "reality" of their group. It is a process in which identification processes interact with characteristics of the sociopolitical context to shape and mold trajectories of change in individual and groups (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010a).

But what, then, about the so-called lone wolves? They are not part of a group, but they are expected to strongly identify with a group or category. A lone wolf in the context of terrorism doesn't mean a loner who acts completely on their own and without any reference outside. A lone wolf comes with an ideological background, and s/he has contact with other extremists, but s/he is not a part of a command structure, s/he is not a part of an organization that conducts terrorism (Turrettini, 2015). In the words of Taylor (2013), they are part of a *discursive community*. So, you could have an Islamist lone wolf who is a part of an Islamist ideological framework, but who is not a member of Al-Qaeda, for instance, or you could have a Right-Wing extremist who conducts terrorism but is not a part of an organization, but also draws his ideas from somewhere.[2] The Danish security police have warned against exactly that kind of a mixture, a threat from people who are not necessarily a part of a group, but they create their own frames and, then, they conduct terrorism or violence on that basis.[3]

In terms of tactics, legitimization seems to be important. Feinberg et al. (2017) surveyed self-identified political activists, who revealed that they were willing to use extreme tactics because they believed them to be effective for recruiting popular support. How, then, do such violent events change public opinion and what factors shape differences in interpretation? Baggetta and Myers (2022) answer these questions by reanalyzing survey data collected in four US cities before and after the "long hot summer" of

[2] Website no longer available. [3] Website no longer available.

1967, a period of intense rioting that marked a violent turn in the Civil Rights Movement. They find that the violence of 1967 increased the sense across all respondents that riots were *legitimate responses* to conditions and decreased a sense that riots were effective, but only among Whites. The social psychological mechanism behind this finding might be decreased identification. Indeed, Feinberg et al. (2017) find across three experiments that extreme protest tactics decreased popular support for a given cause because they reduced feelings of identification with the movement (see Louis et al., 2020 for a similar argument). The activist's dilemma – wherein tactics that raise awareness also tend to reduce popular support – highlights a key challenge faced by social movements struggling to affect progressive change (Feinberg et al., 2017).

Thomas et al. (2014) demonstrate experimentally the importance of legitimacy. Their study reveals that social interaction can lead to both politicized and radicalized solutions but that radicalization rests on the perception that extreme action is legitimate. Where participants had been primed to accept the legitimacy of more extreme measures, radicalized interaction produced stronger radical intentions, mediated through a willingness to break the law. Importantly though, neither the priming of radical strategies (an intergroup factor) nor social interaction (an intragroup factor) in isolation was sufficient for the emergence of radicalization. Rather, it was the combination of these factors that created the conditions from which support for extreme action clearly emerged.

Finally, we will attempt to formulate an answer to the who and why of political violence and thus the underlying motivational dynamics. A thorny issue in radicalization research, as primary data is scarce (e.g., Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Horgan, 2008). However, recent work in the area has delivered promising and exciting starting points with empirical underpinnings (e.g., impressive empirical work by Kruglanski et al., 2019, and for a meta-analysis see Wolfowicz et al., 2020). These authors sought to collate and synthesize the risk and protective factors for different outcomes of radicalization. In doing so, they aimed to quantify the effects of all factors for which rigorous empirical data exists. Extensive searches resulted in the screening of more than 10,000 publications, and a final inclusion of fifty-seven publications published between 2007 and 2018, from which sixty-two individual level factors were identified across three radicalization outcomes: attitudes, intentions, and actions. Their findings are interesting, in particular for social psychologists. This because the most researched factors, sociodemographic factors, have exceptionally small effects, while the largest effects were found for social psychological factors such as low

self-control, thrill-seeking, attitudinal factors relating to the law and institutions, and factors associated with social controls and bonds, such as parental involvement, school bonding, and types of peers. Furthermore, radical attitudes had the largest effect on radical intentions and behaviors. The authors, therefore, conclude that the finding regarding the effects of radical attitudes on intentions and actions provide empirical support for existing theoretical frameworks like McCauley and Moskalenko's (2017) two-pyramid model of radicalization comprising radical attitudes (justification/support for radical behaviors), willingness/intentions toward radical behaviors, and involvement in radical behaviors (including terrorism).

The themes of the radicalization literature described above are brought together in the recent 3N model by Kruglanski et al. (2019). Based on rare fieldwork with terrorists, this groundbreaking book delineates the drivers of radicalization and develops a deradicalization model to mitigate contemporary terrorism. Radicalization arises from individuals' needs, ideological narratives, and support networks. The first N pertains to the individual's motivation – the need to feel that one is significant and that one matters. The second N pertains to the ideological narrative that enshrines violence as the means best suited for the attainment of significance. Finally, the third N pertains to the social network – the group or category of people whose acceptance and appreciation one seeks and whose validation of the ideological narrative is essential to its believability for the individual. A need for personal significance and mattering is proposed as a dominant motive that underlies violent extremism. This corroborates the earlier described observation by Boutellier (2021), who maintains that a thirst for recognition spurs polarized conflicts, and Simon (2020), who argues that many intergroup conflicts, especially those in modern, culturally diverse societies, can be fruitfully understood as politicized struggles for recognition. A narrative that ideologically justifies a cause and violence is proposed to channel the need for significance toward expression by engaging a particular collective cause, and violent tactical choice in the service of that cause. The violent extremist is exposed to the narrative through a network of others who subscribe to that narrative and who make the narrative cognitively accessible and convey that it is morally endorsed.

9.3.1 Embeddedness and Networks

In radicalized groups embeddedness and networks play a different role than for moderate social movement organizations. Due to their semi-clandestine activities, radicals are often underground and embedded in

small loosely coupled networks rather than official organizations. Members of the group break away from the moderate path and take a radical activist route to promote or prevent social change. By breaking away, radicalizing group members thus turn their back on the society at large *and* on their fellow activists. This means a "double marginalization," both from society and from the movement (Della Porta, 1995, p. 107). Such double marginalization often implies material, social, and psychological isolation. Their social isolation – or in some cases even completely underground existence – makes them inherently inward looking. In this narrower, ideologically homogeneous network, worldviews are created largely based on mediated experience, stereotypes, and prejudices shaping even more detached imagined realities. The group's isolation is an important factor in explaining its deviation from the "normal" perception of reality (Della Porta, 1995, p. 186) and strengthens the tendency toward violence (Della Porta, 1995, p. 51). What group members feel, think, and do is severely restricted. In fact, in isolation, no deviance from the group norm is accepted and the degrees of freedom decline to nearly zero (cf. Moghaddam, 2005).

Among the effects of an underground existence are increased cohesion among militants and a heightened desire to strike out at those who threaten the group (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Impatient for results and disillusioned with or otherwise dismissive of the path of nonviolence, radicalized groups frequently develop a strong internal pressure toward carrying out a violent act (Crenshaw, 1987). A need to "do something" that is not necessarily tied to politically strategic goals. Furthermore, highly cohesive ingroups that need to make decisions in times of crisis and in conditions of considerable stress are vulnerable to "groupthink." This refers to a setting in which loyalty to group norms and social pressures toward conformity override critical thinking and the voicing of doubts (Janis, 1971). Groupthink further deteriorates the ability of (terrorist) groups to accurately assess the "reality" that surrounds them. This can cause them to overestimate their own capabilities, to dismiss information or criticisms that do not fit their preconceptions, and to hold stereotypical views of the enemy that prohibit a realistic assessment of their opponents' capabilities and likely responses (Crenshaw, 2011; Janis, 1971).

9.3.2 Commitment and Identity

In radical networks a high level of commitment is expected, both in terms of time and resources dedicated to the group. While most political

organizations are satisfied with achieving integration of their members simply through participation in elections or through an identification with the group which is limited to the political sphere, an underground organization needs total commitment from its supporters. The very fact of being an underground group requires commitment to it to become the absolute priority with respect to the other roles an individual plays. Moreover, choosing to be an underground group involves reducing relationships with the outside world and profoundly disturbing daily life, even when going on the run is not necessary.

In isolation, charismatic leaders play an important role in shaping injustice frames and legitimization of violence. They form "information filters" and shape a story on injustice which legitimizes the use of violence. Underground organizations, being totalitarian institutions, strongly limit the range of cognitive sources and consideration of the outside reality is normally filtered through a story-line that highlights the successes of the "armed struggle" (Della Porta, 2009). Leaders' identity talk includes identity attributions about individuals and groups construed as capable of overcoming injustice and solving the problem the movement has identified. They include collective identity claims about the movement and its allies and typically involve positive identity attributions such as "heroes" and "heroines," "aggrieved populations," and "future generations." Charismatic leaders often vilify their opponents, referring to them by caustic labels such as "baby killers," "fascists," "capitalist pigs," "gun grabbers," and the like (Hunt & Benford, 2004). Such vilifying framing of the collective character of an antagonist/opponent functions to demarcate boundaries between "us" and "them," good and evil, and right and wrong.

9.3.3 Emotions and Emotional Labor

The strength of Moghaddam's stages model is that it elaborates the different psychological processes at play at the different stages. However, it overlooks the role of emotions in propelling violent actions and the role of organizers' emotion work at play in the different stages. In order to plug emotions into Moghaddam's stage model we merged it with Matsumoto's emotion transformation theory (Van Stekelenburg, 2017b). The emotion transformation theory suggests that emotions and extremism transform over time and thus that every stage in the social psychologial process to radicalization (i.e., Moghaddam's staircase) is accompanied by different emotions (Matsumoto et al., 2015). They propose that emotions *transform* over time, often via stories shared in the networks figuring prominent in

Kruglanski et al.'s (2019) work, to inculcate cultures with hatred and violence. Specifically, this emotional transformation follows three phases (based on Matsumoto et al., 2012):

Phase 1: Outrage Based on Anger. This phase involves the group identifying events that obstruct goals or stem from perceived injustice. It also may involve the group identifying threats to its well-being, physical safety, or way of life. These interpretations and attributions lead to or are fueled by feelings of anger toward the outgroup.

Phase 2: Moral Superiority Based on Contempt. Groups begin to reinterpret anger-eliciting situations and events identified in Phase 1 and take the high road. That is, they reappraise the events from a position of moral superiority and identify links between similar behaviors or events, no matter how tenuous, thus making the attribution that the outgroup is morally inferior. These reappraisals and attributions lead to or are fueled by the emotion of contempt.

Phase 3: Elimination Based on Disgust. A further reappraisal of events and situations leads to the conclusion that distance – the mild form of elimination – is necessary between the ingroup and outgroup, or that the outgroup needs to be removed altogether – the extreme form of elimination. These ideas are promulgated by the emotion of disgust.

The three phases of emotion transformation proposed by Matsumoto and colleagues illuminate that groups can hate, but that not all hatred leads to violence or hostility. Hatred based primarily on anger or contempt likely will *not* be associated with violence or hostility, but hatred that involves disgust – the emotion of repulsion and elimination – likely will. Additionally, we made a plea for humiliation as a pathway to violence, humiliation may contribute to, or intensify, aggressive responses to the humiliator. Hence, groups can be angry or contemptuous but, when also disgusted or humiliated, they may become dangerous.

The three emotional transformation phases neatly align with the social psychological stages as described in Moghaddam's staircase to radicalization. People located at the first three floors of Moghaddam's staircase (i.e., ground floor: psychological interpretation of material conditions, first floor: perceived options to fight unfair treatment, and second floor: displacement of aggression) align to Matsumoto's first phase. At this stage we will observe outrage based on anger. On the third floor – "Moral Engagement" – anger is expected to be accompanied by feelings of moral superiority based on contempt. At the fourth and the fifth floors –

categorical us-vs-them thinking and violent acts, respectively – people are expected to experience feelings of elimination based on disgust. Moreover, and important in the context of emotional work by organizers, Matsumoto and colleagues show, by analyzing leaders' speeches in different stages, how organizers mobilize different violent emotions at different stages. Through the careful use of language and nonverbal behaviors, leaders motivate, escalate, or defuse situations and incite action through emotion transformation (Matsumoto et al., 2015). Hence, combining Moghaddam's staircase to radicalization with Matsumoto's emotion transformation theory might provide an analytical tool for understanding the thorny process of radicalization. Obviously, these ideas await empirical scrutiny.

9.4 To Conclude

With this final chapter we hope to inspire research in the burgeoning area of processes of protest like politicization, polarization, and radicalization. In fact, the work we discuss demonstrates in an exemplary manner how the social psychology of protest can be brought into dialog with existing insights into participation in political violence, because it breaks away from some of the more psychological treatments of these questions in terrorism studies.

Little is known about the dynamic processes of politicization of the collective identity and how this may change the content of the social identities. Felicity Turner (2016) devoted a whole dissertation to this topic. The two lines of her work described, show how changes in identity content reflect psychological changes in how nonactivists become activists (i.e., the politicization process) and how moral identity content differentiates politicized from nonpoliticized identities, suggesting that who we are and what we stand for are closely linked in the context of collective action. Together these two lines of work suggest that it is through changes in identity content that we can better understand the psychological process of politicization (see also Livingstone, 2014 for a similar quest for attention to qualitative aspects of identity). We are confident that her research will yield results that will move the field forward, especially on the interlock between individual and context and dynamic changes over time.

There are compelling reasons to worry about polarization. Indeed, the latest Global Risks Report (World Economic Forum, 2017) ranked "increasing polarization" as the third most important risk-trend for the decade to come. So, there is a real need for research into understanding the dynamics of political and/or societal polarization; we see an important role

for the social psychology of protest in this. Each incident – like a terrorist attack – generates a push for intragroup similarity and intergroup distinctiveness through which groups drift apart and intergroup conflicts intensify (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010). This cyclic process intensifies by exposure to intergroup violence, which increases intolerance, hatred, and feelings of revenge (e.g., Halperin, 2008). The more intense the polarization, the more – and more violent – the associated intergroup conflicts. Understanding such inter- and intragroup thoughts, feelings, and behavior, after all, is social psychology's cup of tea.

Our study on polarizing online public debates can be seen as a good example. To our knowledge this was the first study to demonstrate the social psychological dynamics of polarizing online public debates (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010). Devastating events such as the attacks in Madrid, London, or the murder of Theo van Gogh are clearly the talk of the town, also in the "virtual cafes." Our results indicate that people do not just talk randomly about these events but in a predictable manner. We have attempted to catch polarization in the texts that Dutch Muslims and ethnic Dutch post on "their" web forums reflected in how processes of categorization, self-enhancement, and identification are shaped by the ebb and flow of incidents over time. After an incident, debaters clearly feel the urge to express their view: participation on the web forums increases and for the Moroccan forum even doubles. People "talk" much more in terms of the conflicting groups – Muslims, Jews, Moroccans, ethnic Dutch, etc. – which enhances their inclination to define themselves as a member of one of these groups – "I as a Muslim," "I as a Dutchman." Incidents bring group membership forcefully to the psychological foreground, such that Dutch Muslims and ethnic Dutch are faced with a threatened group identity. Consequently, group members reveal the urge to defend or "repair" their threatened group identity and the debates boil down to a few stereotypical characteristics fueled by strong emotional loadings to differentiate between the loved ingroup and the hated outgroup. These are fascinating first findings but, obviously, more research is needed to understand when and why and under what conditions groups polarize.

Activists have a tendency to radicalize if they fail to draw the attention of politics. Strange enough we know little about the dynamics of such radicalization. Indeed, we know little about why some activists go beyond moderate collective action to choose more extreme, radical forms of action while others don't. Once again the social psychological theory and methods toolbox might be useful to find the answers to these questions,

and this has been perfectly illustrated by the projects discussed (Doosje et al., 2016; Gøtzsche-Astrup et al., 2020; Kruglanski et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2014).

Contemporary politicization, polarization, and radicalization may result in the form of support for radical and/or populist political parties and/or radical movement organizations (Van Stekelenburg, 2014; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010a). Hence, politicization, polarization, and radicalization may take place along the two different routes discussed in Chapter 7, via party politics and movements politics. For radical political activity this would imply through participation in radical and/or populist political parties or through participation in radical social movements (see also Jenkins and Klandermans' 1995 diamond model). The radical party route is often overlooked by social movement scholars. Hutter and Kriesi (2013) argue that, by neglecting this route, social movement scholars tend to overlook the populist radical right parties. As a matter of fact, since the 1990s, right-wing populist politics has been well represented in national politics in many Western countries, including France, The Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, and the like, and most recently in the United States with the election of President Trump and the Capitol riots. Little is known about how these routes vary or interact, how such variation is determined, or how it impacts on who radicalizes, for what reasons, and why people take the one route rather than the other. Of course, in trying to achieve social change people will attempt to keep their costs and their risks to a minimum (cf. McAdam, 1986). Therefore, one can expect that citizens demanding radical social change initially prefer the low costs/risks route of party politics. However, this is only possible if there is a supply of radical party politics that impresses as effective. Kriesi's (2009) suggestion that the extreme right mobilizes via party politics seems to be confirmed by the supply of populist radical right political parties in many European countries. The radical left, on the other hand, tends to choose movement politics. Hence, movement politics have been dominated by the so-called left-libertarian movement family (Della Porta & Rucht, 1995), although we do encounter radical right movements (for instance, anti-abortion, the Tea party, and white hate groups).

A final interesting issue is the relation between the two routes. As far as moderate political activities are concerned, the two routes have always been intimately related. That is to say, people who participate in party politics are also likely to participate in movement politics (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). However, if the route via the political representational system does not live up to citizens' expectations, chances are that the protest route via social

movements will be used more frequently. This raises the question of whether the two routes for radical political participation are as intimately related as those for moderate forms of participation and to what extent failing radical party politics would similarly make people shift to movement politics. Or a populist shift in party politics may create the floor – legitimize – to voice more radical extreme right claims in the streets. Indeed, there are many questions to be addressed in future research.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion
Taking Stock

We are reaching the point of assessing what we achieved, which questions we were able to answer, and which remained unanswered. In short, time to take stock. We will do so by revisiting the three foci of our book. A first section focusing on the individual as the unit of analysis; next a section positioning the contextualization of contention as the focal point; followed by a section on the aftermath of contention for the individual. The final section of this chapter is dedicated to methodology. We will maintain that, in order to understand contextualized contestation, we need disciplinary collaboration and comparative designs.

The central question underlying this volume was: *Why do some people protest, while other in apparently similar situations don't?* Our aim was to merge theory and evidence on protest politics, whereby individuals figure center stage – what are their fears, hopes, and concerns? What groups do they identify with? Are they cynical about politics, do they trust authorities? What are the choices citizens make, the motives they have, the emotions they experience? Why do some decide to stay, and others radicalize or quit the movement? These are all questions that take the individual as the unit of analysis, the first focus of this book. Employing the individual as unit of analysis we were able to detail the role of the individual citizen in staging protest events. In the final instance it is individuals who in mutual interaction build the structures and shape the dynamics that design the political process. What keeps them going? What are the choices they make and how do we explain these choices? In doing so, we developed a social psychological approach of contention. It focuses on subjective variables and takes the individual as its unit of analysis. This is social psychology par excellence.

Yet, the decision to protest is not taken in a social vacuum. To the contrary, we firmly believe that the political power-play is – by definition – fought out in the sociopolitical intergroup context and, therefore, the second focus of this book was on *contextualized contestation*. We elaborated

what we dubbed contextualization of contestation. We took Lewin's definition of social psychology and Colemans' model of the social sciences as our point of departure – both examples of modeling the interaction of individuals into building society. While sociologists and political scientists typically analyze the meso- and macro-level and employ structural approaches, the social psychological approach takes the micro-level as the point of departure and concentrates on questions of how individuals perceive and interpret these structural conditions. We elaborated consensus formation, consensus mobilization, and action mobilization along the lines of Coleman's boat.

The third focus of the book is devoted to the dynamics of the aftermath of contention. We zoom in on processes underlying mobilization such as politicization, polarization, and radicalization. We depart from the notion that instances of collective action are not independent, indeed, the most fundamental fact about collective action is its cyclicity (Koopmans, 2004), but how does that work for the individual protester? The remainder of this concluding chapter will elaborate on what we have learned regarding the three foci that structured the argument: the individual as a unit of analysis; contextualization of contestation; and the individual aftermath of contention.

Our final words will be devoted to methodology. Indeed, our main argument of the book is that more attention should be placed on what happens *before* and *after* mobilization processes, and we hoped to show how a contextualized social psychological approach, with disciplinary collaboration and relying on comparative designs, can open and develop insights into these largely untapped areas. But first we start with the individual as the unit of analysis.

10.1 Individuals in Action

As mentioned, social psychology takes the individual as its unit of analysis. This implies that social structures, processes, and dynamics are to be broken down into individual cognitions, affect, and behavior. Social psychology entered the studies of protest bringing with it some typical concepts such as grievances, efficacy, social identity, emotions, and social embeddedness; and methods such as survey-methods and experimental designs. As we emphasized throughout the chapters of this volume, social psychology imported to the field the individual level of analysis and with it the world as perceived. Undoubtedly, this growth of scholarship was encouraged by the decades of dramatic appearance of protest events all

over the world, but also theoretical approaches like social identity and group-based emotions gave the social psychology of protest a boost.

We maintain that protest begins with grievances. We assume that people who don't have any grievances are not susceptible to mobilization attempts. Therefore, we argued that the focal question of a social psychology of protest is not so much whether and why some people are aggrieved while others are not, but rather why some of those who are aggrieved get into action, while others don't? Furthermore, the observation of shared grievances makes people aware of the collective they are identifying with, which translates into varying levels of collective identity, and politicization of that identity and therewith its position in and relation to the sociopolitical context which in the process of politicization gradually divides into allies and opponents.

Research on political activities tends to restrict itself to a comparison of participants versus nonparticipants. However, there are many different activities people can engage in. In fact, as we discussed, the motivational dynamics of these different activities, for instance signing a petition or taking part in a demonstration, vary as well. Indeed, Van Deth (2016) distinguishes more than eighty different political activities. Research into what activities citizens engage in and why these and not others is scarce and would indeed be of great interest. Moreover, attending a specific political activity does not necessarily mean readiness to take part in any other activity. Think of such diverging activities as signing a petition, occupying a building, taking part in a demonstration, or blockading a road, and so on. For different individuals, such protests are differently appealing. Understanding such differences requires comparative research designs. However, not only the type of activity but many more characteristics of protest events account for variation in participation. It is certainly worth the effort to compare motivation, mobilization, and participation in various activities. Moreover, we were interested in citizens' choice between movement politics and party politics as well. It seems that citizens engage in both forms of political participation. Research into what arena citizens engage in and why these and not others would be of great interest. Once again, comparative studies are needed. Obviously, readiness to act relates to the costs of participation involved as well. The higher the costs, the lower the number of would-be participants. Linking the propensity to participate into different kinds of activities and issues would result in a more dynamic story to tell.

We need to know more about mobilization potential, and specifically about consensus formation and consensus mobilization. In a society some

proportion of the population exists of people sympathizing with the goals of the protests. We dubbed that the movement's mobilization potential. That is to say, those citizens who are prepared to act. The size of the mobilization potential depends on the formation and mobilization of consensus. These are basically social psychological processes, such as convincing and activating. However, much is still to learn about the mechanisms and dynamics involved in turning thinking into doing.

In that context, it might be interesting to study the impact of *issues*. Issues have a varying impact on protest. Both issues citizens are fighting for and their social identity are involved. Obviously, dependent on the issue, different people are mobilized. Depending on these issues people's complaints vary. In fact, very little attention is given to the role of issues. It would be interesting to collect the slogans participants in the demonstration carry. Especially if the protest is staged by a coalition of organizers (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992), versus, for matters of comparison, bottom-up nonorganizational connective action (cf. Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).

10.2 Mapping the Contextualization of Contestation

What have we contributed to our knowledge of political protest? First and foremost, we have taught how to translate structural processes, mechanisms, and dynamics into individual behavior. We have studied street demonstrations as the major protest event social movements employ. Not only in Western democracies but also in nonWestern authoritarian countries. Of crucial importance appeared to be group identification, identity, collective identity, and politicized collective identity. Look through the previous chapters and conceive of it as a compilation of opportunities an individual can take. We have tried to catch the turns individual citizens take. We aimed to develop the first full account of the frame of mind of the individual participants in a protest event. Protests, we hold, are means of communication. Citizens want policymakers to know that they are upset. Few participants believe that they will be able to change government's policy overnight, but making it into the news, the social media, or on television would make quite a few protestors happy.

For a long time, scholars of protest focused on movements of the left. Partly because the protest movements themselves were predominantly leftist oriented. This is no longer true. Not only are many more protests leaning toward the right, scholars are also more interested in movements of the right, as witnessed by the edited volume of studies of the far right (cf. Ashe et al., 2020). Nonetheless, more studies of the extreme right and

populist right movements are needed. The past few years we witnessed the growing presence of radical right populism as a movement in many countries. It would certainly be worth the effort to systematically study extreme right movements. Would they be fundamentally different than radical left movement or would they rather have features in common (Chirumbolo et al., 2006)?

So far, protest studies are predominantly Western-biased, except for a few notable exceptions (e.g. Della Porta, 2015; Honari & Muis, 2021; Jacobsson & Saxonberg, 2015). The motivation to protest varies across contexts. There are differences in the dynamics of supply and demand. The contexts constrain perceived grievances, political efficacy, and general motivation and willingness to protest. It has been debated that there is a regional specificity of social activism in different parts of the world (Piotrowski, 2015). Accordingly, the theoretical and analytical approach should be adjusted, taking into account, for instance, historical legacies, different levels and access to the material, social and psychological resources, and the presence of the repressive regimes as the target of the protest. Talking from today's perspective, pro-democracy protests and movements, like the ones in Hong Kong and Eastern Europe, continue to increase in scale and frequency across continents and countries, and are particularly worth our attention and efforts to scrutinize. And not only for academic reasons that would feed our curiosity, but also for the improvement of the world and the future of democracy. Will these movements achieve meaningful political change and what will be the role of individual agency in it? We will witness the outcomes of these questions in the years to come.

The democratization of a country is also an important determinant of protest. Drawing from Western countries' experience, protest participation increases rather than decreases when societies democratize and governments become more responsive to citizens' claims (Goldstone, 2004). This is congruent with Inglehart's thesis: in democracies citizens develop awareness and criticism against hierarchical institutions and, thus, are more likely to engage in elite-challenging activities. The opposite is observed in nondemocratic countries. Repressive political environments may increase the costs of participation considerably: people may lose friends, they may risk their jobs or otherwise jeopardize their sources of income, they may be jailed, and they may even lose their lives (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Davenport et al., 2005; Honari, 2018). What is important is that repression need not be individually experienced. Perceived repression, or the knowledge of others being repressed, can be equally effective in

spreading fear (Honari, 2018). Studies that elaborate on the impact of repression reveal that individual participants react in many different manners to repression; in fact, repression might have a paradoxical effect – making people inclined to protest more. Again, research would help to solve the puzzle. Hence, contextualized contestation inevitably comprises the influence of repression.

10.2.1 Social Embeddedness

Maintaining that the individual is the unit of analysis of social psychology implies that we need to conceive of processes, mechanisms, and dynamics that connect individual citizens to each other and societal structures. We proposed to integrate social embeddedness into our models, be it formal, informal, or virtual. Social embeddedness implies someone's place in society. People tend to build the social networks they are embedded in by interaction with the members of their society. Note that social embeddedness does not necessarily mean support for the movement. People could just as well be embedded in networks favoring opposition. In any event, the role of social embeddedness deserves scholarly attention.

First, in terms of formation of demand and supply, the Internet and social media have become increasingly central to the emergence of protest. Social media obviously facilitates cooperation and helps to overcome the start-up problems of collective action by forming small groups and coalitions that share similar attitudes (Centola, 2013). Thus, it raises new questions about how social media reduces the costs of information acquisition and information processing. Take, for instance, the traditional information-processing approach focused on the individual. There is growing recognition that cognition forms within social groups rather than within an individual (e.g., Gamson, 1992a; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Taber, 2003). Via social media people more readily acquire "shared cognitions." How do people come to share information? Who do they trust as a source of information? And who do they mistrust? Why would people adopt certain frames while neglecting or paying less attention to others? We suggest that socially structured cognition is a new and inviting field in relation to collective action. Information search behavior has changed significantly, as has the available amount of information and the algorithms that "steer" the information to one's screen. Take, for instance, the much debated "alternative facts" and "fake news" in the 2016 and 2020 American presidential elections. If social media has changed one thing profoundly, it is our perception of reality, in ways that fuel

politicization, polarization, and radicalization (e.g. Alberici & Milesi, 2015; Enjolras et al., 2014; Hong & Kim, 2016; Johnson et al., 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2017).

Social media functions not only as an informational tool, but also as a tool of expression, the latter being, arguably, more important for protest participation. Providing an expressive mechanism, social media reduces the psychological distance between individual and collective action, as the cost increase from doing nothing to expressing something on social media is very low. Thus, future research should more thoroughly investigate how social media expression boosts levels of identification, positive incentives, and individual efficacy, and how they in turn lead to protest participation. Furthermore, the question remains how social media moderates the intentions not only to attend, but also actually to organize the protests in these times of nonorganizational leaderless protests? In other words, what are the long-term effects of social media on broadening the pool of collective action sympathizers and potential organizers?

Second, the discussion on social media raises another focal question: does internet usage inspire offline political participation? What is the relationship between offline versus online participation? Some authors claim that increased online political discussion indirectly affects offline political participation through the influence of political information sharing (Lane et al., 2017). For instance, Greijdanus et al. (2020) conclude that social media facilitate online activism, particularly by collating individual experiences, community building, and the development of shared realities. They suggest that online and offline activism are positively related because social media posts can mobilize others for offline protest, although the visibility of activism could become risky in the repressive contexts.

On the other hand, a question for future research could investigate whether online activism could hinder offline protests. Virtual interaction in its essence is at odds with traditional models of predicting protest participation. These models assume that social movements are generated through direct participation in activities within an organizational context that explicitly expresses prosocietal stances and norms. Indeed, some studies tend to show that online and offline civic participation have different attitudinal predictions, so these types of participation do not necessarily grow from each other. For instance, studies show that social trust and civic responsibility lead to more (peaceful) protest offline, while the same pattern is not found for online collective action (Machackova & Šerek, 2017; Oser et al., 2013). The fact that we observe two different patterns stems from the specific character of online participation, as it is

typically performed at a relative distance from other people, rather than demanding direct personal interactions. Having said this, to understand the conditions under which online protests hinder or inspire offline participation we need more (comparative) research.

Virtual interactions also have dubious effects on political efficacy as it provides only limited opportunities to feel a sense of accomplishment. Even if it enhances critical thinking and deliberation (Dahlgren, 2009), empirical data suggest that this kind of participation is not related to a desire to work toward common societal good (Machackova & Šerek, 2017). Thus, the concern remains that online participation may, in fact, boost greater acceptation of radical attitudes and create a fragmented public sphere (Benkler et al., 2018; Klein & Muis, 2019). We could investigate the differences and similarities between people that participate online and offline (or both) to better understand whether traditional explanatory models of protest participation are feasible to also explain online participation, or whether we need to expand our models of collective action. For instance, the psychological inclination to participate offline and online could be investigated – do people restrict their actions to one domain (c.f. Greijdanus et al., 2020)? What are the goals of the activists and what are the mechanisms that convert online (dis)agreement to the actual protest in the streets? What are the potential opportunities and challenges of online participation, both to participants on the individual level and political society as such?

10.2.2 *Identities*

Foregoing demonstrated the role of identity in spurring protest participation. Indeed, collective action is contingent upon seeing oneself as part of a group, while acting collectively requires some *collective* identity or consciousness (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). It shows that the role of identification in spurring protest participation is not simply a matter of an on/off switch. Indeed, the influence of identity strength, identity salience, and identity content changes over time, and its politicization reveal that the role of identity on collective action participation is dynamic and multifaceted.

There remains a lot to be explained regarding the role of identity in the context of protest participation. To be sure the basics are clear but, so far, we mainly studied the direct effects of identification on protest participation but, through its influence on values, interests, and emotions, identification may also have an indirect effect on protest participation (Hogg

et al., 1995). The stronger someone's group identification, the more shared beliefs, grievances, emotions, and fate comprised in the group's collective identity are incorporated in the individual's social identity. These indirect effects of group identification on participation are far from understood. Moreover, people have multiple social identities that can reinforce or work against each other in motivating people to take to the streets (on intersectionality see Prins et al., 2015; on cross pressure see Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012).

Furthermore, to allude to yet another unsolved issues, little is known about the relation between collective identity and the idiosyncratic remake of this into someone's social identity. Swaab et al. (2008) suggest that there are two theoretically distinct pathways to the formation of a sense of shared identity. The classic perspective on shared identities is that they are inferred deductively from the broader social context within which the group members act. The formation of a shared identity can thus be deduced through recognition of superordinate similarities such as membership of the same organization or occupying the same "place" in society. However, a sense of shared identity can also be induced by intragroup processes in which individuals get acquainted with one another on an interpersonal basis and form inductively a sense of shared identity. The authors show that both top-down and bottom-up processes lead to the formation of a sense of shared identity. The authors test their assumptions in the context of interaction within and between small groups, and we observed similar mechanisms at work within the much larger collectives that populate street demonstrations (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2019; Klandermans et al., 2014). Yet, in the context of the formation and politicization of a mobilization potential, a lot is still unknown about these processes, especially where they interact, that is, where identities are inferred both inductively and deductively, into an idiosyncratic remake of who we are, what we are angry about, and who we hold responsible.

Finally, it might be of interest to examine these mechanisms in the context of contemporary collective identities created via Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, WhatsApp, or other forms of social media. Digital networks strengthen collective identity because online anonymity and reduced social cues decrease perceived differences among members, fostering group's unity, identification, and solidarity (e.g., Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Wojcieszak, 2010). Social movement organizations, on the other hand, have the resources to shape collective identities for organizational recruits. Consequently, we found participants in a demonstration who deduced a collective identity in a top-down manner from their

membership of an organization which staged the demonstration next to participants who induced a collective identity in a bottom-up manner from their interaction with like-minded people at the demonstration (Klandermans et al., 2014). Again, a whole lot of questions remain unanswered, for instance, what do these different mechanisms of identity construction mean for identity content, or group-based emotions? Especially in the context of nonorganizational connective action, these processes of identity formation are in dire need for future research.

10.3 Movement's Incline: The Individual Aftermath of Contention

No movement lasts forever. A movement's aftermath manifests itself both at the individual level and the collective level. Some participants leave the movement dissatisfied and frustrated and with an activist burnout with the feeling that they have failed or alternatively deeply satisfied and with a big smile about what they have achieved. Interestingly, both success and failure may result in a movement's decline. What happens to a movement when it is declining? Movement decline is among the processes that are in dire need of empirical studies as are answers to questions about why it occurs, and, for our argument most importantly, the individual processes steering it.

Most studies of movement participation focus on comparisons of participants and nonparticipants. Much less attention is paid to movement decline and membership defection. There are many different reasons for participants to quit. An obvious reason is movement decline. Next, success and failure are reasons for people to drop out. Similarly increasing repression may make participants resign from activism. In the previous chapters we have elaborated on reasons to leave activism. Much is still to learn, however. Movements and their members move through trajectories. We know little about these trajectories; one of our PhD candidates (Fatma Khalil) is writing a dissertation on this topic, she is studying different trajectories over the course of the changing sociopolitical context of Egypt between 2008 and 2014. We are confident that her research will yield results that will move the field forward, especially on the interlock between individuals and context and dynamic changes over time.

There are many different reasons for people to resign. It would be interesting and important to systematically investigate why people resign and investigate the various forms of defection – going into abeyance, leaving altogether, or moving to another social movement. In a study of

peace movement activists, we went back to our respondents a few years later. We asked them whether they were still active in the movement. It turned out that those who were no longer active were already committed less to the movement years ago. In general, commitment to the movement makes for long-term engagement. It would be interesting to see whether this holds for today as well. These are yet another set of questions begging for comparative studies. Social embeddedness, formal, informal, and virtual, plays an important role in these dynamics.

Very few activists are active all the time; neither are movements up in arms 24/7. Consequently, for any new protest event sympathy cannot be taken for granted but must be mobilized again. Depending on the experience in previous events this will be more or less of a challenge (Van Leeuwen et al., 2016). In a study of labor conflicts, Thommes et al. (2014) found that social relations and productivity in the company deteriorated for a long-time as a result of the conflict. The aftermath of political activism depends very much on someone's role in the protest and his/her experience in that role. In a study among right-wing extremists some of our interviewees reported to have lost their jobs; lost friends; got into fights with their family (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). We know little about how diverging sanctions impact on participants later lives. Longitudinal comparative studies could sort that out and would be able to make the relevant comparisons.

If a movement is successful moderate people join and repression declines, while radicals shut up temporally. If the movement fails, moderates resign, and radicals remain. Hence, toward the end of the cycle radicals tend to take over (Della Porta & Tarrow, 1986; Koopmans, 1997). Movement activists play an important role in a movement's lifetime. Nonetheless, little systematic information is known about the reasons why some participants quit and others carry on. Indeed, few studies have been conducted, and once again proper comparisons are badly needed.

10.4 Disciplinary Collaboration and Comparative Designs

Our approach of contextualized contestation outlines the necessity of employing an integral methodological framework between the disciplines of political psychology, sociology, political science, and communication science to enable a more holistic and dynamic understanding of collective action. Combining the different levels of analysis provides more comprehensive perspectives on which issues, which mechanisms, and which

contexts bring individuals to protest. As Klandermans (2014) argues, we need an interdisciplinary approach to answer the following questions: What are the motives people have? To what extent do movement organizations appeal to these motives? What are the opportunities and constraints regimes impose? Dynamics of demand thus represent the factors at the micro-level and are mostly featured in the political/social psychology literature (taking the individual as a unit of analysis), dynamics of supply and mobilization refer to the factors at the meso-level and are mainly reflected in the discipline of sociology, and the macro-level predictors – contextual dynamics – draw mostly on the scholarship of political science. Furthermore, we need more research on protest information, and how information forms into consensus, how calls for action find their ways through current ecosystems of individuals, networks, and organizations. Thus, how information mediates and is mediated also relates to micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of analysis and could be integrated in the findings of the disciplines mentioned. In sum, the field would benefit if scholars working in different disciplines talked more with each other, employing a crosscutting approach to the dynamics of collective action (Christopher, 2021).

We have emphasized over and again the importance of comparative designs. Without proper comparisons it is difficult to decide whether findings are typical for this movement or rather typical for this country, or typical for this issue. In fact, any measure of contextualization requires comparison to assess the situation. Protest can take a variety of forms. Comparative research serves to understand which factors are responsible for this variation. Throughout the previous chapters we discussed the virtue of comparison, observing how protest events differ, concluding what made them differ: grievances, ideology, identity, repression, emotions. Note, that all these variables are individual level factors. Indeed, a social psychology of protest is about *individuals* in action, but these individuals and their anger, indignation, and frustration are embedded in a sociopolitical context, hence our plea for contextualized contestation and, in order to understand differences and similarities between contexts, we need comparative designs. Take, for instance, the quest for effect of protest, if we as researchers are approached by journalists, they typically want to know whether protest has any effect – does it make any difference? The answer to that question depends very much on what kind of effect they have in mind. It is certainly worth the effort of exploring what citizens think of if they bother about impact and effect and influencing politics. For a first very interesting series of studies in the effect of protest, we would like to refer to the dissertation of Eric Shuman (2022). For now, it suffices

to say that, obviously, this again is a matter of comparison. Countries differ in that respect, so do movements, so do protest events, and so do individuals.

Future research into contextualized contestation should ideally start from a comparative perspective and try to integrate different levels of the emergence and aftermath of collective action, by combining micro-, meso-, and macro- perspectives featured in different disciplines of studying contestation.

10.5 To Conclude

While we were writing the final pages of this volume, the world was on fire, sometimes literally. People are angry about a variety of matters: climate change, Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, the COVID-measures taken by governments, failing health care systems, immigration, the invasion in Ukraine, and housing problems to mention only a few issues. So, plenty of reasons for people to act, and if they choose to act, the question remains what would they decide to do to exert sociopolitical influence? Which of the many opportunities to protest will they end up choosing? Street protest is one way people employ to influence politics, but certainly not the only one. Yet, street demonstrations are a major element of the protestors' repertoire. Why are some people staying away from any protest events while others engage in politics, sometimes even risking their lives? In fact, our knowledge about this is limited. Protest appears to be a complex phenomenon. In the meantime, social structures are eroding, while trust in authorities is declining. Meanwhile, fake news and misinformation are confusing people. Amidst all these changes life has become uncertain. "The times they are a changing" indeed.

Looking back, the most impactful change on protest dynamics has been the combined erosion of formal membership in, for instance, political parties, social movement organizations, and labor unions combined with the individualization and digitalization of modern society. Issues, means of communication, social media, and social embeddedness have changed the field of formation and mobilization of consensus, and protest organizing fundamentally. At the same time, social media facilitate the spread of fake news. The simple fact that these days virtually every citizen is equipped with a computer, laptop, tablet, and smart phone has changed the dynamics of mobilization and participation profoundly. Research on the role of these devices on the relation between citizens and their authorities and protest is badly needed.

This volume focused on the individual citizen. "Individuals in action" is a deliberately chosen title. In its turn social psychology is the discipline par excellence to deal with the interaction of the micro-level with the meso- and macro-level. In the final instance, it is individual citizens choosing to engage in politics. Social psychology helps to explain why individuals who are in seemingly identical circumstances chose different sometimes even opposite strategies. As we maintain in this book, this methodological point of departure reflects the attention given to the social construction of reality as a filter between contextual conditions and individual actions. Such an approach highlights the fact that all social phenomena – social structures and social causal properties – depend ultimately on facts about individuals and their social relationships. An assertion of a structure or process at the macro-social level must be supplemented by account of how it is that ordinary citizens, situated in specified circumstances, come to act in ways that produces, reproduces ,or take action against the societal structures or institutions. As social psychology explores the causes of the thoughts, feelings, and actions of people – and primarily how these are influenced by sociopolitical context – it is well-versed to do so. People – social psychologists never tire of asserting us – live in a perceived world. They respond to the world as they perceive and interpret it and if we want to understand their cognitions, motivations, and emotions we need to know their perceived and interpreted reality. A social psychological approach highlights the point that all social facts – social structures and social causal properties – depend ultimately on individual or shared perceptions of the surrounding reality. So, in order to make assertions about the causal properties of governments or civil societies (e.g., how political opportunity structures affect levels of protest) we need to arrive at an analysis of the social construction of reality as a filter between sociopolitical conditions and individual action patterns.

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