
Bernadette Hanlon
Once the American Dream
Inner-Ring Suburbs of the Metropolitan United States

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To my father and mother
and to Tom and Claire McCarthy

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Once the American Dream

1
Once the American Dream

In his book *The Epic of America,* historian James Truslow Adams first coins the term "the American Dream." He states, "[The American Dream is] that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement. . . . It is . . . a dream of social order in which each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position" (Adams 1931: 404). The American Dream rests on the belief that even those from the humblest origins can achieve social eminence and a richer standard of living. This dream has inspired many Americans and has attracted millions of immigrants to the United States in search of prosperity and a new life. It has shaped the country's image and has brought forth strong feelings of national pride (Mennell 2007).

The American Dream manifests itself most acutely in the American suburb. Over time, suburbia has evolved to become that imagined land of opportunity, the place where life is better and richer and fuller for everyone. In their early history, suburbs were "bourgeois utopias" available only to society's elite (Fishman 1987). Early in the nineteenth

century, tensions between social classes, the tremendous problem of overcrowding, and the more noxious aspects of industrialization caused the cities' affluent to seek escape at the suburban fringe. Suburbs were envisioned as sanctified spaces in deep contrast to the wicked, irreverent, and gritty industrial city. Eventually, and most profoundly in the postwar period, suburbs acquired a new image of material well-being for everyone, even those from the humblest origins. Suburbs were reinterpreted as the ultimate path to material success and the true expression of the American Dream.

This dream took concrete form in the physical structure of the suburban house, usually complete with an automobile and private yard. In the 1950s, Americans moved en masse to the suburbs. Housing was not readily available during the war years, and many young families lived with their parents or in-laws or packed into cramped apartments in the city. Spurred by postwar federal housing policies, white Americans, many of them returning World War II veterans, were suddenly able to afford new homes in the suburbs. The suburban boom of the postwar era presented new opportunities for homeownership and the possibility of a middle-class lifestyle. As Kenneth Jackson states, "The American suburb was transformed from an affluent preserve to the normal experience of the middle class" (Jackson 1985: 215).

In a study of American automobile workers in this postwar period, Ely Chinoy (1955) sought to understand their perceptions of the American Dream and opportunities for progress. Spending more than a year with workers from the so-called ABC plant in the pseudonymous midwestern city of Autotown, Chinoy interviewed white male workers and found that many lacked hope for any major advancement within the factory. They envisioned progress in another way. Ultimately, they felt they were "getting ahead" if they were each able to buy a new car, a new washing machine, and a small home of their own, all possessions needed for living the good, middle-class suburban life. The workers redefined advancement through the consumption of middle-class goods. Single-family houses in particular became the "fundamental components of the new identity kit for middle-class status" (Knox 2005: 36). For these workers of the postwar era, real advancement through the production process was unattainable, but a house and an automobile in the suburbs were viewed as marks of success, achievements of the American Dream.

A great symbol of suburban possibility was Levittown, a suburb on Long Island created by developers Levitt and Sons between 1947 and 1951.

When first built, this quintessential postwar seven-square-mile suburb contained close to 17,500 houses. In her book *Expanding the American Dream,* Barbara Kelly (1993: 148) recalls an interview between an exchange student and a Levittown resident who stated, "The war was over, and we were living in one room in my parents' apartment. . . . Think of it, Wei Ren, we were living in one room with two children. The boys had come from overseas and all we wanted was a home of our own. Then Mr. Levitt turned all these little potato farms into Levittown, and we got a piece of the American Dream." For Levittowners, the ability to purchase a suburban home—a piece of the American Dream—symbolized upward mobility.

The federal government was instrumental in promoting homeownership in the suburbs. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), established in 1934, began insuring home mortgages. With risk underwritten by the federal government, banks were much more willing to lend money to house buyers previously considered risky. Federal government involvement helped lessen down payments and lengthen the repayment period. Prior to the FHA, buyers typically needed to put down 50 percent of a home loan and pay it off in five years. Homeownership was therefore restricted only to the most affluent in society who could meet these financially burdensome requirements. A typical FHA loan, in contrast, required just 10 percent down with thirty years to pay, opening up the housing market to the middle and working class. Because of FHA as well as Veterans Administration loans, the houses of the 1950s became cheaper to buy than the cost of renting an apartment in the city. Homeownership was feasible for more people than ever before, and the suburbs were envisioned and sold as the open path to new opportunities.

Of course, some groups were excluded from participation in the suburban dream. African Americans in particular were denied access to the postwar suburbs. The FHA actively promoted the idea of racially and ethnically segregated neighborhoods. African Americans were refused insured loans to purchase houses in white suburbia. Developers were advised by the FHA to draw up restrictive covenants preventing the sales of suburban houses to nonwhites. Developer William Levitt actively limited the sale of homes in Levittown to whites only, declaring that buyers did not want racially integrated neighborhoods. He stated, "We can solve a housing problem or we can try to solve a racial problem. But we cannot combine the two" (Jackson 1985: 241). The exclusion of nonwhites from the suburbs had lasting implications for metropolitan patterns of race and

ethnicity. Many African Americans became isolated into poor city neighborhoods, and suburbia became the cultural home of white, middle-class Americans.

Recent work has demonstrated that U.S. suburbs have been mischaracterized as completely homogenous (Kruse and Sugrue 2006). Working-class and black suburbs have long existed, and certainly tensions among social classes and different racial and ethnic groups exist within suburbia as they do between suburbs and cities (Nicolaides 2002; Wiese 2004). Suburbs were always diverse, and they have become more diverse as time has passed. They have evolved tremendously in the past half century into places black and white, unconventional and stereotypical, old and new.

In 2007, the classic postwar suburb of Levittown turned sixty years old. Since it was first built, this Long Island suburb has transformed greatly. Many of Levittown's original Cape Cod–style houses have been expanded upward and outward. Bought for about $7,000 in the 1950s, the average Levittown house sold for nothing less than $350,000 in 2008. Levittown is no longer accessible to its original residents—the lower middle class—and, compared to other postwar suburbs, few minorities live there: The suburb has remained almost 100 percent white over its sixty-year history.

Ironically, Levittown, once the archetype of postwar suburbanization, is today quite different than other postwar suburbs. Many have devolved into much poorer places, struggling with issues of fiscal stress, income decline, housing deterioration, and race and ethnic segregation. The socioeconomic decline of these aging suburbs has upended the American Dream. Once the bastion of the middle-class lifestyle, many older inner-ring suburban communities, especially those built in the immediate postwar period, have declined into places of desolation and decay. Once symbolic of the American Dream, some have now become America's nightmare.

Take for instance Lansdowne, outside Baltimore. An iron-ore mining town during the nineteenth century, this inner-ring suburb was built up primarily in the 1950s and 1960s. The postwar houses in Lansdowne are small, boxy structures, most under one thousand square feet. Many are attached row houses, each with only one bedroom and a tiny yard. Now more than fifty years old, the housing stock is showing signs of disrepair, and, unlike in Levittown, little expansion or remodeling has occurred over the decades. Poverty in Lansdowne has steadily increased. In 1970, 5 percent of the population lived in poverty, increasing to 14 percent by 2000. Six in every ten students in the local Lansdowne elementary school

received free and reduced-price lunches in 2003, a major indicator of poverty among the suburb's children. Income levels have dropped. In 1980, the median household income was $38,800 (in 1999 dollars), declining to $37,000 by 2000, a number 40 percent below the median household income of the Baltimore region. Once growing in the 1950s and 1960s, Lansdowne has experienced population loss, losing an average of fifty residents a year for the past two decades. The white population has declined, and the black population has risen as whites moved to Baltimore's outer suburbs and blacks migrated from inner-city neighborhoods. The social structure of Lansdowne and other similar struggling inner-ring suburbs has changed dramatically in recent decades.

In part, this book describes the extent and nature of socioeconomic decline among inner-ring suburbs, comparing these suburbs to outer suburbs over the twenty-year period from 1980 to 2000. I provide an exact definition of inner-ring suburbs in Chapter 3, but, in short, these are the oldest suburbs closest to the city core of a metropolitan area. Outer suburbs were built more recently, and they are located farther from the city. This book is a contemporary study of these areas and, although some historical discussion of particular suburbs is included, the focus is on more recent transformations.

Unfortunately, because of data constraints, much of the analysis in this book ends in 2000. Since then, the U.S. economy, financial system, and housing market have experienced tremendous upheaval. The housing bubble that began around 2000 finally burst, sending the economy and Wall Street into a tailspin. As this book goes to press, figures emerge each day that paint a very bleak picture of the U.S. housing market and future economic stability. News reports of rising unemployment, lack of credit flow, declining stock prices, and loss of homes to foreclosure are a daily occurrence.

One of the more reliable gauges of the housing market is the Standard and Poor's/Case-Shiller home price index. The index is calculated by tracking the changes in residential housing values in twenty metropolitan regions across the United States. It measures how much a home price has increased or decreased in a certain market since January 2000. The January 2000 figure is assigned a price index value of 100.

As Figure 1.1 indicates, since around 2006, housing values have slumped nationally. Housing prices are still about 50 percent higher than they were in 2000, but they are slowly creeping down to 2003 levels.



FIGURE 1.1 Standard and Poor's/Case-Shiller Home Price Index in the United States from 1987 to the second quarter of 2008. *(Standard and Poor's and Fiserv.)*

According to recent figures, in 2008, housing prices across the nation fell more than 13 percent.

Some metropolitan areas have fared worse than others. The most intense price drops have occurred in cities and suburbs in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada. These Sun Belt metropolitan areas had huge increases in housing prices in the height of the boom period. They have also been the hardest hit by the market crash. From October 2007 to October 2008, housing prices dropped by 31 percent in the San Francisco area, 33 percent in Phoenix, and 32 percent in Las Vegas. In some suburbs, housing price decline has been even more dramatic. The largest drop has occurred in Fort Myers, Florida, where the median sales price declined by 50 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008.

Housing price decline is one element of the recent housing market debacle. There has also been an unprecedented jump in housing foreclosures, in part the result of the exceptional growth in the subprime mortgage lending market beginning in the 1990s. In 2008, two million people nationwide faced foreclosure proceedings (*Business Journal of Milwaukee* 2009). Foreclosures have been particularly copious in vulnerable, low-income minority communities. This frequency is often the result of racial

discrimination and predatory lending practices, particularly in the subprime lending market (Wyly et al. 2006). In a recent article in *Professional Geographer,* David Kaplan and Gail Sommers (2009) describe the geography of foreclosures in Summit County, Ohio. They demonstrate that this geography corresponds tightly with the county's racial distribution. They also show how poorer communities are particularly affected. Kaplan and Sommers suggest that policies that specifically address the issue of predatory lending will go a long way in resolving the foreclosure problem. Vulnerable people were sold the American Dream for a price that was often unaffordable and that quickly changed with rising variable interest rates.

The future effects of the housing market crisis and economic downturn on U.S. suburbs will no doubt be profound. However, describing these effects on inner-ring and outer suburbs more specifically is not part of this book's purpose. Studying future effects will have to wait until 2010 census data can be analyzed. As a result of the economic downturn, many of the suburban communities examined in this study will no doubt suffer tremendously from increased unemployment, housing stress, fiscal instability, and social malaise. My prediction is that the suburbs I categorize as "in crisis" during the twenty-year period from 1980 and 2000 will decline even further by 2010. Certainly, many poorer and minority inner-ring communities will be more vulnerable than other places, especially in metropolitan areas where the regional economy suffers from large-scale unemployment and declining production.

One interesting story to follow will be the effects of the housing market crash on outer suburbs and continued outward suburban expansion. The rather scary reality of upside-down mortgages,[1] the halting of housing construction and sales, and the explosion in foreclosures has already greatly damaged outer communities in such states as Arizona, California, Nevada, and Florida. In a recent article in the *New Yorker,* reporter George Packer (2009) describes Florida as "the Ponzi state," where uncontrolled investment in the real-estate market went awry, leaving a trail of foreclosures in once fast-growing suburbs, such as Fort Myers, Twin Lakes, and Cape Coral. Left in the wake of the housing market crash are empty suburban homes and cleared but undeveloped greenfield sites abandoned by developers and investors who once benefited tremendously from the housing boom.

[1] In this scenario, homeowners owe more than the current value of their house.



FIGURE 1.2 Visual representation of the location of inner-ring suburbs and outer suburbs across different census regions of the United States. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places [and County Subdivisions for New England] in the United States. The polygons were converted to points for the purposes of this visualization.)*

The long-term effects of the economic downturn on metropolitan growth and decline are as yet unknown, but they will likely lead to a reconfiguration of the metropolitan landscape. Some suburbs will be lost and abandoned, but others will probably continue to grow. Certain city neighborhoods and downtown areas will likely benefit. But this speculation is the topic of future research. For now, let us return to this particular study.

This book focuses on examining approximately five thousand suburbs across one hundred different metropolitan areas and census regions in 1980 and 2000. Figure 1.2 provides a visual representation of their locations across the United States. The four census regions of the West, South, Midwest, and Northeast are marked. A high proportion of sample suburbs are located along the eastern seaboard, stretching from Boston in the Northeast to Washington, D.C., in the South. A concentration of suburbs can also be found in the Great Lakes region in the Midwest, along California's and Washington's west coast, and in the southern states of Florida and Texas. By examining these suburbs, I set out to achieve six major goals in this book:

1. Review the current state of knowledge about suburban decline.
2. Develop a definition of inner-ring suburbs.
3. Describe the primary forces shaping inner-ring suburbs.
4. Examine the prevalence and extent of decline from 1980 to 2000 among the inner-ring compared to outer suburbs and demonstrate how suburban decline differs across census regions and metropolitan areas.
5. Identify different types of inner-ring suburbs.
6. Discuss the policy implications of the research findings.

In their book *Confronting Suburban Decline,* William Lucy and David Phillips (2000a) convincingly argue that the focus on issues of suburban sprawl masks the recent decline among America's suburbs. In Chapter 2, I examine the major findings from recent studies of suburban decline, focusing in particular on those studies that examine the problem of decline among inner-ring suburbs. Many of these suburbs experience similar problems and symptoms of decline. They suffer from a dwindling tax base, and they are often unable to raise sufficient revenue to sustain adequate public services. Many are on a downward spiral. Poor declining suburbs are often very similar to poor neighborhoods in the central cities of the United States, where the negative impacts of racial, ethnic, and class segregation abound.

So far, I have thrown about a number of different terms—for example, "inner-ring suburbs," "postwar suburbs," and "older suburbs." Exact definitions of suburbs and various recognized suburban types, such as inner-ring or outer suburb, are lacking. Yet, as suburban differentiation continues to unfold, the search for new methodologies for collecting data and analyzing suburbs becomes ever more paramount. This study provides a definition that distinguishes inner-ring suburbs from outer suburbs. I use the term "inner-ring" to denote the closeness of these suburbs to the major cities in a metropolitan area. Other scholars employ different terms. In Chapter 3, I discuss how urban scholars define inner-ring suburbs, and I outline my methodology for defining the boundaries of these places.

In Chapter 4, I outline the forces shaping the demise of certain inner-ring suburbs. The continued outward movement of people, employment, and investment resources is a tremendous force shaping the inner ring. As growth pushes to the metropolitan fringe, inner-ring suburbs are left behind in terms of people, jobs, and capital. More than sixty years have passed since the period of mass suburbanization, and the housing stock

in inner-ring suburbs has become outdated, requiring large-scale capital for revitalization. However, the real-estate industry, developers, and lending institutions have focused more on developing pristine landscapes than on trying to revitalize inner-ring suburbs. At the same time, local governments of declining suburbs lack the resources to encourage rejuvenation. The political fragmentation of U.S. metropolitan areas ensures that suburbs compete with one another, each trying to retain and to attract wealthy taxpayers. Declining suburbs are at a tremendous disadvantage. Losing population and the battle for much-needed investment resources, many suburbs have hit rock bottom.

In Chapter 5, I examine changes in the population of suburbs, comparing inner-ring to outer suburbs across different census regions and metropolitan areas. In Chapter 6, I turn my attention to issues of poverty and declining incomes. I examine suburban poverty, again comparing inner-ring to outer suburbs. I also study what I refer to as "the suburban dichotomy": An increasing dichotomy is developing between poor inner-ring suburbs and more affluent outer suburbs.

In Chapter 7, I identify what I term "suburbs in crisis." These suburbs are places where decline is most extreme. The focus in this chapter is largely on the notion of relative suburban decline or growth—that is, a determination that compares suburbs *to each other.* In most other studies, suburbs are compared to cities or to the metropolitan area where they are located, and typically one measure—income—is used. In contrast, I compare each suburb in a metro area to other suburbs in the same metro area. Also, I use a combination of measures. This method of comparing suburbs to suburbs on a blend of decline measures is unique among suburban studies. I identify suburbs in crisis and compare them to suburban successes. I explore the different features of these suburbs and provide insight into why some inner-ring suburbs are more vulnerable to decline than others in the same metropolitan area.

So far, the emphasis has been on the problem of decline and poverty among inner-ring suburbs. However, many of the wealthiest as well as poorest suburbs in the metropolitan United States are found in the inner ring. Different types of inner-ring suburbs exist. In Chapter 8, I explore the results of a cluster analysis in which I identify a typology of inner-ring suburbs. Some inner-ring suburbs are high income, and others are poor. Some inner-ring suburbs have changed dramatically, and others have

changed hardly at all. Certainly, some inner-ring suburbs are major success stories, and others are much more troubled.

Despite the reality of suburban decline, little is being done at a national or even a state level to revitalize our older suburbs. In Chapter 9, I offer some broad policy prescriptions that might help improve inner-ring suburbs, and I discuss different policies that affect declining inner-ring suburbs. Much more can still be learned about the process of decline and growth among inner-ring and other suburbs. The concluding chapter includes an agenda for future research on the transformation of U.S. suburbia and describes the principal findings of this particular study.

2

Decline Is a New Suburban Reality

Suburbia is the "true center of American life" (Fishman 1987: 248). For more than three decades, it has been a dominant place of residence for metropolitan Americans (Beauregard 2006). Since their origination, suburbs have evolved to become complex, varied, and independent. In recent years, they have had to fight hard to remain symbolic of the good life, places apart from and somehow better than the inner city. Such newspaper headlines as "Suburban Poverty: Economy Brings Increased Need for Help" (McClellan-Copeland 2008), "Suburbs' Grass Isn't Always Greener" (Nasser 2004), and "Suburbs Nearer to Cities Neglected" (Ohlemacher 2006) are more common than ever. In the words of Mark Baldassare (1986), there is "trouble in paradise."

Suburbia, at one time built solely for the elite of society and later the middle class, now includes a mix of people from the very rich to the very poor. Over two centuries of development, suburbia has evolved into a new reality that includes continued growth and prosperity *and* decline and poverty. Gated communities, McMansions, and the supersize subdivision exist alongside much poorer suburbs struggling with issues of blight, fiscal stress, income decline, increasing poverty, and

housing deterioration. In this chapter, I examine the evolution of this suburban dichotomy. The problem of suburban decline, particularly as it relates to inner-ring suburbs, is one side of this dichotomy and the primary focus of this chapter.

Four Suburban Movements

Many excellent studies on the historical development of U.S. suburbs have been made, and there is no need to repeat them verbatim here. However, to provide some context, it is necessary to briefly and rather crudely describe the evolution of U.S. suburbia, dividing this development into four major movements: (1) suburban elitism, (2) suburban homogeneity, (3) suburban diversity, and (4) suburban dichotomy. I apologize in advance to those scholars who conducted great historic studies of U.S. suburbanization, such as Kenneth Jackson (1985) and Dolores Hayden (2003), for smudging many of the nuances of this truly fascinating story, but the goal here is to briefly demonstrate how suburbs have evolved into complex, varied places.

Suburban Elitism

The first movement is the era of the elite suburb. Early in the nineteenth century, suburbs acquired the image of the ideal environment for healthy, wholesome, family living. About this time, many affluent members of society fled the grit of industry concentrated in the city and moved to the suburbs (Jackson 1985). Heavy industrial development and the concentration of smoke-belching factories in the urban core made life unbearable for many city dwellers (Ashton 1978). The city environment was grim. Tremendous tension between social classes, overcrowding, and difficult living conditions caused many affluent city dwellers to escape to the suburban fringe. These original suburbs became, in the words of Robert Fishman (1987), "bourgeois utopias." Unlike the gridlike grimy city, these elite or romantic suburbs had curved, tree-lined streets and lanes that meandered to large, very beautiful houses surrounded by lush greenery. They were built as charming, scenic spaces for the new bourgeoisie of the rising capitalist economy of the Industrial Age. Wealth was a central feature in the rise of these very first suburbs, making this the period of the elite suburb. Some of these elite suburbs still exist today as some of the most prosperous, influential, and culturally selective places in metropolitan America (see Chapter 8).

Suburban Homogeneity

Suburbia took on a new cultural form with further decentralization of housing and employment, especially after World War II (Fishman 1987; Singleton 1973). With the onslaught of the Depression during the 1930s and a moratorium on new construction during the war, the demand for housing was pent up by the mid-1940s. Actively promoted by federal housing policies, a massive explosion in suburban residential development began during the postwar period.[1] Housing was built on a large scale using standardized methodologies and techniques of mass production (Jackson 1985). Before the war, one-third of houses were built by their owners, and small contractors built another third (Hayden 2003). By the late 1950s, almost two-thirds of U.S. housing were built by large developers (Hayden 2003).

Most famous among the large developers were William Levitt and his sons. The houses of Levitt and Sons were prefabricated, and, before rising out of the potato fields of Long Island, they were first partly assembled in a factory. This cost-cutting measure ensured the quick and easy development of thousands of identical homes for eager families (Baxandall and Ewen 2001). Using cheap, precut materials fitted to exact specifications, Levitt and Sons was able to erect a new 800-square-foot house every fifteen minutes. By the end of the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of Levittown-style subdivisions dotted the suburban landscape. Small, standardized, single-family houses were mass produced.

The prevalence of identical tract housing developments spurred a number of studies of suburban uniformity (e.g., Mumford 1968; Whyte 1957). Despite other studies aimed at dispelling this myth (e.g., Gans 1967), suburbs generally were portrayed as middle-class, white enclaves. The existence of working-class, ethnic, and black suburbs was understood but largely ignored. Various TV shows reinforced this image of suburban sameness. Major tract developments, such as Lakewood in California and Park Forest in Illinois, typified the suburbs that were celebrated in such popular TV shows as *Leave It to Beaver, Ozzie and Harriet,* and *Father Knows Best.* These shows, and the suburbs they portrayed, promoted an era of domesticity and consumerism that preceded the counterculture of the civil

[1] A large body of work provides details on the politics and policies related to the development of suburbs after World War II. Excellent examples include Kenneth Jackson's *Crabgrass Frontier* (1985), Rosalyn Baxandall and Elizabeth Ewen's *Picture Windows* (2001), and Kevin Kruse and Thomas Sugrue's *The New Suburban History* (2006).

rights and feminist movements of the 1960s (Alves 2001). The housewife's role was celebrated by new household appliances and gadgets, and television became the new medium by which to promote endless consumption and the model family structure. The suburbs became the cultural home of the white, middle-class family (Singleton 1973), reified as the embodiment of the American Dream. It was believed that everyone—that is, everyone who was white—could own a home, a potent symbol of middle-class values and lifestyle.

Suburban Diversity

A number of studies documenting the historic nature of suburban heterogeneity have emerged in recent years (e.g., Kruse and Sugrue 2006; Nicolaides 2002). These studies trace the early history of class and racial tensions in U.S. suburbia. Restrictive housing covenants and discrimination in federal housing programs were powerful instruments used to exclude certain racial and social groups from the suburbs. Despite encountering tremendous resistance, some pioneering black families did suburbanize during the postwar period and earlier. Working-class suburbs, composed oftentimes of self-built housing, evolved in the suburban space around many industrial cities as early as the 1900s. Historically, some suburbs did not fit the stereotype.

In more recent times, diversity among suburbs has become more and more pronounced, and America's suburbs are evermore peppered by issues of class and race. Beginning in the 1970s, suburbs witnessed the marked out-migration of middle-class blacks from central cities to the suburbs (Cashin 2004; Wilson 1987). Immigrant groups also suburbanized, especially in the 1990s (Frey 2003; Li 1998). In recent decades, the problem of socioeconomic decline has crept into certain suburbs. Suburbs as poor as any city neighborhood have emerged to disrupt the myth of suburban success (Jargowsky 2003; Leigh and Lee 2005; Orfield 2002; Swanstrom et al. 2006). The result of such changes is a mix of suburban spaces, each segregated by race, ethnicity, and economic class.

The industrial, working-class suburbs that developed during the height of the Industrial Revolution (Lewis 2004) have declined, while the office park and retail developments of the outer suburbs have boomed (Lang 2003). Some scholars refer to these outer suburbs as "edge cities" (Garreau 1991). A classic example is Tyson's Corner, Virginia. Once a quiet area

located some twenty miles west of Washington, D.C., Tyson's Corner grew substantially during the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to highway construction. The growth of this suburb has been characterized by an increase in jobs and employment infrastructure. The area boasts more than twenty-five million square feet of office space and four million square feet of retail space. The availability of cheap land on the outer fringe of metropolitan areas has allowed unfettered growth in jobs and housing (Davis, Nelson, and Dueker 1994).

The outer suburbs are often the location of outrageously expensive and obnoxiously large homes, built in what Paul Knox refers to as a "schlock and awe" style. In his book *Metroburbia USA,* Knox (2008) describes the various housing designs and common features of these suburbs for the affluent upper class. These "schlock and awe" suburbs are rather gaudy copies of the elite suburbs at the turn of the nineteenth century. They are the reinvention of the "bourgeois utopia," heavily packaged by developers and design professionals selling what Knox refers to as "the American Dream Extreme."

Suburban Dichotomy

Outer suburbs result from the outward movement of investment resources and people from the urban core and inner-ring suburbs (Squires 2002). The dual processes of the continued growth of these outer suburbs and the decline of inner-ring suburbs is a new prevailing reality. Outer suburbs stand in opposition to inner-ring suburbs. Suburbia has ruptured, and the inner-ring suburbs have emerged as new places of socioeconomic distress and decline.

In his landmark study *Crabgrass Frontier,* Jackson (1985) is one of the first U.S. scholars to herald the demise of inner-ring suburbs. He states (1985: 301), "The cycle of decline has already caught up with the inner suburbs. [Some] are already encountering fiscal, educational, racial, and housing crises as severe as those which troubled major cities in the 1960s and 1970s. In these aging areas, a stable tax base, coupled with increased service costs necessitated by a more elderly and less affluent population, have put heavy pressure on revenues." Jackson highlights some of the chief aspects of inner-ring decline, including less affluence, aging population, racial tension, fiscal distress, and housing difficulties.

Suburban Poverty

The problem of suburban decline is evident in recent statistics on poverty in the suburbs. A study of 2005 census data by the Brookings Institution (Berube and Kneebone 2006) finds that, for the first time in U.S. history, the number of poor suburbanites was larger than the number of poor city dwellers by one million people. In the 1990s, poverty among cities declined slightly but nudged upward in the suburbs from 8 percent to 8.3 percent (Berube and Frey 2002). The geography of poverty is changing.

This decline is manifest in recent changes in poverty concentration. Over the past decade or more, the geographical distribution of high-poverty neighborhoods shifted from cities to the suburbs. G. Thomas Kingsley and Kathryn Pettit (2003) conduct a study of poverty concentration in one hundred metropolitan areas and find that the suburban share of high-poverty census tracts increased from 11 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 1990 and 15 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, the concentration of poverty in inner-city neighborhoods declined in the 1990s (Jargowsky 2003).[2]

A number of studies suggest that the problem of poverty is more prevalent among inner-ring compared to outer suburbs. In their study of Philadelphia, Nancey Leigh and Sugie Lee (2005) use data on the age of housing to develop a new model of metropolitan spatial structure. They divide the metropolitan area into downtown, inner city, inner-ring suburbs, and outer suburbs based on the year housing was built, providing a new approach that moves beyond a simple dichotomy of suburbs and central city. They identify inner-ring suburbs as low-density residential areas where housing was built between 1950 and 1969. They examine various subareas and find that poverty rates were higher in the downtown and inner city areas than in the inner-ring or outer suburbs each decade from 1970 to 2000. However, they also find that poverty rates downtown declined from 1970 to 2000 but increased in the inner city and inner-ring suburbs. The downtown areas bounced back, while the inner-ring suburbs declined.

Paul Jargowsky (2003) finds a similar pattern for the 1990s. He determines that poverty increased in inner-ring suburban census tracts of

[2]For Kingsley and Pettit (2003), high-poverty neighborhoods are defined as census tracts where more than 30 percent of residents live in poverty. Paul Jargowsky defines high-poverty neighborhoods as census tracts where more than 40 percent of residents live in poverty.

Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, and Dallas, while poverty concentration among cities declined. Other studies have identified increased poverty among inner-ring suburbs compared to outer suburbs in the metropolitan areas of Baltimore, Atlanta, and Camden (Hanlon and Vicino 2007; Smith, Caris, and Wyly 2001; Leigh and Lee 2005). After classifying the metropolitan area into urban core, inner-ring, and outer categories, Thomas Cooke and Sarah Marchant (2006) find that the number of high-poverty neighborhoods increased in inner-ring suburbs of Los Angeles, in metropolitan areas in California's Central Valley, and in a number of fast-growing metropolitan areas in the Sun Belt region (e.g., Las Vegas and Miami). All these studies demonstrate that poverty and poverty concentration have increased in inner-ring suburbs across very different metropolitan areas.

Income Decline

Combined with the problem of increased poverty is the issue of suburban income decline. Research on suburban decline typically focuses on income as a key measure. Rather than using absolute income levels, however, studies use relative income, comparing a suburb's income level to that of the central city or the metropolitan area where the suburb is located. For instance, William Lucy and David Phillips (2000a; 2000b; 2006) compare a suburb's income level per family and per household to the metropolitan income level of that category. These measures are expressed as a ratio—greater than or less than one—of the metropolitan area's income. In their study of 554 suburbs from 1960 to 1990, Lucy and Phillips (2000a) find that 20 percent of suburbs declined faster in median family income ratio than did their central cities. When focusing solely on the 1980s, they find that 32 percent of the suburbs in their study had a similar fate. Also, the number of low- and moderate-income suburbs (below 80 percent of the metropolitan median family income) increased fourfold from 1960 to 2000, and a third of suburbs declined faster than or increased slower in income than did their central cities during the 1990s.

Regarding which types of suburbs are declining, Lucy and Phillips (2000a) find that about a third of inner-ring suburbs experienced more decline than other suburbs. In the metropolitan areas of Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, however, suburbs declining in relative income were dispersed widely in terms of geography, with some suburbs immediately adjacent to central cities improving in income. Overall, Lucy

and Phillips conclude that the postwar suburbs—those built between 1945 and 1969—are particularly vulnerable.

Leigh and Lee (2005) identify a similar pattern in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Using relative per-capita income where per-capita income levels in the subareas of downtown, inner city, inner-ring suburbs, and outer suburbs were compared to regional levels, they find that inner-ring suburbs—those built between 1950 and 1969—experienced a continual decline in relative income from 1970 to 2000. Bernadette Hanlon and Thomas Vicino (2007) study suburbs in the Baltimore region and find that inner-ring suburbs declined in income relative to outer suburbs from 1980 to 2000, although they do find a number of stable inner-ring suburbs around Baltimore where income levels stayed fairly constant. Overall, though, the postwar suburbs of their study struggled in the last few decades when compared to other inner-ring and outer suburbs. In short, relative to other suburbs, suburbs built in the 1950s and 1960s appeared to experience the most income distress.

Income Segregation

Recent studies suggest income segregation is increasing among suburbs. In a national study of suburban places, Todd Swanstrom, Peter Dreier, Colleen Casey, and Robert Flack (2006) find that the gap between the richest and poorest suburbs increased rapidly in the 1980s and increased again in the 1990s, although at a slightly slower pace. They identify some regional variation in income polarization. The regions with the least inequality between the richest and poorest suburbs were in the older Northeastern metropolitan areas. Booming regions, such as Phoenix, Los Angeles, Miami, and Houston, in contrast, had the widest gaps between the richest and poorest suburbs.

Lucy and Phillips (2000a) similarly examine suburban income segregation and also determine that the gap between the highest- and lowest-income suburbs increased in the past few decades. They find that the average gap between the richest and poorest suburbs in their study sample was 2.1 to 1 in 1960. This means that, on average, income levels in the richest suburbs were more than double the income levels in the poorest suburbs. By 1990, the average income-ratio gap had increased to 3.4 to 1. In other words, the average income level of the richest suburbs had grown to 3.4 times that of the poorest suburbs by the end of the 1980s. Despite these

recent findings, questions still remain about the spatial aspect of this income gap among suburbs. It seems as though inner-ring suburbs are declining in income relative to other suburbs. However, is this occurring across most metropolitan areas or only in some regions? If some inner-ring suburbs are improving relative to other suburbs, is there a particular pattern to this improvement? I address these questions in Chapters 6 and 7, primarily.

Population Loss and Slow Growth

The typical impression of U.S. suburbia is continuous population growth and expansion. However, growth is uneven across the suburban landscape. In the postwar period, inner-ring suburbs boomed. According to a study by Robert Puentes and David Warren (2006) from the Brookings Institution, inner-ring suburbs were the location of 40 percent of total U.S. population growth in the 1950s. Today, they are still highly populated. This same study finds that inner-ring suburbs were home to more than fifty-two million people in 2000 (Puentes and Warren 2006). Since shortly after the postwar boom, however, population growth has stagnated. The share of U.S. population living in inner-ring suburbs has remained the same since 1970. Meanwhile, newer outer suburbs have greatly expanded. They grew at almost twice the rate of older inner-ring suburbs in the 1990s (Puentes and Warren 2006).

Other studies have found stagnation and, in some instances, population decline among inner-ring suburbs. In their study of Philadelphia's suburbs, Leigh and Lee (2005) determine that, on aggregate, inner-ring suburbs had a population decline of almost 8 percent from 1970 to 2000. In this study, they find that population loss occurred in 70 percent of the census tracts in the inner-ring suburbs during this period. Similarly, in their analysis of the inner-ring suburbs of Baltimore, Hanlon and Vicino (2007) find that the population of these areas remained fixed at a half million people from 1980 to 2000, while the population of the outer suburbs increased by more than 350,000 residents during this same period. In general, the trend is toward slow or no growth among inner-ring suburbs and tremendous expansion of outer suburbs.

This slow population growth is often combined with population aging. Nationally, the elderly population is increasing. However, the percentage of elderly in the inner-ring suburbs is increasing faster than the national rate. The baby boom generation initiated the move to the suburbs during

the postwar period, and, after five generations, these residents have aged in place (Hudnut 2003). Meanwhile, since 1970, the total number of children among inner-ring suburbs barely grew. As the elderly die off, few incoming residents replace them.

The conventional wisdom is that population growth is positive, and population loss is a sign of something negative. Population growth is typically linked to economic growth and population loss the opposite. However, population growth may not be the best indicator of economic health (Gottlieb 2002). An area can "grow without growth"—that is, it can increase its per-capita income without growing in population. Suburbs that are declining in population maybe growing in income, and some growing inner-ring suburbs may experience income decline. Population decline alone does not paint the full picture of suburban decline. In fact, Lucy and Phillips (2006) find that relative income decline often occurs in a suburb where the population is increasing. They suggest that population growth can have a negative impact on a suburb's fiscal capacity, its quality of life, and its natural environment. To fully identify the effects of population change on the stability of inner-ring suburbs, they must be studied in combination with other variables, such as changes in income or poverty. For this study, I combine variables related to population, income, and poverty change to identify suburbs in extreme decline. These variables are used to develop an index of suburban decline, the results of which I explore in Chapter 7.

Fiscal Stress

According to the latest U.S. *Census of Governments* (2008), there were 89,476 local governments across the nation in 2007. More than 36,000 were at the subcounty level, the overwhelming majority of which are suburban jurisdictions. Among other powers, suburban governments have zoning authority, the ability to raise property and other local taxes, powers of eminent domain, and oversight of the local school system. These local governments make decisions that affect the condition of municipal services, the quality of public-school systems, and the transformation of land within their jurisdictions. They rely heavily on local revenues to provide good quality services to their residents.

The fiscal condition of suburbs is determined by their ability to generate revenue and by the costs associated with provision of local services

(Orfield 2002). In large part, suburbs rely on local property, sales, and income taxes to generate revenue. These taxes made up about 84 percent of all local tax revenue in the United States in 1996. The less revenue suburbs can muster in the form of local taxes, the less they have to spend on services. Also, the higher the cost of local services, the more tax revenue is needed. A local government is fiscally stressed when the need for government services outweighs its ability to generate the resources needed to provide these services.

The problem of fiscal distress among certain suburbs has been well documented by Myron Orfield (2002) in his book *American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality.* In a cluster analysis of 4,606 incorporated municipalities and 135 unincorporated areas in 25 different metropolitan areas, Orfield identifies "at-risk suburbs"—that is, communities with high social needs but limited resources. According to Orfield, more than half the population of suburbs in his sample of metropolitan areas lived in at-risk suburbs. These at-risk communities incur many costs, but their tax capacity is limited,[3] only about two-thirds of the fiscal capacity of central cities.

Fiscal stress for declining suburbs is often compounded by a lack of aid from higher levels of government. One of the earliest case studies of fiscal distress among older suburbs is by David Listokin and W. Patrick Beaton (1983). They examine fifty suburban and urban communities in New Jersey, focusing on the inner-ring suburb of Englewood. Much of their analysis centers on fiscal stress and municipal expenditures in what they refer to as mature suburbs, making comparisons between these areas and growing suburbs in New Jersey. They find that, relative to growing suburbs, mature suburbs in general and Englewood in particular had higher levels of fiscal distress, measured by higher levels of municipal spending, higher tax burdens, and less revenue. Listokin and Beaton attribute this distress to declining population, losses in the retail sector, increased service needs, and a loss in intergovernmental aid to mature suburbs.

Intergovernmental aid is an important issue, one that local government officials recognize. William Hudnut (2003), the former mayor of Indianapolis, conducts a qualitative assessment of suburban decline, visiting some sixty inner-ring suburbs across the nation and meeting with their

[3]Orfield (2002) measures tax capacity by determining the amount of revenue a locality would generate if the average local tax rates within the locality's metropolitan area were applied to its actual tax base.

local officials, including Tom Longo, mayor of an inner-ring suburb in the Cleveland metropolitan area. Longo told him, "We are caught in the crossfire between renovation in the heart of the city and new developments out on the farmlands. The dollars are going to those other two places" (Hudnut 2003: 51). This had profound effects on Longo's jurisdiction, Garfield Heights. In October 2008, the suburb of Garfield Heights was declared to be in fiscal emergency by the state of Ohio. The auditor's office announced that the suburb was $3.4 million in the red and that the local government had outspent its tax revenue by more than two months' worth of income (O'Donnell and O'Malley 2008).

As Hudnut (2003) suggests, federal government aid bypasses many suburbs. For instance, communities eligible for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) monies are by definition low-income neighborhoods in central cities, primary cities with populations more than fifty thousand, and qualified urban counties with populations of two hundred thousand or more. Smaller low- to moderate-income suburbs are often ineligible. Similarly, Hope VI program funding is limited to areas with distressed public-housing developments, few of which are located in the inner-ring suburbs. Hope VI is a U.S. Housing and Urban Development program aimed at revitalizing public-housing projects and converting them to mixed-income developments. According to Hudnut (2003), only the inner-ring suburbs of Alexandria in Virginia, Camden and Jersey City in New Jersey, and Richmond in California received grants from the Hope VI program in recent years. Inner-ring suburbs are typically excluded from two major sources of federal funding—CDBG and Hope VI—thwarting their ability to generate revenue for revitalization and development efforts.

Declining inner-ring suburbs are in what Puentes and Orfield (2002) refer to as a "policy blind spot," caught between attempts to lure jobs and population back to central cities and, at the same time, to rein in development on the suburban fringe. Suburban politics is frequently caught up with issues of growth rather than decline. As some scholars suggest, "Poor suburbs have it even worse [than central cities]. If anything, they are more invisible and have less political clout than cities" (Swanstrom et al. 2004: 11). With less political clout, poor suburbs receive less aid from higher levels of government. Declining suburbs, in short, have limited ability to generate resources, and, at the same time, they have a growing need for public-service provision. In Chapter 9, I discuss some of the ways in which various inner-ring suburbs are trying to combat this problem.

Public Schools

In Maryland, the state's education department utilizes test scores to grade each school system as part of the federal No Child Left Behind Act. Similar standardized tests exist for other states. Maryland schools with declining scores can be subject to state takeover. Among the different school districts in Maryland, Baltimore City has consistently performed the poorest. However, Prince George's County, an inner-ring suburban county of the Washington, D.C., metro area, follows a close second. In the early 1990s, nine of Prince George's public schools were threatened with takeover by the state, and, although test scores have improved in more recent years, the school system in Prince George's County still underperforms relative to wealthier, whiter suburban counties in Maryland.

In assessing reasons for poor school performance, school officials in Prince George's County argue that tight budgets and increasing poverty are root causes. The lack of funding for school construction is a major problem, and racial disparity is also an issue in standardized testing. Almost 90 percent of the student body in Prince George's County is African American, and almost half receive free and reduced-price lunches. Poor school performance threatens to undermine gains made by suburban African Americans families in the county.

School performance is inextricably tied to race and poverty. In Orfield's at-risk suburbs, the demographics within the public schools are rapidly changing, and more and more children in these suburbs qualify for free and reduced-price lunches. At the same time, school tax capacity declines. All this leads to a drop in school performance, which in turn makes it difficult to retain current residents and attract new ones.

Schools in outer suburbs often outperform those in inner-ring suburbs. Evidence of this can be seen in the Baltimore region. Using data on standardized tests, Hanlon and Vicino (2005) find that 35 percent of all tested students in the outer suburbs of Baltimore passed the advanced test in fifth-grade reading, compared to 26 percent of tested students in the inner-ring suburbs in 2003. Similarly, 27 percent of tested tenth-grade students in the inner-ring suburbs was considered advanced readers, compared to 38 percent of tenth graders in the outer suburbs. Consistently, outer suburban students in the Baltimore region outperformed students in the inner-ring schools. These same inner-ring suburbs are undergoing tremendous racial transition.

A study of Cleveland-area schools echoes these findings (Keating and Bier 2008). School districts in Cleveland's inner ring have increasing numbers of poorer students as well as racial disparities in standardized testing and graduation rates. Public-school enrollment is down in some declining inner-ring suburbs. In Cleveland, because of the decline in population in the inner ring, some public schools have had to reorganize or close (Keating and Bier 2008). The aging population and the fact that many parents in the first suburbs send their children to private schools have resulted in a lack of public support for the local school system. In addition, inner-ring suburban voters have consistently rejected school levies in the greater Cleveland area. This rejection has resulted in school financing issues.

School financing is a problem not only for inner-ring suburbs where the population is declining but also for low-density and growing (or "bedroom-developing") suburbs. In Orfield's study (2002), per-pupil spending is constrained in three types of suburbs—at-risk, low-density, and bedroom-developing suburbs. Per-pupil spending in these suburbs is limited because of growth in the ratio of children per household; not enough resources are available to build the necessary number of public schools for the growing number of children. In many schools districts, children attend classes in trailers. This was the case for children in the inner-ring suburbs of Prince George's County as well as in the fast-growing county of Cherokee, in the Atlanta metropolitan area.

Housing Deterioration

The deterioration of available housing stock is typically explained under the guise of aging. Theoretically, aging housing in older suburbs is losing its value and, as a result, is becoming occupied by low-income groups as higher-income groups move to the outer suburbs. Thomas Bier (2001: 17) states, "Suburbs can do only so much on their own. They work to survive in a context of metropolitan forces that propel movement up the ladder of real estate values . . . from older to newer structures."

This analysis has some caveats. For instance, Puentes and Warren (2006) determine that inner-ring or first suburban housing value was often higher than the national average, although this varied across states. For instance, the average home value in some inner-ring suburbs in New York and California was more than two times the national average, but all first suburbs in Ohio witnessed housing value increases far behind the national

TABLE 2.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM DIFFERENT STUDIES OF SUBURBAN DECLINE

Characteristic	Key findings	Variable(s) used	Relevant work(s)
Poverty	Changing geography of poverty; inner-ring suburbs have experienced increased poverty and increased poverty concentration.	Percentage of population in poverty Poverty concentration by census tract	Jargowsky 2003 Kingsley and Pettit 2003 Leigh and Lee 2005 Lucy and Phillips 2000a, 2006 Madden 2003 Puentes and Warren 2006
Income	Some suburbs are declining in income relative to other suburbs. Some studies suggest inner-ring suburbs are declining in income relative to other suburbs and neighborhoods in the central city. Income segregation among suburbs is on the rise.	Median household-income ratio Median family-income ratio Per-capita income ratio	Bollens 1988 Leigh and Lee 2005 Lucy and Phillips 2000a, 2006 Madden 2003 Swanstrom et al. 2004
Population	Inner-ring suburbs are experiencing slow growth and population loss.	Change in population size Number and percentage of suburbs (tracts) losing population	Leigh and Lee 2005 Lucy and Phillips 2000a, 2006 Puentes and Warren 2006
Fiscal stress	At-risk suburbs have high costs but low tax capacity. Intergovernmental aid for suburbs is lacking.	Local and state revenue tax rates Tax base per household Percentage of elementary students eligible for the free- or reduced-price lunch program	Orfield 2002 Listokin and Beaton 1983
Public schools	Public schools in inner-ring suburbs underperforming relative to schools in outer suburbs; school financing is an issue in at-risk, declining suburbs as well as some growing communities with lots of children	Standardized tests Public school enrollment	Keating and Bier 2008 Orfield 2002 Hanlon and Vicino 2005
Housing deterioration	Inner-ring suburbs have aging housing stock; postwar housing particularly vulnerable	Age of housing stock	Bier 2001 Lucy and Phillips 2000a, 2006 Puentes and Warren 2006

average. Housing in New York's inner-ring suburbs are not losing value compared to those in Cleveland, for instance. Lucy and Phillips (2000a: 173) suggest that "age of housing was not singularly associated with relative income decline among suburbs." In some jurisdictions with new housing (i.e., built between 1980 and 1990), relative income was as likely to increase as decrease. In their words, "Housing age alone is a flawed predictor of [decline]" (Lucy and Phillips 2000a: 199), and, in fact, very old housing can attract a wealthy consumer. Middle-age suburbs are most rapidly declining. Built in unison, these postwar suburbs are now struggling to compete with newer, larger developments in the outer suburbs.

Summary Comments

Table 2.1 provides a summary of the findings from recent studies of suburban decline. These studies determine that decline is now a suburban reality, no longer a sole problem of central cities but an increasing problem particularly for inner-ring suburbs. Poverty has increased in these areas in recent decades, and some suburbs suffer from poverty concentration. Compared to the outer suburbs, inner-ring suburbs have grown at a much slower pace. Some have experienced population loss. The inner-ring suburbs are aging in terms of people and housing. They have few resources but very high costs because of an increasing elderly population and more low-income families. The message from many of these studies is that troubled suburbs are likely to be inner-ring suburbs, although not all inner-ring suburbs are troubled.

Certain regions of the country are more prone to suburban decline than others. For instance, although not distinguishing inner-ring suburbs per se, Lucy and Phillips (2001) find that decline among suburbs was more predominant in the Northeast and Midwest, specifically in metropolitan areas, such as St. Louis, Cleveland, and Philadelphia. Bier (2001) suggests that decline among inner-ring suburbs applies most often to the Midwest and is less applicable to growing areas of the South and Southwest.

Questions still remain, however, about the spatial nature of suburban decline. For instance, is inner-ring suburban decline occurring across some metropolitan areas more than others? What do declining suburbs look like, and how do they compare to other suburbs across different metropolitan areas? Decline among inner-ring suburbs ultimately raises these questions: Why is this happening, and what, if anything, can be done about this problem? These and other questions are the focus of subsequent chapters.

3
Defining Inner-Ring Suburbs

Suburbs in the United States are generally understood to be those places located between the central city limits and the rural area (Oliver 2001; Teaford 2008). Suburbia is that stretch of land beyond the city but still within a designated metropolitan area.[1] Many different types of suburbs exist; some are located close to the historic urban core, and others are many miles away at the metropolitan edge. The metropolitan landscape has morphed to include different suburban settlement types, such as inner-ring suburbs, middle-tier suburbs that lie between the inner-ring and the outer edge of the metro area, outer suburbs, exurbs on the rural-urban interface, edge cities, and so on. Defining suburbia as having one unified settlement pattern has, in many respects, become meaningless. There are distinct suburban geographies. Yet we grapple with delineating these different settlement types. How should we define inner-ring suburbs, for instance? What are the common traits, if any, of these suburbs?

Answering such questions is not a straightforward task given the fact that the U.S. Bureau of the Census has never used the term "sub-

[1]According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, a metropolitan area has a populated core where adjacent counties have a degree of economic and social integration with this core.

urb" in tabulating data and does not delineate nuanced settlements, such as inner-ring suburbs, outer suburbs, or exurbs. The Office of Management and Budget, mandated to develop standards for defining metropolitan statistical areas, "recognizes that formal definitions of settlement types such as inner city, inner suburb, outer suburb, exurb and rural would be useful . . . and the Census Bureau and other Federal agencies should continue research on settlement patterns below the county level to describe further the distribution of population and economic activity throughout the Nation" (Federal Register 2000: 82,228). Despite the interest, an exact census definition of suburbs—be they inner ring, outer, or otherwise—is lacking (Palen 1995). Academics and practitioners alike have attempted to characterize different suburban forms regardless of this problem. In this chapter, I examine various interpretations of the term "inner-ring suburbs" and critique the ways that different scholars have defined the boundaries of these areas. At the end of this chapter, I describe how inner-ring suburbs are defined for my particular study.

Naming Inner-Ring Suburbs

An array of terms is used to identify inner-ring suburbs, including, but not limited to, "inner suburbs," "older suburbs," "first-tier suburbs," "postwar suburbs," and "first-ring suburbs." Table 3.1 provides a list of these and other expressions. Despite different vocabulary, each of these terms points to similar defining characteristics. In each case, the timing of housing development is a significant trait. These suburbs are generally the oldest suburbs.

Their geographic locations also characterize their names. They border the central city. The terminology of "inner-ring suburbs" or "inner suburbs" emphasizes this closeness to the historic urban city core. According to Anthony Downs (1997: 359), inner-ring suburbs are "those legally binding communities immediately adjacent to, and contiguous with, the central city of a metropolitan area." Their existence next to the central city is a fundamental feature (Jackson 1985; Baldassare 1986, 1992). These areas are first-ring communities (Fishman 2000) or, in the words of William Hudnut (2003), "the first [suburbs] founded after the central city—first in time and first in place." Hudnut (2003) deems the term "first-tier" most precise in describing these areas, since it accentuates their stage of development as well as the spatial location of these suburbs right outside the central city.

TABLE 3.1 TERMS USED TO DESCRIBE INNER-RING SUBURBS

Terms	Examples of relevant work(s)
Inner-ring or inner suburb	Baldassare 1986, 1992 Smith, Caris, and Wyly 2001 Downs 1997 Jackson 1985 Madden 2003
First-tier or first-ring suburb	Fishman 2000 Hudnut 2003 Ohio First Suburbs Consortium 2006 Puentes and Orfield 2002
Older, old, or mature suburb	Bollens 1988 Hayden 2003 Kotkin 2001 Listokin and Beaton 1983
Sitcom suburb	Hayden 2003
Streetcar suburb	Warner 1978
Town and country suburb	Lang, LeFurgy, and Nelson 2006
Post–World War II suburb	Lucy and Phillips 2000b

The term "older suburb" demonstrates their historical nature. For the Ohio First Suburbs Consortium, these first settlements are suburbs that were built adjacent to or near central cities before 1960. Within this categorization are, for instance, "streetcar suburbs" (Warner 1978), "town and country suburbs" (Lang, LeFurgy, and Nelson 2006), and "sitcom suburbs" (Hayden 2003), denoting different types and stages of suburban development. Tied to their histories are the architectural design and style of housing, with "sitcom suburbs" representing the postwar period of mass production of tract housing; "streetcar suburbs" representing much earlier middle-class subdivisions along streetcar transportation routes; and, in the case of "town and country suburbs," early settlements representing those that were serviced by horse-drawn streetcars.

The postwar period often receives the most emphasis. William Lucy and David Phillips (2000b: 1) suggest inner-ring suburbs are areas composed primarily of "single-use residential-only subdivisions of the type constructed in every metropolitan area from the end of World War II through 1970." Some debate rages about the specific age and land-use characteristics of these areas. For instance, Scott Bollens (1988) suggests that old suburbs are composed of a large percentage of housing built before 1940,

slightly earlier than the postwar period. For David Listokin and W. Patrick Beaton (1983), the focus is less on residential use and more on the decline of economic and commercial activities of mature suburbs. Despite these different emphases, in general, the literature identifies inner-ring suburbs as settlements built sometime before 1969, with some distinction between these developments on cities' borders and those built further out.

Comprehensive Definitions

A few studies employ specific methodological techniques to identify the geographic limits of inner-ring suburbs. Table 3.2 outlines three comprehensive definitions that determine their precise boundaries. In each case, different census geography is utilized.

First, there is the definition Nancey Leigh and Sugie Lee (2005) put forth in their examination of the suburbs of Philadelphia. Borrowing from prior literature, they suggest inner-ring suburbs are "low-density, single-family, residential suburban areas," and, in the case of Philadelphia, they determine that these suburbs lie within twenty miles of the central city border (Leigh and Lee 2005: 15). In their definition, the specific geographic boundaries of inner-ring suburbs are delineated using census tract

TABLE 3.2 EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF INNER-RING SUBURBS, THEIR ADVANTAGES, AND THEIR DISADVANTAGES

Terms	Census geography	Advantages	Disadvantages	Relevant work(s)
Inner suburbs	Census tract	Highly detailed analysis	Ignores political boundaries	Leigh and Lee 2005
First suburbs	County	Historical analysis back to 1950 Data readily available Accessible to national audience	Scale is coarse and therefore lacks detail Parts of large counties are on the outer fringes of the metropolitan area Governance issues	Puentes and Warren 2006
Inner suburbs	Place	Considers political boundaries More detailed than county level	Areas outside place boundaries are ignored Number of places is inconsistent across decades Boundaries can change over time	Hanlon and Vicino 2007

geography. Leigh and Lee identify clusters of housing built during different time periods within the various census tracts of the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Those tracts with a "predominance level" (relatively higher percentage) of 1950–1969 housing stock are identified as inner-ring suburbs.

One of the important advantages of Leigh and Lee's definition of inner-ring suburbs is that it enables a fine-grained analysis of these areas. Census tracts are, aside from census block and block group, the smallest geographic units for which census data are available. Leigh and Lee (2005) take advantage of this scale by providing a detailed comparison of inner-ring suburbs, the inner city, and outer-ring suburbs of Philadelphia. A disadvantage of Lee and Leigh's definition is the lack of consideration for political boundaries. Census tracts often cross recognized municipal borders. By using census tracts, local administrative bodies and local decision-making processes are largely ignored in their study.

A second definition of inner-ring suburbs is put forth by Brookings Institution scholars Robert Puentes and David Warren (2006). They use a number of criteria to define these areas. For them, first suburbs are defined as follows:

- Counties that are identified using county level geography.
- Counties that were part of a census-defined standard metropolitan area (SMA) in 1950 (if a county was not part of the SMA that year, they feel "reasonably certain it was not part of older, suburban America" [Puentes and Warren 2006: 58]).
- Counties that were linked with the top one hundred most-populated cities in 1950.
- Counties that were not central cities in 1950.
- Counties that are adjacent to a primary city.
- Counties that comprise "suburban population" only. In this sense, the primary city population is extracted from the county-level data. (For instance, the population of the primary city of Syracuse is removed from the population of Onondaga County so that what remains is, in essence, the population of the first suburb of Onondaga.)
- Counties with a population threshold of more than 120,000 residents.

In short, Puentes and Warren's (2006) definition of first suburbs is based on the age, location, and population of a county. An important advan-

tage of this definition of first suburbs is that it allows for historical analysis as far back as 1950. Data are readily available at a county level from 1950 to the present. Puentes and Warren suggest that counties are more easily recognizable to a broad national group of spectators than are census tracts. This theory provides an additional advantage to using county boundaries.

However, Puentes and Warren (2006) also recognize a number of disadvantages in their definition. Their definition of inner-ring suburbs is a rather crude, coarse measure. A county contains many places and census tracts, so using this level of geography means that a description of internal variation or a fine-grain analysis is lost. In terms of governance, county definitions can be meaningless in some states. In many politically fragmented metropolitan areas, local municipalities at a subcounty level have zoning and planning powers. County governance has little impact on land use. Parts of some large counties identified as first suburbs are technically on the metropolitan fringe and, spatially, not part of the first tier of suburban development.

A third definition of inner-ring suburbs is that of Bernadette Hanlon and Thomas Vicino (2007). In their analysis of inner-ring suburbs in Baltimore from 1980 to 2000, they define these suburbs using census place boundaries. Census places include consolidated cities, census designated places (CDP), and incorporated places; in the case of Baltimore, suburban places are CDPs. They classify inner-ring suburbs using two criteria. First, a place is an inner-ring suburb if it shares a boundary with the central city. Second, those suburban places that share a boundary with another suburban place that is adjacent to the central city are classified as inner-ring suburbs *if* more than 50 percent of the housing stock was built before 1969. Using these spatial and temporal criteria, Hanlon and Vicino find that, in the case of Baltimore, inner-ring suburbs are those places that lie within eight miles of the border of the central city.

Hanlon and Vicino's (2007) definition of inner-ring suburbs has two advantages. First, this definition takes into account municipal boundaries. Defining inner-ring suburbs by place-level geography facilitates examination of the political dimension and policy ramifications of suburban transformation. It enables determination of suburban communities in need of resources to combat decline. Second, Hanlon and Vicino's definition allows for a more detailed analysis of suburbs than a county-level comparison.

As with other classifications, however, Hanlon and Vicino's (2007) definition has some disadvantages. First, not all residents or land uses fall

within the boundaries of a place. Therefore, analysis at the place level excludes residents of "nonplace" inner-ring and outer suburbs within a metropolitan area. Second, with continuing suburbanization, the number of suburban places increases from one decade to another. For instance, more suburban places existed in Baltimore in 2000 than in 1980. This is also the case with other metropolitan areas in the United States. Therefore, more recent suburbs are not captured for analyses over time. Third, in many instances, place boundaries change from one decade to the next. Unfortunately, at this time, no process is available to mitigate inaccuracies in data analysis caused by place-level boundary changes that may have occurred over time. This is a shortcoming to using this geographic scale for longitudinal analysis.

Each definition of inner-ring suburbs has advantages and disadvantages. From what we know so far, inner-ring suburbs are distinguished among suburbs by their spatial and temporal characteristics. In short, they are the oldest suburbs—in general, urban scholars suggest they were built prior to 1969—and they are the closest suburbs to the central city. The boundaries of inner-ring suburbs have been delineated using county, tract, and census place geography.

Definition Used in This Study

This study examines inner-ring suburbs in the top one hundred most-populated urban areas in the United States and compares them to their newer outer suburban counterparts. The metropolitan areas where these suburbs are located include all eighteen consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSA), composed of seventy-three primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSA) and the top twenty-seven most-populated metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). These metropolitan areas are located in different regions defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census—the Midwest, the Northeast, the South, and the West. The most highly populated metropolitan areas that geographically spread across these four different regions are represented.[2]

For this study, primarily census place-level geography is used to identify inner-ring and outer suburbs. According to the U.S. Bureau of the

[2]See the Appendix for a complete list of the metropolitan areas and their corresponding census regions.

Census, three types of census places exist: CDPs, consolidated cities, and incorporated places. CDP boundaries are delineated to collect data on unincorporated areas with concentrations of population, housing, and commercial sites. These places have a degree of local identity, and their boundaries are established by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in cooperation with local and state officials. CDPs do not have their own local government structures. Consolidated cities and incorporated places, on the other hand, are municipal incorporations that operate local governments. An incorporated place is established to provide governmental functions for a concentration of people, and a consolidated city consists of two or more local governments that have merged to create a regional government.

Using census places to define suburbs has two benefits. First, places provide the opportunity for a more fine-grained analysis than county geography and, as a result, enable a nuanced examination of suburban transformation. Second, and more important, place-level geography emphasizes suburbs as political entities distinct from the central city. In *The American Suburb,* Jon Teaford (2008: x) states that "because of the strong tradition of local self-rule in the United States, [the] political distinction between suburb and central city has been vital to discussions of suburban development, lifestyle, and policy. American suburbs are not simply peripheral areas with larger lawns and more trees than districts nearer the historic hub. They are governmentally independent political units that can employ the powers of the state to distinguish them from the city." Census place geography captures the political nature of suburbia.

Suburban consolidated cities and incorporated places have control over land-use planning and regulation, a powerful tool in shaping the balance between residential, commercial, and industrial use within suburban municipal boundaries. Local suburban governments determine the size, type, and pattern of housing developments and, having fiscal powers, determine the level of taxation and expenditures on local services within their jurisdictions. Governmental resources at state and local levels are often provided based on municipal boundaries as well as CDP boundaries. In the case of the Baltimore metropolitan area, for example, Baltimore County funds revitalization projects to many older CDPs surrounding Baltimore City (Hanlon and Vicino 2007). Also, since CDPs capture suburbs with a cohesive community identity, local community groups often mobilize politically around these boundaries (Neidt 2006). CDPs and suburban municipalities are the building blocks of my definition of inner-ring suburbs.



FIGURE 3.1 Inner-ring suburbs, outer suburbs, and older outer suburbs in Cleveland-Akron CMSA. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places in the Cleveland-Akron CMSA.)*

Using Geographic Information Systems technology and the census place-level data on the total number of housing units built during specific time periods, I identify suburbs where the majority of the housing stock was built prior to and after 1969. I classify contiguous suburbs adjacent to one another and to the central city, where more than half the housing stock was built prior to 1969, as "inner-ring suburbs." I classify "outer suburbs" as those suburbs where the majority of the housing stock was built after 1969. I identify "older outer suburbs" as places where the majority of the housing stock was built prior to 1969 but that are not contiguous suburbs adjacent to the central city. Many times, these older outer suburbs are very small in population size and geography. They often exist as small towns located at the edge of a metropolitan area. They are, in this sense, more "rural" than "suburban" in character, and, for this reason, they are not included as part of this study.

For the sake of clarification, I explain and outline the procedure for identifying inner-ring and outer suburbs using place-level geography in Figure 3.1 for the Cleveland-Akron CMSA. I map housing age for all suburban places in the metropolitan area, and I identify those suburban places with the majority of housing built prior to and after 1969. I include the boundaries for Cleveland, Elyria, Akron, Lorain, and Kent in Figure 3.1 to distinguish the central cities from suburban places. Inner-ring suburbs are the contiguous places adjacent to these central cities. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, outer suburbs are located in the next tier of development. Some older outer suburbs are located on the fringe of the metropolitan area and stretch along Lake Erie. These are dropped from the sample to be consistent with the sampling procedure for other metropolitan areas where older outer suburbs are typically small in population and rural in character. In the case of Cleveland-Akron, there are 66 inner-ring suburbs and 36 outer suburbs for a study sample of 102 suburbs.

Sample of Suburbs

Based on this methodology, I delineate inner-ring and outer suburbs in the top one hundred most-populated metropolitan areas in the United States. Table 3.3 shows the regional breakdown in the number of inner-ring and outer suburbs for 1980 and 2000. The number of outer suburbs shows a greater increase compared to inner-ring suburbs between 1980 and 2000. This increase is the result of suburban development over two decades. The number of inner-ring suburbs increased because more areas were classified by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as census places (due to incorporation) over the time period.

As expected, the Northeast and the Midwest have a preponderance of inner-ring suburbs compared with the South and the West. The lack of

TABLE 3.3 TOTAL NUMBER OF SAMPLE SUBURBS BY REGION, 1980 AND 2000

		Inner-ring suburbs		Outer suburbs	
Region	CMSA/MSA	1980	2000	1980	2000
Midwest	18	482	505	585	657
Northeast	34	856	943	286	378
South	25	219	251	857	1,190
West	23	208	245	445	707
Total	100	1,765	1,944	2,173	2,932

TABLE 3.4 SAMPLE SUBURBS CATEGORIZED AS CENSUS DESIGNATED PLACES (CDPS) AND MUNICIPALITIES BY CENSUS REGION, 2000

Regions	Suburbs, N (%)	CDPs, N (%)	Municipalities, N (%)
Midwest	1,162 (100)	98 (8)	1,064 (92)
Northeast	1,321 (100)	421 (32)	900 (68)
South	1,441 (100)	617 (43)	824 (57)
West	952 (100)	437 (46)	515 (54)
Total	4,876 (100)	1,573 (32)	3,303 (68)

inner-ring suburbs in the South and the West can be explained in part by the annexation process in these regions. Cities in the South and the West often engulfed the earliest stages of suburban development, in some cases right up to the 1980s (Abbott 1987; Rusk 1999, 2003; Teaford 1993).

Table 3.4 demonstrates the number of suburbs in the nationwide sample by the different categories of places. A total of 1,573 sample suburbs are CDPs, accounting for almost a third of the suburbs in this study. The remaining two-thirds are incorporated municipalities. Of the CDPs, only ninety-eight are located in the Midwest, indicating that the overwhelming majority of suburbs in this region are municipalities with their own local governments. Compared with other regions, the Midwest has the highest rate of suburban municipalities among the sample (92 percent). The West has the lowest rate.

As previously mentioned, CDPs and suburban municipalities are the building blocks of my definition of inner-ring suburbs. Using these geographies has important policy implications, since government resources are provided and, in the case of incorporation, acquired based on these boundaries.

4

Forces Shaping Inner-Ring Suburbs

In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of studies identified a complex array of suburbs, dispelling the myth of so-called suburban homogeneity. The recognition of working-class suburbs (Berger 1968) and the rise of black suburbanization (Schnore, André, and Sharp 1976) demonstrated that the suburbs did not merely comprise white, middle-class families. These early studies emphasized racial differences (Blumberg and Lalli 1966; Farley 1970), ethnic variety (Kramer 1972), and class distinctions (Pinkerton 1969; Dobriner 1963). Suburbs were shown to be varied and diverse. This diversity, along with concern about the effects of suburban growth, prompted questions about the processes underlying suburban differentiation, particularly in relation to varied social position. A number of sociologists in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s began to examine suburbs to determine if they actually were changing in terms of social status and why this might be happening. Three theoretical models emerged: the suburban persistence model, the life-cycle model, and the stratification model.

In this chapter, I examine each of these early models that offer explanations about the changing social composition of suburbs. These models still provide tremendous insight into the process of growth and decline among suburbs, and I refer to them from time to time

throughout the rest of this book. In this chapter, I also identify a number of forces I believe are shaping inner-ring suburbs today. In describing these forces, I seek to explain why some inner-ring suburbs are more vulnerable to decline than others.

Early Theoretical Models of Suburban Change

The first theoretical model to emerge in early studies of suburban change was the suburban persistence model. The suburban life-cycle model and stratification model followed shortly afterward. Table 4.1 outlines the main tenets of each of these models.

Suburban Persistence Model

One of the effects of the mass suburbanization of the 1950s was increased socioeconomic disparity between cities and suburbs. This differentiation was generally attributed to the movement of high-income groups from city neighborhoods to the suburbs. But, with the recognition of different types of suburbs, two questions emerged about this process. First, was population growth the same across the different suburbs, or was it related to specific characteristics of a suburb? In other words, were certain types of suburbs growing more than others? Second, did population growth lead to changes in the socioeconomic status of a suburb?

Reynolds Farley (1964) poses these two questions in a study of 137 suburbs from 1920 to 1960. Regarding the first question, he finds that

TABLE 4.1 THREE EARLY THEORETICAL MODELS OF SUBURBAN CHANGE

Model	Main tenet(s)	Relevant work(s)
Suburban persistence	Social status of suburb remains consistent as population of incoming group resembles existing residents; suburb's "ecological niche" determines initial and current status.	Farley 1964 Guest 1978 Stahura 1979
Life cycle	Older housing in older suburbs "filters" to low-income groups as high-income groups move to newer housing in new suburbs.	Choldin, Hanson, and Bohrer 1980 Winsberg 1989
Social stratification	Inequality increases among suburbs; high-status suburbs use political mechanisms to maintain their positions relative to low-status suburbs.	Hill 1974 Logan 1976 Logan and Schneider 1981

suburbs with high rates of population growth were generally those with high-income status. Farley thinks that the wealthiest areas of suburbia were the primary destination of the high-income groups that were out-migrating from the city. As for the second question, Farley (1964: 47) suggests that class composition in the suburbs remained the same over time, since "the population that move[d] into the suburb tend[ed] to resemble the population already living there." In other words, the socioeconomic status of a suburb "persisted" despite rapid population growth. Farley uses the term "suburban persistence" to suggest that the socioeconomic status of suburbs did not change overtime.

He provides the examples of Parma and Shaker Heights, two suburbs of Cleveland, to illustrate his argument. Both suburbs had similar population sizes, were settled around the same time, and are the same distance from Cleveland. Despite these similarities, however, the characteristics of the inhabitants of these suburbs were different, with professionals and college graduates making up a sizable proportion of the Shaker Heights population compared to Parma. Shaker Heights had large expensive housing, and Parma had numerous small residences. For Farley, the social status of these suburbs was fixed early in their history, and subsequent population growth in these suburbs merely reinforced their existing socioeconomic patterns of differentiation.

Some later studies reinforced Farley's position. For instance, Avery Guest (1978) examines 661 incorporated places from 1920, 1950, and 1970 to determine the persistence of suburban socioeconomic structure over time. He distinguishes between two different eras of growth. From 1920 to 1950, he finds some evidence of changing status among suburbs but also evidence of persistence. But, in the period from 1950 to 1970, Guest suggests persistence truly emerged as, according to his study, social status remained stable in most suburbs. He states, "Amid the massive suburban growth of post–World War II America, most suburbs retained a very high stability of relative ranking in social status" (Guest 1978: 262). He determines that high-status suburbs received high-status residents during this period.

In general, suburban persistence theory is underscored by the notion that the affluent were suburbanizing. The focus is on city and suburban disparity. Suburbs increased their status relative to cities over time, yet they remained stable relative to each other. Population growth was paramount, and, according to early persistence theorists, established high-status suburbs grew rapidly in population by attracting high-status in-migrants. In

a study of 714 suburbs in 1960 and 1970, John Stahura (1979) deviates slightly from this position. He is one of the first scholars to develop a causal model of suburban social-status change. In this study, he suggests the role of population growth was somewhat exaggerated but finds other characteristics much more pertinent. Aside from population growth, he includes the variables of suburban age, initial suburban status levels, the suburbs' geographic locations, suburban racial makeup, and employment specialization in his statistical model. He finds (1979: 946) that suburban age, the percentage of black inhabitants, and employment specialization within a suburb affected its then-current status (in 1970) "inasmuch as they also affected earlier (1960) status levels." He describes how a suburb's initial, established "ecological niche" was a great determinant of its future status. Using the examples of Hammond, Indiana, and Evanston, Illinois, he states, "The ecological niches occupied by these two places [i.e., Hammond is an employment center, and Evanston is a residential center] have persisted and their socioeconomic compositions have changed little in relation to one another: that is, Evanston still has a much higher status level. . . . Once an initial population composition is established as determined by its ecological niche, the composition is likely to persist since functional roles persist" (1979: 946).

In other words, according to Stahura (1979), the initial residential, population, and employment characteristics of a suburb determined its status later on. When applied to the concept of decline among suburbs, suburban persistence theory rejects the notion, since status, formed in a suburb's early history, remains the same overtime. This model is most acutely demonstrated in the granitelike persistence of high social status among some of the nation's old, elite suburbs. Such places as the old suburbs along Chicago's North Shore or Scarsdale and Llewellyn Park around New York have maintained an elite status since they first developed at the turn of the twentieth century.

Suburban Life-Cycle Model

Harvey Choldin, Claudine Hanson, and Robert Bohrer (1980) rebuff suburban persistence theory. They believe that persistence studies were flawed, because they employed absolute rather than relative measures to determine changing suburban social status. Choldin, Hanson, and Bohrer develop a relative-status scoring technique to compare city and suburban residential

areas within a metropolitan area. They find that certain suburbs experienced relative decline as a function of their age. In their study, they state, "The great majority of the suburbs are subject to the neighborhood life cycle. Suburban housing ages, like in the city, and, as this happens, the relative status of places decline" (Choldin, Hanson, and Bohrer 1980: 981). Drawing upon life-cycle theory, they predict that as suburbia continues to grow, the aging suburbs will decline in a relative sense.

Neighborhood life-cycle theory has traditionally been used to disentangle the process of decline among inner-city neighborhoods. Edgar Hoover and Raymond Vernon (1962) initially formulated this concept. They suggest that city neighborhoods undergo a process of life-cycle change that involves five distinct phases: development, transition, downgrading, thinning-out, and renewal. The first phase—development—is a healthy growth period of housing development that is subsequently followed by a second, transition phase of higher density development, including apartment construction. The third phase—downgrading—emerges with even higher density development and overcrowding, typically as a result of the spread of minority and ethnic areas. The fourth phase—thinning-out—is the consequence of population loss and the rapid deterioration of housing units. The final phase of renewal occurs with public intervention or, more specifically, the replacement of obsolete housing with new, multifamily dwelling units.

According to Hoover and Vernon (1962), these different stages of growth, stability, and decline are heavily influenced by the age of the local housing stock. Based on their study of New York, they determine that city neighborhoods progressively decreased in social status as the housing stock became older, and all neighborhoods, except the newest, declined over time. Other scholars have explored the neighborhood life-cycle process, identifying similar distinct stages and coming to similar conclusions. Theoretically, neighborhood change is a "trickle-down" process where, as time passes, older neighborhoods in the inner city become occupied by poorer households (Downs 1981). Choldin, Hanson, and Bohrer (1980) apply this trickle-down or life-cycle process to the suburbs and find decline most prevalent among older suburbs.

This view of the process of suburban decline relates most specifically to the notion of filtering. The first reference to filtering is found in a British report on slum housing in the 1920s. This report states, "When post-war building began, it was hoped that there would be a gradual movement of

the working-class population out of the slums to better houses. This might occur in two ways; either the slum dweller might go directly into a new house, or a process of 'filtering up' might occur under which a slum dweller would move from the slum to better pre-war housing, the tenant of which would, in his turn, move into a new house. Both of these processes have, of course, occurred, but on a disappointingly small scale" (quoted in Davies 1978: 140).

Filtering is implicit in Homer Hoyt's sector model of urban growth and form. By examining 142 American cities, Hoyt (1939) finds varying levels of rental values in different sections or sectors of the city. He suggests high-status households moved into sectors located along transportation routes or in hilly areas away from industrial districts. His model emphasizes the movement of high-status groups into new housing and the subsequent abandonment and obsolescence of existing stock that is later occupied by lower-status households. In a series of maps, he shows that high-income households shifted location every thirty years. In Hoyt's model, the housing stock filters down the income ladder, with the oldest and cheapest housing eventually occupied by the poorest families. Applying this model to a suburban context, old housing in the oldest suburbs filter to low-income groups as higher-income groups move to newer housing on the suburban periphery. Recent studies of U.S. suburbs suggest that the decline of older suburbs can, in general, be attributed to the aging housing stock (Bier 2001; Puentes and Orfield 2002) and the demand for newer, larger housing in the outer suburbs (Sternlieb and Lake 1975).

Suburban Stratification Model

The social stratification model in the suburbs emphasizes social differentiation among these places. Its main tenet is that inequality in suburbia is increasing as high-status suburbs capitalize on their high-status positions and low-status suburbs continue to deteriorate (Logan 1976). This model focuses on the political aspects of suburbanization. According to this model, affluent suburbs use zoning regulations, taxation policies, service provision, land-use controls, and other institutional resources to maintain their positions relative to poorer suburbs (Hill 1974).

John Logan and Mark Schneider (1981) explore suburban stratification in their examination of more than sixteen hundred suburbs in fifty-two standard metropolitan statistical areas from 1960 to 1970. They find that

suburban inequality increased, especially in the Northeast. In contrast to this region, many of the poorer growing suburbs in the South improved, lessening the extent of suburban inequality in that region. According to their findings, politics matter. Logan and Schneider attribute increasing suburban stratification in northern metro areas partly to the "antagonistic political relationship between cities and suburbs" (1981: 185). According to their analysis, suburbs in this region used the practice of exclusionary zoning and other political mechanisms to preserve their status as compared to cities.

They similarly find a positive relationship between politically fragmented metropolitan areas and increasing suburban inequality as higher-status incorporated suburbs used political mechanisms to maintain their status. By zoning out lower-status groups, encouraging job growth, attracting new taxpayers, and prohibiting the construction of low-income housing, local governments were able to minimize decline and maximize growth.

Changes since These Early Models

Since these early theoretical models were first formulated, immense changes have occurred in the metropolitan United States. One major transformation has been the growth of the immigrant population. In the last decade of the twentieth century, more immigrants entered the United States than in any other decade in the nation's history. It is estimated that the immigrant population, with and without legal status, reached a record 37.9 million in 2007 (Camarota 2007). Traditionally, new arrivals to the United States in-migrated to ethnic neighborhoods in large cities, such as New York, Chicago, and Boston. However, this traditional settlement pattern has changed, with many new immigrants bypassing the city and migrating directly to the suburbs (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). According to a recent report by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, four out of every ten immigrants sidestepped the traditional urban core and settled directly in the suburbs in 2006. More immigrants now live in U.S. suburbia than in the nation's central cities (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). Immigrant suburbs, or "ethnoburbs" (Li 1998), have evolved. This evolution has occurred around some traditional immigrant gateway cities, such as Los Angeles and Miami, as well as around emerging immigrant gateway cities, such as Washington, D.C.; Phoenix; and Atlanta (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008).

Another related change is the rise of what has been referred to as "melting pot suburbs" (Frey 2003). According to recent figures, racial and ethnic minorities constituted more than 25 percent of the suburban population in 2000, up from 19 percent in 1990. A survey of 102 of the most populated metropolitan areas found that more than 50 percent of the Hispanic population and 40 percent of the black population lived in suburbs in 2000. Some metropolitan areas have more suburban minorities than others. Such metropolitan areas as El Paso, Miami, Los Angeles, and Albuquerque have high percentages of suburban Hispanics, and the metropolitan areas of Washington, D.C.; Atlanta; Charleston; and New Orleans have high proportions of suburban blacks. A high proportion of Asians live in the suburbs of such metropolitan areas as San Francisco, San Jose, and Los Angeles. As William Frey (2003: 13) observes, "the new suburban diversity patterns, particularly the fact that minorities are dominating suburban growth in more than half the nation's largest metropolitan areas, raise many questions about 'race and space' in America's metropolitan areas." Distinguishing the unique nature and characteristics of minority suburban locations has emerged as a new area of study. Tremendous barriers to spatial assimilation exist within suburbia (Massey and Denton 1988). Racial and ethnic segregation has been devastating for poor, minority populations in inner-city communities (Massey and Denton 1993). The segregation of poor minority populations into certain suburbs is equally as devastating.

A third area of change is the continued sprawl of employment and people to outer suburbs. Since the 1970s, edge cities, edgeless cities, exurbs, and various subcenters have emerged on a grand scale that gives the metropolitan landscape a widely varied configuration. Multiple employment centers have sprouted with the clustering of retail and business activities. Joel Garreau's "edge cities" can be found near the intersection of interstate highways and major roads across different metropolitan areas. Since Garreau, Robert Lang and Jennifer LeFurgy (2003) have identified more elusive "edgeless cities," which are described as "a form of sprawling office development that never reaches the scale, density, or cohesiveness of 'edge cities'" (Lang and LeFurgy 2003: 427). Office development has occurred at a large scale but in a loose and irregular form. The dispersion of jobs and businesses has radically changed suburbs from mere places of residential living to places where people also work, shop, and have fun.

Forces Shaping the Inner-Ring Suburbs Today

These three major changes have important implications for U.S. suburbs. As I demonstrate in the following sections, they are elements of a number of forces shaping inner-ring suburbs in particular. In the early stages of metropolitan expansion, the suburbs adjacent to the central cities benefited from growth, but, as decentralization has continued, these inner-ring suburbs have been left behind for suburbs much farther out. Continued outward expansion is the ultimate force shaping the decline of inner-ring suburbs. Among a myriad of possible contributing forces, I suggest the following four.

Housing Market Dynamics

Market forces largely dominate housing allocation in the United States. New housing is, in general, only available to higher-income households, with very few new houses built by the public or private sectors to support lower-income households (Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982). Lower-income households, therefore, typically must settle for housing vacated by moving higher-income groups. A number of studies have tested the relevance of this process on the decline of inner-ring suburbs. For instance, in her study of cities and suburbs, Janice Madden (2003) finds that inner-ring suburbs with older housing stock experienced higher increases in poverty from 1970 to 1990 than outer suburbs with newer housing. She finds that lower-income groups moved into old housing in these inner-ring suburbs as higher-income groups moved to the newer, outer suburbs.

Housing in inner-ring suburbs is certainly outdated, especially the stock that was built in the 1950s and 1960s. Innovative and highly desirable when they were first constructed, the postwar Cape Cod or suburban ramblers now represent a bygone era. This housing stock lacks the size and amenities to compete with newer, much larger housing on the outer fringe of the metropolitan area. Today, large developments are unabashedly desired, and the typical contemporary house measures more than twenty-two hundred square feet, more than twice the size of the average house built in 1950. The postwar suburb struggles to compete in today's housing market. These suburbs have reached a crisis in their life cycles.

A fairly new and interesting development is the remodeling of the smaller, old houses in some postwar suburbs. A recent article in the

Washington Post describes the evolution of Pimmit Hills, a Washington, D.C., suburb that has witnessed extensive remodeling of its postwar housing stock and the extension of small boxy structures into much larger houses (Straight 2005). Some postwar suburbs are being transformed. Levittown, the epitome of postwar suburbanization, has seen its housing altered and expanded dramatically over the decades. Even older housing within inner-ring suburbs is being demolished and replaced with newer, larger housing.

These new developments indicate that the old housing may be undesirable, but its suburban location is still attractive. Local residents' ability to reinvest in the housing stock of these suburbs is central to the areas' continued stability. The transformation of postwar housing and the tearing down of even older housing indicates the effects of a new injection of capital. According to a recent study of Chicago City and its suburbs, small, older housing near public transportation and traditional village centers is being torn down and replaced (Dye and McMillen 2007). Being near transportation and in a village setting is still valued, even though the housing may be obsolete. This teardown process suggests that consumers with the means can live close to centers of employment and various amenities yet also possess new housing.

However, the revitalization and tearing down of the old housing stock is only taking place in certain inner-ring suburbs. Few, if any, teardowns and little remodeling occur in economically depressed regions where there are few employment opportunities and services and even fewer resources. Little remodeling occurs in the inner-ring suburbs of such metropolitan regions as Baltimore, Detroit, or Cleveland, for instance. Where household or community resources for reinvestment in old housing are lacking, deterioration prevails, and little upgrading occurs. Even in healthy metropolitan economies, only housing in select inner-ring suburbs is being completely remodeled. Many inner-ring suburbs are left to fend for themselves.

The inner-ring suburbs continue to deteriorate as they lose the battle for investment resources. These investment resources are typically tied up in greenfield development in the outer suburbs. Capital to develop the newer, outer suburbs is easier to acquire. It is much more profitable for real estate companies and developers to develop new places than to redevelop already existing communities, such as old inner-ring suburbs. William Lucy and David Phillips (2006) refer to this situation as the "tyranny of easy development decisions": Realtors, developers, and lenders prefer

greenfield development, because the risks are more predictable and manageable than those associated with redeveloping existing neighborhoods. In a capitalist market, there are always winners and losers. Currently, the losers are inner-ring suburbs, and the winners are outer suburbs. In certain locations, inner-ring suburbs have become a devalued urban form where aging housing stock is devalued and reinvestment is slow to occur. In his analysis of gentrification in the city, Neil Smith (1996) suggests that inner-city properties were devalorized or devalued because of the reallocation of capital to the suburbs. In a similar manner, aging housing stock in the postwar suburbs is devalued as these suburbs lose out to edge-city development and the revitalization of housing in central city neighborhoods.

The New Suburban Demographic

The impact of demographic shifts on neighborhood change has a long tradition in urban studies. Traditional urban theory tends to explain the socioeconomic transformation of neighborhoods in terms of the in- and outmigration of different groups. This is rooted in ecological models of city neighborhood change. Based on examinations of ethnic and racial areas in Chicago, urban sociologists of the Chicago School propose a theory of invasion and succession, where one group "invades" a city neighborhood and "succeeds" over the existing group of residents (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1967). Borrowing from ecological studies of the natural system, they examine the settlement patterns of newly arriving immigrants to the city, suggesting that these in-migrants entered specific neighborhoods in inner core areas of the city and displaced the previous population. This in-migration, they believe, created a chain reaction where each displaced group moved out a little closer to the edge of the city. This ecological model assumes in-migrants initially settled in cheap inner-city housing and eventually progressed and moved to better, more expensive housing in the suburbs. Through the years, the invasion-succession model has been modified and used by scholars to explain the suburbanization process (Bourne 1981), the spatial assimilation of immigrants to the United States (Massey 1985), and racial and ethnic turnover in neighborhoods (Schwirian 1983).

A number of recent studies have linked changes in suburban demographic structure to changes in suburban socioeconomic status. For instance, Thomas Cooke and Sarah Marchant (2006) suggest that the increase in high-poverty neighborhoods among inner-ring suburbs of

metropolitan areas in California and other Sun Belt states is the result of rapid population growth, particularly of the immigrant population.[1] Lucy and Phillips (2000a) find that of the 350 suburbs that declined in income from 1960 to 1970, 260 (or 75 percent) experienced an increase in the African American population. Other works suggest that the "white flight" phenomenon is evident, as the residents of older suburban communities struggle to accept minority neighbors (Orfield 2002).

Already vulnerable because of their aging and outdated housing stock, inner-ring suburbs in a sense are groomed for racial and ethnic transition. Old postwar suburbs, vulnerable to decline, have become the new home of different minority groups, particularly those coming from other countries. Immigrants, bypassing the cities, are clustering in the most affordable suburbs and transforming them in the process. With the gentrification of inner-city neighborhoods and the development of high-end suburbs on the outer fringe, the inner ring has become the only affordable place left to go for many minority groups.

Racial and ethnic discrimination is also a fundamental issue. Neil Smith, Paul Caris, and Elvin Wyly (2001) warn against blaming demographic shifts on the decline of inner-ring communities. They state, "Decline is all too easily blamed on the visible race and class attributes of those who are moving, or trying to move, into the neighborhood" (2001: 498). They caution against disregarding the deeper underlying effects of discrimination. The inability of minority populations in minority neighborhoods to secure credit and fixed-interest home loans (Holloway 1998), the steering of homebuyers and renters to certain neighborhoods based on their race or ethnicity (Galster 1990), and the resistance of white residents to live in even somewhat integrated neighborhoods results in the segregation of African Americans and other minorities into poor, declining suburbs (Smith, Caris, and Wyly 2001). Because of discrimination in the housing market, minorities are essentially excluded from many high-income suburbs and gentrified inner-city neighborhoods and therefore must live in less-than-stable neighborhoods in the inner ring.

[1]It is interesting to note that Joel Kotkin (2001) finds that several older suburbs were thriving as a result of increasing ethnic diversity. He points to "midopolitan," or older suburban, settlements in Silicon Valley that have been positively transformed by an increasing Asian population and suggests that older suburban areas that lack immigrants—such as around New Orleans, Cleveland, St. Louis, and Indianapolis—need this population influx, since they are losing affluent white and black residents to the outer suburbs.

Racial discrimination in acquiring adequate and secure credit is clearly seen in the recent housing foreclosure crisis, which has greatly impacted many city neighborhoods and older suburbs. According to a report by the Center for Urban Poverty and Community Development, regardless of income levels, African American borrowers in Cleveland and suburban Cuyahoga County in Ohio were two to four times more likely to receive high-cost subprime loans than their white counterparts between 2005 and 2007. As a result, African Americans and African American inner-ring suburbs and city neighborhoods were the most likely victims of subprime mortgage foreclosures (Coulton et al. 2008).

The inner-ring suburban Prince George's County in Maryland had the state's highest rate of foreclosure in the first quarter of 2008.[2] This county is also predominately African American. Three Prince George's communities with the highest county share of property foreclosures were the inner-ring suburbs of Hyattsville (41 percent black in 2000), Upper Marlboro (45 percent black in 2000), and Bowie (31 percent black in 2000). Minority inner-ring suburbs, already at risk, have unduly suffered as a result of discriminatory subprime lending practices. Discrimination and the exclusion of minority populations from higher-income metropolitan neighborhoods is a force shaping vulnerable inner-ring suburbs that are undergoing major racial and ethnic transition.

Because of discriminatory practices and the lack of affordable housing in outer suburbs or gentrified inner-city neighborhoods, minority groups cluster in declining inner-ring suburbs. In inner-ring suburbs where investment resources are lacking and housing stock is outdated, sudden and quick changes in demographic structure can be devastating, especially when white residents assume the surrounding decline is due to an influx of minority groups. A major force shaping inner-ring suburbs is the changing suburban demography, where the problems of housing discrimination and affordability lurk in the background.

Labor Market Restructuring

A significant feature of an advanced capitalist society is the mobility of capital and the deindustrialization of older cities and suburbs (Bluestone

[2]The foreclosure rate is measured as the number of homeowner households per foreclosure event.

and Harrison 1982). In the past fifty years, the U.S. economy has witnessed a shift away from the traditional manufacturing base to more specialized service and information-producing industries (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Noyelle and Stanback 1983; Sassen 1990, 1991). This shift has caused the decline of many long-established, manufacturing metropolitan areas, particularly in the Northeast and the Midwest. This shift has led to the loss of relatively high-paying union jobs in manufacturing in the cities and older suburbs, greatly impacting the local economies of these deindustrialized communities (Bluestone and Harrison 1989). These impacts have been well documented for central cities, and a number of studies note the effects on inner-ring suburbs. For instance, in a study of the change in Chicago's suburbs, Morton Winsberg (1989) finds that heavy declines in household income were most striking in deindustrialized suburbs. Similarly, Scott Bollens (1988) finds that, particularly in the older, northeastern metropolitan areas of the United States, the more troubled suburbs tended to be manufacturing oriented, and Bernadette Hanlon and Thomas Vicino (2007), in their study of Baltimore's inner suburbs, find a predominance of decline among older, industrial suburbs on the southwestern border of the city.

In the traditional manufacturing regions of the United States, older working-class suburbs have witnessed the effects of runaway industry and, in the case of metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles, the abandonment by such industries as aerospace and defense, which have had tremendous impacts on these areas (Davis 2005). Deindustrialization follows the trail of industry, and, just as inner-city plants were often the first to close, now it is the turn of inner-ring suburban plants. A force shaping the inner-ring suburbs is the loss of blue-collar jobs in the wake of deindustrialization.

Metropolitan Fragmentation

The U.S. metropolis is highly politically fragmented. It is composed of central cities surrounded by separate suburban municipalities, each with its own local government services and structures and each making its own land-use planning decisions. These separate suburban municipalities range in social status and compete with each other for investment resources. Each suburban jurisdiction strives to increase its tax base—hence, the desire for high-income residents. The fragmentation of the metropolitan region has two important consequences for declining inner-ring suburbs.

First, uneven geographical development is reinforced. As suburban stratification theory suggests, affluent suburbs wield their political power to maintain their high-income status, to the detriment of declining inner-ring suburbs. Affluent suburbs use exclusionary or "snob" zoning to deny entry to low-income residents and maintain the status quo. Zoning allows suburban municipalities to determine lot sizes and development types. Affluent suburbs maintain large lots designed for large single-family dwellings unaffordable to poor families. They also utilize local zoning laws to prohibit low-income multifamily dwellings from being built within their jurisdictional boundaries. Lower-income suburban families are confined to certain suburbs and excluded from others. Protecting local property values is most significant in the use of exclusionary zoning. As Michael Danielson (1972: 164) states, "Given the nature of the local constituency and local government's dependency on the property tax system, the suburban political system has few incentives to act in anything but the town's self interest."

This brings me to the second issue of metropolitan fragmentation. With fragmentation comes fiscal inequality. Suburban local governments are under immense pressure to provide high-quality services at low tax rates (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2004). Poor, declining inner-ring suburbs are in an inescapable dilemma. Their ability to generate revenue is weakened by a drop in local income levels, property values, and, in some instances, a loss in population. Yet these suburbs also have increased service-provision costs, because their proportion of low-income residents has increased (Pack 1998). The overall result is a lack of fiscal strength. This lack of capacity impacts local tax rates. A poor tax base typically necessitates the assessment of higher local taxes to generate enough revenue.[3] Also, poor fiscal health results in a decline in the quality of local service provision. For instance, take Robbins, an inner-ring suburb of Chicago. This poor, declining suburb went completely bankrupt and was forced to lay off its entire workforce for a few weeks or more in 1987 just to replenish the government coffers. Local services were provided by volunteers who received token vouchers for free meals in local restaurants as small compensation. Robbins is an extreme example of the effects of

[3]In the case of the Baltimore region, for instance, Baltimore City—the jurisdiction with the highest rate of low-income residents among the five counties in the region—also had the highest property-tax rate in 2006 (Baltimore Metropolitan Council 2006).

acute poverty in a small inner-ring suburb. But it still holds true that, with less tax revenue, schools and most local services in declining inner-ring suburbs suffer, as do the suburbs' competitiveness within their metropolitan regions. Declining inner-ring suburbs become less and less attractive as places to live. The "push factors" of deteriorating schools and poor services combined with relatively high tax rates encourage further population loss, particularly of any remaining high-income families. This situation is a major dilemma for declining inner-ring suburbs.

Summary Comments

The housing stock in many aging inner-ring suburbs is outdated and requires capital for remodeling and revitalization. However, the real estate industry, developers, and lending institutions have more incentive to develop pristine greenfield sites than to redevelop older inner-ring suburban communities. Relying on the private market to revamp and to revitalize older inner-ring communities is insufficient, particularly in areas that are economically depressed and where redevelopment is most risky.

The changing suburban demography is greatly impacting inner-ring suburbs. Immigrants and nonwhites are often excluded from higher-income suburbs and can only afford to live in vulnerable inner-ring suburbs. Many inner-ring suburbs in crisis are minority suburbs. Some were also once the home of heavy industry, especially those in the Northeast and the Midwest. The shift from manufacturing to a more service-based economy has led to the decline of many suburbs on the borders of such cities as Baltimore, Detroit, Cleveland, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Chicago. These communities have experienced widespread poverty and extensive decline in income levels.

Add to this mix the issue of metropolitan fragmentation. The political fragmentation of metropolitan areas ensures that suburbs compete, each trying to attract and to keep wealthy taxpayers and, at the same time, to minimize decline. Declining inner-ring suburbs are at a disadvantage. Losing fiscal strength, the battle for investment resources, and political power, these suburbs are on a continual spiral of decline as suburbs farther out continue to grow.

5

Sidestepping Inner-Ring Suburbs

Highland Park is an inner-ring suburb of Detroit. It was developed in the early 1900s, when the Ford Motor Company opened the first assembly line for the mass production of the Model T automobile. The Model T promoted national suburban expansion, and Highland Park excelled. Its population catapulted in its early years, growing from a mere 4,120 in 1910 to an astounding 46,599 by 1920. Then Ford closed its production plant in the 1950s, and Highland Park started to lose residents. In 1940, the population was around 50,000. By 1970, it had declined to about 35,000. Population loss continued, especially after the Chrysler Corporation's world headquarters left the suburb in the 1980s. In 1980, Highland Park had about 28,000 residents, 60 percent of the number who lived there in 1920. By 2000, the population had dropped to about 16,700, a decline of more than 11,000 people. Highland Park lost about 4 out of every 10 residents between 1980 and 2000.

Many of those residents left for greener pastures. They died, moved to other metropolitan areas, or moved to newer suburbs much farther out on Detroit's metropolitan fringe. Not enough people in-migrated to replace those lost. Highland Park was sidestepped, in part bypassed

for Detroit's outer suburbs, which expanded by more than 440,000 residents from 1980 to 2000. These outer suburbs experienced growth, while Highland Park struggled to retain its existing residents.

The story of Highland Park is not unique. It is part of a larger story of population loss and stagnation among many inner-ring suburbs, especially those surrounding struggling cities, such as Detroit. It is also a story that contrasts with the tremendous expansion of outer suburbs. This chapter documents changes in population among the cities, inner-ring suburbs, and outer suburbs of the top one hundred most-populated metropolitan areas in the United States from 1980 to 2000.[1] In each metropolitan area, outer suburbs grew enormously during this time period. Inner-ring suburbs grew to a far lesser extent, if they grew at all. At one time, cities were abandoned for their adjacent suburbs. Now, adjacent suburbs are being abandoned or bypassed for suburbs farther out. This metropolitan growth pattern of continued outward expansion has increased the vulnerability of many inner-ring suburbs to decline.

A Broad Sweep of Population Change

In the first half of the twentieth century, cities reigned supreme as the primary location of metropolitan growth in the United States. Cities were the gravitational centers of economic, cultural, intellectual, and home life for the nation. They were the backbone of the national economy. In 1950, almost two in every three metropolitan residents lived in cities. Since then, circumstances have changed dramatically, and suburbs have grown tremendously. Between 1950 and 1970, the suburban population doubled from thirty-six million to seventy-four million; by the end of the 1970s, suburbs were the dominant home of metropolitan residents (Beauregard 2006). From an analysis of a sample of 4,876 suburbs across the nation, I find that they grew by more than twenty-three million residents between 1980 and 2000. In contrast, the population of their cities increased by 8.1 million people (see Figure 5.1). For every one additional resident in the central cities, the suburbs gained three additional residents.

However, in recent decades, not all suburbs grew. More than four fifths of suburban population growth occurred in outer suburbs, which expanded by almost twenty-one million residents from 1980 to 2000. In contrast,

[1]For definitions of inner-ring suburbs and outer suburbs, see Chapter 2.



FIGURE 5.1 Population change in all suburbs, inner-ring suburbs, and outer suburbs by census region from 1980 to 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

inner-ring suburbs witnessed a substantially smaller population increase of 2.5 million residents. In fact, in the decades between 1980 and 2000, inner-ring suburbs experienced less growth than did their central cities. Half the inner-ring suburbs across the nation lost population, while newer outer suburbs expanded (see Table 5.1). Outer suburbs essentially became the favored sites of development over the two decades, consistently attracting more and more residents. Inner-ring suburbs were in many cases bypassed.

Regional Variation

Beginning in the postwar period, the population largely shifted from cities to suburbs. In particular, the Northeast and the Midwest now possess many suburbs built during the 1950s and 1960s. The prevailing trend in the metropolitan areas of these regions has been continued out-migration to the suburbs. For the Northeast, New York City has acted as a centralizing

TABLE 5.1 POPULATION CHANGE IN THE SUBURBS BY CENSUS REGION FROM 1980 TO 2000

Region	Number of inner-ring suburbs in 1980 and 2000	Inner-ring suburbs with declining population, N (% within region)	Number of outer suburbs in 1980 and 2000	Outer suburbs with declining population, N (% within region)
Northeast	856	385 (45)	286	15 (5)
Midwest	482	338 (70)	585	32 (5)
South	219	93 (42)	785	80 (10)
West	208	39 (19)	384	16 (4)
Total	1,765	855 (48)	2,040	143 (7)

force. This city experienced the most growth of all the central cities in the sample metropolitan areas of this study, increasing by more than 900,000 residents from 1980 to 2000. Without the growth of this city during this period, the total central city population of the Northeast would have declined by more than 200,000 residents. Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Newark, Hartford, and other, smaller cities, such as Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Trenton, New Jersey, all lost population. But, mostly because of growth in New York City, the central city population of the Northeast expanded by about 730,000 residents between 1980 and 2000 (see Figure 5.1).

As a whole, the central cities in the Midwest experienced population loss during this period. In raw numbers, the top city population loser in the Midwest was Detroit, with a loss of more than 250,000 residents. Chicago and St. Louis were next, with population declines of more than 100,000 each, although Chicago did regain some of its losses during the 1990s. Other big population losers were Cleveland, Gary, Flint, and Milwaukee. These cities were all once vital centers of the nation's economy. Many have witnessed a loss in vitality.

The loss of population among cities of the Northeast and the Midwest is well documented.[2] Compared to these cities, the cities of the South and the West greatly expanded between 1980 and 2000. The metropolitan areas of the South and the West are part of what is loosely defined as the Sun Belt region. The Sun Belt is typically associated with suburban growth, and the Sun Belt lifestyle is presumed to be automobile-focused because

[2]It should be noted that these data are from 1980 to 2000. Some cities in the Northeast and the Midwest did make population gains in the 1990s, but they were not enough to return to 1980 population levels. Also, during the 1990s, downtown areas within such cities as Chicago, Cincinnati, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh experienced population growth. For further examination of downtown population growth in the 1990s, see Birch 2005.

of the lack of available public transit and the emphasis on low-density development (Abbott 1987). In many cases, despite the rapid and extensive deconcentration of population, central cities in the Sun Belt region often captured outlying residents and resources through the process of annexation, which, when compared to such activity in the Northeast and the Midwest, stopped relatively recently. Cities in the Sun Belt engulfed their earliest stages of suburban development, in some cases right up until the 1980s (Rusk 1999, 2003; Teaford 1993; Abbott 1987). As a result, central cities in the South and the West have grown and maintained a level of stability despite tremendous population decentralization.

In the South, the central cities of San Antonio, Houston, Austin, and Dallas combined added more than 1.3 million residents between 1980 and 2000. Some of these population gains were offset by the loss of population in such cities as New Orleans; Washington, D.C.; and Norfolk, Virginia. Cities in the West experienced large-scale expansion. In particular, the Californian cities of Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Jose grew tremendously. Also, such cities as Phoenix and Las Vegas exploded in recent decades, each adding more than 530,000 and 313,000, respectively, between 1980 and 2000. Apart from Berkeley, cities in the West expanded and, as a whole, their populations increased by 4.7 million, accounting for more than half of all growth among the sample central cities.

Cities in the Sun Belt region grew but not as much as their suburbs. Suburban growth in the South and the West occurred at a tremendous pace. These regions added eighteen million new residents to their suburbs between 1980 and 2000. The Midwest and the Northeast also experienced suburban growth, but to a far lesser extent.

Across every census region, the outer suburbs expanded much more than inner-ring suburbs. Outer suburbs particularly exploded in the West and the South. Inner-ring suburbs also experienced some growth in these regions. Above other regions, the West gained the most inner-ring suburban residents, and, compared to other regions, few inner-ring suburbs in the West lost population (see Table 5.1). Inner-ring suburbs of the South experienced far less growth.[3]

Inner-ring suburbs of the Midwest experienced population loss, while these areas in the Northeast grew, albeit to a lesser extent than the inner-ring suburbs of the West.

[3]The South had few inner-ring suburbs, as defined by this study.

Some inner-ring suburbs of the Northeast and the Midwest were already built out by 1980, making it difficult to expand these areas. In such instances, population growth should rightly come to a halt and slow down. However, in many cases, the population of inner-ring suburbs actually declined. In fact, the inner-ring suburbs of the Midwest lost a total of 156,000 residents between 1980 and 2000, and the population declined in almost 75 percent of these suburbs. In the case of the Northeast, almost half the inner-ring suburbs declined in population over the two decades. At the same time, outer suburbs in both regions grew, although the Midwest experienced greater outer suburban expansion than did its Rust Belt neighbor, the Northeast.

The Midwest and the West each offer contrasting pictures of inner-ring population change. The Midwest informs us about the dynamics of population decline among inner-ring suburbs. The West, in contrast, provides insight into the nature of inner-suburban growth. Let us look a little closer at both regions.

A Closer Look at the Midwest

Population decline among inner-ring suburbs of the Midwest was often coupled with population decline among many of the region's major cities. Certain cities and inner-ring suburbs hollowed out in many metropolitan areas of the Midwest between 1980 and 2000 (see Table 5.2). In nine out of ten metro areas, more than half the inner-ring suburbs lost population

TABLE 5.2 POPULATION CHANGE IN CITIES AND SUBURBS OF THE METROPOLITAN AREAS IN THE MIDWEST FROM 1980 TO 2000

		Inner-ring suburbs		Outer suburbs	
CMSA	Population change in cities	Number in 1980 and 2000	Suburbs with declining population, N (%)	Number in 1980 and 2000	Suburbs with declining population, N (%)
Chicago	–31,371	111	55 (50)	156	3 (2)
Cincinnati	–48,785	55	36 (65)	43	2 (5)
Cleveland-Akron	–122,129	66	52 (79)	36	0 (0)
Columbus	152,060	17	15 (88)	20	2 (1)
Detroit	–285,585	60	51 (85)	39	1 (3)
Indianapolis	76,102	17	13 (76)	22	1 (5)
Kansas City	36,633	31	22 (71)	54	8 (15)
Milwaukee	–28,602	10	5 (50)	33	0 (0)
Minneapolis–St. Paul	28,588	21	11 (52)	117	2 (2)
St. Louis	–114,971	94	78 (83)	65	13 (20)



FIGURE 5.2 Population change in the cities and suburbs of St. Louis MSA from 1980 to 2000. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

from 1980 to 2000. In five of these nine metro areas, central city population also declined. The cavity of city population loss got bigger, spreading outward to the inner ring. Where the city suffered population decline, so did many of the inner-ring suburbs.

This pattern of city and inner-ring population decline was experienced alongside large-scale outer-edge growth. One example is St. Louis. This metropolitan area had the highest number of inner-ring suburbs that lost population between 1980 and 2000, more than 8 out of every 10. In total, these suburbs lost about 35,000 people. Next to Detroit, St. Louis also lost the greatest number of city residents. At the same time, the outer suburbs of St. Louis experienced growth, increasing by more than 370,000 people. An outward shift from the cities and inner-ring suburbs of St. Louis occurred.

Figure 5.2 is a map of the cities and suburbs in St. Louis where population declined and grew from 1980 to 2000. With a few exceptions, the inner-ring suburbs west of the central city of St. Louis and surrounding East St. Louis lost population, while the outer suburbs toward the metropolitan

fringe expanded. The central cities, with the exception of St. Charles, saw their populations drop. The inner-ring pattern is one of population loss around cities that are also losing population, like a doughnut hole getting bigger as outer suburbs expand. These outer suburbs struggle to build schools, roads, and other public infrastructure, while inner-ring suburbs and cities try to deal with the effects of downsizing.

Other metropolitan areas in the Midwest tell a similar, although less extreme, story. Compared to St. Louis for instance, fewer inner-ring suburbs of Chicago lost population, and the cities experienced less population decline. Figure 5.3 is a map of declining cities and suburbs in the Chicago metropolitan area. Some inner-ring suburbs close to cities in Chicago increased in population. These inner-ring suburbs are primarily adjacent to the northern section of the city of Chicago and along the shore of Lake Michigan, close to the city of North Chicago. Like St. Louis, the pattern is still one of outer suburban expansion, but unlike St. Louis, some suburbs close to cities grew.

Lake Forest is one example. Its population increased from around 15,000 in 1980 to about 20,000 in 2000. Located along Lake Michigan, this suburb began as an enclave for wealthy Chicagoans in the mid-nineteenth century. Famous for the quality of its architecture and landscape planning, Lake Forest has managed over the past century and a half to maintain a certain status among the suburbs of northern Chicago (Ebner 1988). This suburb certainly did not grow to the extent of many outer suburbs in the Chicago area; the high property values and status of this suburb kept out many who could not afford to live there. However, unlike other inner-ring suburbs, Lake Forest did not lose population. It is still a desirable location for well-off families who wish to be close to the city and yet live in a tranquil and scenic settlement. Many young families live there, with almost 40 percent of households including children under eighteen years old in 2000. This suburb is renowned for having some of the best schools in the metropolitan area.

Like Lake Forest, Lemay, outside the city of St. Louis, is also an old inner-ring suburb but, unlike Lake Forest, it lost more than 18,000 between 1980 and 2000. Lemay is old in terms of people *and* development. Twenty percent of the population of Lemay was age sixty-five and older in 2000, and Lemay struggles to attract a younger cohort. Only a quarter of households in this inner-ring suburb had children under eighteen years old. Younger families in St. Louis tend to live in outer suburbs, such as O'Fallon.



FIGURE 5.3 Population change in the cities and suburbs of Chicago CMSA from 1980 to 2000. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places in the Chicago CMSA; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

O'Fallon added more than 37,000 people from 1980 to 2000, and, in contrast to Lemay, only 9 percent of the population was age sixty-five and older in 2000. Forty percent of households in this outer suburb included children age eighteen and younger in 2000. These younger families bypassed Lemay.

Lemay is not unusual among inner-ring suburbs of St. Louis. In seventeen of ninety-four suburbs of St. Louis, more than one in five residents was age sixty-five and older in 2000, and many of these suburbs had few families with children. Examples include Sappington, Oakland,

Shrewsbury, and St. George. These inner-ring suburbs developed before 1970, and remaining residents are aging in place. The aging population was combined with few young in-migrants, a classic problem for some inner-ring suburbs in the Midwest.

Another issue is the loss of industry among inner-ring suburbs and the growth of employment centers farther out. Hammond is an old suburb located between the cities of Chicago and Gary. It has a long history, incorporating in the late nineteenth century as a meatpacking town. It was named after George Hammond, pioneer of the refrigerated railcar and a major figure in the growth of the meatpacking industry in the Chicago region. Hammond was an integral part of Chicago's industrial history and an important center for the manufacture of steel and petroleum products, chemicals, soaps, and machinery and transportation equipment. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the industrial and commercial base of this suburb began to decline, particularly with the erosion of steel and subsidiary industries throughout the Midwest. Hammond, along with the central city of Gary immediately to the east, is described as a "classic deindustrializing center," characterized by declining manufacturing employment and decreasing population (Negrey and Zickel 1994). From 1980 to 2000, the population of Hammond declined by more than 10,000 people, a loss of more than one in ten residents.

Hammond contrasts with the outer suburb of Schaumburg, also in the Chicago metropolitan area. This suburb has been identified as a major employment center (McDonald and Prather 1994). Close to O'Hare International Airport, Schaumburg has a large manufacturing base. It is also home to the Woodfield Mall, the largest shopping mall in the Chicago metropolitan area, and Motorola's headquarters are located there. According to John McDonald and Paul Prather (1994: 209), "Schaumburg has a wide diversity of employment." This suburb has seen its population grow in recent decades; from 1980 to 2000, Schaumburg's population increased from about 53,000 to more than 75,000. Old, industrial suburbs, such as Hammond, have lost people and jobs to outer suburbs, such as Schaumburg. In the once heavily industrial Midwest, this is a classic problem for old, industrial suburbs located in the inner ring.

In general, inner-ring suburbs in the Midwest are unable to attract young families, and many of the area's older suburbs were once integral to the industrial base of the region. The impact of deindustrialization on central cities is well understood, but similar effects can be now seen in

inner-ring suburbs that relied on heavy manufacturing. The shift of employment and capital investment to outer suburbs of the Midwest has left inner-ring suburbs behind.

The West Tells Another Tale

Population decline is not always a feature of inner-ring suburbs. Some inner-ring suburbs expanded between 1980 and 2000, and many of these were in the West. As Table 5.3 indicates, a total of 169, or 75 percent, of inner-ring suburbs in the West grew between 1980 and 2000. About 1.3 million residents were added to these areas. Their expansion is not as significant as that of outer suburbs, but they grew to a much larger extent than inner-ring suburbs in other regions.

This population growth was largely driven by an increase in the immigrant population. Growing inner-ring suburbs in the West added a total of 1.3 million immigrants from 1980 to 2000. In each metropolitan area, the immigrant population increased significantly among inner-ring suburbs, especially in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, and Denver. Los Angeles in particular stands out. The immigrant population of growing inner-ring suburbs of this metro area grew by more than 970,000 between 1980 and 2000. The top five growing inner-ring suburbs of Los Angeles were Pomona, Glendale, Garden Grove, El Monte, and South Gate. Combined, these suburbs grew by more than 220,000 residents, and, during the same period, the number of immigrants increased by about 290,000. These suburbs grew because their immigrant population grew.

TABLE 5.3 IMMIGRANT POPULATION CHANGE FROM 1980 TO 2000 AMONG INNER-RING SUBURBS IN THE WEST WHERE THE POPULATION INCREASED DURING THIS SAME PERIOD

CMSA	Number of inner-ring suburbs with increasing population, 1980–2000	Inner-ring suburban population increase	Immigrant population increase in inner-ring suburbs	Immigrant population increase as percentage of total population increase
Denver	7	9,607	8,270	86
Los Angeles	97	949,450	976,845	103
Portland	3	4,805	1,148	24
Sacramento	6	54,951	32,138	58
Salt Lake City	2	12,512	3,608	29
San Francisco	41	285,279	265,190	93
Seattle	13	47,453	16,351	34
Total	169	1,364,057	1,303,550	96

In terms of population change, such inner-ring suburbs as Garden Grove and Glendale differ considerably from such inner-ring suburbs as Lemay in St. Louis. Lemay is struggling to retain residents and to attract young families; however, Garden Grove and Glendale are being transformed by in-coming immigrants. Immigration to these inner-ring suburbs has changed their local economies, political structures, and physical space. Ethnic restaurants have opened, churches have been built and transformed, school demographics have changed dramatically, and different local leaders have emerged. The futures of such inner-ring suburbs as Garden Grove and Glendale are distinctly tied to the futures of their immigrant populations.

Immigration and Inner-Ring Suburbs

Even beyond the West, some inner-ring suburbs would not have grown without an inflow of immigrants. Figure 5.4 demonstrates how the trend of population change among a random sample of inner-ring suburbs across the nation was often in rhythm with changes in the immigrant population from 1980 to 2000.



FIGURE 5.4 Change in the number of residents and the number of immigrants in a random sample of inner-ring suburbs from 1980 to 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

Population growth among inner-ring suburbs was often infused with spiked increases in the population of immigrants, and where population declined, the number of immigrants was little changed, in most cases. With some exceptions, those inner-ring suburbs where population stagnated experienced minor inflow of immigrants.

Large-scale immigrant population growth among inner-ring suburbs tended to occur in metropolitan areas of the West. However, in other regions, some inner-ring suburbs gained population and many immigrants. Waukegan, along the lakefront near North Chicago, is a prime example. This suburb added a staggering 20,248 new residents from 1980 to 2000. During this same period, the immigrant population expanded by more than 19,000. By 2000, 30 percent of the population was foreign born, and the overwhelming majority of these immigrants were Latin American. The suburbs around Washington, D.C., have also seen an increase in the number of immigrants (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). For instance, the immigrant population of Lincolnia in Fairfax County, Virginia, expanded by more than 6,000 from 1980 to 2000, and the total population increased by about 5,400 residents.

On the other end of the spectrum were such suburbs as Darby Township, outside Philadelphia. This suburb experienced a population loss of more than 2,600 residents between 1980 and 2000. The immigrant population grew by only 30 people. In Glenwood, in Chicago, the population declined by 1,500 residents, and the immigrant population similarly dropped by 244 people. In a few cases, the population of an inner-ring suburb declined while the immigrant population increased, but more often than not inner-ring suburbs that grew also grew in the number of immigrant residents.

In Baltimore City, during Mayor Martin O'Malley's administration, there was a push to attract immigrants to the city to offset population loss. Baltimore City, like many other U.S. cities, has continually lost population since 1950. The inflow of immigrants was encouraged by the O'Malley administration as a strategy to steady this population loss and to revitalize declining inner-city neighborhoods. Immigrants were seen as an energizing force, with the ability to change the city. Suburban governments often have a different perspective on the impact of immigration. Immigration has been fraught with resistance from a number of suburban communities. In Waukegan, for instance, the local government considered police officer training to initiate deportation for illegal immigrants. This proposal was met with strong protest from the local immigrant community.

Laws concerning day-labor sites, language, rental housing, and law enforcement have been introduced by local suburban governments across the country. These laws attempt to either curb immigration or to drive immigrants out. In the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, the suburbs of Prince William County in Virginia were recently caught up in a controversy about illegal immigration. County officials advocated checking the immigration status of anyone using public services, such as schools, libraries, and swimming pools. They pushed to pass a bill requiring police to check the residency status of anyone suspected of breaking the law and to ask people about their immigration statuses during routine traffic stops. These stringent measures were criticized by many, including officials from neighboring suburban counties. Many from Fairfax County, Virginia, refused to follow Prince William County in their attempts to clamp down on the immigrant community. Politically, suburbs are struggling with their newfound source of growth as immigrants settle within their jurisdictional boundaries.

Summary Comments

The metropolitan population profoundly shifted away from central cities and inner-ring suburbs to outer suburbs between 1980 and 2000. Nationwide, inner-ring suburbs scrambled for additional residents, while the outer suburbs grew and sprawled to the metropolitan edge. Many inner-ring suburbs found it difficult to attract young families, causing their population to age without incoming young families to breathe new life into these areas. This reality has profound consequences for the vitality and stability of these suburbs.

Above other regions, the Midwest's inner-ring communities dwindled in size. Some of these inner-ring suburbs were once industrial centers that have subsequently lost jobs and people to large employment centers farther out. Such inner-ring communities as Highland Park in Detroit and Hammond in Chicago are prime examples. Particularly in the inner-ring suburbs of the West, immigration staved off population loss. Such inner-ring suburbs as Glendale and Garden Grove in Los Angeles grew largely because of the inflow of immigrants. Population growth among inner-ring suburbs across the nation was inextricably tied to immigration. Rather than seeing immigrants as a source of revitalization, however, many suburban communities struggle to accept the changing demographics.

6
Declining Inner-Ring Suburbs

Trayce Davis lives in a suburb within Cook County, Illinois. She also lives in poverty. "We live in the suburbs, [but] it means nothing. It's just a word," Davis says. "We are here struggling just like everybody else, and wow, man, it devastated me for a minute. I was like, I live in the suburbs. I moved away from the city to get some help, but the struggle goes on." In a recent article in the *Daily Herald* newspaper, Davis describes how, despite her job, she and her family struggle to barely make the rent each month (Krone 2008). Davis's story was prompted by a new report on poverty in Illinois that found that, in 2006, approximately 367,000 residents of suburban Cook, Lake, DuPage, Kane, and McHenry counties were living in poverty. The suburbs have always had a certain number of poor residents, but in recent decades these numbers have increased. In 2006, the suburbs of Chicago accounted for 42 percent of the region's poor, up from only 24 percent in 1980 (Krone 2008). Problems of increasing poverty and declining income are now documented as part of suburban living. This chapter examines changes in poverty and income among the suburbs of the top one hundred most-populated metropolitan areas, in part to discern the nature of these changes among inner-ring as well as outer suburbs.

TABLE 6.1 PERCENTAGE OF SUBURBAN RESIDENTS LIVING IN POVERTY BY CENSUS REGION, 1980 AND 2000

	All suburbs		Inner-ring suburbs		Outer suburbs	
Region	1980	2000	1980	2000	1980	2000
United States	7.2	8.1	9.1	9.0	6.8	7.3
Northeast	6.8	6.9	6.7	7.0	5.8	5.1
Midwest	5.3	5.8	5.6	7.4	4.2	4.0
South	8.4	9.1	8.0	11.2	8.0	8.3
West	8.8	10.0	10.1	13.0	7.6	8.5

New Suburban Poverty

There were 6.1 million suburban residents living in poverty in 2000, an increase from 3.7 million in 1980. Of those suburbanites living in poverty in 2000, 2.8 million were living in inner-ring suburbs, and 2.9 million were in the outer suburbs.[1] Between 1980 and 2000, the number of inner-ring suburban residents living in poverty increased by more than 800,000. The outer suburbs added about 1.6 million poor residents during the same period. Suburbs, long associated with the outward movement of the middle class, have become the location for poor people as well. As the suburbs grew—particularly the outer suburbs—so did the number of poor suburbanites.

Poor suburban residents increased not just in raw numbers but also as a proportion of the total suburban population. As Table 6.1 indicates, the poverty rate among suburbs rose from 7.2 percent to 8.1 percent from 1980 to 2000. On aggregate, the poverty rate among inner-ring suburbs remained practically unchanged from 1980 to 2000, although poverty rates were higher among these suburbs than among the outer suburbs both years.

Beyond the national aggregate, poverty rose in the inner-ring suburbs of different census regions. In the Midwest and the Northeast, poverty among inner-ring suburbs increased, while poverty among outer suburbs declined or remained unchanged between 1980 and 2000. The poverty gap between inner-ring and outer suburbs increased over time in the Northeast and the Midwest.

The South and the West had relatively high rates of suburban poverty in both decades, even among their outer suburbs. However, poverty in these regions was still higher in inner-ring rather than in outer suburbs in

[1]The remaining half million resided in older outer suburbs.

TABLE 6.2 NUMBER OF SUBURBS BY CENSUS REGION WHERE THE POVERTY RATE INCREASED FROM 1980 TO 2000

	Inner-ring suburbs		Outer suburbs	
Region	Number of suburbs, 1980–2000	Suburbs with increasing poverty rates, N (% within region)	Number of suburbs, 1980–2000	Suburbs with increasing poverty rates, N (% within region)
United States	1,765	1,044 (59)	2,040	909 (45)
Northeast	856	421 (49)	286	69 (24)
Midwest	482	339 (70)	585	256 (44)
South	219	149 (68)	785	405 (52)
West	208	135 (65)	384	179 (47)

2000. About one in every nine residents of the South's inner-ring suburbs lived in poverty that year. In the West, the rate was more than one in every eight residents. As with the Northeast and the Midwest, the difference in poverty between inner-ring and outer suburbs grew. In each census region, poverty was more pronounced among inner-ring than outer suburbs in 2000, and the poverty-rate increase was greater among inner-ring than outer suburbs between 1980 and 2000.

Table 6.2 shows the number of suburbs that experienced poverty increases in the different census regions. Six in every ten inner-ring suburbs, compared to about four in every ten outer suburbs, increased in poverty between 1980 and 2000. In general, the increase in inner-ring suburban poverty was more widespread in the Northeast and the Midwest than in the South and the West. Of the 1,040 inner-ring suburbs where poverty increased between 1980 and 2000, 760 (or 73 percent) were located in Rust Belt metropolitan areas of the Northeast and the Midwest. Of the 909 outer suburbs where poverty increased from 1980 to 2000, 584 (or 64 percent) were located in the Sun Belt region of the South and the West. Inner-ring suburban poverty is a problem for the Rust Belt; outer suburban poverty is more of a problem for the Sun Belt. However, questions still remain over the extent and nature of the poverty increase among these individual suburbs, inner ring and outer. Therefore, I examine in greater depth poverty in inner-ring suburbs and then in the outer suburbs.

Poverty in the Inner Ring

Figure 6.1 includes four scatter plots demonstrating the relationship between inner-ring suburbs' poverty rate in 1980 and their poverty rate in 2000. One scatter plot represents each census region. Each dot on the



FIGURE 6.1 Scatter plots for each census region that compare the poverty rates among inner-ring suburbs in 1980 to the poverty rates among inner-ring suburbs in 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

different plots represents an inner-ring suburb. These plots demonstrate at least three distinct trends, each outlined in the following sections.

Low Poverty among Inner-Ring Suburbs

Many inner-ring suburbs had poverty rates far below 10 percent, or even 5 percent, in 1980 and 2000, especially in the Northeast and the Midwest. This is indicated by the clustering of inner-ring suburbs in the lower left-hand corner of the charts in Figure 6.1. Many inner-ring suburbs had low poverty rates in 1980 and maintained low poverty rates up to 2000. In fact, of the 1,765 inner-ring suburbs that existed from 1980 to 2000, 1,338 (or 76 percent) had poverty rates below 10 percent in 2000, and 804 (or 46 percent) had poverty rates below 5 percent the same year. So, although on aggregate suburban poverty is on the rise, the extent of poverty among individual inner-ring suburbs was often quite low.

In the Northeast and the Midwest in particular, the location of the metropolitan poor has largely remained concentrated in central city neighborhoods. Many of the suburban poor are scattered and not necessarily clustered in specific suburbs.[2] More than eight out of every ten inner-ring suburbs where the poverty rate was 5 percent or less in 2000 were located in the Midwest and the Northeast. Meanwhile, poverty rates for central cities hovered at around 21 percent in the Northeast and 18 percent in the Midwest. So, although poverty rose in many inner-ring suburbs, in many cases, it did not rise to extreme levels and, in most cases, not to levels higher than those of central city poverty.

Some High-Poverty Inner-Ring Suburbs

However, some inner-ring suburbs did show high levels of poverty in 2000, more than did in 1980. I term "high poverty" those suburbs where more than 20 percent of the population lived in poverty.[3] Figure 6.2 charts the percentage of high-poverty inner-ring suburbs in each region. The proportion of high-poverty inner-ring suburbs increased in every region from 1980 to 2000, reaching the highest proportions in the South and the West. Poverty extremes rose in the inner ring.

The South's high-poverty inner-ring suburbs were largely composed of poor, non-Hispanic blacks and immigrants in 1980 and 2000 (see Table 6.3). About half were located in the Miami metro region. Examples include such inner-ring suburbs as Gladeview, Pinewood, North Miami, and Opa-locka. The South's high-poverty or close-to-high-poverty, nonwhite inner-ring suburbs in 1980 were typically higher poverty and more minority by 2000. For instance, in 1980, more than eight out of every ten residents of Gladeview were non-Hispanic blacks, and more than a third were living in poverty. By 2000, half the population of Gladeview lived in poverty, and almost three-quarters of the population were non-Hispanic blacks. It was not just any inner-ring suburb that had high levels of poverty by 2000—it was nonwhite inner-ring suburbs that had already been struggling.

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[2]For details on city versus suburban poverty, see Jargowsky 2003.

[3]The mean poverty rate was about 7 percent and the standard deviation was about 6 percent for the suburbs that existed between 1980 and 2000. A suburb was defined as "high poverty" if its poverty rate was more than two standard deviations from the mean poverty rate in 2000. A suburb was therefore defined as "high poverty" if its poverty rate was about 20 percent.



FIGURE 6.2 Percentage of inner-ring suburbs by census region categorized as high poverty in 1980 and 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

In other regions, high-poverty inner-ring suburbs were also composed largely of nonwhites. Compared to the South, high-poverty inner-ring suburbs in the West had a higher proportion of Hispanics and immigrants and fewer non-Hispanic blacks. On average, two-thirds of the residents of the West's high-poverty inner-ring suburbs were Hispanic in 2000. Almost one in every four was an immigrant. The overwhelming majority of these high-poverty suburbs were located in Los Angeles. A classic example is Cudahy, located in southeastern Los Angeles County. About 29 percent of the population of this suburb lived in poverty in 1980 and 2000. About seven out of every ten residents were Hispanic, and a third of the population was foreign born in 1980. By 2000, nine out of every ten residents were Hispanic, and half the population was foreign born. Cudahy is a poor, largely immigrant suburb that became poorer between 1980 and 2000.

High-poverty inner-ring suburbs in the Midwest and the Northeast had fewer immigrants. Most were composed largely of non-Hispanic blacks. In the case of the Midwest, on average, half the population of these suburbs was non-Hispanic black in 1980, increasing to almost 70 percent by 2000.

TABLE 6.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR HIGH-POVERTY INNER-RING SUBURBS

Average percentage	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Population that was in poverty, 1980	20	22	18	20
Population that was in poverty, 2000	26	31	27	27
Working-age population that was not in the labor force, 1980	47	44	38	39
Working-age population that was not in the labor force, 2000	46	45	43	45
Working-age population that was unemployed, 1980	11	19	9	17
Working-age population that was unemployed, 2000	10	15	11	12
Workers who were in manufacturing, 1980	34	30	15	33
Workers who were in manufacturing, 2000	15	17	11	21
Population that was white, 1980	71	41	55	34
Population that was white, 2000	49	25	25	14
Population that was black, 1980	19	57	32	20
Population that was black, 2000	31	69	47	14
Population that was other, 1980	1	1	1	4
Population that was other, 2000	4	3	3	7
Population that was Hispanic, 1980	8	2	12	42
Population that was Hispanic, 2000	17	3	25	66
Population that was immigrant, 1980	10	3	12	25
Population that was immigrant, 2000	14	3	25	39

The Northeast's high-poverty suburbs experienced widespread social change over the two decades. The population of these areas dropped from almost 75 percent white in 1980 to 50 percent white in 2000. The racial and ethnic composition of these areas was transformed largely as a result of the in-migration of Hispanic immigrants and non-Hispanic blacks.

Almost half the Midwest's high-poverty inner-ring suburbs were located in St. Louis, and the rest were mainly in Detroit and Chicago. East St. Louis is an excellent example, as is Ford Heights in Chicago. In Ford Heights, 38 percent of the population was in poverty in 1980. This rate increased to 49 percent by 2000. Previously known as East Chicago Heights, Ford Heights incorporated in 1949. In its early history, it was once composed of middle-class blacks, with a smattering of poor black families. In more recent years, it has witnessed socioeconomic decline and a loss in population, particularly of middle-income families. In 1987, it changed its name to Ford Heights in an attempt to change its reputation and to attract more well-to-do tax payers. This inner-ring suburb is a poor black suburb that has been left behind by outward expansion in the Chicago metropolitan

area. In the Midwest, close-to-high-poverty black suburbs became blacker and poorer by 2000.

Aside from being composed of already-struggling, nonwhite residents in 1980, high-poverty inner-ring suburbs also had widespread underemployment at that time, and, in the case of the Midwest and the Northeast, manufacturing employment declined between 1980 and 2000. In all regions, about four out of every ten residents of working age were not in the labor market in 1980 or 2000. Surely some of these residents either gave up searching for employment or were working in low-wage jobs in the informal economy. This unemployment rate combined with a loss of manufacturing jobs in the Midwest and the Northeast resulted in extreme poverty among some inner-ring suburbs. These high-poverty suburbs had distinct characteristics not unlike the poorest inner-city neighborhoods. Generally moving toward high poverty in 1980, these inner-ring suburbs became poorer over the course of the next two decades.

Dramatic Poverty Increases in Some Low-Poverty Inner-Ring Suburbs

A few low-poverty inner-ring suburbs experienced profound increases in poverty between 1980 and 2000. This trend is indicated by those suburbs low on the y-axis but farther to the right on the x-axis in Figure 6.1. These suburbs had fairly low poverty rates in 1980 but had much higher levels of poverty in 2000. An example is Latonia Lakes, outside Cincinnati. The poverty rate of this inner-ring suburb was 7 percent in 1980, which increased to 24 percent by 2000. I found twenty inner-ring suburbs where the poverty rate was less than 10 percent in 1980 but increased by 10 percent or more before 2000,[4] therefore being reclassified from low to high poverty. Half these suburbs were located in the Midwest, and seven were in St. Louis alone. Another two were located in the Northeast, one was in Pittsburgh, and the other was in Philadelphia. Many of these blue-collar suburbs saw manufacturing employment decline on a dramatic scale, including Dixmoor outside Chicago, Trainer outside Philadelphia,

[4]There were twenty-four in total, but four of these suburbs had very small populations (fewer than two hundred residents in 1980), which exaggerated the poverty-rate changes from 1980 to 2000.

Versailles outside Pittsburgh, and Riverview outside St. Louis. In the case of Riverview, for instance, the poverty rate increased from 6 percent in 1980 to 17 percent in 2000. During the same period, manufacturing employment declined from 34 percent to 14 percent of total employment. Combined with this labor-market change, the suburb lost four out of every ten white residents, and the black population increased from 3 percent to 39 percent between 1980 and 2000. Once stable, the older working-class suburb of Riverview and other similar suburbs in the Northeast and the Midwest underwent tremendous socioeconomic change in a couple of decades.

The change from low poverty to much higher levels of poverty occurred in eight inner-ring suburbs in the South and the West. Typically, these suburbs experienced substantial growth in the number of foreign-born residents; the population of these suburbs grew, but mostly because of an in-migration of primarily Hispanic immigrants. This population shift occurred in the inner-ring suburbs of Alondra Park and Hawthorne in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, West Sacramento in Yolo, and North Miami Beach in Miami. Poorer immigrants entered these inner-ring communities in recent decades, typically working in low-wage jobs in the service sector. The social status of these suburbs changed dramatically as a result. Thomas Cooke and Sarah Marchant (2006) similarly find an increase in high-poverty neighborhoods among inner-ring suburbs of metropolitan areas in California and other Sun Belt states because of rapid growth in the immigrant population.

Declining Outer Suburbs

Many outer suburbs experienced increased poverty, particularly those in the South and the West. Figure 6.3 includes four scatter plots demonstrating the relationship between outer suburbs' poverty rates in 1980 and their poverty rates in 2000. One scatter plot represents each census region. For the Northeast and the Midwest, the pattern shows that the overwhelming majority of outer suburbs had fairly low poverty rates in 1980 and 2000. In the South and the West, the pattern is much more unpredictable, and, although there were many low-poverty outer suburbs in these regions, poverty rates randomly declined and increased over the course of the two decades.



FIGURE 6.3 Scatter plots for each census region that compare the poverty rates among outer suburbs in 1980 to the poverty rates among outer suburbs in 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

Many immigrants settled in outer suburbs of the metropolitan areas of the South and the West, often bypassing cities in search of low-wage employment on the metropolitan fringe. The decentralization of jobs cleaning homes, landscaping suburban subdivisions, and working in expansive strip malls and office parks has resulted in poverty spreading to fast-growing new outer suburbs. In some cases, poverty fluctuated with the influx of migrant workers into outlying areas. Although rapidly developing, some of the South's and the West's unincorporated fringe suburbs were still largely farming communities where poor laborers from Mexico and other parts of Latin America in-migrated for seasonal work. In other outer suburbs, immigrants worked in the service sector.

An analysis of the suburbs of Los Angeles demonstrates these trends. In Los Angeles, poverty increased in a higher proportion of outer suburbs than inner-ring suburbs. According to my analysis, eight in every ten of the outer suburbs of Los Angeles experienced an increase in poverty.



FIGURE 6.4 Suburbs in the Los Angeles CMSA where poverty increased and declined from 1980 to 2000. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places in the Los Angeles CMSA; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

Figure 6.4 is a map of suburbs that shows increasing and declining poverty in Los Angeles. Suburban poverty increase was widespread throughout the metropolitan area. The suburbs that were high poverty in 2000 are mostly located south of the central city of Los Angeles, and the majority is located in the inner ring.

However, poverty definitely increased in a smattering of outer suburbs, in some cases to very high levels. The percentage of immigrants in these suburbs doubled from 1980 to 2000, with the addition of almost 750,000 foreign-born residents. Some entered poor and now work in low-wage jobs or for large corporate agricultural operations. An example is the outer suburb of Coachella. Between 1980 and 2000, the proportion of immigrants in Coachella jumped from 28 percent to 48 percent of the population. During the same period, the poverty rate increased from 20 percent to 29 percent. Coachella is a tremendously fast-growing suburb in the Riverside–San Bernadino metropolitan area that is still predominately agricultural. Migrant workers and other Latinos entered Coachella to work in the suburb's large farms and fruit groves.



FIGURE 6.5 Percentage of outer suburbs by census region categorized as high poverty in 1980 and 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

In the West, the proportion of high-poverty outer suburbs increased between 1980 and 2000 (see Figure 6.5). This was the only census region where this occurred. More than a third of the population of the West's high-poverty outer suburbs was Hispanic, and an additional 22 percent was Asian or part of some other ethnic group. More than 16 percent was foreign born. Compared to the high-poverty suburbs in the West's inner ring, those in fringe areas had few non-Hispanic blacks. Poor African Americans lived closer to city neighborhoods rather than in suburbs farther out. As with high-poverty inner-ring suburbs, most high-poverty outer suburbs in the West were located in Los Angeles, and a substantial number was in Phoenix.

The South also had a considerable number of high-poverty outer suburbs. These suburbs were similar in ethnic, racial, and class composition to the region's high-poverty inner-ring suburbs. On average, the population of the South's high-poverty outer suburbs was 35 percent non-Hispanic black and 17 percent Hispanic in 2000. One in every ten residents of these suburbs was foreign born that same year. Their average poverty rate was 20 percent or more in 1980. These high-poverty suburbs remained high

poverty into 2000. They were also fairly evenly spread between the metropolitan areas of Miami, Houston, Dallas, New Orleans, Tampa, and Atlanta. As with the high-poverty inner-ring suburbs, the poor, nonwhite outer suburbs became poorer over time.

The Midwest and the Northeast only had a few high-poverty outer suburbs. High poverty was more of an inner-ring suburban than outer suburban problem in most metropolitan areas of these regions. Exceptions to this trend in the Midwest were the metropolitan areas of Cincinnati, Kansas City, and Minneapolis, where no inner-ring suburbs were high poverty and a total of eight outer suburbs were high poverty in 2000. In the case of the Northeast, only nine outer suburbs were high poverty, five of which were in the New York area. These high-poverty outer suburbs were old rather than newly developing communities. In the case of New York, two of these suburbs were long-standing Jewish settlements. One was Lakewood, New Jersey, a hub for Orthodox Jews, who make up about half the population. The other, New Square, has been a Hasidic Jewish suburban community for more than sixty years.

The high-poverty outer suburbs of the Midwest and the Northeast were generally preexisting, poor communities, the majority of which were built in the 1950s and 1960s. In comparison, many of the high-poverty outer suburbs in the South and the West were fast-growing communities where the proliferation of low-wage jobs attracted newly arriving immigrants and Hispanics.

Summary of Suburban Poverty Trends

Suburban poverty increased from 1980 to 2000. In many cases, however, the suburban poverty increase was fairly minimal. This was especially true among suburbs in the Northeast and the Midwest. Suburbs that were high poverty, particularly in these two regions, tended to be inner-ring suburbs rather than outer. The proportion of high-poverty inner-ring suburbs was greater than the proportion of high-poverty outer suburbs in most metropolitan areas. In addition, there was a distinct trend where those suburbs that were heading toward high poverty in 1980 did become poorer by 2000. These were typically nonwhite suburbs, and inner-ring and outer suburbs alike were affected. In essence, many of the suburbs that started out behind in 1980 fell farther behind over the course of the next two decades.

A Suburban Dichotomy

So far, I have examined the spatial distribution of the suburban poor by examining census data on poverty. The U.S. Bureau of the Census utilizes a set of thresholds to determine if an individual or a family is living in poverty. These thresholds vary by the size of the family and the age of the family members. An individual under age sixty-five was living in poverty in 2000 if he or she earned $10,294 or less that year. The thresholds are adjusted for inflation each year, but thresholds do not vary geographically. The measures used to define these thresholds were developed more than forty years ago and are derived from data on what portion of a family's or an individual's income is spent on food.

The federal definition of poverty has been criticized as a measure that undercounts the number of poor people in the nation. An expert panel from the National Academy of Sciences recently suggested the definition of poverty is outdated, because it does not take into consideration rising expenditures on such necessities as shelter and utilities (Garner and Short 2008). One major problem with the federal standard of poverty is that it does not factor in the variation in cost of living across different metropolitan areas. An individual earning $10,294 or less will struggle more in a place like New York City than in Memphis, Tennessee, but the federal definition of poverty does not account for this discrepancy.

Therefore, I use income as a measure to identify poor as well as affluent suburbs. More specifically, I use a measure of relative income, taking into consideration a suburb's status in relation to other suburbs in the same metropolitan area. This relative measure offers a means of comparison as well as takes into consideration the cost of living and other metropolitan effects. I determine relative income by calculating the median household income ratio for each suburb. This is a measure of the median household income of each suburb relative to the median household income of the suburbs as a whole, expressed as a ratio. *The State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000,* from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, contains a variable for the suburban median household income for each metropolitan area in 1980 and 2000. This variable allows for comparison between the median household incomes of each suburb in a specific metropolitan area and the suburban median household income of that same metropolitan area. A ratio of more than 1.0 means a suburb's median household income is higher than the suburban median household income

in the metropolitan area where the suburb is located. A ratio less than 1.0 means the median household income of a suburb is lower than the suburban median household income.

Using median household income ratios, I identify a poor suburb as one with a median household income ratio of 0.75 or below in a given year. This means that the median household income of a poor suburb was 25 percent below the suburban median household income in the metropolitan area where this suburb was located. I identify an affluent suburb as a suburb with a median household income ratio of 1.25 or above, 25 percent above the suburban median household income in the metropolitan area where this suburb was located.[5]

Using these measures, I identify 206 poor inner-ring suburbs nationwide in 1980, increasing to 360 by 2000. The number of affluent inner-ring suburbs was 395 in 1980, dropping to 394 in 2000. There were 377 poor outer suburbs in 1980 and 2000. The number of affluent outer suburbs increased from 367 in 1980 to 488 in 2000.[6] In short, the number of poor suburbs in the inner ring increased, and the number of affluent suburbs on the outer fringes increased. This reflects a new, emerging suburban dichotomy between poor inner-ring suburbs and affluent outer suburbs.

In 1980, a total of 3.3 million suburban residents were living in poor inner-ring suburbs. This number rose to 6.2 million residents by 2000, a total of 10 percent of the suburban population. Four in every twenty inner-ring suburban residents lived in poor inner-ring suburbs that year. In 1980, 4.1 million suburbanites, or 9 percent of the total suburban population, lived in affluent inner-ring suburbs. This declined to 3.9 million, or 6 percent of suburban population, by 2000. Over the course of the two decades, the proportion of the suburban population living in poor inner-ring suburbs increased, while the proportion of suburbanites living in affluent inner-ring suburbs decreased.

In 1980, 6.8 million residents were living in affluent outer suburbs. This number increased to 8.6 million, or 13 percent of the suburban population, by 2000. The population of poor outer suburbs was 1.2 million in 1980, increasing to 2.8 million by 2000. Six percent of outer suburban residents lived in poor outer suburbs in 1980, but 8 percent lived there in

[5]A similar measure was used in Swanstrom et al. 2006.

[6]These changes are not simply a process of suburbanization, since these findings are from an examination of only those suburban municipalities that existed in 1980 and 2000.



FIGURE 6.6 Percentage of suburbs by census region categorized as poor in 1980 and 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

2000. The proportion of suburbanites living in poor outer suburbs increased, but residents of the outer suburbs were still more likely to live in an affluent rather than a poor suburb. In fact, suburban residents as a whole were more likely to live in an affluent outer suburb than any other type of suburb in 2000. The next most likely type of suburb was a poor inner-ring suburb, meaning that an increasing number of suburban residents are living in either affluent outer suburbs or poor inner-ring suburbs.

As Figure 6.6 indicates, in the Midwest and the Northeast, the proportion of poor inner-ring suburbs increased from 1980 to 2000. The increase was most dramatic in the Midwest. In the Rust Belt region, the proportion of affluent outer suburbs also increased, most significantly in the Midwest (see Figure 6.7). The Midwest in particular experienced a surge in poor inner-ring suburbs and affluent outer suburbs, increasing the gap between the inner and the outer rings.

Between 1980 and 2000, the proportion of poor inner-ring suburbs increased in the South and the West. At the same time, affluent outer suburbs in the Sun Belt region declined, slightly in the South and more significantly in the West. Despite this decline, though, the gap between



FIGURE 6.7 Percentage of suburbs by census region categorized as affluent in 1980 and 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

poor inner-ring suburbs and affluent outer suburbs increased, the result of a surge in the proportion of poor inner-ring suburbs.

The proportion of poor outer suburbs declined in every region from 1980 to 2000. A large proportion of inner-ring suburbs were also affluent in every region, although this proportion either remained the same or declined over the course of the two decades.

Many affluent inner-ring suburbs were located in the Northeast. In fact, in this region, the proportion of affluent inner-ring suburbs was higher than the proportion of poor inner-ring suburbs in 2000, which was unique among regions. Most of the affluent inner-ring suburbs of the Northeast were located around the cities of New York and Boston. Both metropolitan areas had more affluent than poor inner-ring suburbs in 1980 and 2000. In Boston, such inner-ring suburbs as Weston stand out. The median household income of Weston was more than $150,000, and the per-capita income was almost $80,000 in 2000, making it one of the wealthiest suburbs of Boston. In the case of New York, as Figures 6.8 and 6.9 demonstrate, a number of affluent suburbs are located along the gold coast in Long Island and north of New York City. Old affluent suburbs, such as



FIGURE 6.8 Poor and affluent suburbs in New York CMSA in 1980. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places and County Subdivisions in the New York CMSA; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

Sands Point in Long Island and Briarcliff Manor in Westchester County, north of New York City, are prime examples. Easily accessible from Manhattan, Briarcliff Manor had a median household income of more than $130,000 in 2000.

As the maps of poor and affluent suburbs in the New York region demonstrate, there was an in-filling of affluent inner-ring suburbs north of New York City and around Stamford, Connecticut, and north of Bridgeport between 1980 and 2000 (see Figures 6.8 and 6.9). Stamford has in recent years become the site of such large corporations as Xerox, the finan-



FIGURE 6.9 Poor and affluent suburbs in New York CMSA in 2000. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places and County Divisions in the New York CMSA; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

cial service unit of General Electric, and Clairol. As a center of employment and with close proximity to New York City, Stamford's downtown economy has diversified, and its surrounding suburbs have become some of the wealthiest in the New York area. In the case of Long Island, many suburbs were affluent from their initial development. Sands Point, for instance, is a suburb with "old money," where houses have private beaches and beautiful views of the famous Manhattan skyline. The median household income of Sands Point was more than $200,000 in 2000, up from more than $150,000 in 1980. Sands Point contrasts with an old inner-ring suburb,



FIGURE 6.10 Poor and affluent suburbs in Washington, D.C.–Baltimore CMSA in 1980. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places in the Washington, D.C.–Baltimore CMSA; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

such as East Orange, where the median household income was $32,000 in 2000, an increase from a mere $27,000 in 1980.

New York has extremes of wealth and poverty among its inner-ring suburbs. In other metropolitan areas, the pattern tends to be one of increasing affluence in the outer fringe areas and, at the same time, an increasing number of poor inner-ring suburbs. In Washington, D.C., for instance, the proportion of poor inner-ring suburbs more than doubled from around 14 percent in 1980 to 30 percent in 2000, and the number of affluent outer suburbs more than doubled from 22 to 53 percent during the same period. The increasing dichotomy between poor inner-ring suburbs and affluent outer suburbs is illustrated by comparing Figures 6.10 and 6.11, which



FIGURE 6.11 Poor and affluent suburbs in Washington, D.C.–Baltimore CMSA in 2000. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places in the Washington, D.C.–Baltimore CMSA; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

show maps of poor and affluent suburbs in Washington, D.C., in 1980 and 2000, respectively.

Poor inner-ring suburbs spread southeast of Baltimore City; east and southeast of the central city of Washington, D.C.; and between Washington, D.C., and Baltimore between 1980 and 2000. At the same time, the number of affluent outer suburbs increased, particularly northwest of the central city of Washington, D.C.

The poor inner-ring suburbs that emerged around the city of Baltimore are old suburbs that are part of Baltimore's industrial past. Such suburbs as Dundalk, Essex, Middle River, and Lansdowne are working class and have suffered tremendously from a loss of manufacturing jobs in key sectors of

steel production, car manufacturing, and brewing. The poor suburbs that also spread east and southeast from Washington, D.C., are located in Prince George's County, a predominantly African American county in Maryland. Inner-ring suburbs, such as Seat Pleasant, Oxon Hill, North Brentwood, Fairmount Heights, and Glenarden, are all poor and primarily African American suburbs, many hugging poor central city neighborhoods. Relative to other suburbs in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, these poor suburbs were left behind as affluent outer suburbs emerged much farther out. Even some inner-ring suburbs that were affluent in 1980 were no longer affluent in 2000. Affluence tended to move farther out along the Potomac, spreading north from the district rather than remaining inside the Beltway.

Summary Comments

The suburban geography of wealth and poverty is changing. Levels of affluence have shifted from inner-ring to outer suburbs. This is not to say that affluent inner-ring suburbs do not exist—many obviously do, as do poor outer suburbs. However, the number of affluent inner-ring suburbs is declining, and the number of affluent outer suburbs is rising. At the same time, the number of poor inner-ring suburbs is increasing, along with the proportion of suburban residents living in these types of communities. The consequences of this change are profound. Just as the wealth and resources moved from the central city to the suburbs, now these resources are moving from the inner ring to the outer suburbs and, in some cities, back into downtown. Inner-ring suburbs are being left behind, caught in the middle between suburban sprawl and downtown revitalization.

7
Suburbs in Crisis

This chapter compares the magnitude of decline among inner-ring suburbs with that of outer suburbs and examines some features of the most declining suburbs. To make this comparison, I developed a method for measuring decline in these areas. More specifically, I constructed an index of suburban decline and analyzed the results for a total of 3,428 U.S. suburbs from 1980 to 2000. The results focus on suburban places nationally and in different regions of the country and allow suburbs to be ranked according to the extent of their decline or growth.

Many indices have been developed to measure city decline (e.g., Furdell, Wolman, and Hill 2005; Nathan and Adams 1976, 1989), but examinations of U.S. suburbs typically make limited use of indices. Recent exceptions are two separate studies by Myron Orfield (1997a, 1997b) of municipalities in the Philadelphia region and census designated places (CDPs) in the Baltimore region. For Philadelphia, Orfield (1997b) develops an index of regional economic conditions using four socioeconomic variables: the percentage of female-headed households as a percentage of all households with children, the percentage of children under five years of age in poverty, median income levels, and the

tax base per household. Orfield (1997a) develops a similar index for the Baltimore region, although the tax base per household variable was dropped because it could not be calculated for CDPs. Using this index, Orfield (1997a) divides places in the Baltimore region into three distinct suburban community types: high social need inner places, high social need outer places, and low social need places. Similarly, places in the Philadelphia region were divided into affluent suburbs, older cities and boroughs, and middle-income townships.

These indices were obviously developed for specific metropolitan cases, and they emphasize differences in suburban social status. Orfield's work is concerned with status or stock rather than change or flow. My study, by contrast, is one of the first to develop an index of decline for a national sample of suburbs across a large number of metropolitan areas. This index focuses on decline (or growth) over time rather than solely on a determination of the social status of each suburb.

The data source for the construction of the index is the *State of the Cities Data System, 1970–2000,* the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's dataset that provides census data on individual metropolitan areas, central cities, and suburban places. The variables employed to construct this index relate specifically to changes in population size, income, and poverty from 1980 to 2000. They have been used individually in previous studies of decline in U.S. suburbs (e.g., Bollens 1988; Leigh and Lee 2005; Lucy and Phillips 2006; Madden 2003; Orfield 2002; Puentes and Warren 2006). Here, they are combined to develop a robust measure of suburban decline and advancement. Specific details on the procedure for developing the index are outlined in the Appendix.[1]

What is important to note here is that relative and absolute measures were estimated for each suburb before the ranking or indexing procedure. Each suburb was compared with the suburbs in its corresponding metropolitan area on specific measures of population, income, and poverty change. It was then ranked in relation to all the suburbs in the nationwide

[1]Practitioners in the Montgomery County Planning Department used this index technique to identify areas of decline and growth within their county, located in Maryland outside Washington, D.C. They used similar variables at the geographic scale of planning districts. Students in planning or other disciplines can easily replicate the index for an area of interest using different census geography. This might be a worthwhile exercise for students wishing to learn about census data and using various geographies to explore changing social status within a given region.

sample. The relative measures ensure that the cost of living and other metropolitan effects were considered before suburbs were ranked and compared in the national sample. Therefore, a suburb of San Francisco, for instance, was measured relative to suburbs in its metropolitan area before any direct comparison was made between this suburb and a suburb of, say, Baltimore. Once each suburb received an index score, the suburbs were ranked within the nationwide sample.

A Broad Sweep of the Suburban Crisis

To analyze and to compare decline among inner-ring suburbs and outer suburbs at a national scale, the sample of suburban types was divided into deciles based on index scores. Deciles were used to identify the most extreme cases along the continuum of changing suburban social status. Table 7.1 indicates the number and percentage of inner-ring and outer suburbs that fall into the first, fifth, and tenth deciles in the national sample. In the index calculation, the first decile identifies the most extreme cases of decline over time. These are termed "suburbs in crisis." The fifth decile identifies the suburbs that have remained largely unchanged; in other words, they neither declined nor progressed from 1980 to 2000. These are termed "stable suburbs." The tenth decile identifies the suburbs that improved during this period. These are termed "advancing suburbs."

Over two-thirds of the suburbs in crisis are in the inner ring, indicating that they experienced a dramatic decline from 1980 to 2000. Nationally, three in every twenty-two inner-ring suburbs are categorized as suburbs in crisis, compared with three in every forty-three outer suburbs. Despite population growth, 125 outer suburbs nationally are in crisis. The overwhelming majority of these outer suburbs experienced a decline in

TABLE 7.1 SUBURBS IN CRISIS, STABLE SUBURBS, AND ADVANCING SUBURBS NATIONWIDE

Index categories	Inner-ring suburbs	Outer suburbs
Suburbs in crisis	217 (13% of national sample of inner-ring suburbs)	125 (7% of national sample of outer suburbs)
Stable suburbs	192 (12% of national sample of inner-ring suburbs)	151 (8% of national sample of outer suburbs)
Advancing suburbs	66 (4% of national sample of inner-ring suburbs)	276 (15% of national sample of outer suburbs)

non-Hispanic white population from 1980 to 2000. In the aggregate, the minority population of these suburbs increased from 21 percent in 1980 to roughly 50 percent by 2000. Although outer suburbs would not necessarily be expected to be in decline, many outer suburbs with increasing minority populations are struggling.

Inner-ring suburbs are more likely than outer suburbs to be stable. This typically means that these areas did not grow, but neither did they lose population, and their poverty and income levels were unchanged from 1980 to 2000. One in every eight inner-ring suburbs is stable, compared with one in every twelve outer suburbs in the nationwide sample. Typically, outer suburbs grew or progressed rather than declined or remained stable. More than four in five advancing suburbs are outer ones. Nationally, about one in every seven outer suburbs advanced, compared with one in every twenty-five inner-ring suburbs.

These findings suggest that when ranking suburbs by index score, extreme decline more likely occurred in inner-ring suburbs than in outer ones. In general, the results indicate a national pattern of inner-ring suburbs that declined and outer suburbs that improved or advanced from 1980 to 2000.

The Suburban Crisis in Different Regions

Index results were analyzed for the different U.S. census regions. Again, suburbs were divided into deciles based on index score, the extreme cases of decline are termed "suburbs in crisis," and the most progressive are termed "advancing suburbs." The fifth decile again identifies "stable suburbs." I determined the number and percentage of suburbs in the Midwest, the Northeast, the South, and the West that fall into these categories; Table 7.2 presents the results.

The South

The region with the highest proportion of suburbs in crisis is the South. A total of 126 (or 15 percent) of southern suburbs fit this category. An unusual feature of the South is that most of the suburbs in crisis are outer rather than inner-ring suburbs. In this region, fifty inner-ring suburbs are in crisis in addition to seventy-six outer suburbs. However, it is important to point out that these fifty inner-ring suburbs represent a quarter of all

TABLE 7.2 SUBURBS IN CRISIS, STABLE SUBURBS, AND ADVANCING SUBURBS BY CENSUS REGION

Suburbs	Midwest, N (%)	Northeast, N (%)	South, N (%)	West, N (%)	Total, N (%)
All suburbs					
Total	872	1,085	868	603	3,428
In crisis	125 (14)	42 (4)	126 (15)	49 (8)	342 (10)
Stable	55 (6)	162 (15)	59 (7)	67 (11)	343 (10)
Advancing	84 (10)	58 (5)	117 (13)	83 (14)	342 (10)
Inner-ring suburbs					
Total	411	824	207	195	1,637
In crisis	108 (26)	36 (4)	50 (24)	23 (12)	217 (13)
Stable	21 (5)	137 (17)	11 (5)	23 (12)	192 (12)
Advancing	11 (3)	28 (3)	11 (5)	16 (8)	66 (4)
Outer suburbs					
Total	461	261	661	408	1,791
In crisis	17 (4)	6 (2)	76 (11)	26 (6)	125 (7)
Stable	34 (7)	25 (10)	48 (7)	44 (11)	151 (8)
Advancing	73 (16)	30 (11)	106 (16)	67 (16)	276 (15)

Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding.

inner-ring suburbs in the region. The South is typically identified with unabashed suburban growth, but, as this analysis demonstrates, the South was not immune to the problem of suburban decline from 1980 to 2000.

As Table 7.2 indicates, proportionately fewer stable suburbs exist in the South than in other regions, with the exception of the Midwest. Only 7 percent of all suburbs in the South is stable. This means that these areas remained unchanged in terms of population, income, and poverty. Of the suburbs in the South, 13 percent advanced from 1980 to 2000. Outer suburbs in particular fit the advanced category. However, there was substantial disparity among outer suburbs in the South, where a high proportion declined as well as advanced. An example of an outer southern suburb in crisis is Hialeah in Miami. By 2000, the median household income there declined to 25 percent below the suburban median income for the Miami metropolitan area, and the poverty rate increased from 13 percent in 1980 to 19 percent in 2000. Three-quarters of Hialeah's population were Hispanic in 1980, increasing to 90 percent by 2000. Hialeah is an outer, struggling minority suburb that contrasts sharply with the outer suburb of Southlake in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. The median household income in this suburb more than doubled from 1980 to 2000, and the poverty rate was cut in half by 2000, ending at less than 2 percent. Southlake had few minorities and was 92 percent non-Hispanic white in 2000.

Table 7.3 indicates the metropolitan location of suburbs in crisis. Of the southern suburbs in this category, more than two-thirds are located in the metropolitan areas of Washington, D.C.–Baltimore; Atlanta; Dallas–Fort Worth; Miami–Fort Lauderdale; Houston; and Jacksonville, Florida. A total of 25 of the 126 southern suburbs in crisis are located in the Washington, D.C.–Baltimore metropolitan area. Of these twenty-five, all but one are inner-ring suburbs. Classic examples include Dundalk, Essex, Lansdowne, and Seat Pleasant, many of which were identified as poor suburbs in the previous chapter. These suburbs became poorer and declined relative to other suburbs of the Washington, D.C.–Baltimore metropolitan area between 1980 and 2000.

A total of seventeen southern suburbs in crisis are located in the Atlanta metropolitan area. More than half of Atlanta's inner-ring suburbs experienced extreme decline from 1980 to 2000, compared with about one in eight outer suburbs. In Atlanta and Washington, D.C.–Baltimore, suburbs in crisis are typically in the inner ring.

In other southern metropolitan areas, inner-ring and outer suburbs are in crisis. In Dallas–Fort Worth, half of the suburbs in crisis are inner ring, the other half outer. In Miami—Fort Lauderdale, eleven suburbs are in crisis. Only four of these are inner-ring suburbs. In Dallas–Fort Worth, suburbs in crisis are as likely to be newer as older. In Miami, suburbs in crisis are more likely to be outer rather than inner ring. The South has few stable suburbs, many outer suburbs that advanced, and, depending on the metropolitan area, a number of outer or inner-ring suburbs in crisis.

A fair number of outer suburbs in the South are in crisis, more than in other regions of the country. Generally, these outer suburbs declined not in population but in income, and poverty increased to high levels relative to other surrounding suburbs. Such suburbs as Lauderhill in Miami are classic examples. Lauderhill has undergone tremendous social change in recent times. This suburb was once the location of many retirees from northern metropolitan areas and white working- and middle-class families, but many neighborhoods have shifted to a multicultural mix of African Americans and Caribbean and Latin American immigrants. In 1970, Lauderhill had only one black resident. By 2000, the black population bloomed to more than 33,000, 6 out of every 10 residents. Some new residents moved to tranquil neighborhoods, but others have been segregated into more depressed areas where the houses are small and poorly constructed.

TABLE 7.3 SUBURBS IN CRISIS IN DIFFERENT METROPOLITAN AREAS

	N	%	Cumulative %
South			
Total	126		
Washington, D.C.–Baltimore	25	20	20
Atlanta	17	13	33
Dallas–Fort Worth	16	13	46
Miami–Fort Lauderdale	11	9	55
Houston	9	7	62
Jacksonville	7	6	67
Memphis	7	6	73
West Palm Beach	7	6	79
Orlando	6	5	83
New Orleans	5	4	87
Nashville	4	3	90
San Antonio	4	3	94
Austin	3	2	96
Tampa	2	2	98
Charlotte	1	1	98
Norfolk	1	1	99
Raleigh	1	1	100
Midwest			
Total	125		
St. Louis	28	22	22
Chicago	27	22	44
Detroit	18	14	58
Minneapolis	15	12	70
Cincinnati	10	8	78
Cleveland	9	7	85
Indianapolis	5	4	89
Kansas City	5	4	93
Columbus	4	3	96
Milwaukee	4	3	100
Northeast			
Total	42		
New York	17	40	40
Philadelphia	13	31	71
Pittsburgh	4	10	81
Buffalo	3	7	88
Boston	2	5	93
Hartford	2	5	98
Providence	1	2	100
West			
Total	49		
Los Angeles	14	29	29
Phoenix	12	24	53
Sacramento	8	16	69
Seattle	5	10	80
Denver	3	6	86
Salt Lake City	2	4	90
San Diego	2	4	94
San Francisco	2	4	98
Las Vegas	1	2	100

The Midwest

The Midwest followed closely behind the South in the proportion of suburbs in crisis. As Table 7.2 indicates, 14 percent of the Midwest's 872 suburbs falls into that category. In the traditionally older region of the Midwest, decline was far more prevalent among inner-ring rather than outer suburbs. There are 84 advancing outer suburbs in the Midwest, 125 suburbs in crisis, and relatively few stable suburbs. According to this analysis, 108 (or more than 25 percent) of inner-ring suburbs are in crisis, and 73 advancing suburbs are outer ones. A tremendous dichotomy exists between old and new suburbs in this region.

As Table 7.3 demonstrates, more than half of the suburbs in crisis in the Midwest are located in St. Louis, Chicago, and Detroit. Almost a quarter of midwestern suburbs in crisis are located in St. Louis, with another quarter in Chicago. Much of this extreme decline occurs in the inner ring. Of the twenty-eight suburbs in crisis in St. Louis, twenty-six are inner-ring suburbs, and the other two are outer ones. These twenty-six inner-ring suburbs represent one-third of the total sample of inner-ring suburbs in St. Louis. In Chicago, twenty-four of the twenty-seven suburbs in crisis are inner-ring suburbs. According to this analysis, one in five inner-ring suburbs in Chicago is in crisis, compared with one in fifty outer ones. In Detroit, all eighteen suburbs in crisis are inner-ring suburbs, with some providing clear illustrations of the negative effects of deindustrialization. A telling example is Ecorse, a suburb located seven miles outside Detroit's central city. Beginning in the 1920s, steel rolled efficiently from the Michigan Steel mill located in the heart of this older suburb. Closed down since 1953, the old, rusted mill now represents the demise of the manufacturing sector in suburban Detroit (Teaford 2008). Almost half of the workforce of Ecorse was employed in manufacturing in 1980, but this number declined to less than a quarter by 2000. Increasing poverty and declining incomes followed the loss of manufacturing jobs.

As with many central cities in the Midwest, old industrial suburbs, such as Ecorse, struggle to retrofit their local economies to the postindustrial era. A force greatly shaping the inner-ring suburbs of the Midwest is deindustrialization and subsequent labor-market restructuring. Old industrial suburbs located in the inner ring around the cities of Chicago and Detroit, for

instance, have experienced decline as a result of losses in manufacturing employment for local residents. In the meantime, outer suburbs of the Midwest have continued to grow and to expand, to the detriment of the inner ring.

The Northeast

Typically, people think that older suburbs in the Northeast are in crisis, yet only 4 percent of inner-ring suburbs in this region falls into this category. Rather, in this analysis, the inner-ring suburbs of the Northeast emerge as areas of relative stability, with 137 classified as stable. A number of inner-ring suburbs are also advancing, and, although few outer suburbs are in this region, one in nine advanced from 1980 to 2000. Theoretically, the advancement of many suburbs in the Northeast was partly the result of their closeness to economically robust cities, such as New York and Boston. In fact, of the fifty-eight advancing suburbs in the Northeast, fifty-one are located in the Boston and New York areas. A classic example is the inner-ring suburb of Dover, which is outside Boston. The median household income of this suburb increased from almost $83,000 in 1980 to more than $140,000 in 2000. The poverty rate declined from 4 percent to 3 percent during this same period. With a population that is overwhelmingly non-Hispanic white and college educated (a majority of residents ages twenty-five and older are college graduates), Dover is a thriving inner-ring New England suburb. The median value of housing in Dover was twice the suburban median housing value in 1980, and this value had increased by 2000.

Table 7.3 illustrates the location of suburbs in crisis in the Northeast. The overwhelming majority are located outside New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. A total of seventeen of the forty-two northeastern suburbs in crisis are in New York. Of these, thirteen are inner-ring suburbs. An example of an inner-ring suburb in crisis is Wyandanch, whose black population increased from 62 percent in 1980 to 75 percent by 2000. At the same time, the Hispanic population doubled from 8 percent to 16 percent during this same period. A suburb whose population was heavily minority in 1980, Wyandanch has been left behind as its median household income slipped from 15 percent to more than 40 percent below the suburban median for the Nassau-Suffolk metropolitan area from 1980 to 2000.

At the same time, the poverty rate increased from 14 percent to 17 percent. Struggling in 1980, the minority suburb of Wyandanch continues to struggle, despite the gains made by other northeastern suburbs between 1980 and 2000.

Philadelphia and Pittsburgh are in many respects classic older manufacturing cities that, like places in the Midwest, struggle with the pains of deindustrialization and restructuring from manufacturing to a more service-based economy. Of the forty-two northeastern suburbs in crisis, seventeen are located in the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas. Of the thirteen suburbs in crisis in Philadelphia, one is outer, and the rest are inner-ring suburbs. All four suburbs in crisis in Pittsburgh are inner-ring suburbs. Many of that city's declining inner-ring suburbs are primarily industrial and have witnessed a major decline in manufacturing employment in recent decades. One example is North Versailles, where 36 percent of the workforce was employed in manufacturing in 1980, versus 14 percent by 2000. During this same period, median household income declined from more than $39,000 to about $30,000, and the poverty rate increased from 7 percent to more than 10 percent. The median household income of North Versailles was on a par with the suburban median household income in the Pittsburgh area in 1980 but declined to 20 percent below by 2000.

In many ways, the patterns of suburban decline in the Northeast and the Midwest are similar in that decline is most prevalent in inner-ring suburbs. However, in contrast to the Midwest, many inner-ring suburbs are also stable, and the distinction between inner-ring and outer suburbs is not as sharp. A number of inner-ring suburbs are advancing, typically located around Boston and New York.

The West

After the Northeast, the West has the smallest proportion of suburbs in crisis and the highest proportion of stable ones. Of the western suburbs in crisis, more than half are located in Los Angeles and Phoenix. In Los Angeles, fourteen suburbs are in crisis, and twelve of them are inner-ring suburbs. By contrast, in Phoenix, all the suburbs in crisis are outer rather than inner-ring suburbs. Phoenix has no inner-ring suburbs as defined in this study. The city of Phoenix expanded over the decades to annex its

early suburban development. Suburban areas outside the central city of Phoenix are new—in many cases, small rural places that have witnessed large-scale growth in recent decades. In some cases, however, little has changed, and relative decline has ensued. An example is Sacaton, on the outer edges of the Phoenix metropolitan area. Its population is 95 percent Native American. This is a reservation that has witnessed population decline while the Phoenix metropolitan area grew between 1980 and 2000. On average, the sample of suburbs in Phoenix grew by more than 23,000 people during this period, while Sacaton saw a decline of more than 300 people. The median household income there was 40 percent below the suburban median household income of Phoenix in 1980, and it fell to almost 60 percent below by 2000.

Los Angeles is the home of many of the West's inner-ring suburbs in crisis. Figure 7.1 shows a map of suburbs in crisis, stable suburbs, and advancing suburbs in Los Angeles. The inner-ring suburbs in crisis are primarily those located closer to the city of Los Angeles, and advancing suburbs are located along the coastline south of Irvine and sporadically on the metropolitan edge. A classic case of an inner-ring suburb in crisis in Los Angeles is Inglewood, southwest of Los Angeles city. About four miles from Los Angeles International Airport, this predominantly African American and Hispanic suburb had a median household income of about $34,000 in 2000, 20 percent below the median household income of surrounding suburbs. The poverty rate increased from 15 percent to 20 percent from 1980 to 2000. Many of the workers of this inner-ring suburb are employed in low-wage jobs in hotels and other businesses close to the Los Angeles airport. In 2007, the City Council of Los Angeles extended its living-wage laws to include those employed in hotels along Century Boulevard, a large thoroughfare near the airport. Initiatives of this nature can help improve the lot of many poorly paid workers in declining inner-ring suburbs.

Among regions, the West has the highest proportion of advancing inner-ring suburbs. In fact, compared with other regions, many of these areas in the West grew from 1980 to 2000. This growth was driven in part by an influx of immigrants. Overall, in the West, as in other regions, proportionately more inner-ring suburbs are in crisis than outer suburbs, although decline can be also a problem for outer suburbs, as illustrated by the Phoenix metropolitan area.



FIGURE 7.1 Suburbs in crisis, stable suburbs, and advancing suburbs in Los Angeles CMSA. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

Housing Matters

It is presumed that as suburbs age, their statuses change, and they move through the life cycle from a period of stability and growth to eventual decline (Choldin, Hanson, and Bohrer 1980). To examine this theory further, housing age in advancing and in-crisis suburbs was analyzed and compared across national and regional samples. Again, suburbs in crisis are the first decile, while advancing suburbs are the tenth. As Table 7.4 indicates, half of the housing stock in inner-ring suburbs in crisis nationally was built between 1950 and 1969. When even older housing is examined, however, a different picture emerges. More than one in four houses in advancing inner-ring suburbs were built before 1939. On average, the

TABLE 7.4 HOUSING AGE AND VALUE AMONG SUBURBS IN CRISIS AND ADVANCING SUBURBS

	Inner-ring suburbs		Outer suburbs	
Descriptive variables	In crisis	Advancing	In crisis	Advancing
Number	217	66	125	276
Housing built 1990–2000 (%)	5	9	14	39
Housing built 1980–1989 (%)	8	9	21	28
Housing built 1970–1979 (%)	16	11	32	18
Housing built 1960–1969 (%)	23	14	18	8
Housing built 1950–1959 (%)	27	19	10	4
Housing built 1940–1949 (%)	11	11	3	1
Housing built before 1939 (%)	11	26	2	2
Median house value 1980 (mean, in 1999 dollars)	$114,783	$297,464	$109,571	$160,562
Median house value 2000 (mean, in 1999 dollars)	$133,775	$628,044	$114,376	$238,920

median house value in the oldest advancing suburbs was more than $628,000 in 2000, compared with less than $120,000 for the nation as a whole for that same year. Some advancing older suburbs have exclusive and expensive old housing that continues to maintain its value. On average, the median house value among older suburbs across the nation increased from $297,000 (in 1999 dollars) in 1980 to more than $628,000 by 2000. In fact, on average, the value of the oldest housing stock outpaced that of the new housing in the outer suburbs in 1980 and 2000. The very oldest housing has a certain cachet or exclusivity, while the postwar housing prevalent among suburbs in crisis is showing signs of obsolescence. House values for inner-ring suburbs in crisis, many of which date from the postwar period, showed little appreciation. As expected, very new housing is prevalent among successful suburbs. Two out of every five houses in advancing outer suburbs were built between 1990 and 2000. In short, the very oldest housing and the very newest housing are prevalent among successful suburbs.

As Table 7.5 demonstrates, the oldest housing is highly prevalent in advancing suburbs in the Northeast and the Midwest in particular. A total of 29 percent of the housing stock in the advancing inner-ring suburbs of the Midwest was built before 1939. In Chicago, for instance, many old inner-ring suburbs are advancing (see Figure 7.2). A telling example is Lake Forest, north of the city of Chicago. In this inner-ring suburb, about

TABLE 7.5 HOUSING AGE AMONG SUBURBS IN CRISIS AND ADVANCING SUBURBS BY CENSUS REGION

	In crisis				Advancing			
Housing age	Midwest	Northeast	South	West	Midwest	Northeast	South	West
Inner-Ring Suburbs								
Number	108	36	56	28	11	28	11	16
Built 1990–2000 (%)	4	3	5	6	12	8	17	7
Built 1980–1989 (%)	6	5	9	12	10	8	10	9
Built 1970–1979 (%)	15	11	19	20	11	10	7	15
Built 1960–1969 (%)	24	17	25	22	14	13	8	18
Built 1950–1959 (%)	30	24	25	24	19	17	17	24
Built 1940–1949 (%)	11	15	10	9	6	9	17	15
Built before 1939 (%)	10	24	5	8	29	35	24	16
Outer Suburbs								
Number	17	6	76	26	73	30	106	67
Built 1990–2000 (%)	13	11	13	15	40	24	39	40
Built 1980–1989 (%)	15	12	21	23	25	23	31	27
Built 1970–1979 (%)	28	36	32	33	17	18	17	18
Built 1960–1969 (%)	22	20	19	15	9	12	7	8
Built 1950–1959 (%)	14	10	10	10	5	8	3	4
Built 1940–1949 (%)	4	4	3	3	1	3	1	1
Built before 1939 (%)	5	6	2	2	3	12	1	2

Some percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

one in every five units was built before 1939. Located along Lake Michigan, this suburb was developed as an enclave for wealthy Chicagoans in the mid-nineteenth century. Famous for the quality of its architecture and landscape planning, Lake Forest has managed over the past century and a half to keep its elite status among the northern Chicago suburbs (Ebner 1988). The median household income for Lake Forest increased from $90,800 in 1980 to $136,000 in 2000. Lake Forest, Lake Bluff, Kenilworth, and other old suburbs are north of Chicago City and along the lakefront.

More than a third of housing units in advancing inner-ring suburbs and more than one in ten units in advancing outer suburbs in the Northeast were built before 1939. In the Northeast, very old housing can be found in advancing and in-crisis suburbs. A quarter of the housing in inner-ring suburbs in crisis in the Northeast was built before 1939. A classic case of an advancing suburb with very old housing is Scarsdale, New York, which is located north of Manhattan. Half of the housing stock there was built before 1939. Described as a "sort of utopia," Scarsdale began as a wealthy enclave and has infamously maintained its high status (O'Connor



FIGURE 7.2 Suburbs in crisis, stable suburbs, and advancing suburbs in Chicago CMSA. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

1983). The median household income there increased from $117,000 in 1980 to $182,000 in 2000.

Scarsdale contrasts sharply with another old suburb in the Northeast, McKeesport in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. McKeesport is an old industrial suburb where steel-making attracted many working-class families and immigrants, beginning at the turn of the twentieth century. Half of the housing stock there was built before 1939. With the decline of the steel industry, McKeesport has changed dramatically. The poverty rate has

increased from 15 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 2000, and the median household income declined from about $26,000 to $23,600. This suburb's minority population is also increasing, since the black population increased from 10 percent in 1980 to almost a quarter by 2000. Clearly, some older suburbs can maintain their status, but others decline over time.

In every region, although less so in the Northeast, postwar housing dominates inner-ring suburbs in crisis. In the Midwest, the West, and the South, half of the housing stock in inner-ring suburbs in crisis was built between 1950 and 1969. A typical example of a postwar suburb in crisis is Garden Grove, California, outside of Los Angeles. This suburb experienced a population explosion after World War II, growing from 3,762 residents in 1950 to an incredible 84,238 residents by 1960. About 60 percent of the current units in Garden Grove was built between 1950 and 1969. Poverty increased from 8 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 2000, and although the median household income increased slightly from $43,000 to $47,000 over the same period, this change represents a relative decline compared with other suburbs in its metropolitan area. Garden Grove's median household income declined from 7 percent to about 25 percent below the suburban median from 1980 to 2000. By that year, almost half of the population of Garden Grove was foreign born. These new arrivals can now avail themselves of the low-cost, postwar housing in this suburb.

In the Midwest, the South, and the West, 40 percent, 39 percent, and 40 percent, respectively, of housing in the advancing outer suburbs was built in the 1990s. Very new housing is prevalent among the advancing suburbs in these regions. This outer housing is less prevalent among advancing suburbs in the Northeast. It is no surprise that outer housing is increasingly occupied by high-income groups. However, the fact that suburbs with the oldest housing can improve over time contests prevailing notions that suburban decline is merely a function of the age of the housing stock (Choldin, Hanson, and Bohrer 1980). The oldest suburbs have unique qualities that ensure continued progress, particularly in the Midwest, the Northeast, and the South. In the 1940s, Walter Firey (1945) drew attention to the importance of cultural factors in maintaining elite status within the aging city neighborhood of Beacon Hill in Boston. He found that, because of sentimental attachments and certain symbolic neighborhood features, high-income households remain or seek out old housing in Beacon Hill. As a consequence, the neighborhood maintains its exclusivity. The same is true of elite inner-ring suburbs, as I explore in Chapter 8.

Postwar housing, however, has in many respects lost its charm. William Lucy and David Phillips (2000a, 2006) find that decline is most prevalent in these middle-aged suburbs—that is, the bedroom communities built after 1945 and before 1970. Style, size, and uniformity of postwar housing may be more important to the decline of postwar suburbs than the problem of age alone. It reinforces Lucy and Phillip's (2006) call for planners and policy makers to consider housing characteristics as a major factor in suburban decline.

The Poor Inner-Ring Suburb in Crisis

So far, I have examined housing age among in-crisis suburbs. What are some other defining features? First, many suburbs in crisis were poor. Examining the income levels of these suburbs compared to suburbs in their respective metropolitan areas, I find that 172 (or half) had an income ratio of 0.75 in 2000. In other words, the median household income of these suburbs was 25 percent below the median household income of their suburban neighbors. The overwhelming majority of these poor suburbs had income levels below the suburban median in 1980 as well. Already vulnerable, these suburbs fell farther behind by 2000.

Almost two-thirds of these poor suburbs in crisis were inner-ring suburbs, and the remaining third were outer suburbs. Table 7.6 highlights some features of the poor inner-ring suburbs in crisis. One in every six residents of these suburbs lived in poverty in 2000. To offer some perspective on this problem, the typical sample suburb had a poverty rate of

TABLE 7.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE AVERAGE POOR INNER-RING SUBURB IN CRISIS

Variables (averages)	Total	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Poverty rate, 2000 (%)	16	18	14	15	21
Median household income, 2000	$34,600	$34,189	$34,200	$36,700	$34,000
Change in population, 1980–2000	817	177	–954	660	12,557
Population that was non-Hispanic white, 2000 (%)	46	50	60	44	18
Population that was non-Hispanic black, 2000 (%)	23	17	20	40	17
Population that was non-Hispanic other, 2000 (%)	6	6	4	4	11
Population that was Hispanic, 2000 (%)	26	26	16	11	54
Population that was immigrant, 2000 (%)	20	25	11	14	36

7 percent, but poverty in inner-ring suburbs in crisis was double this rate. These suburbs were far behind other suburbs. The poor inner-ring suburbs in crisis in the West had the highest poverty rate, at 21 percent in 2000. The poverty rate in Baltimore City—an exemplar of a struggling U.S. city with multiple socioeconomic problems—was 23 percent that same year. This comparison provides some insight into the scale of the problem.

Second, the median household income of the average poor inner-ring suburb in crisis was about $34,600 by 2000. The national median household income was about $43,000 that same year. In terms of income, poor inner-ring suburbs in crisis significantly trail the nation as a whole. Again, the average poor inner-ring suburb in crisis in the West had lower income levels than inner-ring suburbs in other regions. Considering housing prices in metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, the residents of the West's poor inner-ring suburbs in crisis certainly struggle to afford the suburban lifestyle.

Third, the typical poor inner-ring suburb in crisis experienced little population growth between 1980 and 2000. On average, these suburbs grew by only 817 residents. In the Midwest, these suburbs actually declined in population. The suburbs in crisis with the highest population growth were in the West. This suggests that population growth is not always an indicator of economic growth. Many of the growing suburbs in the West were poor inner-ring suburbs in crisis.

As Table 7.6 indicates, less than half of the population of the typical poor inner-ring suburb in crisis was composed of whites in 2000. Among regions, the Midwest had the "whitest" poor inner-ring suburbs in crisis. A quarter of the population of poor inner-ring suburbs in crisis was composed of non-Hispanic blacks, and another quarter was Hispanic. One in every five residents of these suburbs was an immigrant.

The average poor inner-ring suburb in crisis in the West was largely composed of Hispanics with relatively fewer non-Hispanic blacks. In the South, in contrast, the average poor inner-ring suburb in crisis had proportionately more non-Hispanic blacks but fewer Hispanics. The average poor inner-ring suburb in crisis in the West had the highest proportion of immigrants than other regions, and the suburb in the Midwest had the lowest proportion.

Poor inner-ring suburbs in crisis are typically minority suburbs close to the border of the traditional urban core in the United States. They are

suburbs with high-poverty rates and low income, and, if they are growing in population, they do so only because of in-coming nonwhite residents and immigrants. These suburbs in crisis are the new metropolitan calamities of the United States, areas of ethnic, racial, and income segregation where the suburban dream has largely vanished.

Summary Comments

This chapter develops an index of changing statuses for 3,428 U.S. suburbs. Using the results of this index, I measure the prevalence and extent of decline among inner-ring suburbs and outer suburbs across different census regions. Nationally, three out of every twenty inner-ring suburbs are in crisis and more than three out of twenty outer suburbs experienced tremendous progress from 1980 to 2000. Extreme cases of decline among inner-ring suburbs are most prevalent in the Midwest and the South. Stable inner-ring suburbs are the prevailing trend in the Northeast, while the West has the highest proportion of advancing inner-ring suburbs. Regionally, a dichotomy exists between inner-ring suburbs in crisis and advancing outer suburbs. In every region, particularly the Midwest and the Northeast, suburbs in crisis are more likely to be inner-ring suburbs than outer ones.

Postwar housing—specifically, housing built between 1950 and 1969—is most prevalent among inner-ring suburbs in crisis. However, housing built before 1939 has maintained its value, and the suburbs where this housing stock prevails improved from 1980 to 2000. Housing age appears to be important in the sense that postwar suburban housing is particularly outdated. However, the fact that some old suburbs with older housing are advancing suggests that style, historic appeal, and a certain suburban cachet can be just as important as age. In the following chapter, I explore these elite inner-ring suburbs in more detail. These areas first emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. They were built primarily for wealthy families of the industrial era. Wielding their political power over the years, these suburbs have remained wealthy ever since.

They contrast sharply with poor, minority inner-ring suburbs. Typically, inner-ring suburbs in crisis have more minorities than advancing suburbs. Segregated by race and class, inner-ring suburbs vary from nonwhite and poor to white and rich. I explore this variation further in the next chapter.

8

Different Types of Inner-Ring Suburbs

Some inner-ring suburbs are in crisis, and, in general, decline is more prevalent among inner-ring suburbs than outer ones. However, as the previous chapter demonstrates, some inner-ring suburbs performed well between 1980 and 2000. Inner-ring suburbs are a mix of places. Some are wealthy; others are working class. Some are mostly white; others are much more diverse. Some have changed dramatically since their origins; others have changed less. In short, several types of inner-ring suburbs have evolved over time. Three recent studies have developed typologies to identify different sorts of suburbs. These typologies were developed for all suburbs rather than just inner-ring suburbs. In this chapter, I explore these suburban typologies and offer a typology specifically for inner-ring suburbs.

Suburban Typologies

Swathes of development outside central cities have grown to the point where now almost two out of every three U.S. metropolitan residents live in suburbs (Beauregard 2006). What has evolved from this increasing development is a complex array of suburban areas (Baldassare

1992). The diversity among suburbs has been explored in a number of recent typologies. In the following sections, I examine three.

Orfield Typology

Myron Orfield (2002) conducted a cluster analysis of 4,606 suburban municipalities and 135 unincorporated areas in twenty-five different metropolitan regions and identifies six different types of suburbs: at risk, segregated; at risk, older; at risk, low density; bedroom developing; affluent job center; and very affluent job center. The three at-risk types of suburbs are communities with high social needs but limited or declining local resources. The at-risk, segregated suburbs have very high poverty rates and low tax capacity. The housing in these suburbs is old. They are similar to at-risk, older suburbs, except they have a high concentration of minority children in public schools. Orfield also identifies a number of at-risk, low-density suburbs. They are typically outer suburbs that have higher-than-average poverty rates and low tax capacity.

In addition, Orfield identifies bedroom-developing suburbs. They are recognized as typical, traditional suburbs. The population of these suburbs is mostly white. The housing stock is new, and these suburbs are typically low density with high rates of population growth. The final two types of suburbs are affluent job centers and very affluent job centers. These suburbs are quintessential edge cities. They have large amounts of office space, and they are the primary location for the most affluent and well-educated suburbanites. They have a large tax base and offer many amenities. Orfield (2002) aptly describes these suburbs as "having it all." Typical examples of these suburbs are areas along Route 128 outside Boston, the Irvine area south of Los Angeles, around O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, and the Perimeter Center north of Atlanta. The biggest concern among residents of affluent job centers is growth. According to Orfield (2002), anti-growth initiatives are disproportionately found on local ballots in these types of suburbs.

Hanlon, Vicino, and Short Typology

Based on a descriptive analysis of 1,639 suburban census places in thirteen different metropolitan areas, Bernadette Hanlon, Thomas Vicino, and John Short (2006) identify five types of suburbs: rich, poor, manufacturing, black,

and immigrant. In their analysis, they find substantial variation in income levels among suburbs, and in each of the metropolitan regions in their study, the poorest suburban place had a lower median family income than the central city. Poor suburbs were often poorer than the central city. Some suburbs in the Hanlon, Vicino, and Short study had high levels of manufacturing employment. The overwhelming majority of these blue-collar suburbs experienced increasing levels of poverty in recent decades. Blue-collar suburbs were generally struggling with deindustrialization and a shift in emphasis from manufacturing to more service-based employment.

Hanlon, Vicino, and Short (2006) also note increasing racial and ethnic diversity in the suburbs. Out of the 1,639 suburban places they analyze, 1,245 increased their black population (in 227 places by more than 10 percent, and in 114 places by more than 25 percent). They identify 252 suburban places where the black population was more than 25 percent and 132 suburbs where it was more than 50 percent in 2000. These suburbs they term "black suburbs." In their analysis, they also identify 108 immigrant suburbs, places where more than 25 percent of the population was foreign born. Ultimately, Hanlon, Vicino, and Short (2006) distinguish different suburban types from traditional white, middle-class, residential suburbs.

Mikelbank Typology

Brian Mikelbank (2004) analyzes data on 3,567 suburban incorporated places along dimensions of population, place, economy, and government. He conducts a cluster analysis and identifies ten different types of suburbs. Generalizing first at a four-cluster solution, Mikelbank distinguishes between white bedroom, manufacturing, suburban-success, and working-diversity suburbs. The white bedroom suburbs include three different types: seasonal wealth, traditional, and small retail. The residents of seasonal-wealth suburbs have high incomes, and housing values are high. These suburbs tend to be along the coastline, with large concentrations in Florida and California. Employment in these suburbs tends to be in the food services and accommodations sectors. Traditional suburbs, another variety of white bedroom suburbs, are generally new, low density, and characterized by married families with children. Small-retail suburbs have small populations, and economic activity in these suburbs is generally in the retail sector.

Mikelbank (2004) identifies two varieties of manufacturing suburbs: struggling and black. The struggling manufacturing suburbs are typically characterized by low income levels, low housing values, and a high proportion of employment in the manufacturing sector. Black manufacturing suburbs share similar characteristics but in addition have high black population rates.

Suburban-success suburbs include three variations: prosperity, working stability, and aging. These suburbs are generally prosperous, and their residents are well educated. The population is stable, and vacancy rates are low. Some of these suburban-success suburbs are aging. Housing in aging suburban successes is generally older, and these suburbs are generally high-density settlements. In prosperity suburbs, housing values and income levels are high. In working-stability suburbs, the emphasis is on employment. Working-stability suburbs have large populations and large numbers of establishments, particularly in manufacturing. Tax collections from these suburbs are higher than average.

Two subcategories of working-diversity suburbs exist: South/Western and Central. Both types have high percentages of foreign born and other race populations. They each score very low in terms of white population and married families with children. The primary distinguishing feature between these two different types of suburbs is their location. South/Western diversity suburbs are primarily located in Arizona, California, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Central diversity suburbs tend to be close to central cities, while South/Western diversity suburbs are located in more remote areas of the metropolitan landscape.

The Mikelbank typology demonstrates the tremendous variation among suburbs. As Mikelbank points out, about half the suburbs in his sample fit the stereotypical image of the suburbs—that is, half these suburbs are white bedroom suburbs that are prosperous and aging. The other half is nontraditional suburbs with their own unique character.

Some similarities exist among the different suburban typologies outlined here. Despite an emphasis on different variables and the use of different methodologies, these typologies match on four distinct trends or characteristics. First, suburbs vary considerably by socioeconomic status. Some suburbs are affluent, rich, or suburban successes; others are at risk, poor, or struggling. Socioeconomic status is a key driving force behind suburban differentiation. Second, each typology identifies racial and ethnic diversity in the suburbs. Suburban black and immigrant populations in

particular stand out. The development of these types of suburbs is a new source of social change in recent decades. Third, some suburbs fit the stereotype of white, middle-class, residential, family-oriented enclaves. Each typology identifies these traditional suburbs, so, although suburbs are evolving, evidence of the typical, white middle class abides. Four, suburbs as job centers or places with certain employment characteristics emerge. In two typologies, manufacturing suburbs materialize as specific sorts of suburbs. If the typologies are compared, manufacturing suburbs are struggling, and they contrast with very affluent job centers. Drawing on these different trends as well as findings from a cluster analysis, I posit a typology of inner-ring suburbs.

Typology of Inner-Ring Suburbs

Different types of inner-ring suburbs are outlined in Table 8.1. This typology identifies the unique characteristics of inner-ring suburbs based on recent statistics. However, the past is still important. The common traits of inner-ring suburbs often depend on when and for whom these suburbs were originally built. Some inner-ring suburbs retain pieces of their past lives that have greatly impacted their trajectories and more recent trans-

TABLE 8.1 TYPES OF INNER-RING SUBURBS BY CENSUS REGION

Type	Total, N (%)	Northeast, N (%)	Midwest, N (%)	South, N (%)	West, N (%)	Features
Elite	208 (12)	110 (13)	53 (11)	22 (10)	23 (11)	Wealthy, white, in many cases very old housing
Middle class	609 (35)	355 (42)	122 (25)	70 (32)	62 (30)	Middle-class, somewhat diverse, stable
Vulnerable	824 (47)	367 (43)	291 (60)	109 (50)	57 (28)	Working-class, some formerly industrial, declining
Ethnic	120 (7)	23 (3)	15 (3)	18 (8)	64 (31)	Mostly poor, Hispanic, immigrant
Total	1,761	855	481	219	206	

Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

formations. For some, the transformation has been staggering, for others far less so.

To develop this typology, I conducted a two-step process of performing first a principal component analysis (PCA) and then a cluster analysis of 1,761 inner-ring suburbs. The variables I use in the clustering technique and PCA relate to housing, employment, race and ethnicity, and income. Details on the methodology I use to identify the four different clusters are located in the Appendix. This typology is based on 2000 census data, although I examine change among these different types of suburbs from 1980 to 2000. Socioeconomic status emerges as the key factor in the differentiation of inner-ring suburbs—hence the use of the rather broad categories of elite, middle class, and vulnerable. However, other sources of differentiation, particularly related to ethnicity, race, and housing age, similarly poke through. In the following sections, I explain the various characteristics of the different types of inner-ring suburbs, referring to their employment and race and ethnic features in 2000 and before.

Elite Inner-Ring Suburbs

I classify about an eighth of inner-ring suburbs as elite. They were high income and predominantly white in 2000. Many of these suburbs are located in the Northeast and the Midwest. In the regions of the West and the South, elite inner-ring suburbs are slightly more diverse than those in the Northeast and the Midwest. In the West, one in seven residents of an average elite inner-ring suburb was immigrant in 2000, typically Asian. In the South, the average elite inner-ring suburb was 11 percent immigrant, mostly Hispanic (particularly in Miami). In the Midwest and the Northeast, elite inner-ring suburbs were, on average, 90 percent non-Hispanic white.

In general, the elite inner-ring suburbs are very old. On average, almost a third of the housing stock in these suburbs was built before 1939. Some developed as early as the 1890s, and others can trace their beginnings to the early 1920s. These earliest suburbs developed initially as enclaves for upper-income classes, and they have retained a high-income status over many, many decades. On average, the median household income of elite inner-ring suburbs was more than twice that of other suburbs and more than $121,000 in 2000. The poverty rate of the average elite suburb was extremely low, less than 3 percent in 2000. On average, the median housing

value of these suburbs was more than $550,000 in 2000. Despite their age, the old houses of these elite suburbs have maintained high values.

In their excellent book *The Suburb Reader* (2006), Becky Nicolaides and Andrew Wiese refer to "the elite suburban ideal"—suburbia as the ideal place of wealth, beauty, privacy, peacefulness, and nature—as instrumental in the initial development of elite suburban space. Elite suburbs were an important element in bourgeois class identity (Nicolaides and Wiese 2006). They mention Llewellyn Park in New Jersey as a classic example.

Llewellyn Park is a wealthy suburb first established in 1857. Located twelve miles outside Manhattan in the foothills of the Orange Mountains in New Jersey, Llewellyn Park was designed with nature in mind. The owner and promoter of Llewellyn Park was Llewellyn Haskin, a dealer in pharmaceuticals in the Philadelphia and New York areas. He was a great admirer of nature, supporting the development of such spaces as New York's Central Park (Wilson 1979). He became close friends with architect Alexander Jackson Davis, who was famous for designing Gothic cottages, Italianate villas, and Greek and Tuscan townhouses. Haskin hired Davis to remodel his old farmhouse in the Orange Mountains in New Jersey, but this work soon greatly expanded to include a plan for a residential park. The idea for a picturesque suburb in the foothills of the Orange Mountains was born. Designed as a commuter suburb, many of the early settlers of Llewellyn Park were successful businessmen and professionals working in New York City.

Descriptions of Llewellyn Park are steeped in nature and note charming, scenic spaces. Richard Wilson (1979: 83) provides the following account: "Entering past the gate lodge the visitor found himself in a middle landscape composed of natural growths of oak, hickories, chestnuts, cedars, pines, and wildflowers. . . . The central feature was the Ramble . . . a 60-acre picturesque ravine honeycombed with paths and bridges that crossed the middle of the park, and contained a miniature Minnehaha Falls, and, at both ends, ornamental ponds. Bounding the Ramble were two roads, Tulip Avenue and Parkway, and winding off from them was a variety of drives that gave access to the terraces of housing sites."

This description depicts an Eden-like picture of paradise. First developed more than 150 years ago, Llewellyn Park is today still the embodiment of a particular community, lifestyle, and ideal. On the Web site of the homeowners' association of Llewellyn Park, the community is described as "truly a special place to live, offering community, privacy, peace, and

quiet—values that are all too rare in today's world. Our leafy enclave of 173 homes and estates is situated in West Orange, New Jersey, near Montclair, Maplewood, and Short Hills. Located close to New York City, this private gated community caters to those looking for a home where neighbors know and socialize with each other, children play together, and families stroll on parklike streets among rambling lawns and parks. In Llewellyn Park a desire for privacy is respected while still offering shared amenities."[1]

Even today, Llewellyn Park espouses several aspects of the elite suburban ideal. Residents of this exclusive suburb promote the qualities of privacy, nature, peacefulness, family, and quietness. One hundred fifty years have passed since the area was developed, yet these themes remain. Llewellyn Park has managed over more than a century and a half to maintain its high-income status and to espouse familiar values. Its wealth and bourgeois appeal has persevered.

Other similarly picturesque, elite suburbs developed around the same time as Llewellyn Park and also continue to exist as wealthy enclaves. Many are among the elite inner-ring suburbs identified in this cluster analysis. Examples in the Northeast and the Midwest regions include such inner-ring suburbs as Scarsdale and Bronxville outside New York; and Kenilworth, Winnetka, and Glencoe along Chicago's North Shore. Examples in the South include such inner-ring suburbs as Highland Park in Dallas; Chevy Chase outside Washington, D.C.; and Olmos Park in San Antonio, Texas. In the West, an example is Piedmont outside Oakland. These suburbs are old and wealthy, and, although many have been physically transformed to a greater extent than Llewellyn Park, they have each maintained a high-income status over many years.

Take Scarsdale, New York, for instance. This elite inner-ring suburb first developed in the 1890s as a commuter suburb of New York. Wealthy businessmen and professionals first settled there with their families at the end of the nineteenth century. Fearful that their newly found suburb would be absorbed into White Plains, a less-exclusive neighborhood, Scarsdale's residents pushed for and successfully achieved incorporation in 1915. Throughout much of Scarsdale's history, local residents utilized municipal powers and local ordinances to achieve the dual goals of minimizing the in-migration of low-income residents and preserving the suburb's pastoral setting, high-quality schools, and, above all, high property values (O'Connor

[1]Available at http://llewellynpark.com/.

1983). In the postwar period of mass suburbanization, Scarsdale sought to prevent the development of any look-alike housing by adopting ordinances forbidding repetition in the length and height of roofs, window and door placement, and the width of houses in a single neighborhood. Residents did not want any Levittown-style developments in their suburb (Teaford 2008); the housing stock was to maintain a much grander style. In describing the 1920s Berkley subdivision, Carol O'Connor states:

> [Developers] began to construct three houses. These served not as models in the usual sense, but as style-setters, which helped establish a tone of discreet wealth. Blending creativity with conformity, they offered variations on traditional themes. One house was a large colonial of seam-faced granite; another was typically Southern with tall white columns supporting a porch. The third was an English residence of stone construction with a turreted entrance tower and leaded windows. Inside, it has oak paneling in the living room and hall, a library of knotted pine, a dining room, kitchen, butler's pantry, five master bedrooms, five baths, and two rooms for the servants. . . . [Developers] had commissioned respected architects, hired skilled workers, and supplied high-grade materials. The resulting houses bespoke prestige and a sound investment. (1983: 47)

These "sound investments" and "style setters" have maintained their value. The median housing value in Scarsdale was about $700,000 in 2000, more than two and a half times the median housing value of other suburbs in the New York metropolitan area. Incorporation, high-grade housing, and close proximity to bustling New York City have helped Scarsdale preserve its exclusivity. Incorporation and resistance of annexation by the city have been central to the maintenance of some suburbs' elite status. Such inner-ring suburbs as Olmos Park in San Antonio and Highland Park and University in Dallas are completely surrounded by their respective cities, yet they are independent suburbs that have successfully resisted being absorbed into the city boundaries.

In general, elite inner-ring suburbs were developed to be exclusive, and they have remained exclusive. Echoing the suburban persistence model of suburban change, the social status of these suburbs has "persisted" over a long period of time. As social stratification theorists suggest,

many elite inner-ring suburbs wield their political power to minimize decline, maximize social stability, and maintain their high property values and lofty quality of life. These are the old inner-ring suburbs that continue to advance, and, unlike for some other older suburbs, age has been good to these areas.

Middle-Class Inner-Ring Suburbs

I classify about a third of inner-ring suburbs as "middle class." The median household income of the average middle-class inner-ring suburb was about $69,000, and the poverty rate was about 4 percent in 2000. The median household income of middle-class inner-ring suburbs was, on average, about the same as or 10 percent higher than the suburban median household income in the respective metropolitan areas. The Northeast and the Midwest had the most middle-class inner-ring suburbs, although proportionately (based on the total number of suburbs) the South and the West had more middle-class inner-ring suburbs than did the Midwest. On average, about eight out of every ten residents of middle-class inner-ring suburbs were white in 2000. However, these areas showed some regional variation in their racial and ethnic makeup.

Middle-class inner-ring suburbs of the Northeast and the Midwest were typically the whitest among regions. Those in the Midwest were scattered throughout different metropolitan areas, including Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, and Minneapolis. The Northeast's middle-class inner-ring suburbs were typically located in the metropolitan areas of New York, Boston, Pittsburgh, Providence, and Hartford, with a smattering around Philadelphia. On average, almost 90 percent of residents living in the Rust Belt's middle-class inner-ring suburbs was non-Hispanic white in 2000. A few middle-class black inner-ring suburbs were identified in the Northeast, especially in Long Island, New York. Otherwise, the overwhelming majority of middle-class inner-ring suburbs in this region resembled traditional white suburbs.

In the West and the South, middle-class inner-ring suburbs were much more diverse. In the West, only six out of every ten residents of these middle-class suburbs were non-Hispanic white in 2000. On average, in the West's middle-class suburbs, 15 percent of the population was Hispanic, and about 17 percent was Asian or some other ethnic group. Most of the West's mixed Hispanic and Asian middle-class inner-ring suburbs

were located in metropolitan areas of San Francisco and Los Angeles. A classic example is San Mateo, one of the largest suburbs outside San Francisco. The population of San Mateo was two-thirds non-Hispanic white, 15 percent Asian, and 20 percent Hispanic. The median household income of this suburb was about $64,700 in 2000.

In the South, about two-thirds of the population of middle-class suburbs were white, 14 percent was non-Hispanic black, and 11 percent was Hispanic in 2000. Most of the black middle-class inner-ring suburbs in the South were in the Washington, D.C., and Atlanta metropolitan areas. The South's Hispanic middle-class inner-ring suburbs were typically located in Florida's metropolitan areas of Miami and West Palm Beach or outside the Texas cities of Dallas and San Antonio. The emergence of middle-class and black suburbs around Washington, D.C., has been well noted (Hanlon, Short, and Vicino 2006). Examples include such suburbs as Camp Springs, Hillandale, and Cheverly outside Washington, D.C. In Cheverly, for instance, more than half the population was non-Hispanic black, and the median household income was about $65,600 in 2000.

Middle-class inner-ring suburbs evolved over a long period of time. Many, particularly those in the Northeast and the Midwest, first developed as suburbs for the wealthy and then the middle class. A classic example of this process is demonstrated by the inner-ring suburb of Catonsville, outside Baltimore City. Catonsville is located in Baltimore County, on the southwestern border with the city. It was first an elite suburb, largely populated with Victorian and Colonial summer houses for wealthy Baltimoreans of the early nineteenth century. These large houses still exist today and are typically situated in old, tree-lined streets, surrounded by plenty of green space and large yards and gardens. Parts of Catonsville conjure images of the elite suburban ideal—large houses strategically placed in pastoral, peaceful settings. Even today, the old Victorian and Colonial houses are very well maintained.

Beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an extensive network of streetcars developed to move people about Baltimore City and its surrounding suburbs. At the peak of Baltimore's streetcar era, about two thousand streetcars traveled four hundred miles of tracks to bring people around the city and from the suburbs to the city (Harwood 2003). The line along Frederick Road in Catonsville transported residents of this new bedroom suburb to the city of Baltimore. Eventually the automobile took over, and the streetcar tracks were converted to roads and

highways for the expanding suburbs of the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, Catonsville became a well-established middle-class bedroom community of Baltimore.

Baltimore City attempted to annex the newly sprouted suburb of Catonsville on different occasions. The last failed attempt was in 1918. Catonsville continues to be a suburban community within Baltimore County. It is not an independent, incorporated city. The Baltimore region is unique among most other metropolitan areas in the United States in that it has no incorporated suburban municipalities, and it has a strong county government structure. In 1995, Baltimore County established its Office of Community Conservation with the mission to enhance and preserve the older communities within its jurisdictional boundaries. Since its establishment, the Office of Community Conservation has targeted certain older communities that are showing clear signs of decline. Despite its age, Catonsville is not one of these targeted communities. This inner-ring suburb is noted as stable, maintaining a middle-class status since its early development.

Catonsville's median household income was about $53,000 in 2000, on par with surrounding suburbs. The poverty rate was about 4 percent the same year. The median housing value was about $141,000 in 2000, again equivalent to the suburban median housing value in the Baltimore metro area. About eight out of every ten residents were white in 2000, and one in very ten was African American. In recent years, Catonsville has experienced an in-migration of Asians, many students and faculty at the local university. Catonsville's old village center has shown some signs of decline as its smaller businesses struggle to compete with larger retail outlets in the suburbs beyond the inner ring. The new Asian immigrants have recently established a number of local businesses and restaurants that may stabilize the village's Main Street over time. Overall, Catonsville and other similar communities have evolved into middle-class inner-ring suburbs where the demographic structure has changed, but their social statuses have remained stable and middle class.

Vulnerable Inner-Ring Suburbs

I categorize about half the inner-ring suburbs as "vulnerable." The median household income of these suburbs was about $43,000 in 2000, about 22 percent below the suburban median household income within respective

metropolitan areas. About 10 percent of residents of these suburbs lived in poverty that same year. Vulnerable inner-ring suburbs, in general, experienced some decline between 1980 and 2000. In 1980, these suburbs had median household income levels 14 percent below the suburban median household income within their respective metropolitan areas, and 8 percent of the population lived in poverty that year.

These suburbs also experienced more racial and ethnic transition than middle-class and elite suburbs did. About seven out of every ten residents of vulnerable inner-ring suburbs were non-Hispanic white in 2000, a drop from more than eight out of every ten residents in 1980. On average, 16 percent of residents was non-Hispanic black, 7 percent was Hispanic, and about 5 percent was Asian or some other non-Hispanic ethnic group in 2000. These suburbs were much less diverse in 1980. The population was 10 percent non-Hispanic black, 3 percent Hispanic, and less than 2 percent Asian or some other non-Hispanic ethnic group that year.

Most of the vulnerable inner-ring suburbs were located in the Northeast and the Midwest. More than other regions, the Midwest had proportionately the most vulnerable inner-ring suburbs, and the West had the least. Among regions, the Northeast's vulnerable inner-ring suburbs were the whitest. Eight out of every ten residents of these suburbs were non-Hispanic white in 2000. Compare this to the other end of the spectrum in the West, where only roughly half the population of vulnerable inner-ring suburbs was non-Hispanic white that same year. The West's vulnerable inner-ring suburbs were an even mix of Asians and Hispanics, with some non-Hispanic blacks.

A number of vulnerable inner-ring suburbs were composed of blue-collar workers, largely in the Midwest and the Northeast regions. In 1980, more than one out of every four workers in the Midwest's vulnerable inner-ring suburbs were in manufacturing, declining to about one out of every ten workers by 2000. Similar statistics exist for the vulnerable inner-ring suburbs of the Northeast. Manufacturing has declined in these suburbs, but it is still a defining feature. Many of these vulnerable inner-ring suburbs are still rooted in their industrial pasts and have working-class identities. Some evolved around the mid-nineteenth century, when industry first located in the outskirts of large cities (Lewis 2004). At this time, heavy industry located in fringe areas of such cities as Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Detroit, Boston, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Cleveland, and others. In his classic study of streetcar suburbs, Samuel Warner (1962) notes that by

1900, the Boston metropolitan area was split between the central city and a suburban ring of industrial subcenters as well as residential homes. Old textile suburbs of Philadelphia emerged around the same time, as did the steel-manufacturing suburbs of Chicago. The most famous in Chicago was the suburb of Pullman, notorious for the production of railroad cars. Other early industrial suburbs include Ecorse outside Detroit; Granite City and Alton outside St. Louis; Milwaukee's Cudahy, Waukesha, and West Allis; and Lackawanna and North Tonawanda surrounding Buffalo.

Another classic example is Dundalk outside Baltimore City. Comprising mostly white, working-class families and located near a major steel-manufacturing plant in Sparrows Point, Dundalk is the epitome of the "gritty" suburb on the edge of the central city (Reutter 1988). Situated between the Patapsco and Bear Creek rivers in southeastern Baltimore County, for almost a hundred years Dundalk was the home of Bethlehem Steel Corporation until the company filed for bankruptcy in October 2001. Bethlehem Steel was bought by the Cleveland-based International Steel Group, Inc., for $1.55 billion in cash and assumed debt. The steel plant has since had a number of owners, the latest being Serverstal, a Russian steel producer. Upon selling, Bethlehem Steel Corporation said that its annual revenue had fallen by $1.3 billion by 1998 due to reduced demand for steel products and cheaper imports. In its heyday during the 1950s, Bethlehem Steel had employed some 30,000 steel workers at its Sparrows Point plant, whereas it employed a mere 4,000 people when it was sold to the International Steel Group. According to the latest figures, the old plant employs only 2,500 workers (Walker 2008).

With steel production and its location along the Chesapeake Bay, Dundalk became a hub of industrial, trade, and distribution activity. It was the location of many industries, some still existing and others now part of the suburb's industrial past. Over the years, two shipyards closed. Its General Motors plant shut down in 2005, and earlier large companies, such Western Electric and Lever Brothers, also closed. The ripple effects of these closures were felt by many smaller companies and surrounding businesses. The concentration of industrial corporations once provided ample employment for local residents, but, with the closure of several plants as well as technological advancements in steel production, formerly well-paying union jobs for local residents are now hard to come by. The old Bethlehem Steel furnace still burns with the ability to produce more steel than ever, but with far fewer workers.

In the most recent economic downturn, the plant has produced little steel. Like other companies, Serverstal is waiting in anticipation for the potential benefits of the federal government's 2009 economic stimulus package. In February 2009, Congress passed a $787-billion recovery bill that included plans to invest heavily in infrastructure projects. Steelworkers in Dundalk are left hoping this economic boost will stimulate the need for steel products; otherwise, workers will likely face layoffs. Serverstal recently shutdown its Wheeling, West Virginia, plant, and, although there are no immediate plans to halt operations at Sparrows Point, the threat looms large.

Unemployment in communities like Dundalk has been the downside of a more general decline in heavy industry. Dundalk has experienced dramatic declines in manufacturing employment, particularly since the 1970s. In 1970, about half of Dundalk's workers were employed in manufacturing. By 2000, manufacturing employment had declined to just 16 percent of total employment. Unemployment rates were 6 percent for white males and more than 16 percent for African American males by 2000. As with many working-class inner-ring suburbs, Dundalk has experienced the effects of deindustrialization. With the loss of its industrial base, this suburb has experienced income declines and poverty increases. The median family income in 1969 was $48,464 (in 1999 dollars), which declined to $46,035 in 1999. The poverty rate doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent between 1969 and 1999.

Another offshoot of deindustrialization is environmental degradation. Dundalk and other inner-ring suburbs are scattered with old industrial sites, some vacant, derelict brownfields. Brownfields are contaminated or perceived-to-be-contaminated vacant industrial sites that are typically difficult to redevelop. Of the land area of Dundalk, 120 acres (or 12 percent) are industrial, 20 acres of which were vacant in 2003. Large brownfields are often listed as "Superfund sites," a federal designation that denotes hazardous waste sites. Sparrows Point is one of the largest in the nation. The Superfund National Priorities List contains 370 suburban and 160 urban brownfield sites. These suburban sites are located in many working-class inner-ring suburbs around such cities as Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago. Contending with the aftermath of deindustrialization is a major challenge. The redevelopment of brownfields is a difficult and arduous task. Idle industrial land exacerbates decline, affecting local housing values.

Houses in Dundalk were built slowly over time, with much of the housing constructed in the 1950s when steel production and industrial activity were at their highest levels. Dundalk, like other working-class inner-ring suburbs, comprises a large number of postwar houses. One in every four houses in Dundalk was built in the 1950s. In Dundalk, much of the earliest housing is located in the historic district, the heart of the suburb and the main shopping area. Symbolically located there is the Strand Theatre, a once-popular movie theater that first opened in 1938 and is now the location of a dollar store. For local residents, this change is a symbol of the suburb's more recent struggles.

Dundalk is extremely vulnerable. Disinvestment occurred with the loss of the suburb's industrial base. The housing stock is now outdated, and, in recent decades, racial and ethnic tension has increased. Dundalk has always espoused a white identity. Deed restrictions in the suburb's early history ensured racial homogeneity. Blacks are still segregated to Turner's Station, a small neighborhood on Dundalk's south side. Navigating the growing visibility of nonwhites has been a challenge for Dundalk's white working-class residents, and conservative local politicians and others have fed the perception that Dundalk's troubles are because of in-coming racial and ethnic minorities (Neidt 2006).

In late 1993, Baltimore City, in cooperation with a suburban nonprofit agency called the Community Action Network, sought to become part of the recently initiated U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program. MTO was a pilot, federally initiated, poverty-deconcentration program aimed at dispersing primarily African American public housing residents to different city and suburban neighborhoods. In 1994, news broke of the plan, and neighborhood groups in Dundalk and other communities in suburban Baltimore County rallied to prevent the pilot program. There was near panic that thousands of African Americans and other minorities would be flooding Dundalk from the inner city. The perceived threat of subsidized housing was a major concern among homeowners, local businesses, and neighborhood associations in Dundalk. Much of the panic and concern was exploited by local politicians and primarily Republican candidates who were winding up for local primary elections.

To this day, there is still marked unease about the rising rental market and the influx, real or perceived, of Section 8 voucher holders—welfare recipients for whom rent is subsidized. The negative perception of public

housing, renters, and Section 8 is layered with racial stereotypes. According to the Dundalk Renaissance Corporation—the suburb's community development corporation—Dundalk has the highest concentration of Section 8 rentals among Baltimore's suburbs. Whether Section 8 or not, rental housing is on the rise. At the same time, homeownership is on the decline, and housing values are dropping in Dundalk.

In 2005, in *Thompson v. HUD,* a federal judge ruled that HUD violated fair housing laws by failing to desegregate public housing in Baltimore City. U.S. District Court Judge Marvin J. Garbis ordered HUD to develop a regional approach to deconcentrating public-housing recipients to suburbs beyond the city. Surrounding suburbs were not part of the lawsuit, and the question remains of how receptive they will be to participating in a regional solution. Are wealthy outer suburbs willing to open their doors to low-income families? Or will already-vulnerable inner-ring suburbs be the only suburbs where poorer families can afford to live? If the latter occurs, is it possible that these vulnerable inner-ring suburbs will become places of poverty reconcentration? A more difficult but more meaningful solution to the problem of poverty concentration would be to implement regionwide inclusionary zoning and affordable housing so that low-income families would have more choices about where to live. These places should include wealthy outer suburbs, not only vulnerable inner-ring suburbs, such as Dundalk.

Vulnerability to decline is not only an issue for traditionally industrial communities, such as Dundalk. Some vulnerable inner-ring suburbs have a working-class identity, but others are more middle class and still susceptible to socioeconomic decline. A telling example is Cleveland Heights. Similar to Catonsville outside Baltimore, Cleveland Heights first developed as a retreat for the wealthy of Cleveland and then expanded more fully with the advent of the streetcar. In the early 1890s, the Lake View Cemetery streetcar line was extended into Cleveland Heights in anticipation of new middle-class residential developments. By 1910, the population of Cleveland Heights was about 5,000; with much of the new housing along streetcar lines, the population rose to more than 15,300 by 1920. Cleveland Heights became an independent suburban municipality in 1922. Its population continued to grow, tripling to 50,945 residents by 1930. Its population peaked during the early postwar years: In 1950, the population was 59,988 (Keating 1994).

Blacks began moving into Cleveland Heights in the early 1960s, most typically to neighborhoods in the northeastern part of the suburb, bordering East Cleveland. Racial integration in Cleveland Heights has been and continues to be a tremendous struggle. The first major sign of racial strife occurred with the 1965 firebombing of the home of the director of Karamu House, a black theater and arts center (Keating 1994). Heights Citizens for Human Rights, seeking to promote racial integration, formed shortly afterward in response to rising racial tension. In 1972, Heights Community Congress formed to more fully endorse a racially integrated community. One of its primary goals was to ensure an open and fair housing market, and, in 1976, it pushed the city council of Cleveland Heights to adopt a nine-point plan "to promote the city as a well-maintained full service residential community and to prevent racial segregation" (Keating 1994: 125). This nine-point plan continues to serve as a major element of Cleveland Heights' diversity policy (Keating 2008).

Cleveland Heights recognizes that fair housing is an essential part of racial integration. Few other suburbs have been so forward thinking. Another exception in this regard is Oak Park in Illinois. Oak Park and Cleveland Heights serve as national examples of suburbs that have actively encouraged racial and ethnic diversity. In the case of Oak Park, the suburb adopted a nondiscriminatory housing ordinance in 1968 to prevent the use of "for sale" signs to scare whites into selling their homes to the incoming black population. Oak Park has over the years sought to prevent racial steering and segregation by actively promoting residential cohesion among people of different racial backgrounds. Oak Park, like Cleveland Heights, prides itself on being racially progressive.

Efforts to maintain racial integration have proven difficult in both suburbs. In the case of Cleveland Heights, 52 percent of the population was non-Hispanic white and 42 percent was non-Hispanic black in 2000. Yet blacks are typically segregated into some neighborhoods *within* Cleveland Heights. According to a recent study of Cleveland Heights by Dennis Keating (2008), in four of the five northernmost census tracts bordering the majority black East Cleveland, blacks were in the majority in 2000. In three of these same tracts, more than eight out of every ten residents were black. Meanwhile, other neighborhoods in Cleveland Heights are predominantly white. Of the suburb's twenty-one census tracts, nine were majority white. Only three census tracts had populations evenly mixed with both

races in 2000 (Keating 2008). Despite its leadership in promoting fair housing, Cleveland Heights has found it difficult to ensure racial integration at the neighborhood level.

This integration has become increasingly more difficult as the suburb has turned its attention to redevelopment and to increasing its competitive position among Cleveland's suburbs, particularly those on the outer fringe (Keating 2008). Like other older suburbs, Cleveland Heights has, in recent times, experienced population loss and a reduction in its local tax base. Cleveland Heights, along with neighboring older suburbs, such as Shaker Heights, University Heights, and Lakewood, has lost population, while the outer suburbs of the Cleveland area have grown. According to the 2000 census, 49,958 people were living in Cleveland Heights. A recount of this 2000 figure was demanded by the suburb's law director because of concerns regarding federal funding: In order to be eligible for many federal programs, the population of a city must be 50,000 or more. After the recount, the suburb's population was adjusted to 50,769, still 6 percent below the population in 1990 (Morton 2002).

In trying to deal with the fiscal effects of a declining population, the local government suggested increasing the suburb's income tax in the spring of 2008, but this proposal was rejected by voters. Struggling with city finances, the local government has focused on attracting and retaining high-quality commercial businesses and high-income residents. Based on the suburb's 2001 vision report, Cleveland Heights has continued to move toward revitalizing its aging housing stock and declining commercial areas. The suburb has also been involved in such initiatives as developing new housing, mostly aimed at higher-income inhabitants; offering incentives for the redevelopment of local storefronts and streetscape improvements; enhancing the suburb's McCain Park; and encouraging new commercial ventures, such as the redevelopment of Severance Town Center (Keating 2008; Morton 2002). In 1986, Cleveland Heights' city hall relocated to the periphery of the old Severance mall in an effort to boost commercial activity there (Morton 2002). The mall area still struggled until, in 1998, the old Severance mall was demolished. The new structure that replaced it was anchored by big-box stores, such as Walmart and Home Depot, and a large cinema complex. New housing developed around the new town center. Cleveland Heights sees such redevelopment as a way to increase its local tax base, to improve the quality of life for its residents, and, ultimately, to compete with newer suburbs on the metropolitan fringe.

Cleveland Heights well recognizes its vulnerability to decline. In 1996, it initiated the formation of the Northeast Ohio First Suburbs Consortium, a conglomeration of older suburbs in the Cleveland area. This consortium advocates the redevelopment and maintenance of older suburbs around Cleveland and seeks to limit development and sprawl in the metropolitan fringe areas. Efforts have focused on revamping older housing in northeastern Ohio's inner-ring suburbs by offering below-market financing to assist homeowners. The consortium has also opposed continued highway development that tends to encourage sprawl and the out-migration of residents from older to newer suburbs. A recent concern for the consortium as well as the suburb of Cleveland Heights is the problem of housing foreclosures. The Northeast Ohio First Suburbs Consortium recently formed a development council involved in a grant-funded project to provide suburban homeowners with predatory lending counseling and to help prevent foreclosures. According to Keating's study, by 2008, more than eight hundred homes in Cleveland Heights were vacant, mostly due to foreclosures. This is a major problem for a suburb already vulnerable to decline.

Overall, many inner-ring suburbs are vulnerable to decline. Some of these suburbs are largely working-class communities that have witnessed the negative effects of deindustrialization. Others are middle-class communities that are losing out to suburbs on the metropolitan fringe.

Ethnic Inner-Ring Suburbs

A small percentage of inner-ring suburbs is what I term "ethnic." These inner-ring suburbs are struggling postwar suburbs that are typically poorer than other suburbs. On average, the median household income of ethnic inner-ring suburbs was $39,000 in 2000, or 75 percent of the median household income of neighboring suburbs in their metropolitan areas. The poverty rate that year was 18 percent. About one in every four residents of these suburbs was foreign born in 2000. Only 23 percent of residents was non-Hispanic white. Almost two-thirds of the population were Hispanic, and another 10 percent was non-Hispanic black. The median value of housing in these crisis suburbs was $150,000 in 2000, only 75 percent of the median housing value of neighboring suburbs of the same metropolitan area.

Some regions include more ethnic inner-ring suburbs than others. The Midwest has the least, and the West has the most. In each of the census regions, Hispanics are the dominant ethnic group in these suburbs. In the

West, more than two-thirds of ethnic inner-ring suburban residents were Hispanic, and almost four out of ten were foreign born in 2000. Ethnic inner-ring suburbs in the South are mostly in Miami–Fort Lauderdale, with some in Dallas–Forth Worth and around Houston. Again, these suburbs were largely Hispanic in 2000, and about 40 percent of residents was foreign born.

The Northeast's ethnic inner-ring suburbs are largely in the New York metropolitan area. On average, four out of every ten residents were foreign born, almost half the population was Hispanic, and 10 percent was non-Hispanic black in 2000. Examples include such places as Brentwood and New Cassel in Long Island, New York. In New Cassel, four out of every ten residents were Hispanic, and another 40 percent was non-Hispanic black in 2000. About 15 percent of the population lived in poverty that year. In Brentwood, more than half the population was Hispanic, and about one out of every ten residents lived in poverty. The median household income level in Brentwood was 20 percent below the suburban median household income for the New York area. The postwar suburbs of Brentwood and New Cassel are very different from the Levittown-type suburbs that first developed in Long Island in the 1950s.

In the Midwest, one out of every four residents was Hispanic, and one-third of the population was foreign born. The Midwest's ethnic suburbs are largely located in the Chicago metropolitan area. A classic example is Stone Park. Half the population of this Chicago inner-ring suburb was foreign born in 2000, mostly from Mexico. About four out of every ten workers in Stone Park were employed in manufacturing industries. In fact, across the nation, many of the workers of ethnic suburbs are manufacturing workers. On average, 20 percent of the workforce of ethnic inner-ring suburbs was employed in manufacturing in 2000. Among these suburbs in the Midwest, about 25 percent of all workers was in manufacturing.

The overwhelming majority of the West's ethnic inner-ring suburbs are located in Los Angeles. Examples include such places as Walnut Park, Lennox, and Avocado Heights. The population of these suburbs was largely Hispanic, with each experiencing an increase in the number of immigrants. Lennox, which lies close to Los Angeles International Airport, is a hub that draws immigrants from across the globe to work in nearby hotels, restaurants, and other poorly paid service jobs. Lennox was once described as a "late Twentieth Century company town" where a "Third World servant

class of maids, waiters, and others" live to serve and cater to the international tourism hub of the Los Angeles area (McDonnell 1995). Poor and struggling, Lennox is similar to other ethnic postwar suburbs in Los Angeles. About a third of the population of Lennox lived in poverty in 2000, and the median household income was a mere $28,200.

Suburbs like Lennox are the location of postwar ticky-tacky structures, or what Mike Davis (2005) refers to as "throwaway architecture." Almost half the housing stock in these suburbs was built between 1950 and 1969. Immigrants arrive in these suburbs in search of jobs and affordable housing. Comprising mostly cheap postwar housing, ethnic inner-ring suburbs provide the first initial step in the search for upward mobility for many newly arriving immigrants to the United States. These suburbs are very different from the traditional image of suburbia. They are now home to a different type of pioneer than the original white, lower- to middle-class Americans who first settled in these areas in the 1950s. These ethnic inner-ring suburbs are the new places of struggle in the global era.

Summary Comments

Often, inner-ring suburbs are perceived as homogenous entities, but, as this typology demonstrates, these suburbs really are varied. Some are very wealthy, elite suburbs; some are ethnic; many are middle class; and most of them are vulnerable to decline or are already in crisis. Tension often exists between inner-ring suburbs and outer suburbs, but inner-ring suburbs also compete with one another for resources. Immigrants and other poor minorities are excluded from elite inner-ring suburbs, and many poor minorities are segregated into specific suburban neighborhoods rather than spread evenly across the suburban landscape. This is the case among inner-ring suburbs as well as between inner-ring and outer suburbs. Also, inner-ring suburbs vary in terms of population and function. Those that were predominantly industrial suburbs have unduly suffered in recent decades. With deindustrialization, many of these working-class inner-ring suburbs have become vulnerable to decline as runaway industries moved overseas or to the outer suburban areas. This typology underscores the fact that inner-ring suburbs, first built as bedroom communities in the postwar period and earlier, have evolved into places with varied characteristics, assets, and problems.

9

Fixing Inner-Ring Suburbs

The existence and effectiveness of suburban reinvestment strategies are an understudied area in the academic literature (Lucy and Phillips 2000b). Few studies have been done to determine what approaches have been taken, and even fewer attempts have been made to decipher the potential impacts of reinvestment or redevelopment of inner-ring suburbs on any meaningful scale. Some studies have examined strategies for particular metropolitan regions. A recent example is a study of local policies to revitalize Baltimore's inner-ring suburbs (Vicino 2007). This study documents the positive effects of Baltimore County's investment in its old suburbs. According to this study, the county's reinvestment strategies were well-tailored to each inner-ring suburb and focused on revitalizing housing and local infrastructure. This study's results show that plans for each suburb were useful in designing specific strategies and policies. What this study suggests is that declining suburbs, even within the same metropolitan area, have many unique features, issues, and problems. One plan may work in one suburb but not in another.

Specific planning options that address decline in unique areas would take far more than just a chapter to adequately address and are,

in many respects, far better suited to case analysis. Therefore, in this chapter, I focus on critically assessing broad policy initiatives rather than determining the effectiveness of specific reinvestment programs or assessing solutions on a suburb-by-suburb basis. Broad types of policies related to decline among inner-ring suburbs exist at various levels of government. I explore different policies that, often inadvertently, and in most respects inadequately, deal with the issue of decline among inner-ring suburbs.

National Policy

Currently, little in the way of national urban policy is aimed specifically at curbing decline in U.S. metropolitan areas, and, since the 1980s, federal assistance to declining cities has been greatly reduced (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2004). The few existing federal programs aimed at urban decline include such initiatives as the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), Urban Action Grants, Empowerment Zone funding, and Hope VI projects. These initiatives focus on revitalizing central cities. As they stand, they have little impact on many inner-ring suburbs, since these areas often do not qualify for federal monies targeted to the most deprived metropolitan communities (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002; Puentes and Orfield 2002).

For instance, the CDBG program funds a variety of development projects benefiting low- and moderate-income areas. Municipalities with populations over fifty thousand are entitled to an annual CDBG grant. Unfortunately, many suburban communities have fewer than fifty thousand residents and therefore are not eligible for direct allocations. The Hope VI program focuses on redesigning public-housing projects. Through Hope VI, federal monies have been used for large-scale redevelopment or demolition of public housing. However, public-housing projects are generally not located in inner-ring suburbs. Inner-ring suburbs are largely composed of privately owned, single-family residences, and therefore Hope VI initiatives have little impact in these areas. The Empowerment Zone program offers tax incentives for businesses in designated communities. Beginning with eight cities in 1994, the Empowerment Zone program grew to include fifteen more cities in 1999, followed by an additional nine cities in 2001. So far, Empowerment Zone communities are urban rather than suburban. In short, current federal programs to alleviate distress in communities do not cater to ailing inner-ring suburbs.

So far, only one failed attempt has been made on a federal level to provide assistance specifically to inner-ring suburbs. In May 2005, Senator Hillary Clinton introduced the Suburban Core Opportunity Restoration and Enhancement (SCORE) Act (S.1024) with a companion bill in the House of Representatives (H.R. 2347), which was cosponsored by congressional representatives Peter King (R-NY) and Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY). The SCORE Act would offer economic and tax incentives to revitalize older suburbs across the nation. The core of this bill would provide $250 million in a "reinvestment fund," a federal trust fund to provide grants to ailing suburban communities seeking reinvestment dollars. However, SCORE never became law, because it was rejected by the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. It is too early to say whether this bill will be reintroduced. If it is reintroduced and passes, it would have to provide more than $250 million to make a meaningful difference to declining suburbs.

In many respects, the SCORE bill is symbolic rather than substantive. Large-scale reinvestment to revitalize older suburbs requires a far greater fiscal commitment than the proposed $250 million. Even Senator Clinton, the main sponsor of the SCORE bill, acknowledged the lack of federal support. She stated, "Because we identify suburban communities as archetypes of American prosperity, suburbia as a whole has not attracted much federal attention. . . . So resources for development and investment, ideas of concern to suburbs, have really been on the back burner, if on any burner at all" (Clinton 2006).

In conclusion, it is fair to say that a national policy aimed specifically at alleviating decline among inner-ring suburbs is sorely lacking, although one could argue that SCORE, although limited, at least indicates recognition of the problem of suburban decline among some national leaders. Time will tell if the new administration headed by President Barack Obama will initiate federal policies to address problems in the inner ring. One policy area of focus for the new administration is infrastructure redevelopment. In February 2009, President Obama signed into law a $787-billion economic stimulus package in an attempt to turn around the flailing U.S. economy. Some of this money is aimed at providing tax breaks for individuals and businesses as well as providing direct aid to state governments. A total of about $200 billion is set aside to modernize and to update the nation's infrastructure. Investing federal dollars to encourage infrastructure redevelopment within aging inner-ring suburbs has not been specifically mentioned in discussions on the stimulus package, but it seems that older

parts of the metropolitan United States might benefit from this type of strategy. At this point, however, suburban communities in particular will not benefit in any specific ways.

State Policy

With decline in federal aid, ailing cities have turned to states for much-needed funding. State-government action to address urban problems has become increasingly important, especially with the devolution of federal government programs. However, with a loss of population, cities have also witnessed a decline in their political strength in state legislatures (Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom 2005). As a consequence, cities find it increasingly difficult to press their cases for state initiatives directed specifically to decline within their jurisdictional boundaries. Inner-ring suburbs face similar challenges. In fact, compared to central cities, declining suburbs lack the political visibility and professional staff needed to successfully lobby for state funding.

At this time, no specific state legislation is aimed exclusively at the problem of decline among inner-ring suburbs. Decline among inner-ring suburbs is not part of an explicit legislative agenda at the state level. It is not addressed in any direct manner by states but rather through three fairly broad policy areas: (1) growth management, (2) rehabilitation of aging housing stock, and (3) community redevelopment. In the following sections, I critically assess relevant initiatives within these policy arenas.

Growth Management

Policies addressing decline among inner-ring suburbs often exist in the framework of "smart growth." Definitions of smart growth are varied (e.g., see Smart Growth America 2003; Vermont Forum on Sprawl 2003), but, in their broadest sense, smart-growth policies are characterized as strategies aimed at curbing another ill-defined concept, urban sprawl. In the process of combating sprawl, smart-growth policies encourage the redevelopment of inner-ring core areas and the development of infill sites closer to the urban core area rather on the outer fringe (Downs 2001). The 2002 American Planning Association report, *Planning for Smart Growth: 2002 State of the States,* surveys various growth-management policies across different states. According to this report, a quarter of states are implementing

moderate to substantial smart-growth planning reforms, including Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.

Smart-growth initiatives in these and other states advocate reinvestment in existing infrastructure in older communities rather than building new infrastructure. The use and repair of existing public infrastructure is one of the features for managing growth and redeveloping older communities. Publicly supported infrastructure includes such features as transportation networks, sewer and water, schools, and parks. In the case of Maryland, for instance, using this existing public infrastructure is explicitly stated in its smart-growth legislation.

At the core of Maryland's smart-growth legislation is the 1997 Smart Growth Areas Act. This legislation designates parts of the traditional core of Maryland's urban development as "priority funding areas" deemed appropriate for publicly funded resources. Priority funding areas (PFAs) are areas already developed and planned for growth. PFAs do not represent regulatory instruments that demand containment of development; instead, they attempt to use the incentive of state funding to curb growth. Figure 9.1 illustrates the location of PFAs in Maryland. PFAs are, in part, composed of the older suburbs of the Baltimore and Washington metropolitan areas. Major state road, sewer, school, and other related funds are steered toward these older communities where infrastructure is already in place.

Other states have similarly directed funding to existing communities in what are termed "fix-it-first" infrastructure policies. These strategies aim to build upon and to repair existing infrastructure rather than providing investment for creating new infrastructure. For example, Delaware, through the Livable Delaware initiative, guides growth to areas that are most prepared to accept it. Similar to Maryland's smart-growth initiative, the goal is to encourage infill development and redevelopment in older places. Livable Delaware promotes school rehabilitation and construction in areas that fall in line with the state's land-use policies. A priority in terms of land-use policy is the promotion of existing infrastructure above public investment in new infrastructure.

Questions remain over how effective smart-growth policies are in alleviating sprawl and encouraging redevelopment. Debates continue, but it generally has proven tremendously difficult to prevent continuing fringe development, and, although it is still an open question, one could argue that any redevelopment that occurred in older suburbs would have occurred



FIGURE 9.1 Priority funding areas in Maryland. *(Maryland Department of Planning.)*

regardless of smart-growth policies. In a study of urban growth in forty-nine states, Jerry Anthony (2004) finds that many smart-growth policies did not reduce sprawl. He points out that growth-management plans are often voluntary at the local level, and therefore very few jurisdictions adopt such plans. He determines that local governments need to support state-mandated measures for them to be effective.

In the last decade, Maryland has become the national leader in the smart-growth movement (Burchell, Listokin, and Galley 2000). Maryland's smart-growth initiatives aimed at encouraging redevelopment and infill development in older communities are incentive based rather than regulatory (Cohen 2001). In this sense, local governments are encouraged rather than mandated to implement smart-growth policies. This is similarly the case with other state smart-growth programs (Weitz 1999). Smart growth, in general, continues to be largely ineffective as long as local governments maintain exclusive power over local zoning and land use. Smart-growth policies preserve local autonomy over land-use decisions. If local governments do not want to embrace smart-growth initiatives, additional development in the outer suburbs basically continues at the expense of inner-ring areas. In this sense, if local-government decisions continue to promote growth within certain jurisdictions, decline is likely to continue in those suburbs that lose out to these growing areas.

Rehabilitation of Aging Housing Stock

States recognize that the deterioration of local housing stock in older areas is a problem. Statewide policies aimed at the rehabilitation of aging housing stock typically come in the form of assistance to local governments and community groups and tax breaks to local homeowners. In the case of Maryland, for instance, the Community Legacy program is central to this initiative. Community Legacy provides local governments and community-development organizations with funding to encourage, among other things, homeownership and housing rehabilitation in communities within priority funding areas. For instance, the older suburb of Dundalk near Baltimore City has been the focus of local housing investment. Introduced in 2005, Maryland, through Community Legacy, provided Dundalk Renaissance Corporation (DRC), a local community-development corporation, with funding to acquire residential properties in the area. DRC is using this money to rehabilitate older housing, and, once rehabbed, the plans are to sell these houses to moderate-income families. As of early 2008, six houses in the historic section of Dundalk had been acquired and renovated. As this number suggests, the rehabilitation process is slow.

Other states have similarly focused on housing-redevelopment initiatives, offering financial incentives for residents to renovate older housing. For instance, the state of Missouri offers tax credits to renovate historic developments as part of the 1999 Neighborhood Preservation Act. This act provides tax incentives to homeowners who invest in the repair and the improvement of older housing in the suburbs of St. Louis. In Minnesota, the state legislature enacted the *This Old House* program in 1993 to provide owners of older homes in suburbs around Minneapolis with incentives to renovate their properties. In 2001, Rhode Island approved a bill providing tax credits to individuals or organizations that renovate historic buildings for residential use. Up to 30 percent of the rehabilitation costs of projects involving certified historic structures qualifies for credit.

These state-level housing programs recognize the need for rehabilitation of the aging housing stock, some of which exists in older suburban communities. Again, as with smart-growth initiatives, these programs are typically incentive based. Extensive use of these incentives by individual homeowners may occur in selected areas that offer employment oppor-

tunities and a reasonably healthy housing market. Unfortunately, in less popular locations, it is more difficult to encourage private reinvestment in aging housing stock. Dundalk, a working-class community outside Baltimore City, is a case in point. Residents can receive incentives, but few take advantage of them, and rehabilitation by the local community-development corporation has practically come to a standstill in the current "soft" housing market. The recent foreclosure crisis has greatly impacted housing rehabbing efforts. Market forces greatly outweigh any policy initiatives, such as low-interest loans or tax breaks.

Community Redevelopment

States attempt to spur reinvestment particularly in underutilized commercial and industrial properties in cities and inner-ring suburbs. In the case of industrial properties, these incentives often occur under the rubric of brownfield redevelopment. Brownfields are underutilized industrial lands that are contaminated or perceived to be contaminated. Redevelopment of contaminated land has historically been pursued as a means of revitalizing declining neighborhoods and creating jobs and, more recently, as a way to discourage suburban sprawl (Greenberg et al. 2001). States encourage the cleanup and redevelopment of these sites for economic, environmental, and growth-management purposes. For instance, Pennsylvania, through implementation of its 1995 Land Recycling program, encourages voluntary cleanup of contaminated industrial and commercial sites. Releasing property owners from future liability, this program offers grants and loans to encourage businesses to redevelop underutilized properties as a way to improve the environment and to encourage economic growth in older communities.

Many states have similarly structured programs, and, in many instances, these programs are part of the overall smart-growth package of initiatives. In the case of Maryland's 1997 smart-growth legislation, the Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup and Revitalization Incentive program was established to stimulate the reuse of contaminated properties in older areas of the state. Loans and grants are offered to owners for site cleanup. Once becoming part of the program, owners are relieved of liability. According to local officials, to date this program has not been widely utilized to redevelop sites in the older suburbs of Baltimore. Owners are not taking advantage

of available funding or loans for redevelopment, because they do not want to stigmatize their property as a contaminated site. Local government officials suspect that the fear of liability among property owners and potential purchasers of old industrial sites is a strong barrier to brownfield redevelopment (Klots 2005). In a study of brownfield redevelopment in New Jersey, scholars interviewed a number of local officials and found they had a similar perception (Greenberg et al. 2000). These scholars suggest that brownfield redevelopment is a daunting task. Successful brownfield redevelopment is highly contingent on the site being in a good location with limited contamination. These conditions are not always the case with old industrial areas of declining, working-class inner-ring suburbs.

Aside from industrial sites, Maryland, through its Community Legacy program, also encourages the redevelopment of commercial properties in older areas. Operated by the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, the Community Legacy program is designed to assist established "at-risk" communities where decline and disinvestment occurs and to offer assistance to these communities if they are located in the priority funding areas. The program provided $10 million statewide for fiscal year 2002 (Puentes and Orfield 2002). Funding is used to support a variety of capital and noncapital projects, including public infrastructure for redevelopment projects, land acquisition, streetscape improvements and the development of mixed-use ventures. The older suburb of Takoma Park, for instance, was awarded $28,000 through the Community Legacy program to improve the façade of various businesses along the New Hampshire Avenue corridor heading into Washington, D.C.—not a lot of money, but at least a start.

However, the effects of such streetscape improvements and other community-level redevelopment projects within older suburbs on the community and population outcomes are currently unknown (Vicino 2007). William Lucy and David Phillips (2000a, 2006) suggest that Arlington and Alexandria, both older suburbs of Washington, D.C., have greatly benefited from strategies that stimulated high-density mixed-use development near transit stations, emphasized the preservation of historic buildings, and stressed walkability. State-funded community-conservation efforts have definite roles, but knowledge on the specifics regarding what works and does not work is currently unavailable, and, more importantly, the impacts on the local population have yet to be determined.

Regional Coalitions

In his study of U.S. suburbs, Myron Orfield (2002) argues that ailing inner-ring suburbs share problems similar to those of central cities, and therefore cities and suburbs should cooperate politically to confront decline. He advocates city-suburban coalitions as a means of tackling socioeconomic problems within cities and suburbs. Margaret Weir, Harold Wolman, and Todd Swanstrom (2005) conducted a study, in part, to determine whether cities and suburbs are involved in such coalition building. Based on a series of interviews with lobbyists, legislators, and other knowledgeable informants in four different states, they find a lack of political cooperation between cities and suburbs. They state, "This article has shown that big city mayors, preoccupied with autonomy and the immediate fiscal condition of city government, are unlikely to lead the way in metropolitan reform. The mayors we studied were preoccupied with the immediate fiscal condition of city government. Moreover, when mayors did reach out politically to suburbs, the suburbs were often reluctant to join for fear of being dominated by city interests" (2005: 741).

Building partnerships among local jurisdictions is a difficult task. According to Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom (2005), one area of promise is the recent development of new coalitions among suburbs. They suggest that suburban coalitions, such as the Ohio "first-tier" suburbs consortia in the metropolitan areas of Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus, offer new possibilities of political collaboration among suburbs with similar problems and interests. These coalitions "join more than 34 inner suburban municipalities, representing a total population of about 750,000, making them a formidable force the state legislature cannot afford to ignore" (2005: 755).

First-tier suburbs consortia highlight recent attempts to take a regional approach to encouraging redevelopment in declining inner suburbs (Puentes 2006). This has been a particular strategy in metropolitan areas that are politically fragmented. A recent survey of midwestern metropolitan areas identified first-suburban coalitions in eight metropolitan areas: Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Detroit, Kansas City, Minneapolis, and Wisconsin (Puentes 2006). Table 9.1 provides a list of these coalitions. As this table indicates, many were formed in recent years. The Northeast Ohio First Suburbs Consortium in the Cleveland metropolitan area offers a telling example (see Keating and Bier 2008). This is an association of

TABLE 9.1 INNER-RING SUBURBAN COALITIONS IN THE MIDWEST

Metro area	Coalition	Year formed	Number of municipalities represented
Chicago	South Suburban Mayors and Managers Association	1978	42
Cincinnati	First Suburbs Consortium of Southwest Ohio	2003	13
Cleveland	Northeast Ohio First Suburbs Consortium	1996	16
Columbus	Central Ohio First Suburbs Consortium	1999	5
Detriot	Michigan Suburbs Alliance	2002	23
Kansas City	First Suburbs Coalition	2002	19
Minneapolis	North Metro Mayors Association	1987	22
Wisconsin	Wisconsin Alliance of Cities	1969	38

local-government officials that represent mature, suburban communities outside Cleveland, Ohio. The consortium's goals are to acquire funding to maintain and to develop local-infrastructure needs in these communities and to promote incentives to encourage economic development. The local governments of the Northeast Ohio First Suburbs Consortium contend that, by banding together rather than competing, they can best alleviate decline in their communities. According to Robert Puentes (2006), midwestern first-suburban coalitions generally have five core issues around which they are engaged: (1) redevelopment and reinvestment, (2) transportation, (3) municipal revenues, (4) outreach, and (5) implementation of eminent domain.

Redevelopment and reinvestment are the primary goals of each coalition. Most coalitions are also focused on seeking funding for transit projects they feel will directly benefit their needs. First-suburban officials believe that public transportation is central to the needs of local residents. The fiscal health of first-suburban communities is also of grave concern. Many are worried about state-revenue cuts, school funding, and local-government funding assistance.

These coalitions are also heavily involved in increasing the attention paid to the particular needs and challenges of first suburbs. They reach out to state legislatures and to similar suburbs in other metropolitan areas. Finally, these organizations are concerned about initiatives that attempt to undermine their powers of eminent domain. They see these condemnation powers as important for economic development purposes.

The formation of inner-ring suburban coalitions is a new idea, still in the early stages of development. Therefore, it is difficult to fully determine their effectiveness in alleviating decline within their jurisdictional bound-

aries. At this point, little research compares the effectiveness of coalition strategies versus strategies being implemented by lone first-suburban governments. A central question is whether these consortia of first suburbs can succeed without input and support from outer suburbs and state government. Dennis Keating (2005) suggests that it will take more than the coming together of first-tier suburbs to successfully implement revitalization efforts and to fully offset continuing inner-suburban decline. Other suburbs and the entire state must be part of the overall strategy. He states, "Relentless outer suburban development, out-migration, and corresponding shifts in investment keep undermining inner suburbs and the central city. An outside game—involving outer suburbs, adjacent counties, and state government—is needed to alter existing trends and patterns. This is a very, very tall order" (2005: 42).

The goal of alleviating suburban decline requires the engagement of all suburbs, inner and outer. Yet instituting a funding mechanism by which wealthier outer suburbs aid decaying inner-ring suburbs is difficult to achieve. In one case, the Minneapolis metropolitan area successfully established a tax base–sharing program to redistribute funds to aid declining areas. U.S. metropolitan areas, however, traditionally resist attempts to shift local public funding from wealthier to poorer jurisdictions. As Donald Norris (2001: 565) states, "It is simply not in the interests of local jurisdictions to give away tax advantage. Thus, the idea of entering into regional arrangements that might threaten the ability to maximize the generation of local taxes is anathema. Similarly, local governments are not inclined to support proposals for such things as regional tax base sharing (mainly to assist ailing center cities) because nearly everyone sees them as a zero sum game in which the suburbs subsidize the central city." Or, in this case, the newer outer suburbs subsidize the inner-ring suburbs. This makes it all the more difficult to proceed with a regional solution to the problem of decline among older suburban communities.

What is clear is that older or first suburbs need additional resources from federal and state governments, since, on their own, it is difficult for them to guard against decline. This difficulty is heightened by widespread political fragmentation. In politically fragmented regions, the population is divided among small municipalities that, without strong tax bases, struggle to provide local residents with adequate public amenities and services. If income decline occurs, the tax base in these jurisdictions is further reduced, and public services subsequently suffer. Very quickly, decline can

spiral, making it virtually impossible for suburban municipalities to bounce back. Additional resources from federal and state governments can offset a loss of fiscal stability. First-tier suburban coalitions arose out of the need of inner-ring suburbs to improve their ability to petition for additional state funding. Suburbs, by coming together, can at least build their political strength to lobby for state and federal assistance.

Some Ideas to Consider

Forces impacting inner-ring suburbs are deep rooted and complex. Issues of deindustrialization, suburban sprawl, racial and ethnic change, housing-market dynamics, and metropolitan political fragmentation are systemic, large-scale forces that are difficult to address. Policies to reconstruct healthy suburbs are greatly needed but are tricky to achieve, and it is even trickier to know if they will work. In the following section, I put forth a few ideas on some broad courses of action that could be taken to alleviate decline among inner-ring suburbs.

Federal Assistance

First, the federal government needs to be involved. Decline among inner-ring suburbs is a nationwide problem not confined to specific metropolitan areas or regions of the United States. Therefore, a federal response is warranted for what is a national problem. Comprehensive legislation at the federal level is a necessary course of action. The federal government played a vital role in the development of the postwar suburbs. It can surely play a similarly critical role in their revitalization.

Yet so far, federal policy offers little in the way of additional resources for declining inner-ring suburbs. These areas often do not qualify for federal funding aimed at alleviating metropolitan decline. Federal assistance specifically aimed at older suburbs is lacking but needed, as is a mechanism to funnel additional funding to specific inner-ring suburbs. Clearly some affluent inner-ring suburbs do not need federal assistance, but poor, struggling inner-ring communities right now have few places to turn to for additional resources.

Federal funding is particularly important, because many suburbs currently rely on their own local funding streams to deal with problems within their jurisdictions. Outside sources of funding are needed. The SCORE bill

was a step in the right direction, although more money than the initial $250 million suggested by legislators is necessary.

Lobbying and Agenda Setting

In order to obtain a greater fiscal commitment, it is necessary to lobby and advocate for the needs of inner-ring suburbs. Puentes (2006) suggests the establishment of a superregional authority for this purpose. This organization could, he argues, represent the interests of inner-ring suburbs in state and regional debates on suburban growth and decline. He suggests that a small staff consisting primarily of an executive director could manage this organization. In addition, an advisory board consisting of representatives from older suburban local jurisdictions could provide advice to the superregional entity. In short, according to Puentes, this entity could "assist in the development of local revitalization strategies . . . help form regional coalitions . . . pursue statewide reforms, and . . . heighten awareness on the national level" (2006: 62).

Providing national- and state-level voices for inner-ring suburbs is crucial, and a regional or superregional coalition can put suburban decline on the policy agendas at these levels. Examinations of the policy process note the importance of setting an agenda for policy formation, and the mobilization of public support is necessary for an issue to reach the institutional or formal agenda (Cobb and Elder 1972). In some instances, decision-makers are part of the mobilization process, especially those that lack the resources or institutional framework to implement the necessary policies to solve a problem (Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976). This is the case with leaders of inner-ring suburban jurisdictions that do not have the means to fully address decline on their own. Therefore, an additional structural mechanism (e.g., a superregional or regional coalition) can help generate the necessary support to advocate for funding from the state or national government.

Managing Growth

It is essential to manage suburban growth if we wish to address suburban decline. Continuing outward movement to newer suburbs on the metropolitan fringe is detrimental to the stability of inner-ring suburban areas. By restraining the growth of new suburban communities, the abandon-

ment of the older suburbs can be prevented. In their current form, however, many state and metropolitan initiatives struggle to deter continuing suburban expansion.

Growth-management practices in the Portland metropolitan area offer a notable exception. In 1973, Oregon established a mandatory planning program administered by the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC). This program requires every city and county in Oregon to develop comprehensive land-use plans that are tied to specific statewide goals. LCDC can force local planning agencies to revise plans if necessary. The statewide goals are specifically aimed at curbing metropolitan growth and preventing the loss of farmland and open space. They also provide access to affordable housing in local jurisdictions, and statewide land-use control is similarly linked to planning metropolitan-wide transportation, deemphasizing the use of the automobile, and embracing public transit and transit-oriented development. As Carl Abbott (1997: 28) states in his examination of the politics of Portland's growth management, "Oregon . . . operates with a system of strong local planning carried on within enforceable state guidelines that express a vision of the public interest." The ability of the state to force local jurisdictions to comply with measures that alleviate sprawl and ensure the stability of older areas is a key element of success.

A central aspect of Portland's growth management is the Urban Growth Boundary (UGB), which restricts development in rural and open land while targeting development in denser, urban parts of the metropolitan area. In 1979, the UGB was adopted by Metro, the regional planning agency that has jurisdiction over the urbanized areas within the Portland metropolitan region. Metro is the only regional government in the United States with a legislative council elected directly by regional voters. Metro is responsible for, among other things, land-use and regional transportation planning. This regional government has the authority to require the local implementation of regional plans, another important element to the success of Portland's growth management. Between statewide and regional planning, local jurisdictions in the Portland metropolitan area are mandated to comply with policies that prevent sprawl and assist older areas.

If there is to be a policy solution to the problem of suburban decline, states must take a more active role in managing growth. Land-use planning at the local level must comply with well-established statewide goals that prevent suburban sprawl and suburban decline. Many states provide incentives to local jurisdictions for this purpose, but incentives are not

enough. To ensure success at curbing growth and reestablishing older areas, statewide mandatory policies are necessary.

However, Oregon's land-use strategy has been greatly damaged in recent years. Under Measure 37, approved in 2004, property owners who can prove that Oregon's land-use rules have negatively impacted their property values can force the state government to compensate them for the losses. If the state is unable to pay, the damaging prospect for growth management is that property owners will receive an exemption to develop. Political conservatives across the country heralded the new measure. With Measure 37, the battle on behalf of environmentalists and others to restrict growth has become much more difficult.

Regional planning in Portland demonstrates the role that regional government plays in alleviating sprawl. Unfortunately, establishing regional governments is a difficult, if not impossible, task in most U.S. metropolitan areas (Norris 2001). Portland is a unique exception; even in Oregon, long held up as the poster child for growth management, statewide land-use regulatory initiatives are often challenged. However, mandating local jurisdictions within a metropolitan area to comply with regional land-use plans will benefit declining, older suburbs. While we are far from firmly establishing such mandates at this time, this should be a goal in the search for solutions to the growing problem of suburban decline.

Affordable Housing

According to my findings, suburbs with housing built between 1950 and 1969 are of particular concern. Lucy and Phillips (2006) similarly determine that decline is most prevalent in "middle-age suburbs" built between 1945 and 1969. Innovative and highly desirable when first built, the housing stock of these postwar suburbs represents a bygone era. Expensive upgrading of this housing only occurs in metropolitan regions that include a "hot" housing market or many employment opportunities. Elsewhere in less-popular locations, small postwar suburban housing is rarely upgraded and is often left to deteriorate. In such instances, this housing becomes the only affordable option for low-income families wishing to live in the suburbs. As a result, a concentration of low-income, poor, and often minority households develops in declining, postwar suburbs. However, if affordable housing is more evenly distributed across suburbia, this spatial concentration of poorer households could be avoided.

One of the most nationally recognized suburban affordable housing schemes is in Montgomery County, Maryland. Montgomery County's moderately priced dwelling unit (MPDU) program requires developers to designate 15 percent of new housing developments as affordable. As compensation, developers receive a density bonus that allows them to build 20 percent more units than the zoning ordinance permitted. The MPDU program was one of the first successful inclusionary zoning programs in the country. Taking effect in 1974, the main tenets of the program have remained unchanged in its more-than-thirty-year history. Since its inception, the program has produced more than twelve thousand affordable housing units throughout the county.

Montgomery County's MPDU program focuses on providing affordable housing to residents who earn between 60 percent and 70 percent of the county's median income. It should be noted that Montgomery County is one of the wealthiest counties in the state of Maryland. In 2004, the median household income in the county was $76,957. The MPDU program is therefore aimed at residents earning somewhere between about $46,000 and $54,000. It is not designed to address the housing needs of residents earning below these figures, including the poorest residents. Montgomery County's MPDU program is not without its problems, and challenges are definitely associated with such policies elsewhere.

Take the case of antisnob zoning in Massachusetts. In 1969, Massachusetts passed the Comprehensive Permit Law, otherwise known as Chapter 40B, which allows developers to build more densely than otherwise permitted by local zoning rules. In exchange, at least 20 percent of the newly developed units must be affordable. Chapter 40B is highly controversial among local jurisdictions that resist denser development, citing increased demand for services as an issue. However, despite the roadblocks, to prevent the emergence of more suburbs in crisis, it is important for local and state governments to consider more inclusive policy options to address the problem of affordable suburban housing.

A Living Wage

One important initiative that would help raise the poor to a better standard of living is the people-based policy of a living wage. Maryland recently passed living-wage legislation that sets wages at a level higher than the

federal minimum-wage standard. This legislation currently applies to those businesses that receive government contracts. This is typically the case with many living-wage ordinances. Baltimore City, one of the first U.S. cities to pass a living-wage law, successfully pushed for legislation that ensures higher wages for low-skilled workers involved in city contracts. State and local governments are stepping in when the federal government has not.

Expanding the living wage to move beyond just businesses that receive city or state contracts is important. A living wage for the workforce of older inner-ring suburbs would help lift poorly paid workers out of poverty. In 2007, the City Council of Los Angeles extended its living-wage laws to include those workers employed in hotels along Century Boulevard, a large thoroughfare near Los Angeles International Airport. This initiative, although newly implemented, includes inner-ring suburbs around the airport. Still in its early stages, this living-wage legislation should help improve the standard of living for many workers living in these suburbs. Similar legislation for other older suburbs would help alleviate decline.

Summary Comments

Currently, no national policy curbs suburban decline. At the state level, initiatives to manage suburban growth indirectly impact older suburbs. These initiatives typically offer incentives to local suburban jurisdictions to encourage the reuse of existing infrastructure in older communities rather than building anew. They also offer funding for brownfield redevelopment in older areas and seek to rehabilitate aging housing stock.

In the metropolitan areas of the Midwest in particular, the local governments of older suburbs have banded together to increase their strength and ability to alleviate the decline of their communities. These regional coalitions are new, and their effectiveness at encouraging suburban redevelopment has yet to be determined. However, regional coalitions do offer some promise to declining suburban communities, mainly by serving as a lobbying group that can advocate for additional state and federal funding.

Local governments alone cannot solve the problem of suburban decline. Federal- and state-level involvement is also greatly needed. At the national level, legislation similar to the SCORE bill could provide financial assistance as well as the establishment of a funding mechanism specifically

targeted to declining suburban communities. On a state level, it is important to manage suburban growth to alleviate decline among inner-ring suburbs. Other areas to focus on are affordable housing and living wages. In some instances, postwar suburbs are the most affordable. This affordability can lead to a concentration of poorer households in these areas, something that must be avoided if we are to address their decline. Also, many low-skilled and poorly paid workers struggle in declining inner-ring suburbs. Providing this workforce with a living wage can lift the standard of living of local residents and reduce poverty in these areas.

10
Conclusion

Problems are apparent in inner-ring suburbs. Many are now more than fifty years old and showing signs of decline. Population growth in these suburbs has stagnated. The residents have grown poorer, and the housing stock has aged significantly. The postwar suburbs are particularly at risk. Urban scholars William Lucy and David Phillips (2000b) refer to the decline of these suburbs as "the next urban crisis." The results of this study suggest they may be right.

Major Findings of This Study

As Table 10.1 suggests, at national, regional, and metropolitan levels, inner-ring suburbs generally experienced less population growth than outer suburbs did from 1980 to 2000. The cases of extreme population decline mostly occurred in inner-ring suburbs, while outer suburbs typically grew at a rapid pace. Suburban population growth was particularly extreme in the metropolitan areas of the West and the South. The growth that occurred in these regions was partly driven by immigration. In contrast, in the metropolitan areas of the Midwest, population decline among inner-ring suburbs was most prevalent.

TABLE 10.1 SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY

Population	In general, inner-ring suburbs experienced less population growth than outer suburbs did from 1980 to 2000.
Poverty	The number of cases of extreme suburban poverty increased, and, with the exception of the South, this increase was larger among inner-ring suburbs than outer suburbs. In general, though, suburban poverty remained fairly low. Suburbs with high levels of poverty were suburbs with high concentrations of minorities. In particular, these suburbs became poorer over time.
Income	Income decline was more prevalent among inner-ring suburbs than outer suburbs. An increasing dichotomy is developing between poor inner-ring suburbs and rich outer suburbs in many metropolitan areas.
Suburbs in crisis	Two-thirds of suburbs in crisis are inner-ring suburbs, which accounts for 13 percent of my national sample of inner-ring suburbs. The Midwest and the South have the highest proportion of inner-ring suburbs in crisis. A gulf is forming between inner-ring suburbs in crisis and advancing outer suburbs in every region. In some metropolitan areas, decline does not follow a purely concentric ring formation around the central city; rather, sectors of improvement can be found among some suburbs close to the central city.
Features of suburbs in crisis	Almost half of the housing stock in declining inner-ring suburbs was built between 1950 and 1969. Almost one out of three of the houses in advancing inner-ring suburbs were built prior to 1939. Many declining inner-ring suburbs were once home to manufacturing workers and are industrial in nature. Minority population increases combined with white population declines occurred among inner-ring suburbs in crisis from 1980 to 2000.
Types of inner-ring suburbs	Inner-ring suburbs are varied. Some are very wealthy, elite suburbs; some are ethnic; many are middle class; and most of them are vulnerable to decline or are already in crisis.
Forces shaping inner-ring suburbs	Four primary forces include housing market dynamics, the new suburban demographic, labor-market restructuring, and metropolitan fragmentation.
Policy for inner-ring suburbs	No national policy exists, and growth management is insufficient. Regional coalitions are evolving. More federal and state funding is needed for fiscally stressed inner-ring suburbs. Other issues to consider are affordable housing and a living wage for low-skilled workers.

Suburban poverty rose in U.S. metropolitan areas from 1980 to 2000. Some regional variation is apparent. Poverty, whether among inner-ring or outer suburbs, was most extreme in the South and the West. The number of cases of extreme suburban poverty increased, and, with the exception of the South, this increase was larger among inner-ring suburbs than outer suburbs. Extreme cases of increased poverty among inner-ring suburbs

occurred in such metropolitan areas as St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Miami, New Orleans, Sacramento, and Los Angeles. In general, though, poverty levels among suburbs remained fairly low. Suburbs with high levels of poverty tended to be suburbs with high concentrations of minorities. In particular, these suburbs, more likely inner-ring than outer suburbs, became poorer over time.

Suburban income, in real terms, increased in all metropolitan areas (with the exception of New Orleans) from 1980 to 2000. Despite this trend, declining income was more prevalent among inner-ring suburbs than outer suburbs. Using the median household income ratio to identify poor and rich suburbs, this study finds an increasing dichotomy between poor inner-ring suburbs and rich outer suburbs in different regions of the United States.

Examining suburbs based on their index scores, I find that two-thirds of suburbs in crisis are inner-ring suburbs. Suburbs in crisis are defined as those suburbs in extreme decline, in the first decile based on index score. This accounts for a total of 13 percent of my national sample of inner-ring suburbs. The opposite pattern exists for advancing suburbs. Nationally, more than four in five advancing suburbs are outer suburbs. Sixteen percent of outer suburbs in my national sample, compared to 3 percent of inner-ring suburbs, are advancing.

Examining regional variation in the index results, this study finds that the Midwest and the South have the highest proportion of inner-ring suburbs in crisis. The region with the highest proportion of stable inner-ring suburbs is the Northeast, and the West has the highest proportion of advancing inner-ring suburbs. For outer suburbs, the Midwest and the Northeast have the lowest proportion in crisis, and the South has the highest. Advancing suburbs are more likely to be outer than inner-ring suburbs in every region, particularly in the Midwest. In short, inner-ring suburbs in crisis and advancing outer suburbs are diverging in every region.

A number of distinguishing features among suburbs in crisis are observed:

- Almost half the housing stock in declining inner-ring suburbs was built between 1950 and 1969. When even older housing is examined, however, a different scenario emerges. Almost one in three houses in advancing inner-ring suburbs were built prior to 1939. The old housing in these suburbs possesses a certain cachet or

exclusivity, while the postwar housing prevalent among suburbs in crisis is showing signs of obsolescence.
- The impact of the loss of manufacturing jobs on declining U.S. central cities is well documented. However, less is known about the effects on the status of U.S. suburbs. This study suggests that, for some suburban communities, the loss of manufacturing employment results in these areas' decline.
- Minority population increases combined with white population declines occurred among inner-ring suburbs in crisis from 1980 to 2000.

In general, decline is most prevalent among suburbs close to central cities of U.S. metropolitan areas, while improvement occurs among suburbs on the urban edge. Despite this general observation, different types of inner-ring suburbs exist. Some are very wealthy, elite suburbs; some are ethnic; many are middle-class; and most of them are vulnerable to decline or are already in crisis.

A number of forces shape inner-ring suburbs. A significant force is the continuing out-migration of residents, jobs, and investment capital to the outer ring at the expense of inner-ring suburbs. I identify four contributing forces: housing market dynamics, the new suburban demographic, labor-market restructuring, and metropolitan fragmentation.

The housing stock in many aging inner-ring suburbs is outdated. The older houses are being left behind for newer, larger houses on the outer fringes. Development of pristine, greenfield sites is occurring, but redeveloping older inner-ring suburban communities takes much more time. With a housing crisis gripping many parts of the United States, the sustainability of consistent growth and development in the outer ring is called into question. This lack of capital investment in the housing stock is detrimental to many aging suburbs, and the high rates of housing foreclosures in poorer minority inner-ring suburbs are devastating. Suburbs are becoming increasingly more diverse. Immigrants and nonwhites are often excluded from higher-income outer suburbs and can only afford to live in vulnerable suburbs in the inner ring. Many of the inner-ring suburbs that are in crisis are minority suburbs. The segregation of poor minorities into declining suburbs has lasting implications for the long-term stability of these areas.

Many old suburbs, particularly those in the Midwest and the Northeast, are struggling because of the loss of heavy industry. The shift from manufacturing to a more service-based economy has led to the decline of many suburbs on the borders of such cities as Baltimore, Detroit, Cleveland, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Chicago. These communities have experienced widespread poverty and extensive decline in income levels.

The problems of decline among inner-ring suburbs are exacerbated by metropolitan fragmentation. The political fragmentation of metropolitan areas ensures that suburbs compete, each trying to keep and to attract wealthy taxpayers and, at the same time, to minimize decline. Vulnerable inner-ring suburbs are at a disadvantage. Losing fiscal strength, the battle for investment resources, and political power, these suburbs are on a downward spiral from which it is difficult to emerge.

Yet little in the way of public policies is aimed at helping older suburbs. No national policy curbs suburban decline. State policies are typically ineffective at managing growth, and therefore outward movement continues to occur at the expense of inner-ring suburbs.

Local governments alone cannot solve the problem. In the Midwest in particular, inner-ring suburban governments have come together to increase their strength and ability to alleviate decline in their communities. Regional first-tier suburban coalitions offer some promise to declining suburban communities, mainly by serving as lobbying groups that can advocate for additional state and federal funding.

It is necessary to provide federal financial assistance and to establish a mechanism by which funds can be distributed to older suburban communities. At a state level, actively preventing continued growth in the outer ring can help address the demise of inner-ring suburbs. Also, states need to provide funding to declining local suburbs.

An important issue to consider in attempting to address suburban decline is affordable housing. In many instances, postwar housing is the most affordable type of suburban housing. With the lack of public housing in the suburbs, low-income families are forced into often shoddily built postwar houses, causing the concentration of poorer households in the postwar suburbs. Also, many low-skilled and poorly paid workers struggle in declining inner-ring suburbs. Providing this workforce with a living wage could lift the standard of living of local residents and reduce poverty in these areas.

Directions for Future Research

Suburbs dominate metropolitan development in the United States, yet existing literature typically generalizes about the suburbs rather than explores their varied dimensions. As a result, much needs to be done to understand the varied social, economic, and political natures of these areas. In light of this, a number of broad areas of potential research should be considered.

Future studies should continue to try to identify the reasons for decline among certain suburbs. As this study suggests, this topic is complex. For instance, housing age is important, specifically housing built between 1950 and 1969. The decline in manufacturing employment is similarly correlated with decline among certain older suburbs, particularly those in the Midwest and the Northeast. Declining suburbs are also typically areas of racial and ethnic segregation. Yet these and other dynamics and their causal effects need further exploration.

Based upon what I have learned from this study of suburban decline, a number of hypotheses can be developed. First, suburbs with postwar housing are more likely to be in decline than suburbs with new housing. This is not only because the housing is older than contemporary housing but also because this housing is small when compared to newer housing or even housing built in earlier periods. Also, the housing stock is likely of low quality, since much of the suburban housing was mass produced during the postwar period. Therefore, we can assume that housing age, size, and quality are relevant.

Added to these variables is the status of the regional economy. Suburban decline is less likely in metropolitan areas of an economically thriving region. Also, based on scholarly investigations into the role of location in neighborhood desirability, we can assume that distance from a central city or employment center matters. In some metropolitan areas, to be close to the central city or area of employment is desirable (e.g., New York City) but may be less so in other metropolitan areas (e.g., Detroit).

The Hoyt model suggests that high-status areas exist along favored routes. Distance from transportation routes is important, since this determines accessibility to employment. It is likely that suburbs with easy access to major transportation routes (e.g., highways, rail stops, and so forth) may thrive, while those suburbs that are difficult to access may be more likely to be left behind.

There are other important considerations. One issue of particular significance is the role of political fragmentation. Research suggests that the political nature of suburbia leads to further isolation of inner suburbs as high-income suburbs reinforce their higher statuses at the expense of these areas (Lewis 1996; Logan and Schneider 1981). Yet empirical research on the impact of local governmental structure on the demise of inner-ring suburbs is lacking. For instance, is inner suburban decline more severe and difficult to undo in a highly fragmented metropolitan area, such as St. Louis or Philadelphia, as compared to Baltimore, a region with strong county governments? And if so, is this related to differences in political structures?

Finally, as this research points out, many suburbs are successful, particularly those built prior to 1939. In fact, one can think of many old suburbs (e.g., Scarsdale outside New York, Highland Park in Dallas) that have managed to maintain high statuses over long periods of time. Is there something about landscape design and plans for these communities that are still appealing? Those suburbs with plenty of green space are surely more desirable than suburbs with lots of industrial land, especially if this industrial land is underutilized. Additional case study analysis would provide a deeper understanding of the role the environment plays in the status of certain suburbs.

Suburban diversity is on the rise. Another area of further research is the extent and nature of this diversity across old, new, declining, or progressing suburbs in different regions and metropolitan areas. Real questions about the nature and characteristics of minority suburban locations have emerged. Tied to these questions is the need to understand more about the political and policy responses to increasing diversity in specific suburbs. How are local jurisdictions dealing with changing demographics? Is increasing minority population in the suburbs leading to changes in suburban political leadership? How are nonwhite suburbs different from white suburbs along specific political, economic, and social dimensions?

An additional research area surrounds the recent emergence of suburbs as the new immigrant gateways in the United States. Studies of immigrant clusters stretch back to the Chicago School and ecological models of neighborhood change. More recent theoretical debates focus on the sociospatial behavior of immigrant communities in the United States (Zelinsky and Lee 1998). Questions emerge about the assimilation process for immigrants settling in suburbs. The traditional model of assimilation suggests that

immigrants, initially settling in the inner city, eventually shift outward to the suburbs as they progress economically. Subsequently, they are absorbed into the dominant culture. However, what does the assimilation process look like now that immigrants are bypassing cities and settling in suburban areas? Is there one specific process? Do suburban immigrants retain their ethnic identities despite spatial dispersion in a suburban setting?

Lastly, this study demonstrates that certain suburbs are in crisis. Some resemble poor inner-city neighborhoods. We must now look beyond the traditional city and suburban divide and recognize that decline is metropolitan in nature, not urban or suburban. The old division between declining city and booming suburbs is being replaced by a more complex mosaic of resurgent cities, declining cities, and expanding as well as declining suburbs. With this new reality emerges the need for new theories of metropolitan growth, decline, and transformation.

Overall, an emerging body of work on U.S. cities and suburbs is taking shape. The questions raised here provide a basis for continued investigation so as to better understand the processes of decline and transformation in the metropolitan United States.

Appendix

This book is an analysis of a national sample of U.S. suburbs. This sample was drawn from different census regions and different metropolitan areas. Throughout this study, I include a number of vignettes, providing more detail about particular suburbs. In many respects, this study is a geographical investigation in which a combination of methodological approaches is employed to analyze suburbs at various scales—national, regional, and metropolitan.

The suburbs were drawn from a sample of one hundred metropolitan areas across four different census regions of the United States. The metropolitan areas consist of *all* eighteen consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs) in the nation. These CMSAs comprise seventy-three primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs). So, for example, the Washington, D.C.–Baltimore CMSA is made up of the Baltimore PMSA and the Washington, D.C., PMSA. Twenty-seven of the most populated metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) were also included for a total of one hundred metropolitan areas as a study sample. The metropolitan areas, the census regions where they are located, and their population sizes in 2000 are listed in Table A.1. These metropolitan areas are highly populated and provide an excellent sample of urban areas throughout the United States. They are located in regions defined

by the U.S. Bureau of the Census—the Northeast, the Midwest, the West, and the South (see Figure 1.1).

It should be noted that in 2000 the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the agency charged with characterizing metropolitan areas, announced new standards for defining core-based statistical areas (CBSAs), which fall into two categories: metropolitan statistical areas and micropolitan statistical areas. A CBSA is defined as a geographic entity with at least one core of ten thousand residents or more and where the adjacent territory has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core. This integration is measured by examining commuting patterns. The new standards announced by the OMB replaced and superseded the old 1990 standards. The old standard "metropolitan area" referred to MSAs, CMSAs, and PMSAs. This analysis utilizes these older standards due to the need for consistency in order to make comparisons between 1980 and 2000. The older definitions are more appropriate for this type of longitudinal analysis. For more information on the old and new census definitions and terminology, I refer readers to *Federal Register* 65, no. 249, December 27, 2000, by the OMB.

TABLE A.1 LIST OF SAMPLE METROPOLITAN AREAS, REGIONS, AND POPULATIONS

Metropolitan areas	Region	Population
Atlanta MSA	South	4,112,198
Austin–San Marcos MSA	South	1,249,763
Boston–Worcester–Lawrence, MA–NH–ME–CT CMSA		5,819,100
Boston PMSA	Northeast	3,406,829
Brockton PMSA	Northeast	255,459
Fitchburg-Leominster PMSA	Northeast	142,284
Lawrence PMSA	Northeast	396,230
Lowell PMSA	Northeast	301,686
Manchester PMSA	Northeast	198,378
Nashua PMSA	Northeast	190,949
New Bedford PMSA	Northeast	175,198
Portsmouth-Rochester PMSA	Northeast	240,698
Worcester PMSA	Northeast	511,389
Buffalo–Niagara Falls MSA	Northeast	1,170,111
Charlotte–Gastonia–Rock Hill, NC–SC MSA	South	1,499,293
Chicago–Gary–Kenosha, IL–IN–WI CMSA		9,157,540
Chicago PMSA	Midwest	8,272,768
Gary-Hammond PMSA	Midwest	631,362
Kankakee PMSA	Midwest	103,833
Kenosha PMSA	Midwest	149,577
Cincinnati–Hamilton, OH–KY–IN CMSA		1,646,395
Cincinnati PMSA	Midwest	1,646,395
Hamilton-Middletown PMSA	Midwest	332,807

TABLE A.1 *Continued*

Metropolitan areas	Region	Population
Cleveland-Akron CMSA		2,945,831
Akron PMSA	Midwest	694,960
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria PMSA	Midwest	2,250,871
Columbus, OH MSA	Midwest	1,540,157
Dallas–Forth Worth CMSA		5,221,801
Dallas PMSA	South	3,519,176
Fort Worth–Arlington PMSA	South	1,702,625
Denver–Boulder–Greeley, CO CMSA		2,581,506
Boulder-Longmont PMSA	West	291,288
Denver PMSA	West	2,109,282
Greeley PMSA	West	180,936
Detroit, MI PMSA; Detroit–Ann Arbor–Flint CMSA		5,456,428
Ann Arbor PMSA	Midwest	578,736
Detroit PMSA	Midwest	4,441,551
Flint PMSA	Midwest	436,141
Greensboro–Winston-Salem–High Point, NC MSA	South	1,251,509
Hartford, CT MSA	Northeast	1,183,110
Houston–Galveston–Brazoria, TX CMSA		4,669,571
Brazoria, TX PMSA	South	241,767
Galveston–Texas City, TX PMSA	South	250,158
Houston PMSA	South	4,177,646
Indianapolis, IN MSA	Midwest	1,607,486
Jacksonville, FL MSA	South	1,100,491
Kansas City, MO–KS MSA	Midwest	1,776,062
Las Vegas–AZ MSA	West	1,563,282
Los Angeles–Riverside–Orange County, CA CMSA		16,373,645
Los Angeles–Long Beach PMSA	West	9,519,338
Orange County PMSA	West	2,846,289
Riverside–San Bernardino PMSA	West	3,254,821
Ventura PMSA	West	753,197
Memphis, TN–AR–MS MSA	South	1,135,614
Miami–Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA		3,876,380
Fort Lauderdale PMSA	South	1,623,018
Miami PMSA	South	2,253,362
Milwaukee–Racine, WI CMSA		1,689,572
Milwaukee-Waukesha PMSA	Midwest	1,500,741
Racine PMSA	Midwest	188,831
Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN–WI MSA	Midwest	2,968,806
Nashville, TN MSA	South	1,231,311
New Orleans, LA MSA	South	1,337,726
New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island, NY–NJ–CT–PA CMSA		21,199,865
Bergen-Passaic PMSA	Northeast	1,373,167
Bridgeport PMSA	Northeast	459,479
Danbury PMSA	Northeast	217,980
Duchess County PMSA	Northeast	280,150
Jersey City PMSA	Northeast	608,975
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon PMSA	Northeast	1,169,641
Monmouth-Ocean PMSA	Northeast	1,126,217

(*continued*)

TABLE A.1 *Continued*

Metropolitan areas	Region	Population
New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island, NY–NJ–CT–PA CMSA (*continued*)		
Nassau-Suffolk PMSA	Northeast	2,753,913
New Haven–Meriden PMSA	Northeast	542,149
New York PMSA	Northeast	9,314,235
Newark PMSA	Northeast	2,032,989
Newburgh PMSA	Northeast	387,669
Stamford-Norwalk PMSA	Northeast	353,556
Trenton PMSA	Northeast	350,761
Waterbury PMSA	Northeast	228,984
Norfolk–Virginia Beach–Newport News, VA–NC MSA	South	1,569,541
Orlando, FL MSA	South	1,644,561
Philadelphia–Wilmington–Atlantic City, PA–NJ–DE–MD CMSA		6,188,463
Atlantic–Cape May PMSA	Northeast	354,878
Philadelphia PMSA	Northeast	5,100,931
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton PMSA	Northeast	146,438
Wilmington-Newark PMSA	Northeast	586,216
Phoenix–Mesa, AZ MSA	West	3,251,876
Pittsburgh, PA MSA	Northeast	2,358,695
Portland–Salem, OR–WA CMSA		2,265,223
Portland-Vancouver PMSA	West	1,918,009
Salem PMSA	West	347,214
Providence–Fall River–Warwick, RI–MA MSA	Northeast	1,188,613
Raleigh–Durham–Chapel Hill, NC MSA	South	1,187,941
Sacramento–Yolo, CA CMSA		1,796,857
Sacramento PMSA	West	1,628,197
Yolo PMSA	West	168,660
Salt Lake City–Ogden, UT MSA	West	1,333,914
San Antonio MSA	South	1,592,383
San Diego MSA	West	2,813,833
San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose, CA CMSA		7,039,362
Oakland PMSA	West	2,392,557
San Francisco PMSA	West	1,731,183
San Jose PMSA	West	1,682,585
Santa Cruz–Watonsville PMSA	West	255,602
Santa Rosa PMSA	West	458,614
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa PMSA	West	518,821
Seattle–Tacoma–Bremerton, WA CMSA		3,554,760
Bremerton PMSA	West	231,969
Olympia PMSA	West	207,355
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett PMSA	West	2,414,616
Tacoma PMSA	West	700,820
St. Louis, MO–IL MSA	Midwest	2,603,607
Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater, FL MSA	South	2,395,997
Washington–Baltimore, DC–MD–VA–WV CMSA		7,608,070
Baltimore PMSA	South	2,552,994
Hagerstown PMSA	South	131,923
Washington, DC PMSA	South	4,923,153
West Palm Beach–Boca Raton, FL MSA	South	1,131,184
Total		154,307,927

Suburban Place Geography

In Chapter 3, I outline how I define inner-ring and outer suburbs for this study. I also show the number of these different types of suburbs that are located in the various regions of the nation, and I provide a map of these suburbs in the Cleveland metropolitan area. As the map of Cleveland (see Figure 3.1) indicates, "blank spaces" are often located within the metropolitan area outside cities and suburban places. Therefore, some parts of the metropolitan area do not contain suburban places.

Figure A.1 is a map of suburban places in Baltimore County. In this instance, places (in dark gray) within the suburban county of Baltimore



FIGURE A.1 Suburban places within Baltimore County. *(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Tiger/Line Files for Census Places in Baltimore County.)*

TABLE A.2 RESIDENTS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA, SUBURBS, AND SUBURBAN PLACES BY REGION IN 2000

Region	Population of metro area[a]	Population of suburbs[b]	Population of suburban places	Percentage of suburban population in suburban places
Midwest	36,935,190	26,388,735	16,301,037	62
Northeast	39,107,957	24,673,416	19,025,284	77
South	42,245,793	27,969,413	18,211,589	65
West	42,574,258	26,062,997	23,210,464	89
Total	160,863,198	105,094,561	76,748,374	73

[a] Metropolitan area population is based on the population of sample metropolitan areas only.
[b] Suburban population is the metropolitan area population minus the central city population.

(in light gray) do not cover the whole county area. People live in these places, but people also live outside these places. Therefore, some residents of the suburban county of Baltimore do not reside in a suburban place within the county.

In these cases, the aggregate population of suburban places is less than the total population of the suburban county where these places are located. How much of the suburban population lives in the suburban places in the study sample? Table A.2 compares the suburban population (i.e., aggregated population of suburban counties within a metropolitan area) to the population of suburban places for each region. Almost three-quarters of the population of suburban counties nationally resided in suburban places in 2000. In the Midwest, almost two-thirds of the suburban population (i.e., the population of suburban counties) resided in suburban places. Similarly, almost two-thirds of the suburban population of the South resided in suburban places, followed by more than three-quarters of the suburban population of the Northeast. In the West, 89 percent of the suburban population resided in suburban places in 2000.

Table A.3 provides a similar breakdown for each sample metropolitan area in this study. For some areas (e.g., Atlanta, Greensboro, Philadelphia, Charlotte, and Raleigh), fewer than half the suburban population resided in suburban places. In most metropolitan areas, particularly in the West and the Northeast, at least 60 percent of the suburban population resided in suburban places. As Tables A.2 and A.3 indicate, this study captures the majority of the suburban population for each region and, in many cases, for each metropolitan area.

TABLE A.3 RESIDENTS IN THE SUBURBS AND SUBURBAN PLACES BY METROPOLITAN AREA IN 2000

Metro area	Population of suburban places	Population of metro area	Population of metro area without central cities (i.e., suburban)	Percentage of suburban population in suburban places
		Midwest		
Chicago	4,844,873	9,157,540	5,515,648	88
Cincinnati	945,714	2,312,009	1,868,429	51
Cleveland	1,665,912	2,945,831	2,097,843	79
Columbus	457,249	1,540,157	747,073	61
Detroit	2,805,348	10,334,120	8,947,433	31
Indianapolis	452,471	1,607,486	765,882	59
Kansas	904,462	1,776,062	1,059,269	85
Milwaukee	741,573	1,689,572	1,027,773	72
Minneapolis	2,045,233	2,968,806	2,299,037	89
St. Louis	1,438,202	2,603,607	2,060,348	70
Total	16,301,037	36,935,190	26,388,735	62
		Northeast		
Boston	4,088,864	5,819,100	4,088,864	100
Buffalo	420,958	1,170,111	821,870	51
Hartford	1,018,365	1,183,110	1,018,365	100
New York	9,559,151	21,199,865	11,697,794	82
Philadelphia	1,940,603	6,188,463	4,343,392	45
Pittsburgh	1,318,344	2,358,695	2,024,132	65
Providence	678,999	1,188,613	678,999	100
Total	19,025,284	39,107,957	24,673,416	77
		South		
Atlanta	1,300,948	4,112,198	3,695,724	35
Austin	321,656	1,249,763	558,468	58
Charlotte	304,825	1,499,293	749,536	41
Dallas	2,484,543	5,221,801	2,893,406	86
Greensboro	231,814	1,251,509	711,086	33
Houston	1,222,690	4,669,571	2,513,931	49
Jacksonville	222,540	1,100,491	364,874	61
Memphis	248,697	1,135,614	457,848	54
Miami	3,136,203	3,876,380	3,273,580	96
Nashville	344,352	1,231,311	616,971	56
New Orleans	664,830	1,337,726	827,357	80
Orlando	820,305	1,644,561	1,458,610	56
Raleigh	256,652	1,187,941	676,098	38
San Antonio	207,835	1,592,383	411,243	51
Tampa	1,290,100	2,395,997	1,735,531	74
Washington, D.C.	4,557,271	7,608,070	6,050,833	75
West Palm	596,328	1,131,184	974,317	61
Total	18,211,589	42,245,793	27,969,413	65
		West		
Denver	1,492,795	2,581,506	1,784,174	84
Las Vegas	1,033,856	1,563,282	1,084,848	95
Los Angeles	9,715,675	16,373,645	10,413,613	93
Phoenix	996,725	3,251,876	1,173,126	85
Portland	1,086,694	2,265,223	1,455,618	75
Sacramento	1,023,828	1,796,857	1,280,380	80
Salt Lake City	1,018,720	1,333,914	1,048,971	97
San Diego	1,286,447	2,813,833	1,432,774	90
San Francisco	3,543,936	7,039,362	3,872,493	92
Seattle	2,011,788	3,554,760	2,517,000	80
Total	23,210,464	42,574,258	26,062,997	89

Data Source and Variables

The primary data source for this study is the *State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000,* released by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This dataset provides census data on individual metropolitan areas, central cities, and suburban places for the United States. The census data primarily include detailed demographic and economic characteristics for the population by census places and, in the case of New England metropolitan areas, county subdivisions.

Table A.4 lists the primary variables used to measure suburban decline. They include the variables of income, population, and poverty. The variable used to measure income for each suburb is median household income. This was adjusted for inflation so comparisons could be made between 1980 and 2000. Data are converted to 1999 dollars.

Median household income ratio for each suburb was calculated. This is a measure of the median household income of each suburb relative to the median household income of the suburbs as a whole, expressed as a ratio. The *State of the Cities Data Systems* contains a variable for the suburban median household income for each metropolitan area in 1980 and 2000.

TABLE A.4 DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY VARIABLES USED IN THIS ANALYSIS FOR 1980 AND 2000

Primary variables	1980	2000	1980–2000
Income	Median household income (adjusted to 1999 dollars) Median household income ratio	Median household income (in 1999 dollars) Median household income ratio	Change in median household income Change in median household income ratios
Population	Population size	Population size	Change in population size Percent change in population size Change in population relative to suburban population change
Poverty	Individual poverty status in 1979 (given as a percentage of population)	Individual poverty status in 1999 (given as a percentage of population)	Change in number of people in poverty Change in poverty rate Change in poverty in each suburb relative to suburban poverty between 1980 and 2000

This allows for comparison between the median household income of each suburb in a specific metropolitan area to the suburban median household income of that same metropolitan area. A ratio of more than 1.0 means a suburb's median household income is higher than the suburban median household income in the metropolitan area where the suburb is located. A ratio of less than 1.0 means the median household income of the suburb is lower than the suburban median household income. In this study, changes in the median household income ratio from 1980 to 2000 are estimated.

Another variable used to measure suburban decline is changes in population. Changes in population from 1980 to 2000 are calculated in three ways. First, population change is calculated by comparing the change in population size of each suburb from 1980 to 2000. Second, the percent change in population from 1980 to 2000 is calculated and included as a variable. Three, a location quotient (LQ) for changes in population size is calculated by comparing changes in the population size of a suburb to changes in suburban population size. Here, I explain the process for constructing an LQ of population.

The construction of an LQ makes use of a reference area—in this case, the suburbs as a whole within a metropolitan area. Each suburb of a metropolitan area is compared to the suburbs as a whole in the same metropolitan area. It is a locally based comparison that considers each suburb's share of the suburban population over time.

The LQ for population change for suburb *i* is calculated as follows:

$$LQ_i = \frac{Population_{i2000}}{Population_{i1980}} \Big/ \frac{Population_{Metrosuburbs2000}}{Population_{Metrosuburbs1980}}$$

The numerator (denominator) represents suburb *i*'s proportionate share of the suburban population (i.e., metrosuburbs) in 2000 (1980). Any suburb with an LQ greater than 1.0 experiences an increase in its share of the suburban population over time. Any suburb with an LQ less than 1.0 indicates a decline in that suburb's share of the suburban population from 1980 to 2000. This provides a measure of *relative* population loss or growth in a suburb. The LQ contains more information than simply comparing the population size of a suburb over time. For instance, if two suburbs from different metropolitan areas have similar rates of population change, the common assumption would be that these places fare similarly over the time period. This assumption, however, would neglect overall suburban growth in the metropolitan areas where these suburbs are located.

If suburban population growth in one metropolitan area is positive while suburban population growth in another metropolitan area is negative, the relative performance of the two suburbs would be viewed in a different light—one suburb grew while the suburban population as a whole grew; the other suburb grew despite the fact that the suburban population as a whole declined. The premise here is that if the population of one suburb is declining while the population of all other suburbs in a metropolitan area is growing, the first suburb is declining in popularity as a place to live relative to other suburbs in the same metropolitan area.

In a study of growth, Brian Mikelbank (2006) estimates an LQ that measures changes in population for each suburb relative to population change in the metropolitan area in which the suburb is located. Mikelbank (2006: 5) states, "It is one thing for a suburb to increase its population in a rapidly growing region; it is quite another for a suburb to maintain some level of growth in the face of widespread regional population stagnation or decline." On the flip side, it is one thing for a suburb to see a drop in population in a stagnating or declining region, but experiencing population decline while other suburbs are growing rapidly is more indicative of some underlying problem.

Suburban poverty is included as a variable in this study to determine suburban decline. Estimates of the number of people in poverty as well as the change in the percentage of people in poverty during the same period from 1980 to 2000 are calculated. I also estimate an LQ for poverty by comparing the percentage of the population in poverty of each suburb to the percentage of the population in poverty in all suburbs within that same metropolitan area for 1980 and 2000. Again, the *State of the Cities Data Systems* contains a variable for suburban poverty for each metropolitan area in the sample.

The poverty LQ for 1980 for suburb *i* is calculated as follows:

$$LQ_{i1980} = \frac{PovertyRate_{i1980}}{PovertyRate_{MS1980}}$$

and the poverty LQ for 2000 for suburb *i* is calculated as follows:

$$LQ_{i2000} = \frac{PovertyRate_{i2000}}{PovertyRate_{MS2000}}$$

In these instances, the numerator (denominator) represents suburb *i*'s proportionate share of the suburban poverty in 2000 (1980). Any suburb

with an LQ greater than 1.0 for a given year has a higher share of people in poverty than the suburbs as a whole. Any suburb with an LQ less than 1.0 has a lower share of people in poverty than the suburbs as a whole. In this analysis, the change in the LQ for poverty in a particular suburb in 1980 is compared to the LQ for poverty in that same suburb in 2000. This enables the identification of suburbs with an increasing share of poor people in each suburb relative to other suburbs in the same metropolitan area.

Other indicators are also utilized to further identify and compare the characteristics of suburbs. They are listed in Table A.5.

TABLE A.5 DESCRIPTION OF SECONDARY VARIABLES USED IN THIS ANALYSIS FOR 1980 AND 2000

Secondary variables	1980	2000	1980–2000
Race and ethnicity	Percentage of population that was black Percentage of population that was white Percentage of population that was other Percentage of population that was Hispanic Percentage of population that was immigrant	Percentage of population that was black Percentage of population that was white Percentage of population that was other Percentage of population that was Hispanic Percentage of population that was immigrant	Change in percentage of population that was black Change in percentage of population that was white Change in percentage of population that was other Change in percentage of population that was Hispanic Change in percentage of population that was immigrant
Employment	Percentage of total working population that was unemployed Percentage of total working population that was employed in manufacturing	Percentage of total working population that was unemployed Percentage of total working population that was employed in manufacturing	Change in percentage of total working population that was unemployed Change in percentage of total working population that was employed in manufacturing
Housing	Percentage of total housing units that were built in different years Median housing value Median housing value ratio (relative to the suburban median housing value)	Percentage of total housing units that were built in different years Median housing value Median housing value ratio (relative to the suburban median housing value)	Median housing value Median housing value ratio (relative to the suburban median housing value)

These variables are used in the spatial analysis of suburbs in certain metropolitan areas. They relate specifically to race, ethnicity and immigration, employment levels, manufacturing employment, and age of housing.

Analysis of Suburban Decline

Descriptive spatial analysis is an important methodology employed in this study. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology is of primary importance in this regard. Social, economic, and demographic analyses are increasingly complemented with the use of this technology (Findlay and Hoy 2000). Summarizing the emergence of GIS in the social sciences, Michael Goodchild and Donald Janelle (2004: v) aptly state, "The advent of geographic information systems (GIS) has enabled an explosion of interest in and ability to study the spatial patterns of behavior. . . . It provides a powerful new tool that has stimulated new and exciting social science research using geographical concepts and data. At last, long-held but unverified hypotheses about the importance of location and spatial variables can be tested. We are at the dawn of a revolution in a spatially oriented social science." GIS technology has become an increasingly important tool utilized in public policy making and political debate, and I use it to map different variables and declining and growing suburbs in different metropolitan areas.

Calculating an Index of Suburban Decline

These declining and growing suburbs are identified using the results of an index of suburban decline. The index results allow me to determine the extent and the prevalence of suburban decline across different census regions and metropolitan areas. A number of variables are included in the index calculation that relate specifically to changes in population, income, and poverty. More specifically, they include the following:

- Change in population of each suburb from 1980 to 2000
- Change in population of each suburb from 1980 to 2000, calculated as a percentage
- Change in the population of a suburb relative to change in the suburban population from 1980 to 2000 (see the calculation in the section on data and variables)

- Change in median household income of each suburb from 1980 to 2000
- Change in median household income ratio for each suburb from 1980 to 2000
- Change in number of people in poverty in each suburb from 1980 to 2000
- Change in LQ for poverty in 1980 and LQ for poverty in 2000 (see the calculations in the section on data and variables)

Rather than using absolute income levels to measure suburban decline, many studies use relative income, comparing a suburb's income level to that of the central city or the metropolitan area where the suburb is located. For instance, William Lucy and David Phillips (2000a, 2006) measure suburban decline by comparing a suburb's income level per family and per household to the metropolitan income level in that category. For median household income and median family income, these measures are expressed as a ratio—that is, greater than or less than 1.0. Similarly, in her study of the suburbs of large central cities in the United States, Janice Madden (2003) compares the median household income in a civil division to the median household income for its metropolitan area. Mikelbank (2006) uses relative income to determine the social characteristics of suburbs with different rates of relative population growth. Relative measures are important, because they offer a means of comparison.

Using income decline alone as a measure of suburban decline does have one weakness. A suburb could be a high-income community with a low share of suburban poor and still decline in income. Combining income change with changes in the number and the percentage of residents in a suburb below the poverty threshold provides a more rounded and robust measure of overall suburban distress. Therefore, I also include measures of poverty in the index.

The U.S. Bureau of the Census uses poverty thresholds to determine the poverty status of the population. Each person is assigned 1 out of 48 possible poverty thresholds that vary depending on family size and number of children. For someone without children, the poverty threshold in 1999 was approximately $8,500 or less. The index includes changes in the number and the percentage of people in poverty in a particular suburb from 1980 to 2000.

TABLE A.6 NUMBER OF SUBURBS USED IN INDEX CONSTRUCTION BY REGION FROM 1980 TO 2000

Region	All suburbs	Inner-ring suburbs	Outer suburbs
Midwest	872	411	461
Northeast	1,085	824	261
South	868	207	661
West	603	195	408
Total	3,428	1,637	1,791

For the index calculation, the total sample is 3,428 suburbs.[1] This number includes 1,637 inner-ring suburbs and 1,791 outer suburbs. Table A.6 provides a regional breakdown. As expected, a preponderance of inner-ring suburbs is located in the Northeast and the Midwest compared to the South and the West. Similarly, more outer suburbs are in the South and the West than in the Northeast and the Midwest.

There are 872 suburbs (411 inner-ring suburbs and 461 outer suburbs) in the Midwest, 1,085 suburbs (824 inner-ring suburbs and 261 outer suburbs) in the Northeast, 868 suburbs (207 inner-ring suburbs and 661 outer suburbs) in the South, and 603 suburbs (195 inner-ring suburbs and 408 outer suburbs) in the West.

In essence, I assemble a data matrix table (7 × 3,428) containing seven variables utilized to analyze 3,428 suburbs. The values for these variables are standardized for the national sample of suburbs by means of z-scores. The z-score tells how many standard deviations away from the mean a unit of observation is for selected variables (Gilthorpe 1995). Using these z-scores, I estimate an index score for each suburb with each variable weighted equally. Each suburb is ranked in the nationwide sample on the basis of the index score, thus enabling me to determine different extremes or levels of decline and advancement between and among inner-ring and outer suburbs.

A methodological challenge in constructing an index is weighing the different variables. The most straightforward approach is to weigh them equally or not to provide any weights and to standardize the variables to ensure that those with a large distribution of values or a smaller amount of skewness do not unduly influence the index calculation (Gilthorpe

[1]Since this analysis focuses on decline over time, only those suburbs that existed in 1980 and 2000 are included. Suburbs where the population was under 1,000 in 1980 are excluded from the sample.



FIGURE A.2 Scatter plot that compares the index score and change in the median household income ratio of each suburb from 1980 to 2000. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

1995). I standardize the variables using z-scores and I do not apply any weights to any particular variables.

As with any examination, it is important to conduct a sensitivity analysis of the results. I conduct this type of analysis using a number of different techniques. First, the index scores are plotted against a variable widely used to measure suburban decline—income ratios (Bollens 1988; Lucy and Phillips 2000a, 2006; Madden 2003). Figure A.2 shows a scatter plot of the change in the median household income ratio for each suburb from 1980 to 2000 against the index score for each suburb.

The regression line with a 95 percent confidence interval is shown. As the index scores increase, the median household income ratio from 1980 to 2000 declines. According to this analysis, the R-square is 0.64, which means that almost two-thirds of the variability of the income ratios are explained by variations in the index score. In this sense, these two variables share a high level of agreement, with outliers possibly skewing the data.

A correlation exists between changes in median household income ratio from 1980 to 2000 and the index score for each suburb. Table A.7

TABLE A.7 RESULTS OF PEARSON CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEX SCORE AND CHANGE IN THE MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME RATIO FROM 1980 TO 2000

Variables	Index score	Change in median household income ratio from 1980 to 2000
Index score	1	–0.801[a]
Change in median household income ratio from 1980 to 2000	–0.801[a]	1
N	3,428	3,428

[a] Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

shows a Pearson's Correlation between these two variables of –0.801. Pearson's Correlation is a measure of correlation between two variables—that is, a measure of the tendency of variables to increase or decrease together. The correlation coefficient of –0.801 indicates that 80 percent of the variance in income is explained by variance in index score.

The index score and the change in median household income ratio are highly negatively correlated. As the index score increases, the median household income ratio increases less over time. In other words, as the index score increases (i.e., indicating decline), the suburb becomes less affluent over time.

Another element in the sensitivity analysis includes the implementation of a reliability testing technique, termed "Cronbach's alpha." This is a method that enables a determination of the validity of specifics within the index calculation. Cronbach's alpha tests whether the variables are sufficiently interrelated to justify their combination in an index. This methodology is not a statistical test but rather a test of reliability or consistency in the data (Cooper and Schindler 2003). It is, in part, a function of the internal consistency or interrelatedness of a set of variables (Cortina 1993).

Typically in the scientific literature, a level of 0.70 for Cronbach's alpha is deemed adequate as a test of reliability (Cortina 1993). In this study, the dimensions of income, population, and poverty are used for the index calculation. Depending on the exact variable and combination of variables used to measure these dimensions (e.g., percent change in population in or out of the calculation), Cronbach's alpha varies from a low of 0.495 to a high of 0.716 on standardized variables.

It is important to note that the Cronbach's alpha coefficient is highly dependent on the number of variables used in the scaling procedure.

Therefore, this coefficient should be used with some caution (Cortina 1993). In the case of this study, the final version of the index calculation used produces a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of 0.60 on standardized variables. This is a little below the necessary alpha coefficient of 0.70 but not too far below to deem the index calculation completely unreliable.

Understanding the Outliers

In studies that rely heavily on data analysis, outliers always exist. Examining these outliers often provides insight into the methodology employed and the data gathered. Index results demonstrate four major outliers or extreme cases of suburban transformation, each falling into the "growing suburbs" category: Matthews and Huntersville, outer suburbs in the Charlotte metropolitan area; Gilbert, an outer suburb in the metropolitan area of Phoenix; and Fishers, an outer suburb in the Indianapolis metropolitan area. In each instance, these suburbs grew tremendously in population between 1980 and 2000. In fact, population growth rates were highest among these suburbs in the nationwide sample. It is important to note that all four outliers are outer suburbs, places where extreme growth occurred. Compared to inner-ring suburbs, outer suburbs had large population increases from 1980 to 2000, and, in the case of these four outliers, these increases were tremendous.

The outer suburb of Gilbert is an illustrative case. This suburb had a population of 5,700 residents in 1980, increasing to more than 109,000 in 2000. The population growth LQ is 3.4, indicating that, in 2000, Gilbert's share of the suburban population was more than 300 percent its share of the suburban population in 1980. Because of such extreme changes in population, Gilbert emerges as an extremely growing suburb. Income also increased over the same period (median household income increased from more then $37,000 in 1980 to more than $68,000 in 2000), and poverty declined, but slightly. Although these changes in income and poverty were positive, Gilbert is an outlier because of the tremendous increase in population.

The outer suburb of Matthews grew from a population of a little more than 1,600 in 1980 to more than 22,000 in 2000. It population growth LQ is 8.9, indicting that the suburban share of population in 2000 was almost 900 percent its share of the suburban population in 1980. As with Gilbert, such large growth in population makes Matthews an outlier in



FIGURE A.3 Plot of the relationship between standardized measure population variables and standardized measure income/poverty variables for a random sample of suburbs. *(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's State of the Cities Data Systems, 1970–2000.)*

terms of index score. Income increase and poverty decline occurred in Matthews but to a lesser extent than among many other suburbs in the sample. The same is true of Huntersville and Fishers, the two other outliers in my sample. Population was a driving force behind the outlying index scores of these suburbs.

Extreme changes in population, poverty, or income lead to an extremely high or low index score. To further examine this process, I analyze the relationship between the set of population variables and the set of income/poverty variables used to calculate the index scores. Figure A.3 demonstrates this relationship for a random sample of suburbs. This random sample comprises 5 percent of the total sample. The x-axis in the chart in

Figure A.3 plots the combined z-scores for the income/poverty variables used in the index calculation. The y-axis plots the combined z-scores for the population variables. The suburbs are labeled "in-crisis," "growing," or "stable" based on their decile grouping.

As this chart demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of in-crisis suburbs experienced negative results in population and income/poverty change, as indicated by the negative z-scores in both sets of variables. In other words, these suburbs declined in income and population and increased in poverty. This is to be expected. Also, as expected, many of the growing suburbs experienced positive results in income and population as indicated by the positive z-scores. These suburbs grew in population and income and declined in poverty. However, these typical results include some anomalies. Two of these exceptions (Henderson and Weston) provide insight into the significant characteristics of success as defined by the index, and one case (Cicero) helps us understand more about the notion of suburban crisis as defined by the index. Let us consider these cases in more detail.

The z-scores for population change in the outer suburb of Henderson, Las Vegas, are extremely positive, while the z-scores for income/poverty change in this suburb are negative. Population growth was tremendous in Henderson, increasing from fewer than 25,000 residents in 1980 to more than 175,000 by 2000, and, as indicated by the high positive z-scores, this growth far outweighed standard population change among the national sample of suburbs. Although income increased and poverty declined in Henderson, it was to a lesser extent in this suburb than across the nationwide sample of suburbs. Henderson falls into the growing category based on index score primarily because of its rate of population change.

Weston, an inner-ring suburb of Boston, offers a different example of success. In this instance, the population increased only slightly from 11,169 residents in 1980 to 11,469 in 2000. However, the median household income of Weston increased from less than $48,000 in 1980 to almost $155,000 in 2000, indicating a tremendous change. Weston achieved an index score that puts it into the growing category because of income growth rather than population growth.

In the case of Henderson, success is defined by tremendous population growth combined with small increases in income and decline in poverty. In the case of Weston, success is defined by tremendous increases

in income and small increases in population. Is Weston more "growing" than Henderson? In some respects, this is a qualitative judgment. This study treats Henderson and Weston as growing, because they each fall into the tenth decile based on index score. The main function of the index is to determine those suburbs within certain categories based on the ranking system—hence the use of the decile groupings. This, in many respects, demonstrates that, despite the application of established and justified methodological tools, there is some fluidity with how the results can be utilized. I choose decile groupings to identify "growing," "stable," and "in-crisis" suburbs. Another researcher might utilize the index differently.

Typically, suburbs in crisis declined in (absolute or relative) population and income and increased in (absolute or relative) poverty. Cicero, an inner-ring suburb of Chicago, is an exception, since the combined z-scores for income/poverty are negative, while the combined z-scores for population are positive. In Cicero, the population increased from more than 61,000 in 1980 to more than 85,500 in 2000. Its share of the suburban population was 10 percent higher in 2000 than its share of the suburban population in 1980. However, at the same time, poverty increased from 9 percent in 1980 to more than 15 percent in 2000, and the median household income ratio remained at more than 30 percent below the suburban median over this time period. Much of the population growth of Cicero resulted from an increase in the immigrant population, from 8,100 in 1980 to more than 37,000 in 2000. This population increase does not offset the impact of increases in poverty and therefore does not lift Cicero out of the "in-crisis" category. Therefore, a suburb in crisis can have positive population results, but, because of extreme increases in poverty or declining income, it still falls into the first decile based on overall index score.

To conclude, in this study, the results from the index calculation are utilized to identify growing, in-crisis, and stable suburbs. These categories are defined by grouping the index scores into deciles. Suburbs fall into these groupings based on the combined effects of changes in population, poverty, and income. In the case of declining suburbs, population and income (absolute or relative) are typically declining, and (absolute or relative) poverty is typically increasing, although, as discussed, there are some exceptions to this overall trend.

Developing a Typology of Inner-Ring Suburbs

Developing the typology of inner-ring suburbs is a two-step process. The first methodological approach is a principal component analysis (PCA) of 1,761 inner-ring suburbs.[2] PCA enables a determination of the patterns and drivers of differentiation among inner-ring suburban places. Based on the results of the PCA, I use a cluster analysis technique to create a typology of these same suburbs.

Principal Component Analysis

PCA, a form of factor analysis, is a statistical method used to reduce the number of variables in a dataset to a number of main factors and to determine the relationships between the variables used in the reduction technique. PCA transforms the inputted variables into a set of new factors called principal components. PCA has traditionally been an important technique used to disentangle the sociospatial organization of urban space (Wyly 1999). In recent times, this technique has been used in market research to classify residential neighborhoods (Cooper and Schindler 2003). It is an ideal technique for deciphering the variation among inner-ring suburbs in this study.

As with other methodologies in this study, the data come from HUD's *State of the Cities Data Systems*. Table A.8 lists the variables included in the PCA. The selection of these variables chimes with other studies of urban and suburban differentiation and transformation (Lucy and Phillips 2000a; Orfield 2002; Swanstrom et al. 2006; Wyly 1999). Median household income ratio is a key variable that determines the relative income of an inner-ring suburb compared to neighboring suburbs in the same metropolitan area. Income ratios have been used in different forms to study suburban decline (Bollens 1988; Lucy and Phillips 2000a, 2006; Madden 2003). Inner-ring suburbs are, by definition, older suburbs built prior to 1969. I include a variable indicating the percentage of the housing stock built prior to 1939, distinguishing the very oldest suburbs from others of the postwar period. Also, inner-ring suburbs were often places of heavy industry, so I include a variable related to manufacturing employment.

[2] Two inner-ring suburbs were dropped because of a lack of data for some variables.

TABLE A.8 VARIABLES USED IN PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND CLUSTER ANALYSIS

Variable names	Description
Population	
pct_nhspwht_00	Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic white in 2000
pct_nhspblk_00	Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic black in 2000
pct_nhspoth_00	Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic other race in 2000
pct_hisp_00	Percentage of population that was Hispanic in 2000
pct_imm_00	Percentage of population that was immigrant in 2000
Income	
medhhinc_00	Median household income in 2000
medhhinc_ratio_00	Median household income ratio to suburban median household income in 2000
pct_pov_00	Percentage of population that was living in poverty in 2000
Educational attainment	
pct_dnghs_00	Percentage of population that did not graduate from high school in 2000
pct_collgrad_00	Percentage of population that graduated from college in 2000
Employment	
pct_unemploy_00	Percentage of labor force that was unemployed in 2000
pct_manuf_00	Percentage of workforce that was employed in manufacturing in 2000
Housing characteristics	
pct_39	Percentage of housing that was built before 1939
medval_00	Median value of housing in 2000

I assemble a data matrix table (14 × 1,761) containing fourteen variables to analyze 1,761 inner-ring suburbs. I use these data in a PCA using a Varimax rotation method with Kaiser normalization, because the rotation ensures a sharper distinction in the derived components. This analysis produces a number of outputs. First, the PCA generates component loadings. The component loadings measure the relationship between the variables inputted and the components derived. Four components are selected based on their eigenvalues. Eigenvalues of two or more generally indicate that the component has twice the explanatory power of the original set of variables (Kline 1994). Eigenvalues less than one have less power than the original variables. Therefore, using components with an eigenvalue less than one is ineffective. As Table A.9 indicates, four of the components have eigenvalues greater than one, and two have values greater than two.

Table A.9 also indicates that, in total, these four components explain almost 80 percent of the total variance in the original dataset. Component 1 explains more than a quarter of the total variance, and component 2

TABLE A.9 TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY THE PCA

	Rotation sums of squared loadings		
Component	Eigenvalue	% Variance	Cumulative %
1	5.93	26.79	26.79
2	2.43	24.52	51.31
3	1.52	13.95	65.27
4	1.12	13.34	78.61

explains another quarter of the variance. The last two components each explain about 13 percent of the total variance. Therefore, the number of variables in the original dataset is reduced without losing too much variance.

The PCA also produces a communality value for each of the fourteen variables. This indicates the strength of the relationship between each variable and the components produced by the PCA. As Table A.10 indicates, in this PCA, the majority of variables have a communality greater than 0.70. They range from a low of 0.36 to a high of 0.92 and have an average communality of 0.78. The communalities are measures of correlation between the variables and the components. Other studies suggest that variables should have a communality of at least 0.70 to be meaningful (Wyly 1999).

Each of the components produces component loadings for each variable. Table A.11 lists the results. These component loadings are used to

TABLE A.10 COMMUNALITIES FOR THE PCA

Variables	Initial	Extraction
Percentage of housing built before 1939	1	0.36
Percentage of population that did not graduate from high school, 2000	1	0.90
Percentage of population that graduated from college, 2000	1	0.86
Percentage of population that was unemployed, 2000	1	0.75
Percentage of immigrant population, 2000	1	0.87
Median household income ratio, 2000	1	0.90
Percentage of workers who were in manufacturing, 2000	1	0.54
Median housing income, 2000	1	0.89
Percentage of population that was in poverty, 2000	1	0.80
Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic white, 2000	1	0.92
Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic black, 2000	1	0.87
Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic other, 2000	1	0.65
Percentage of population that was Hispanic, 2000	1	0.83
Median house value, 2000	1	0.85

TABLE A.11 ROTATED COMPONENT MATRIX FROM THE PCA

	Component			
Variables	1	2	3	4
Percentage of housing built before 1939			–0.556	
Percentage of population that did not graduate from high school, 2000		0.586		0.577
Percentage of population that graduated from college, 2000	0.820			
Percentage of population that was unemployed, 2000		0.796		
Percentage of immigrant population, 2000			0.743	
Median household income ratio, 2000	0.917			
Percentage of workers who were in manufacturing, 2000				0.659
Median housing income, 2000	0.898			
Percentage of population that was in poverty, 2000		0.792		
Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic white, 2000		–0.835		
Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic black, 2000		0.804		
Percentage of population that was non-Hispanic other, 2000			0.799	
Percentage of population that was Hispanic, 2000				0.684
Median house value, 2000	0.912			

interpret the meaning of the derived components. For Component 1, the relevant loadings refer to income, housing value, and college education. This indicates that socioeconomic status and education are key factors in explaining the stratification of inner-ring suburbs. Numerous studies have shown the importance of these variables in urban and suburban differentiation in U.S. society (e.g., Hanlon, Vicino, and Short 2006). This component distinguishes a continuum between inner-ring suburbs composed of high-income, well-educated residents and those inner-ring suburbs with poorer, less-educated residents.

For Component 2, the key loadings refer to non-Hispanic blacks, high-school dropouts, and poverty. This component distinguishes between inner-ring suburbs composed of white, high-income, well-educated residents and those composed of black, poor, less-educated residents. In U.S. inner-ring suburbs, social stratification has a racial component.

For Component 3, the loadings refer to non-Hispanic (other race) populations, housing built after 1939, and immigrants. This component identifies those inner-ring suburbs with a high proportion of immigrants as well as primarily Asian populations, typically living in suburbs built after 1939. For Component 4, the loadings indicate high-school dropouts, manufacturing employment, and Hispanic populations. This component identifies inner-ring suburbs with a high proportion of blue-collar workers and Hispanic residents.

Overall, the components I identify in this PCA demonstrate that inner-ring suburbs are differentiated by socioeconomic status, race and ethnicity, and employment characteristics. In part, this differentiation results from the variables I selected. It is also in part a function of traditional and new sources of social distinction. Socioeconomic status is traditionally an important driving force behind urban and suburban differentiation. Also, as we have seen in this study, many inner-ring suburbs are experiencing high levels of immigration, providing them with a new source of social change. The in-movement of blacks to many older inner-ring suburbs also provides another source of distinction among these suburbs. Lastly, many inner-ring suburbs are working-class areas, as indicated by the relevance of manufacturing employment. In sum, the results of this PCA reflect the initial variable selection, echo traditional patterns of social stratification, and identify new processes of social transformation among inner-ring suburbs.

Cluster Analysis

The PCA provides the baseline data needed for the cluster analysis. The PCA produces component scores for 1,761 inner-ring suburbs. Component scores measure the relationship between the inner-ring suburbs and the components. Each inner-ring suburb has a different score. I cluster the component scores for the different inner-ring suburbs using k-means clustering analysis. This was the most favorable technique, because it allows me to determine the number of clusters that I want. I chose three, four, five, and six in different runs of the clustering technique. Based on examinations of the data as well as the results of the PCA, I find that the four-cluster analysis is the most constructive.

I identify the primary characteristics of each of the four clusters by examining the mean of the different variables. Since socioeconomic status is so important in the PCA results, and median household income ratio is such a strong indicator of social status, I utilize this variable as primary in determining the character or nature of each cluster. Examining median household income ratios, I find much variation in the middle-class and vulnerable clusters in particular. As a result, I transferred 242 cases originally categorized as middle class to the vulnerable category, because their median household income ratios were 0.90 or less. This means their income levels were more than 10 percent below the suburban median household income in their respective metropolitan areas. In return, I transferred 266

cases from the vulnerable category, because their median household incomes were 1.0 or greater, indicating that their median household income levels were on par with the suburban median household incomes in their respective metropolitan areas. This enabled the most accurate description of the different types of inner-ring suburbs, which I explore in Chapter 8.

Methodological Limitations

As with all studies, this study has methodological limitations. First, this research is limited by the units of analysis. Place-level and county-subdivision geography, although more detailed than a county's geography, is coarse in comparison to census-tract geography. If census tracts were the unit of analysis, it would be possible to examination variation within a suburban place. Also, as noted earlier, all the suburban population of a metropolitan area does *not* reside in a place. Therefore, data on some residents of the sample metropolitan areas are excluded from this analysis.[3]

Second, in some instances, place-level boundaries changed over time. A number of suburbs annexed more land area over time. Unfortunately, at this time, no process is available to mitigate inaccuracies in data analysis caused by place-level boundary changes that may have occurred from 1980 to 2000.

Third, this examination is limited by the time period analyzed. The focus is on two time periods—1980 and 2000. Changes among suburbs prior to 1980 or after 2000 are not included, and changes between 1980 and 1990 and between 1990 and 2000 are excluded, with good reason. Since the number of suburbs increased each decade, I have to focus on two time periods to maintain a consistent dataset. Focusing on 1980 and 2000 allows me to capture a large number of suburbs while giving some historic breadth to my analysis.

Fourth, another limitation is the data and variables I choose to analyze. For instance, I would have liked to include the age of population to capture the aging of certain suburban areas. Unfortunately, HUD's *State of the Cities Data Systems* does not include data on age of population. Since no

[3]See Tables A.2 and A.3 for details on the percentage of a suburban population residing in suburban places for each metropolitan area. In some cases, this percentage can be quite low. For instance, in Detroit, only 31 percent of the suburban population resides in the suburban places of this metropolitan area. In other instances, the percentage is much higher. For instance, in Boston, the entire suburban population lives in suburban places.

data on age are accessible for the large sample of suburban places in this research, it is not feasible to include this variable in the analysis. A number of other possibly important variables are neglected for the same reason. School performance and crime data, for instance, are often not available at census place-level geography.

Finally, this study is limited by definitions developed and adopted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1999 for the 2000 Census.[4] Outer census definitions, such as "principal city" or "micropolitan areas," are not included in this analysis. Instead, the older definitions of "central city" and "metropolitan area" are utilized. A recent report by William Frey, Jill Wilson, Alan Berube, and Audrey Singer (2004) determines that it is difficult to compare census data based on the older definitions to census data based on the newer definitions. Therefore, to ensure a change-over-time analysis, it is necessary to pick between these older and newer definitions. I choose the older definitions.

[4]For information on more recent census definitions, see U.S. Office of Budget and Management 2003.

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Bernadette Hanlon is a research analyst at the Center for Urban Environmental Research and Education at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Her research interests include suburban growth and decline, urban policy and planning, and state and local government.