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# Being Musically Attuned

## The Act of Listening to Music

*Erik Wallrup*

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# List of Music Examples

The author is grateful to the relevant publishers for permission to reprint excerpts from these works.

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# Acknowledgements

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# Introduction

## Rediscovery of an Omnipresent Phenomenon

Music captivates the listener. And when the listener is captured by music, there seems to be nothing else in the world – the music is world. This musical moment is ecstatic but may take place under ordinary circumstances, not to say prosaic conditions. A melody in the background music on the radio can tune us in unexpectedly when we are busy tiding the house: it can be intimate music like a *moment musical* by Schubert, a bittersweet *canzone napolitana* from the 1950s or just something unknown. Everything is changed in a moment. We are being attuned. This book is all about that phenomenon.

It is clearly a question about what in English is called 'mood'. It is part of our everyday experiences as well as our musical listening and musical habits. The film industry knows that very well, having acquired a perfect knowledge of how to move the audience musically, quite often with the spectators not being aware of what they actually hear. It is a difference of degree, not of kind, when we compare the musically moved film viewer with a listener sitting in a concert hall, who is thrown into the extremely well-prepared, relentless and brutal culmination of the development section of the first movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Mood-making is not something hazardous, but at the same time it can never be totally calculated. We are close to manipulation, so we must pay heed.

In German, there is a telling word for 'mood', namely *Stimmung*. For a long time, the word was thought of as a relic of the past, a concept that certainly seemed to be outdated, but which through being absent was also subject to nostalgia. However, when someone in an intellectual discussion bemoans the disappearance of a phenomenon, or when it is declared with a sorrowful tone that a concept is dead, then you can put a wager on the reappearance of that same phenomenon or the rebirth of the concept. Seventy years ago, the philologist Leo Spitzer declared that there was nothing left of the historical and intellectual roots of the untranslatable word *Stimmung*. The Second World War was in its late phase, and the National Socialism that had forced the Jewish Spitzer to leave Germany had also destroyed the culture in which the word had been flourishing – in philosophy, in literature, in music, in religion.[1] In 1985, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben suggested that people living then were the first generation to not be attuned to a *Stimmung*,

[1] Leo Spitzer wrote a rich study on *Stimmung*, which was first published in the review *Traditio* (vols 2, pp. 409–64, and 3, pp. 307–64, both 1945), and then revised and expanded in the posthumously published book *Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony:*

being unmusical in a sense, even without vocation.[2] Almost 20 years later, a highly substantial entry on *Stimmung* was published in the imposing seven-volume dictionary *Ästhetische Grundbegriffe*, where the Germanist David Wellbery reasserted the death of the phenomenon, pointing out that the 'linguistic turn' of the humanities had made the concept theoretically outdated and that the trivialization of the word in everyday speech had made it undifferentiated and brute.[3] However, Wellbery's text clearly shows that he finds the concept exhilarating, and the reader is convinced of the status of *Stimmung* as a key concept in the history of aesthetics.

Then something changed, all of a sudden. A couple of years later, the scholar of comparative literature Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht published a series of articles in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, where he intended to breathe new life into the neglected theme of *Stimmungen* in literary studies.[4] He evoked Wellbery's article, but he also tried to show that the concept was not so dead after all. Much more then happened in the next few years. Ambitious conferences on *Stimmung* were held in Germany, France and Switzerland, and they have been followed by edited collections of the papers.[5] Doctoral theses have been written and are being reworked as books. There will be reason to come back to many of these studies in due course.

I myself had started to reflect on *Stimmung* earlier on. It all began in the mid-1990s with the writing of a text on the Swedish composer Tommie Haglund, in

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*Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word 'Stimmung'*, ed. Anna Granville Hatcher, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1963.

[2] Cf. Giorgio Agamben, 'Idea della musica', in *Idea della prosa: Trentatrè piccoli trattati di filosofia con undici immagini dialettiche*, Macerata: Quodlibet 2002 (1985), 2nd ed., pp. 73–5. Despite his pessimism, he had been one of the first philosophers to pay specific attention to the concept *Stimmung* in Heidegger's thinking. Cf. the text presented in Pavia in 1980, published as 'Vocazione e voce', in *La potenza del pensiero: Saggi e conferenze*, Vicenza: Neri Pozza 2005, pp. 78–91.

[3] David E. Wellbery, 'Stimmung', in Karlheinz Barck et al. (eds), *Ästhetische Grundbegriffe: Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden*, vol. 5, Stuttgart: Metzler 2000–05 pp. 703–33, cit. p. 733.

[4] Gumbrecht's articles were published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) 21 Dec. 2005, 17 Jan. 2006, 2 Feb. 2006, 21 March 2006, 28 April 2006 and 10 Sept. 2006, and gathered on http://www.faz.net/stimmungen under the heading 'Stimmungen: Ein vernachlässigtes Thema der Literatur'. Some of these articles have been reworked for *Stimmungen lesen: Über eine verdeckte Wirklichkeit der Literatur*, Munich: Hanser 2011.

[5] Kerstin Thomas (ed.), *Stimmung:* Ästhetische *Kategorie und künstlerische Praxis*, Berlin and Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag 2010; Anna-Katharina Gisbertz (ed.), *Stimmung: Zur Wiederkehr einer ästhetischen Kategorie*, Munich: Fink 2011; Hans-Georg von Arburg and Sergej Rickenbacher (eds), *Concordia discors: Ästhetiken der Stimmung zwischen Literaturen, Künsten und Wissenschaften*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2012; Friederike Reents and Burkhard Meyer-Sickendiek (eds), *Stimmung und Methode*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2013.

whose works moods emerge in an extraordinarily mesmerizing way.[6] His works required a new way of approaching music within language, and so the elaboration of the Swedish parallel to *Stimmung*, *stämning*, took off. This text was followed by a book-length essay on Nietzsche and listening, where the phenomenon is highlighted in one of the chapters; and this investigation continued in an academic work on the same theme and in some essays.[7]

Surprisingly, not much had been written on *Stimmung* or mood in music from an aesthetic or musicological perspective.[8] This is still the case. Even if music has been discussed at the conferences mentioned, the presence of the source of the concept has often been more of propriety – after all, one should go back to the roots – than a sign of dynamic investigation and theoretical speculation. In one of these contributions, the philosopher Alexander Becker says that it is the absence rather than the presence of *Stimmung* in musical aesthetics that characterizes the concept.[9] The musicologist Sebastian Klotz almost echoes his words, saying that no profound theoretical or aesthetic impulse can be discerned in the musical notion.[10] Admittedly, the literary scholar Caroline Welsh has written a series of articles where music is one of the fields where the travelling concept of *Stimmung* appears (besides physiology, psychology, neurology, literary aesthetics and philosophy).[11] However, we have no detailed study on *Stimmung* in the aesthetics of music covering the birth of the concept in the 1770s, its prosperity in the nineteenth century and the gradual neglect that started in the 1920s. One of the aims of the present work is to write such a history.

Regarding music, *Stimmung* – and its English relative 'mood' – is both a historical and a contemporary notion. This is confirmed by a brief look at the

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[6] Erik Wallrup, liner notes to Tommie Haglund, *Inim-inim*, Caprice Records 21522, 1997.

[7] Erik Wallrup, *Nietzsches tredje öra* [Nietzsche's Third Ear], Stockholm: Natur och Kultur 2002, pp. 99–123. For references to the other works, see the bibliography.

[8] However, Béatrice Han's 'Au-delá de la métaphysique et de la subjectivité: Musique et *Stimmung*', published in *Les Études philosophiques*, no. 4 (1997), pp. 519–39, is a discussion about different conceptions of affectivity from Plato to Heidegger. In 2004, Jan Frei presented the research report 'Jenseits von "aussen" und "innen": Musik und Stimmung', later published in Cathrin Nielsen et al. (eds), *Das Leib–Seele-Problem und die Phänomenologie*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2007, pp. 196–207. Further, although the Finnish musicologist Ilmari Krohn published major investigations on the formal architecture and 'mood content' of the symphonies of Sibelius (1945–46) and Bruckner (1957), he never developed any concept of *Stimmung*, focused as he was on the formal traits with a separable emotional content. For references, see Krohn's titles in the bibliography.

[9] Cf. Alexander Becker, 'Die Zeit der Stimmung: Zur Zeitstruktur bei Claude Debussy', in Thomas (ed.), op. cit., pp. 159–78.

[10] Cf. Sebastian Klotz, 'Musik als Artikulation von Stimmungen: Positionen vom 19. Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart', in Gisbertz (ed.), op. cit., pp. 197–209, ref. p. 198.

[11] For references, see Welsh's titles in the bibliography.

liner notes for LPs of the past and those of CDs today: in the comments on the music from, let us say, John Dowland and on there is often a formulation trying to point out something about the mood of the music. The discussion there may concern the listener's reaction, but also the character of the actual musical work. But do not be surprised if you find almost nothing on the reason why the mood emerges. Usually, no specific detail, no specific combination of notes, is singled out; and if something actually is indicated you will quite often disagree when you listen to the musical work, even if you accept the label of the mood. There is nothing new in this. Beginning with Herder, with whom the affective concept of *Stimmung* became part of the discourse of musical aesthetics, it has been used in many different ways. It has been put in relation to the concept of world harmony and to the inner life of man. It has been said to be close to human feelings or it has been taken as something purely musical. Quite often it has been used as something abstract: just *Stimmung* instead of being specified as joy or melancholy, serenity or anxiety. But when the labelling is in fact declared, little is said about what kind of musical characteristics give rise to that *Stimmung*.

In Gumbrecht's literary investigations of the phenomenon, he observes that 'reading for the *Stimmung*' is what most contemporary readers do when they read: they let themselves be surrounded emotionally, almost physically, by the texts.[12] Such readers do not try to find answers to the great questions of life: they do not read in order to engage themselves in the political situation of today. They read because they want to be immersed in a world. Gumbrecht describes a mode of reading – an ordinary one. Perhaps it is true that it is *the* ordinary mode of reading a literary text nowadays. Then, it would not be too adventurous a guess to say that the ordinary mode of listening to music is related to *Stimmung*. It is a non-structural, non-technical way of listening, sometimes a bit primitive, that is true; but sometimes it might be extremely sensitive too.

Alexander Becker is right when he points out a lack of conceptual foundation of *Stimmung* in music. The aesthetic term began to be used in the last decades of the eighteenth century. It then spread, and in the next century became what we would today call a 'buzzword', and reached a climax around 1900 before becoming less fashionable in the first decades of the twentieth century. With Martin Heidegger, a new era of the concept began in philosophy, but without repercussions on musicology. It started with his elaboration of the concept in *Sein und Zeit* (1927)[13] and continued during the 1930s with different reassessments in his lectures on Friedrich Hölderlin and his second major work, the posthumously published *Beiträge zur Philosophie*.[14] Here, *Stimmung* reached a potency not seen before: elucidative concerning culture, disastrous when transmitted to politics – as

[12] Cf. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, 'Reading for the *Stimmung*? About the Ontology of Literature Today', *Boundary 2*, vol. 35, no. 3 (2008), pp. 214–21.

[13] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Niemeyer 1993 (1927), 17th ed.

[14] Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, in *Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter GA), vol. 65, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1989.

Heidegger did in 1933, thinking that the National Socialist revolution was kindred in spirit with the new beginning of philosophy that he himself tried to accomplish.[15] The German musicologist Heinrich Besseler did investigate the musical relevance of the Heideggerian concept early on,[16] but his pioneering work did not receive much attention.

Only in the last decade has this initial impulse led to a reception by the Polish-American musicologist Karol Berger and, in a more thorough way, the English philosopher Andrew Bowie. However, both of them draw mainly on *Sein und Zeit*, choosing not to consider Heidegger's later thinking. The consequence of their interesting work has not been a commonly accepted conceptual foundation – Becker's assumption is a sign of that. I therefore intend to investigate the possibilities of transferring Heidegger's concept of *Stimmung*, in all its complexity, to a musical context. In my view, his conceptualization has great potential in music even if it is not grounded in musical thinking. As a matter of fact, Heidegger's elaboration turns *Stimmung* into a key concept and, in contrast to David Wellbery, I believe that there are reasons to begin to speak in a new way about *Stimmung* after Heidegger's contribution. It is not just a new sub-discourse, but a necessary step to take. This is also true for musicology. There is no musical parallel to Heidegger's conceptualization; instead, Theodor W. Adorno wrote the death warrant for *Stimmung* and Carl Dahlhaus treated it like a remnant of the *Empfindsamer Stil*.

Adorno's critical stance – where *Stimmung* is regarded as a dated category – and Dahlhaus's historical labelling indicate a general problem. The strong association with the age of Romanticism (or, in fact, sentimentality) is problematic if a more general relevance of the concept is to be investigated. In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger assumed that we are always in a mood: 'daß das Dasein je schon immer gestimmt ist'.[17] He turned later to some very esoteric moods, but even if he thought that the *Stimmungen* were changing through the decades, he did not change his mind concerning the attunement of Being. Due to the Romantic overtones, I shall replace *Stimmung* with 'attunement' in the later part of this work, even if there are advantages in keeping the German expression (Agamben and Gumbrecht do not translate the term in their non-German texts). Attunement is not only a common translation of *Stimmung* in Heidegger's later works, but it is also less contaminated by notions of Romantic sentimentality. *Stimmung* and attunement

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[15] My essay 'Martin Heideggers ljusskygga tankar i öppen dager' [Martin Heidegger's Obfuscated Thought Brought into the Light], *Svenska Dagbladet*, 27 March 2014, delivers a critical examination of Heidegger's errancy – political as well as philosophical – during the 1930s and early 1940s.

[16] Besseler published 'Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens' in 1926 and 'Grundfragen der Musikästhetik' in 1927, and he returned to the topic in 'Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit' (1959). All three articles are published in Heinrich Besseler, *Aufsätze zur Musikästhetik und Musikgeschichte*, Leipzig: Reclam 1978.

[17] Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 134.

are connected with music in a congruent way. The etymological logic of both words says something essential about the phenomenon we are going to investigate. That is not the case with the common translation of *Stimmung* in English, 'mood'. Therefore, it is necessary to elucidate and draw the boundaries for what I will call attunement, even in order to see if the choice between 'mood' and 'attunement' is only a matter of translation, or if there is a more substantial difference.

Crucial for this work is, accordingly, the endeavour to describe the act of listening to music in a new way, but not for the sake of finding a new relation to music; instead, it should grasp the preconditions for that act. Attunement is not a specific kind of emotion or a sort of vague expressiveness; instead, it constitutes the interrelation between listener and sounding musical world. To understand this interrelation, it is necessary both to clarify what *Stimmung* has meant in the history of the aesthetics of music and to give a full account of the meaning in Heidegger. Only in this way can we avoid curtailing the concept and the phenomenon in the investigation.

## On Delimiting, Interpreting, Thinking, Sensing

In the texts on *Stimmung* in the arts from the last decade, the concept is mainly treated in literature and pictorial art. It has even been suggested that it was necessary for the concept to leave the field of music in order to fulfil its potential, since only in this way could the metaphorical energy be released. A consequence is that the aesthetic discourse is stronger in these fields, and it would be easy to simply shift these discourses over to music. However, I have chosen to work the other way around, focusing on what music alone has to say. The word *Stimmung* became common in musical discourse from 1800 on, especially in the context of instrumental music. Soon, 'absolute' music became a model for the other arts, most clearly discernible in German aesthetic thinking. Here it stood for something before or beyond language and representation, being one of the code words for the ineffable. However, an opposing tendency can also be found, where *Stimmung* is related to poetic music suggestive of an atmosphere or an identifiable mood. This ambiguity is constitutive for *Stimmung*.

In order to plumb the depths of this paradox, this study is focused on instrumental music, without resort to any solution where language is allowed to explain away the complexity of the problem. However, I do see many possibilities to widen the scope not only to musical settings of texts or the other performative arts, but also to fields such as film and even computer games. Another restriction of this work is that the focus is principally on art music, leaving promising fields of popular culture – such as the electronica of today or the rock music of yesterday – beyond the scope. This is a choice made on grounds other than the merely practical, since

I strongly believe that the work of art has a greater 'attunemental' potential than that allowed by popular culture.[18]

Even if I have chosen instrumental art music as my field of study, I can see that this investigation has much to do not only with the recent *Stimmung* studies (if I may call them such), but also with the general interest in emotions – sometimes called the 'emotional turn' – which has emerged since the 1990s in different fields, including philosophy, psychology, social sciences and natural sciences. An overview of these is impossible to give here, but just to hint at the magnitude of the field I can point out books as diverse as Martha Nussbaum's works within philosophy and drama; Antonio Damasio's bestsellers in the field of neurology; and Robert J. Shiller's books on the psychology of the economy.

A phenomenon like mood could be studied from many different perspectives, both theoretically and experimentally. It is, however, noteworthy to see that the greatest aesthetic interest in the affective sphere in English-speaking countries does not include mood, especially concerning music.[19] When the philosopher Noël Carroll published an article on art and mood in 2003, he could refer to a solid list of recent literature in the fields of psychology and philosophy when defining mood, but studies on mood in the arts were lacking.[20] In a response to the article, his colleague Peter Kivy said that he agreed with Carroll on the importance of mood in arts generally, but dismissed almost all that Carroll had written on mood and music. Great music can arouse enthusiasm and excitement, Kivy wrote, and in the wake of these strong emotions the listener can get into an uplifted mood. But a listener who is susceptible to the swing of mood in Schumann and Tchaikovsky is 'a man with a problem'.[21] Further, Roger Scruton does not discuss mood in his musical aesthetics, whereas he refers to emotion several times.[22]

For a better understanding of what in English is normally called 'mood' in the field of music, we accordingly cannot orientate ourselves in this direction. I would suggest that it has to do with two circumstances: the tradition of analytic philosophy has not been fertile for aesthetic discussions on mood, especially not in music; but it may even be possible that the word 'mood' has not attracted the

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[18] However, the relevance to popular culture can be hinted at through a reference to an article of mine on the 'Bristol sound' of the 1990s: Erik Wallrup, 'Spleen och sound: 1990-talets musikaliska atmosfär i Bristol' [Spleen and Sound: The Musical Atmosphere in Bristol in the 1990s], in Jacob Derkert (ed.), *Musikvetenskapliga texter: Festskrift Holger Larsen 2011*, Stockholm: Stockholms universitet 2011, pp. 110–19.

[19] Aesthetically orientated *Stimmung* studies of late have, however, given attention to Damasio's 'background emotions'. Cf. Burkhard Meyer-Sickendiek, *Lyrisches Gespür: Vom geheimen Sensorium moderner Poesie*, Munich: Fink 2012.

[20] Cf. Noël Carroll, 'Art and Mood: Preliminary Notes and Conjectures', *The Monist*, vol. 86, no. 4 (2003), pp. 521–55.

[21] Peter Kivy, 'Mood and Music: Some Reflections for Noël Carroll', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 64, no. 2 (2006), pp. 271–81, cit. p. 279.

[22] Cf. Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997.

same kind of attention because it is lacking something to be found in the word *Stimmung*. It is not by chance that Berger and Bowie, the two authors mentioned who have discussed mood and music, both have the German concept *Stimmung* as their point of departure.

It can thus be seen that the choice of 'attunement' is a sign of my own tendency to follow upon Heidegger's philosophy of *Stimmung* and the later contributions in the same vein made by literary theorists such as Emil Staiger and Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht; philosophers such as Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Klaus Held and Thomas Fuchs; and aestheticians such as Gernot Böhme. My work belongs to the phenomenological tradition, but it does not continue along the paths of phenomenology in musicology, which is most often related to Husserlian methodology. Neither *Stimmung* nor mood has been a prominent theme in the phenomenology of music, so even if I do take the works by Thomas Clifton and Lawrence Ferrara into account – as well as those by Hans Mersmann and Alfred Schütz (just to mention a few important names) – I would rather say that I am in line with the rethinking of phenomenology than the more strict Husserlian investigations.

One way of putting it, then, is to say that my approach is both phenomenological and hermeneutic. It is phenomenological since it endeavours to let the phenomenon show itself from itself (Heidegger's short characterization of phenomenology in *Sein und Zeit*). The study seeks the emergence of *Stimmung* in music without any preconceived notions of how it appears, either theoretically or analytically. But instead of adhering to Husserl's transcendental subjectivity, I am following Heidegger's historically situated understanding, leading to the position of a hermeneutic phenomenology.

The study is hermeneutic in at least three different ways. Firstly, it takes the pre-theoretical sphere of human existence into account, which was one of the groundbreaking steps that Heidegger took when in the 1920s he hermeneutically reformulated the phenomenological approach. It should be pointed out that Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann in particular has shed light upon the pre-theoretical dimension of Heidegger's thinking.[23] Secondly, it strives for an understanding of how the contemporary position is confronted with the truth claims behind the conceptualizations made in the past. Precisely as Hans-Georg Gadamer said in the beginning of *Wahrheit und Methode*, such truth claims cannot be rejected or outdone by the modern mind.[24] Thirdly, the hermeneutic perspective is important for the interpretative strategy concerning both texts (primarily those from the history of the aesthetics of music) and music: interpretation starts when the meaning is not simply given. Günter Figal's writings on interpretation have

[23] Cf. for instance Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutik und Reflexion: Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2000.

[24] Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1999 (1960), p. 2.

encouraged an attitude that is both restrictive and active, since they capture both the reliance upon the text and the freedom that the same text affords the reader.[25]

If these elementary remarks concerning phenomenology and hermeneutics can be said to describe the general orientation of the study, then the question of methodology will be highlighted later on, when we have reached a point where the history of the concept has been elucidated. In fact, the problem of methodology will be a central one, since on the one hand I take into account the methodological scepticism concerning the *Stimmung* of Heidegger and later Gumbrecht, but on the other hand try to overcome the problem inherent in an investigation of something that is not an object.

A final comment on language. The majority of the works quoted in this study are written in German. Instead of using German in the main text – which was the solution in my doctoral thesis whence this book draws its material – these references appear in translation.[26] This is in order to increase the accessibility of texts that are often quite complex. Existing translations are used as far as possible, albeit sometimes with minor changes.[27]

## A New Perspective on the Affectivity of Music

This work is in two parts. The first is an investigation of the concept of *Stimmung* and its history, both in the musical field and in that which can be called the philosophy of *Stimmung*. The musical concept that was widespread in the nineteenth century is contrasted with the philosophical concept in the thinking of Heidegger and his followers. This confrontation leads to a reconceptualization of the musical concept and the presentation of what I call 'an attunemental mode of listening'. The second part elucidates three aspects of attunement: its historical, durational and cultural traits.

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[25] Cf. the following works by Günter Figal: *Für eine Philosophie von Freiheit und Streit: Politik – Ästhetik – Metaphysik*, Stuttgart: Metzler 1994; *Der Sinn des Verstehens: Beiträge zur hermeneutischen Philosophie*, Stuttgart: Reclam 1996; and *Gegenständlichkeit: Das Hermeneutische und die Philosophie*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2006.

[26] Erik Wallrup, 'Musical Attunement: The Concept and Phenomenon of *Stimmung* in Music', PhD thesis, Stockholm University 2012. There are some other noteworthy differences between the thesis and this book: the historiography of the concept of *Stimmung* has been reduced, but at the same time the theoretical positions have been pushed forward. I was also able to include some necessary demarcations to and critical comments on Heidegger's uncanny 'Black Notebooks', the first three volumes of which were published in spring 2014.

[27] References to existing translations are given in parentheses after the original. In order to avoid ambiguity, after the first instance, references are made to the translator's surname rather than the author's, followed by 'op. cit.' and pages. If no reference is made to a translation, I have rendered the text into English myself.

This is one way to describe the architecture of the study, but one can also relate to the logic of the individual chapters. Chapter 1 ('*Stimmung* in Music') focuses on *Stimmung* in the aesthetics of music, but set in relation to the position of the concept in aesthetics in general as well as in scientific discourses. During the period 1770–1930, *Stimmung* hovered and mediated between abstract and concrete, formal and emotional, passive and active, inside and outside. Thus, it cannot be put into any conventional dualistic scheme; it breaks loose. Five decisive steps were taken during this period:

1. the birth of the concept in Kant, Schiller and Herder;
2. the emergence of a new way of listening to music with early Romanticism;
3. the response from composers to these impulses;
4. the ensuing debate on autonomous or absolute music;
5. the rise to a prominent position of *Stimmung* in the last decades of the nineteenth century, both in theoretical reflection and compositional strategies.

This aesthetics comes under attack from the phenomenology of music, and Adorno dealt its deathblow.

The concept became obsolete in musical aesthetics, and therefore the next main event in its history, Heidegger's new conceptualization, had almost no influence on the philosophy of music. Chapter 2 ('The Philosophy of *Stimmung*') shows the extent to which Heidegger's new formulation of *Stimmung* has repercussions on the musical understanding of that phenomenon. The importance of everyday life in Heidegger's earlier investigations of the phenomenon leads to the assumption that there is reason to turn to an everyday way of listening to music. Even if there is not much in Heidegger on musical listening, his thinking about the work of art may give some indications. The opening of a world in the work of art, central in Heidegger's thought, should be found in music, too. The question is how this world is constituted, and some hints in different works by the philosopher suggest that temporality, spatiality and mobility are three such dimensions, resting on the materiality put forth by this world. The chapter ends with a discussion on the contributions by Heidegger's followers such as Gernot Böhme and Peter Sloterdijk. They all investigate dimensions of *Stimmung* left aside by Heidegger, dimensions that are essential for the understanding of musical attunement: *Stimmung* is described and elaborated as a spatial, embodied and cultural phenomenon.

Chapter 3 ('Playing in Between') sets the musical and the philosophical concepts in interplay with the goal of achieving an accord between them. A solution is given to the problem occupying many of those who have developed the philosophy of *Stimmung* and investigated the phenomenon of *Stimmung* in the arts: how to relate to something extremely evasive. Through the introduction of the notion of a world emerging in the work of art, an attunemental mode of listening is suggested where the attunement is never made into an object of investigation, but where the attuned world is allowed to emerge. The disclosure of this world can be followed in four dimensions, namely in its temporality, mobility, spatiality and

materiality. Every world is disclosed in an attunement, meaning that attunement is that which allows us to perceive different events in this world as events at all.

If one accepts Heidegger's assumption that human existence is always attuned, then so too must be music-making and listening. However, this leads to a question of history: should music composed before the emergence of the concept of *Stimmung* really be approached in the suggested attunemental mode? And what about contemporary music, if composed in a way that clearly questions the presumptions underlying the argument put forward hitherto in this study? In Chapter 4 ('History'), two works are selected and closely discussed – J.S. Bach's *Goldberg Variations* and Luigi Nono's string quartet *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima* – but the principal question of the historicity of attunement is raised, with the answer formulated as an attunemental history, where it should be possible to locate different modes of listening and affective relations to music. Only now we are in a position to see the difference between mood and attunement clearly: mood can be associated with certain periods in the history of music in the same way as affect and emotion can, whereas attunement is that which conditions all these forms of affectivity. This opposition is hidden in *Stimmung*.

The different formulations of *Stimmung* throughout history are clearly divergent from each other, not least in terms of duration. The notion of both momentary and durable *Stimmung* is dealt with in Chapter 5 ('Duration'). Here, questions are posed as to how attunement emerges, changes and evaporates; in other words, the temporal boundaries. Further, the German expression *Augenblick* is discussed, providing a clue to the specific temporality of attunement – being for the mind only when it is gone, and therefore impossible to catch. The moments chosen are those of climax, followed by the 'breakthrough' that Adorno has elaborated, and finally the sublime moment. These examples are intended to highlight the temporal particularities of attunemental changes, answering the question of how an attunement is temporalized according to the world of the musical work of art.

The principal theme of Chapters 4 and 5 is the disclosure of attunemental boundaries. The epilogue ('Aftersong') strives to touch the definitive boundary of a musical world, beyond which nothing can be said at all. Instead of attunement, there is reason to speak about 'distunement', appearing when a sound world is characterized by a total alienness. This epilogue deals with attunement from an intercultural perspective, with the Western reception of Hindustani music as an emblematic example, since there is exceptionally rich material in Western musical culture's long-standing relation to Hindustani music, reaching back to the eighteenth century. A complete lack of understanding has turned into a reciprocal opening. Thanks to this journey, through time and space, we are able to see not only that attunemental difference is in play both in our relation to the past and in relation to that which is musically alien to us, but also that resonance can occur when we are struck by that which differs.

Writing the history of *Stimmung* in music, trying to give a foundation to that concept through the philosophy of *Stimmung* and – after the transposition to English – drawing the boundaries for attunement, I am heading towards

establishing a new perspective on the affectivity of music. This is the principal aim of the study.

Being musically attuned responds to a primordial listening to music. It is that which situates the listener. This simple formulation has great repercussions for how we understand the act of listening. For the moment it must be an unclear formulation, but I hope that after reading this study, the meaning will have been elucidated.

# PART I
# The Concept

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# Chapter 1
# *Stimmung* in Music: Vicissitudes of a Concept 1770–1930

## The Resonating Concept: On the Sources of *Stimmung*

There are many ways to translate *Stimmung*. The technical term in music is 'tuning': the adjustment of an instrument – the tension of the strings, the length of tubing – in order for it to produce the correct pitches. Closely related to tuning is 'temperament', used in musical terminology for the 'temperation' of scales but in everyday language as a synonym of character; but this latter meaning is musically not really suitable (unless, of course, a musician's performance is extraordinarily expressive).[1] Since the term is not only technical but also affective, there are other possibilities: first of all the common translation, 'mood'; yet, when the mood of the music is evasive, 'atmosphere' can be preferable. Mood is something personal and subjective; it is related to human beings, but it also has an object-related side, making it possible to ascribe a mood to a landscape or a painting. The absence of a musical element in mood should, however, be pointed out. There are also more specific alternatives in English for the term. The circumstances of how the words used to render the term *Stimmung* vary in translations of Heidegger are crucial for this study: 'attunement' has often been chosen for his later works, whereas 'mood' is used for the earlier phases.

'Tuning', 'temperament', 'mood', 'character', 'atmosphere' and 'attunement; these are only a few of the possible translations. Behind that single word *Stimmung* can be found a manifold of meanings, with each sense interconnected. If the etymological root *stimm-* is included, the range is even greater: 'voice' (*Stimme*), 'part' (*Stimme*), 'dispose' (*stimmen*), 'correspond' (*übereinstimmen*), 'agree' (*einstimmen*), 'dejection' (*Verstimmung*). At times *Stimmung* is treated almost as a mystical concept, relating to the most brooding parts of German thinking and literature. More apparent nowadays is the trivialization of the word: in music, where it is used for easy-listening sentimentality; in daily life, where almost everything concerning ups and downs in humour can be included.

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[1] Boris Previšić discusses the historical background of the aesthetic concept *Stimmung* in tuning and temperation in 'Gleichschwebende Stimmung und affektive Wohltemperierung im Widerspruch: Literarisch-musikalische Querstände in 18. Jahrhundert', in Arburg and Rickenbacher (eds), *Concordia discors*, pp. 127–42.

Leo Spitzer has suggested that *Stimmung* is a loan translation from Latin words such as *consonantia* and *concordia* or *temperamentum* and *temperatura*,[2] but if that is the case, it is translated into German with a root much older than the abstract verbal noun. Grimms' famous *Deutsches Wörterbuch* derives the noun from the verb *stimmen*, which in its turn is derived from *Stimme*, so even if *Stimmung* has nothing directly to do with voices, the linkage is indicated by its etymology. There are three different principal meanings of *stimmen* in Grimm: first of all it means 'to do something with the voice'; secondly, 'to harmonize with' or 'to correspond to'; thirdly, 'to give something a musical or verbal expression'.[3] *Stimmung* is derived from any of these three different meanings in all its usages: the act of giving voice to somebody, the determination (*Bestimmung*) of something, voting, the tuning of an instrument and the disposition of a human being. The breadth of this web of meanings is impressive for, as we have seen, it reaches from basic human expression to politics; but in this context it is worth reflecting on the fact that the musical significance is secondary to the other meanings of voice and correspondence. *Stimmung* – that hackneyed expression in the context of 'classical music' – at first had nothing to do with music at all.

German is not the only language with such a word. It is found in many other Germanic languages: *stemming* in Dutch, *stämning* in Swedish and *stemning* in Danish and Norwegian. Turning to the Slavic languages, there are also examples of polysemantic words that relate to the tuning of the string, the mood of a person and the atmosphere of a landscape. With no etymological connection to *Stimmung*, Russian has *nastroenie* (with a rich variety of words having the root *stroy*-, however, not including any connection to voice and pitch), Polish *nastrój* and Czech *nálada*.[4] But the root system of etymology is wider and richer in the case of the German word. As we saw, the Latin word *temperamentum* has found its way into the modern European languages, but its various meanings are limited. More historically significant is *harmonía* in ancient Greek, with the interrelated verb *harmozein* having the basic meaning 'to adjust' – *harmonía* is in fact part of the history of *Stimmung*.[5]

When the origin of the affective word *Stimmung* is discussed, it is usually said to be musical, meaning the tuning of an instrument. This usage of the word is to be found in the early sixteenth century; in the mid-eighteenth century it was introduced to the sphere of the human mind, still with a close connection to the musical source; and the modern signification, with the musical source either

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[2] Leo Spitzer, *World Harmony*, p. 7.

[3] Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, 'stimmen', *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, vol. 10:2:2, Leipzig: Hirzel 1960, cols 3088–110.

[4] I thank the translator Bengt Samuelson for our discussion on the Slavic languages.

[5] Cf. Alexander Becker, 'Die verlorene Harmonie der Harmonie: Musikphilosophische Überlegungen zum Stimmungsbegriff', in Arburg and Rickenbacher (eds), op. cit., pp. 261–80.

implicit or even neglected, comes from the 1770s.[6] Still, the poetical figure of the string instrument as something emotional can be found from antiquity onwards: the soul is likened to an instrument, sometimes tuned, sometimes out of tune. That is common ground for poets, as a simile or a metaphor. The starting point for the development of the word concerned the mind, the soul or the psyche, but later it was also used to describe the character of landscapes, gardens and buildings. In David Wellbery's account, the aesthetic concept *Stimmung* has a clearly metaphorical function with three different but related musical sources: the act of tuning an instrument; the result of this act, that is, the instrument being in tune; and the instrument being ready to be played. Here we are dealing with something objective – an instrument is or has been tuned – and there is no subjectivity to be found. It is when this significance begins to be dissolved metaphorically that the ego quality can emerge.[7]

However, even though the common view is that *Stimmung* comes from music, it is a remarkably unclear concept in that field. Modern encyclopedic dictionaries of music in German only have entries concerning tuning, leaving the other sense – in fact equally conventional – without attention, probably because it is taken as a mere metaphor. This is not coincidence. With the exception of a short entry in Hermann Mendel's 12-volume *Musikalisches Conversations-Lexikon*,[8] the affective term *Stimmung* has no entry of its own in the more important lexica or encyclopedias of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There seems to be no need to define what is only a figure of speech, or something overtly subjective. No questions are asked about the origin of *Stimmung*, before it was used as a term for the tuning of an instrument. The word is, as we have seen already, much older than that sixteenth-century usage, and it could very well be argued that *stimmen* as the act of tuning was a metaphor or metonym, taken from the meaning 'to adjust' or 'to accord'.[9] In language it is almost impossible to find an undisputable origin.

Spitzer never tries to locate the specific passage from *Stimmung* in music to *Stimmung* of the mind in his celebrated investigation of the prehistory of the word, *Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word 'Stimmung'*. Instead, he pursues a practice that he calls 'historical semantics', a combination of lexicography and the history of ideas. If the affective term *Stimmung* has its origin in the eighteenth century, its semantic forerunners came much earlier. In the very title of the treatise, Spitzer makes the reader aware that the term must be understood in the light of the initially Pythagorean idea of a world harmony. Indeed, he says that it is possible to sum up his book with the claim that *Stimmung* is the fruit of the different occasions

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6 Cf. Grimm and Grimm, op. cit., cols 3129–30.

7 Cf. Wellbery, 'Stimmung', p. 707.

8 Cf. Hermann Mendel (ed.), 'Stimmung', in *Musikalisches Conversations-Lexikon*, Berlin: Oppenheim 1870–83, here vol. 9 (1878), p. 457. The entry on the key concept *Gefühl* takes up around two pages, spread over three (vol. 4, pp. 162–4).

9 Grimm and Grimm, op. cit., cols 3088, 3099.

Platonism was revived in the modern period and, together with these revivals, the return of the concept of world harmony.

According to Spitzer, Pythagoras himself had assumed a fourfold harmony: of the strings of instruments, of the body and soul, of the political state and of the sky. The idea was taken over by Plato when, in mythological language, he described the harmony of the spheres in *The Republic* and when he wrote *Timaeus*; later on it was transformed to the medieval correspondence between *musica mundana*, *musica humana* and *musica instrumentalis*. With the Enlightenment the nucleus idea of world harmony vanished, dechristianization started and from then on music was no longer at the centre of Western culture. Or, in Spitzer's own words:

> In ancient Greece and in the Middle Ages, which were centered about music, musical terms expanded, attracting other words; from the period of Enlightenment on, European mankind came to lose the feeling of a central 'musicality'; it is other *Affektkomplexe* which dominate our times.[10]

One can doubt if music had a more central position in ancient Greece and in the Middle Ages than in the Romantic era, but even more problematic is the circumstance that the concept to be investigated by Spitzer is said to emerge at the same time as it evaporates. Spitzer was perhaps aware of the paradox in his thesis: 'At the end of the eighteenth century *Stimmung* was crystallized, that is, it was robbed of its blossoming life.'[11] As we will see, the concept did anything but wither and die. Furthermore, Spitzer ignores the rise of autonomous music around 1800, and also the gaining of music as a paradigmatic art to have an impact on the understanding of language.

Another flaw concerns the prehistory of the concept, despite the encyclopedic urge in Spitzer's search for signs of the tradition of world harmony, moving from ancient times to its recent traces in the twentieth century, trying to capture even the faintest echo of that harmony. One of the most important predecessors is not noted, namely Leibniz's concept of *harmonia*. Through some philosophical elaboration, it is possible to detect the parallels between *Stimmung* and the structure of the pre-established harmony which puts the monad in tune with the world. Leibniz also tends to explain his complex notion through musical metaphors: the harmony works without any external connection, like two choirs singing together without knowledge of one another; and the relation between monad and world is described as that between two attuned strings.[12]

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[10] Spitzer, op. cit., p. 78.

[11] Spitzer, op. cit., p. 76.

[12] Cf. Ilit Ferber, 'Leibniz's Monad: A Study in Melancholy and Harmony', in Hagi Kenaan and Ilit Ferber (eds), *Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking*, Dordrecht: Springer 2011, pp. 53–68. The main reference to Leibniz is 'Les Principes de la philosophie ou Monadologie', in *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. 1, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1996, pp. 438–83.

But Spitzer's 'crystallization' thesis can also be cast in doubt. When the Germanist Caroline Welsh tracks the term in contexts such as philosophy, literature, the natural sciences, psychiatry and psychology, she suggests that *Stimmung* was characterized by a vagueness that gave it a resistance to the different scientific models following on from one another. The present chapter is an attempt to give an account of the vicissitudes of the concept of *Stimmung*, now focused on the aesthetics of music, yet related to the discourses in aesthetics in general, in philosophy and in the sciences. There are many smaller and greater shifts to be registered. This conceptual historiography is, however, not only written with the objective of understanding only the history, but also with the aim of better understanding the phenomenon of *Stimmung* in music. Later on I will deal with the philosophical understanding of *Stimmung*, a phenomenon with its own changes and displacements, but which I also assume to be a constitutive part of human existence. This means, too, that the study of the sometimes more, sometimes less marginal concept is followed by a discussion in which it turns into a key concept. However, my history begins on the fringes of the aesthetics of music.

There are five crucial moments in this history, beginning with the birth of the concept in Kant and Herder. The mediating function is obvious in Kant's philosophic foundation of *Stimmung*, bringing accordance between understanding and imagination in aesthetic judgement, with the aesthetic state enjoying free interplay. Herder underscores passivity instead: *Stimmung* is inscribed in a theory of resonance. Therefore, the birth of the concept of *Stimmung* is twofold, with activity opposed to passivity. The next turning point arrives with the musical listening of Romanticism, leading from Wackenroder to Hoffmann, where elements of passivity and activity are intermingled. The third event is the response from composers, which did not occur until some 30 years after Wackenroder's pioneering discussions, when a new sensitivity was introduced in the genre of character pieces for the piano, beginning with Schubert and continuing with Schumann. The fourth step was taken in the discussion on autonomous music with Hegel worrying about empty abstraction and Hanslick suggesting that there might be strictly musical moods – a notion further developed by Fechner.

If Hegel placed *Stimmung* in the innermost self, the aesthetics of empathy (*Einfühlungsästhetik*) reverses the direction, describing how the subject projects itself onto the surrounding world. This major movement in German aesthetics of the decades around 1900 has musical parallels: several series of cyclical works where *Stimmung* is used in the title were written in the period 1885–1910, and a composer like Sibelius highlighted the relation between music, mood and landscape. This fifth phase is the culmination of *Stimmung* understood as mood, both in reflections on music and in compositional strategies. It is precisely this musical aesthetics that comes under attack from phenomenology and from Adorno.

## The Entry with Two Entrances

### *Kant's Philosophical Foundation*

It was Immanuel Kant who made *Stimmung* into a well-grounded aesthetic concept, in contrast to its earlier usage. Before Kant's aesthetic account, the concept had already reached a first climax in the German literary discussions of the 1770s,[13] and it spread into the discourses of painting and musical aesthetics. It can also be argued that *Stimmung* is a key concept in *Kritik der Urteilskraft*.[14] That may come as a surprise considering that Kant holds music in rather low esteem, stating expressly that it is a mere play of sensations, not leaving anything over for reflection. He does suggest that music exceeds poetry in its power over the movements of the mind, but since it leaves behind only mechanical association, it is the lowest of the fine arts – if it is a fine art at all.

The centrality of *Stimmung* in Kant's aesthetics lies in its position in the play of the mental powers, the faculties of understanding and imagination. The ground of the aesthetic judgement is the accordance (*Zusammenstimmung*) of these two representative powers,[15] and the essence of the aesthetic state is their free interplay. Production of beautiful works of art presupposes 'proportion and attunement [*Stimmung*]' in 'the imagination's free harmony [*Übereinstimmung*] with the understanding's lawfulness'.[16] Kant is, accordingly, focused on form in his approach, describing it in terms of proportion and harmony. John Neubauer has suggested that this means that Kant, in his discussion on music, inherited but also reformulated Pythagoreanism in three ways: 1) the harmony of art mirrors not a cosmic harmony, as the Pythagorean teaching says, but a mental one, which is 2) not prior to but a result of the harmony of art, and 3) not permanent but at play.[17] Kant grounds the mental influence of music in proportions, a 'proportioned attunement [*Stimmung*]'[18] of the musical harmony and melody in the main theme, which provides the dominant affect of the piece. These proportions follow mathematical

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[13] Cf. Bodo Lecke, *Das Stimmungsbild: Musikmetaphorik und Naturgefühl in der dichterischen Prosaskizze 1721–1780*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1967, p. 10.

[14] As did Walter Biemel in *Die Bedeutung von Kants Begründung der Ästhetik für die Philosophie der Kunst*, Cologne: Kölner Universitäts-Verlag 1959. Later examples are John Neubauer in *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure from Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics*, New Haven: Yale University Press 1986 and Stanley Corngold in 'What is Radical in Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"', *The Fate of the Self: German Writers and French Theory*, New York: Columbia University Press 1986, pp. 48–58.

[15] Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, in *Werke in sechs Bänden*, vol. 5, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2006 (1790/93), 6th ed., p. 381 (§35).

[16] Kant, op. cit., pp. 418–19 (§49) (trans. in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett 1987, p. 199).

[17] Cf. Neubauer, op. cit., p. 188.

[18] Kant, op. cit., p. 432 (§53).

rules, Kant admits, but he adds that mathematics surely has nothing to do with the perception of music. We have no subconscious counting of numbers, like in Leibniz. If there is a Pythagorean tradition to be found in Kant, it does not pay tribute to the centrality of music in that theory, and consequently the musicality of *Stimmung* is not accepted, or is at least reduced to formal proportions – if we exclude a curious parenthesis where Kant describes how *Tafelmusik* can be an agreeable noise intended to keep the party in a good mood.[19]

Many a scholar has expressed disappointment with Kant's approach to music.[20] That which seems to be an entrance to a new understanding of music turns out to be a dead end. Kant has been heralded as the harbinger of formalism in music; the assumption that instrumental music is one of the most important examples of free beauty seems to lend support to that position; the contemplation of the beautiful object is a relevant attitude in musical listening. However, in Kant, music has little to do with beauty. Musical form is restricted to mathematical form, without any interest to the listener. Furthermore, Kant speaks of music as a 'language of affects' in a traditional way, and the most intriguing of his thoughts on music, indeed on *Stimmung*, are curtailed in the insistence on music as pleasure only. This is made clear in his reflections on mathematics in music just discussed: the harmony afforded by music, the emerging *Stimmung*, has only to do with self-enjoyment. Music has no sincere duty.

It also has to be pointed out that apart from the most varied use of different forms of words with *stimm-* as the root (*zusammenstimmen*, *gestimmt* and so on), Kant does not refer to any form of musicality in the central passages of his third Critique. This word-family is sometimes set in relation to musically connected terms such as 'harmony' (*Harmonie*) and 'play' (*Spiel*), but still strangely enough with no respect to music. It is as if *Stimmung* has lost its history, a metaphor with its origin lost in oblivion. The concept is a technical one, exported to a new field. This is the starting point for the career of *Stimmung* in which the source is often forgotten; or if it is retained, it is not drawn upon.

### *In the Wake of Kant*

Kant's follower, Friedrich Schiller, makes no reference to music when he uses the concept in order to describe the mind in a state of freedom. In *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* he elaborates the idea of a 'middle disposition' (*mittlere Stimmung*), detached from reason and sensuality but mediating between them.[21]

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[19] Kant, op. cit., p. 404 (§44).

[20] These range from Paul Moos (*Die Philosophie der Musik von Kant bis Eduard von Hartmann*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1922) to Enrico Fubini (*L'estetica musicale dal Settecento a oggi*, Turin: Einaudi 2001 [1965], 4th ed.).

[21] Friedrich Schiller, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*, in *Theoretische Schriften*, Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 2008 (1795), p. 633.

The proportionality of the concept is gone, and the term is taken as a global mindset. Only the idea of *Stimmung* as a disposition is kept intact, since Schiller wants to create a state of potentiality for the mind.[22]

At face value, Schiller's criticism concerning music makes this art only capable of filling the flow of time and exciting the senses; it eradicates self and rationality since it is incompatible with ideas and concepts. Even if in his correspondence with Goethe he is less critical about music – in a formulation that has attracted much attention, he writes about the poetic idea emerging out of a musical mood, an unclear state without any specific object[23] – we should not see his general scepticism as being unproductive. Schiller begins an interesting investigation of passive perception, erasure of the self and a non-reflective relation to the world. That is, however, not part of the aesthetic disposition in Schiller, but a brute sensuality that has nothing to do with rationality even in its most primitive forms. The aesthetic disposition brings about the interplay between rationality and sensuality, and even if the conceptual interplay has different nodes, Schiller's *ästhetische Stimmung* and Kant's *Einbildungskraft* are almost the same.[24] Yet, the free-floating position between rationality and sensuality, self and world, subject and object is determinative for the discussion to come.

One step in this direction can be found in Christian Gottfried Körner's article 'Ueber Charakterdarstellung in der Musik', published by his friend Schiller in the journal *Die Horen*. Here, Körner pays attention to the dark and indefinite enthusiasm which is aroused by the artist, whose mood is spread throughout his or her domain: this indefiniteness is said to give free play to imagination.[25] In an editorial response to the first version of the article Schiller maintained his negative attitude towards the materiality of music: its material force must be tempered by form.[26] Nevertheless, he had in another context written that music is the 'beloved and efficient art which has no other object than the form of sentiment'.[27] With an expression taken from aesthetics later on in the century, music cannot show *what* a specific emotion is about, its object, whereas it has everything to do with *how* this emotion behaves. Suddenly, we have a series of interesting suggestions concerning music related to Kant.

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[22] Cf. Wellbery, op. cit., p. 710.

[23] Cf. Schiller in Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 8:1, Munich: Hanser 1985–98, p. 261.

[24] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Übungen für Anfänger: Schillers Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen. Wintersemester 1936/37*, Marbach: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft 2005, p. 73.

[25] Cf. Christian Gottfried Körner, 'Ueber Charakterdarstellung in der Musik', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Leipzig: Grunow 1881 (1795), p. 94.

[26] Cf. 'Zu Gottfried Körners Aufsatz "Über Charakterdarstellung in der Musik"', in Schiller, op. cit., pp. 1081–4.

[27] 'Über Matthisons Gedichte', in Schiller, op. cit., pp. 1016–37, cit. p. 1023.

Even if there are instances where *Stimmung* is used in the aesthetic sense of the word before the 1770s, it is only by then that the conceptualization starts, both in theory and in literary works. The first signs can be seen in literary discussions. When Johann Georg Sulzer treats the tone with which words are expressed, he stresses that speakers, actors and authors should be aware that the state of mind (*Gemüthslage*) influences the tone, sentence construction and vocabulary. This state, Sulzer suggests, can also be called 'the mood of the mind' (*die Stimmung des Gemüthes*).[28]

In pre-Romantic reflection on literature and music there is an unclear relation between the terms *Affekt*, *Empfindung* and *Gefühl* (affect, sentiment and feeling), and *Stimmung* is established in this context. They are often dealt with as synonyms; even if *Stimmung* is likely to appear when the metaphor of an instrument is used, that term may soon be replaced by *Empfindung* or *Gefühl*. In his novel *Andreas Hartknopf*, Karl Philipp Moritz lets his narrator say that music is the proper language of sentiments (*Empfindungen*), then that it influences the passions (*Leidenschaften*), only to describe how a tone from afar can have an extraordinary effect on the soul being in a particular mood (*Stimmung*).[29] On one and the same page, three different affective kinds are referred to. The differentiation starts slowly, and the ongoing discussions and negotiations continue for at least 100 years.[30]

What took place in the last decades of the eighteenth century was a discursive turn, which can be understood in different ways. One interpretation is that the speculative-symbolic theology of world harmony turned into a reflective aesthetic theory.[31] From another perspective, the harmony of the spheres was altered into a relationship in which the vibrations of the nerves are responsible for the harmonic exchange between man and world: the psychologist David Hartley's doctrine of nerval vibrations from the middle of the eighteenth century leaked over into both philosophical and aesthetic speculations. This physiological and mechanistic explanation, where the focus is on resonance, was challenged by the organic conception of man (and the work of art) around the year 1800 – without *Stimmung* losing currency, however.[32] Taken from the point of view of poetics, the relation between man and ambience is changed, not only through a prominence given to a

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[28] Johann Georg Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt*, vol. 2, Leipzig: Weidmann 1771–74, pp. 1160.

[29] Karl Philipp Moritz, *Andreas Hartknopf: Eine Allegorie*, in *Andreas Hartknopf: eine Allegorie; Andreas Hartknopfs Predigerjahre*, Stuttgart: Reclam 2001 (1786), p. 88.

[30] Cf. Franz Josef Wetz's entry 'Stimmung' in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 10, Basel: Schwabe 1998, col. 173.

[31] Cf. Wellbery, op. cit., p. 706.

[32] Cf. Caroline Welsh, 'Nerven–Saiten–Stimmung: Zum Wandel einer Denkfigur zwischen Musik und Wissenschaft 1750–1850', *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 31, no. 2 (2008), pp. 113–29.

more active subject (*Stimmung*) but also through a more dynamic world (leading to *Gestimmtsein*). Herder has a central role in this change.

*The Second Entrance: Herder*

Johann Gottfried Herder – the philosopher who played off the ear against the eye, who esteemed the energetic qualities in music highly – is the second starting point for the aesthetic concept of *Stimmung*; but, in contrast to Kant, he is often concerned with the musical implications. A major criticism of Kant by Herder is actually the neglect of music in the writings of his former teacher. *Ton* (tone, sound or note) is his point of departure. It is the bodily experience of the tone or sound, influencing the whole human being. He says that the question of beauty should not start with the abstract and empty concept of beauty – aesthetics from above – but instead with the physiology of the senses and sensuous concepts.[33] In his writings from the late 1760s, Herder attacks physical and mathematical explanations of the nature of music, taking his cue from Jean-Jacques Rousseau.[34] However, he is observant of cultural contexts and individual capacities, and *Stimmung* is brought into play in his criticism of trivial notions of both common sense and of total relativism in aesthetic matters. In *Viertes Wäldchen*, he notes that tone and colour, ear and eye are incommensurable, yet he does not hold that everything in nature is only a chaos of individual and disharmonic temperaments (*disharmonischen Stimmungen*) which cannot be brought into an accord.[35] The acoustician enjoys his inner world in a different way from the optician, but both enjoy it – there are rules for beauty and grace. Yet, even those of the same nature might differ due to cultural reasons: a person who had 'attuned [*gestimmet*] his ear to African ape music' (an astonishing formulation by that 'preacher of humanity') differs from the one who has grown up with 'the sweet melodies of Italy'.[36]

The resonance theory is central to Herder's understanding of music and the world, but his model is both flexible and innovative.[37] *Stimmung* and *stimmen* can be found on different levels: as a structure of nature; as a part of human nature; as a force shaping the human mind. Tuning and mind, tuning and world are woven together. In the correspondences or resonances between the emotional sensations and the world, we find a kind of Pythagorean unity, but Herder deviates clearly from the traditional formulation. Firstly, as already stated, the tuning can differ

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[33] Cf. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Viertes Wäldchen*, in *Werke in zehn Bände*, vol. 2, Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1993 (1769), pp. 300–301.

[34] For a recent discussion on Rousseau and music, see Amalia Collisani, *La musica di Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Palermo: Epos 2007.

[35] Herder, op. cit., p. 283.

[36] Herder, op. cit., p. 284 (trans. in Johann Gottfried Herder, *Selected Writings on Aesthetics*, trans. Gregory Moore, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006, p. 201).

[37] For a general treatment of the theory of resonance, see Veit Erlmann, *Reason and Resonance: A History of Modern Aurality*, New York: Zone Books 2010.

and then so does the vibrating world, from which it follows that cultures differ, and also individual persons. Secondly, Herder's scepticism concerning a musical mathematics forces him to judge Pythagoreanism negatively.

In Herder, *Ton* is very close to a world-opening mood, bringing breadth and wholeness to perception. At the same time, that perception is something bodily and concrete: the tone touches directly upon the nerves. When Heidegger in a seminar on *Über den Ursprung der Sprache* discusses 'tone' in Herder, he observes both the potential of Herder's thoughts and their shortcomings.[38] Herder is said to be unable to discern that the relation between sensation (*Empfindung*) and its expression in a tone is founded much deeper than in reason, namely in the 'at-tunement' (*Ge-stimmtheit*) of Being and its truth.[39] At present it is too early to elucidate the meaning of Heidegger's phrase, but obviously Herder's *Ton* is said to be grounded in *Stimmung* or the related *Ge-stimmtheit*. The tone has to do with Being, how Being is given, and more specifically with the relation between *Dasein*[40] and Being; but Herder has not reached this point. His philosophy of listening is focused on what really sounds – not the Heideggerian silent voice of Being.

The nucleus of Herder's discussion on *Ton* is the old German word for mind, *Gemüt*, with its obvious kinship to *Anmut* – the way the tone or sound charms the mind. In the root system of *Mut* (etymologically akin to 'mood'),[41] we have an alternative to the word family of *Stimmung*, with many possible combinations between mind, relations and states. *Gemüt* is central to the discussions on music in *Kalligone*, where Herder scrutinizes Kant's third Critique. Here it is asked how music can affect the mind, and Herder's answer is famous: 'Music performs on the clavichord within us which is our own inmost being.'[42] The human passions follow the dynamics of the music, the modulations, the accents, the key-changes. Whereas he had criticized the universality of music as a language of feelings in his *Wäldchen*, Herder is now more prone to accept it under certain conditions. Some music makes everyone sad, some music makes people happy, but always the listeners react according to their mood as well as to their stature and character.[43] Therefore, *Stimmung* is used in a very modern way, individualized. But the tone

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[38] Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Sprache: Der Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung des Wortes. Zu Herders Abhandlung 'Über den Ursprung der Sprache'*, GA, vol. 85, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1999.

[39] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 44.

[40] Following the practice in translations of Heidegger, the term *Dasein* ('being-there', human existence) remains untranslated.

[41] Cf. 'Mood', *The Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. 9, Oxford: Clarendon 1989, 2nd ed., p. 1047.

[42] Johann Gottfried Herder, *Kalligone*, in *Werke in zehn Bände*, vol. 8, Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1998 (1800), p. 703 (trans. in Peter le Huray and James Day (eds), *Music and Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and Early-Nineteenth Centuries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981, p. 189).

[43] Cf. Herder, op. cit., 703.

has considerable power: it is pregnant with the passions of mankind; it is the voice of nature and the energy of a person who is deeply moved; and it belongs to both the individual and to the species.[44] *Ton* is not something static; it is something dynamic, moving, energetic.

In a prophetic-poetic passage in *Kalligone*, Herder exalts the mood of reverence: tones coming from heaven and singing in the heart, affecting every sympathetic being, re-echoing everywhere.[45] There is not only the obvious Pythagorean vision of the world as a coherent whole founded on a celestial music, but there is also an insistence on reverence as something almost autonomous, being felt by anyone attuned to it, the notion of the human being as a kind of resonating body. The reverence is free-floating in the world, but at the same time giving resonance in the individual's inner life. Not only in Herder's *Wäldchen* but also in *Kalligone*, the idea of the tuning of the string is intact. He combines a whole series of conceptions leading to *Stimmung*. Certainly, his Pythagoreanism is still lacking the central mathematical element, but he also touches upon the medieval notion of correspondences between a macrocosm, a human microcosm and the tones themselves.

However, Herder introduces something new into the notion of world harmony: mobility. There is a kinship between spirit and the movement that is the innermost force of nature. We saw that in 1769 Herder elaborated different levels of attunement where the structure of nature, human nature itself and the shaping of the human mind were interconnected. Here, in *Kalligone*, the polarization between outside and inside, between active and passive, is changed into a mysterious cooperation where the free-floating reverence tunes man, who starts to act along it. This is something invisible, Herder says; sight has nothing to do with this reverence. Instead, it is something for the ear, and nothing but the ear. However fantastical, however exalted, Herder is able to formulate central characteristics for the concept of *Stimmung* to come.

## On Passive and Active Listening

### *Wackenroder as Ear-Opener*

The next turning point in our history of the concept of *Stimmung* arrives with the musical listening of early Romanticism. There is a common acceptance of the notion of a Romantic mode of listening, emerging in the last decade of the eighteenth century or the beginning of the nineteenth, but opinions differ on how this mode is constituted. Some authors stress the passive aspects, putting forward the idea of an immersion in the musical flow (among them we find Heinrich Besseler and after him Karol Berger), whereas others, on the contrary, suggest

[44] Cf. Herder, op. cit., p. 813.

[45] Cf. Herder, op. cit., p. 819.

that the new mode is an active one (Carl Dahlhaus, James H. Johnson, Mark Evan Bonds and Lawrence Kramer). All of them include mood or *Stimmung* in their considerations, most often treating it as a sign of passivity; but, as we shall see, key texts of Romantic listening are not at all clear on this point. Through a close reading of the first elaboration of Romantic listening (Wackenroder on two different modes) and then a discussion of the emblematic text of Romantic music criticism (Hoffmann on Beethoven's Fifth Symphony), the position of *Stimmung* as hovering between activity and passivity will be clarified.

In a letter to his friend Ludwig Tieck, dated 5 May 1792, the young author-to-be Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder describes two different ways of listening to music. It is a part of an intimate intellectual discussion, typical of the close friendship epitomized by the movement of early Romanticism. Later on, Tieck and Wackenroder would write two of the pioneering works of that movement, *Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders* (1796) and *Phantasien über die Kunst* (1799); these are arguably the beginning of Romanticism in literature. In the letter, though, we find a breakthrough in the aesthetics of music. Opinions differ about why the letter is important, but the fact that it is revolutionary, breaks with the past or at least develops in music what had emerged in philosophy has not been put in doubt.[46] The central passage, where two modes of listening are described, must be rendered *in extenso*:

> Whenever I go to a concert, I find that I always enjoy the music in two ways. Only one of these is the true one. This involves attentive observance [*Beobachtung*] of the progression of sounds, yielding completely to this stream of overwhelming sensations [*Empfindungen*], and banishing and withdrawing from every disturbing thought and every alien sense-impression. A certain effort is involved when one drinks in the sounds so avidly, and it cannot be sustained for any length of time. For this reason, I believe I can confidently claim that an hour's music is all that we can absorb, at the very most. Concerts, operas and operettas, therefore, exceed the bounds of nature. The other way in which music gives me pleasure comes not from direct enjoyment, not from

[46] Cf. Besseler, 'Das musikalische Hören', in *Aufsätze*, pp. 151–53; Carl Dahlhaus, *Die Idee der absoluten Musik*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4, Laaber: Laaber 2000–08 (1978), pp. 74–5; Caroline Welsh, *Hirnhöhlenpoetiken: Theorien zur Wahrnehmung in Wissenschaft, Ästhetik und Literatur um 1800*, Freiburg: Rombach 2003, pp. 177–8; Mark Evan Bonds, 'Idealism and the Aesthetics of Instrumental Music at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, vol. 50, no. 2/3 (1997), pp. 387–420, ref. 393–5 as well as *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006, pp. 29–30; Barbara Naumann, *Musikalisches Ideen-Instrument: Das Musikalische in Poetik und Sprachtheorie der Frühromantik*, Stuttgart: Metzler 1990, pp. 40–42; and Matthew Riley, *Musical Listening in the German Enlightenment: Attention, Wonder and Astonishment*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2004, pp. 21–2.

> a passive acceptance of tonal impressions, but from a certain spiritual activity which is generated and sustained by the music. In such cases, I do not feel the prevalent emotion of the piece; my thoughts and fantasies are, so to speak, borne away on the waves of melody, and are lost in some remote hiding-place. The remarkable thing is that when I am in this mood [*Stimmung*], I am best able to reflect aesthetically on the music as I hear it. It is as if universal ideas are being prised loose from the emotions that are induced by the composition, ideas that are then projected rapidly and clearly before my soul.[47]

In the article 'Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit' (1959), Heinrich Besseler writes that this letter is the first sign of Romanticism, not only in music but also understood as a movement. One could suspect that, being a musicologist, Besseler over-emphasizes music's importance in this early moment; but he makes his assumption in accordance with Richard Benz, at the time an influential literary historian, who starts his major study, *Die deutsche Romantik*, with exactly this correspondence between the two young authors.[48] Consequently, Romanticism in music does not begin with a revolution in the musical work of art, but with a change in the way of listening. Romantic music did not yet exist; or, better, it existed only in the ears of the Romantics. When Tieck and Wackenroder wrote their musical fantasies, they almost never mentioned any specific work; and when they did – Tieck in 'Symphonien' – it was music for the theatre, namely Johann Friedrich Reichardt's incidental music to Shakespeare's *Macbeth* (1795). It can thus be said that Romantic reflection on music started with Wackenroder's letter, a description of how music is perceived. And if we dare to follow Besseler's argument, we are in a position to say that Romanticism, and that is not only in music, starts with a change of perception (not with a change of thought), that it concerns music (not literature or pictorial art) and that the affected sense is hearing (not sight).

The observant reader has surely noticed that *Stimmung* plays a key role in Wackenroder's second mode of listening. As listener, Wackenroder is disposed by the music, and he starts to reflect on issues of musical aesthetics. We have not only an important document which can be ranked as one of the founding texts of Romanticism, but also a text which describes how Romantic aesthetic thinking emerges in a *Stimmung*. Perhaps the text also reflects on its own status – then, the text itself emerges in that state of mind. These are good reasons indeed for us to dwell upon this letter.

The best starting point is Besseler's article, since it is one of very few examples of a philosophically informed musicological discussion of *Stimmung* in music.

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[47] Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 2, Heidelberg: Winter 1991, p. 29 (trans. in Oliver Strunk [ed.], *Source Readings in Music History: From Classical Antiquity through the Romantic Era*, New York: Norton 1950, p. 249). Trans. slightly changed.

[48] Cf. Richard Benz, *Die deutsche Romantik: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, Stuttgart: Reclam 1937, pp. 17–19.

It must, however, be stressed that there is a negative tendency in Besseler's treatment, fulfilling critical points of view made already in his inaugural lecture, held in 1925.[49] At that time, Besseler played the more primordial 'communal music-making' (*Umgangsmusik*) off against autonomous music, with the mood-orientated and associative Romantic listening as an almost degenerate form of musical behaviour, typical of the concert life of the bourgeoisie. In the article from 1959 the ideological bias is less obvious, and Besseler seems to have revaluated that kind of listening which focuses upon the formal aspects of a musical work of art; but Romantic listening is still supposed to be regressive. Active listening was, according to Besseler, decisive in the era before Romanticism, with the classical style as the apex in terms of complexity: the listener had to synthesize the musical elements presented, always looking for thematic and rhythmic congruence.

With the Romantics, with Wackenroder, everything is changed: from now on the act of listening is a passive 'mystical immersion in the work'.[50] Here, Besseler is too busy being truthful to his own earlier position than to the wording of Wackenroder. He follows Wackenroder's distinction between passivity and activity, but totally misses that the word *Stimmung* only appears in the description of the second mode, not in the first. According to Besseler, the second mode is akin to the active-synthetic listening of the preceding era, whereas the first answers to distinctive traits for the degenerated listening of the time to come.[51]

We should not expect an enthusiastic letter to be systematic, but that does not mean that the descriptions should be taken with ease; on the contrary, the reading of the text can be intensified and the possibilities of interpretation should not be subject to any restrictions. There are paradoxes, but these paradoxes might prove themselves to be productive. A first dilemma concerns distance. In the first mode, the intense observation of the listener is combined with a total surrender of the soul to the music – the soul is said to be outside the flow or stream of notes, registering its movement, but then it is also said to be captivated by the flow. In the second mode, the music has tuned the listener into a disposition, but it has also set the listener free to wander around in his or her thoughts.

If we go back again to the first mode, the progression of sounds is described as a stream of overwhelming *Empfindungen* and, taking into consideration that Wackenroder is writing in a context in which aestheticians spoke about music as an outpouring of feelings, it is not impossible that he adheres to this quite conventional standpoint. Still, there is no sign of sentimentality, and the overwhelming flow of *Empfindungen* should be understood as a swift stream of sensations rather than feelings. Then follows the pivotal point, bringing the main distinctive element into

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[49] Besseler, 'Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens', in op. cit., pp. 29–53.

[50] Besseler, 'Das musikalische Hören', in op. cit., p. 153.

[51] Later comments go in other directions. Carl Dahlhaus suggests that Wackenroder just has a different understanding of activity and passivity from the modern one (op. cit., p. 74), whereas Bonds holds that the active listening is to be found in the first mode (op. cit., p. 394).

the discussion: only the flow of notes is perceived; nothing disturbs the enjoyment of listening to the music, no thoughts, no impressions. Here, the listener is situated inside the music, whereas in the second mode he or she seems to be outside.

The second problem can be formulated as the problem of activity. According to Wackenroder, the first mode is characterized by being passive; but how, then, is this passivity constituted? The usage of the word *Beobachtung* (observance) does not point at the sense of sight; instead it should be taken as a word for intense attention. The listener is put into the reign of notes and the surrounding world loses its impact. When Wackenroder speaks about strain, he does not mean the effort of combining notes into symmetries; instead he means the endeavour to keep the mind open to the movements of music, to participate in it. Participation means to be a part of the music, not to re-enact it or to co-operate with it.

The activity of mind in the second mode seems to be much easier to understand. The music tunes the mind of the listener into its mood, and, being in the mood of music, the mind starts to work, thoughts are born and imagination is activated. The thoughts may have nothing to do with the development of the music, but the music can also tune the mind into aesthetic reflection, where the sentiments or sensations bring about general ideas related to the music. Suddenly, the distinction between the two different modes is less clear, since the *sentiments in* as well as the *sensations of* the music are connected with the general ideas. It seems as if the second mode can be split into two sub-modes: one which is totally free in its imaginative activity, and another which has to do with an aesthetic thinking attuned to the music. Both variants of the second mode can to be found in 'Die Wunder der Tonkunst' of *Phantasien über die Kunst*, where the listener enjoys how the imagination is activated by the flow of music: images might start to lead a life of their own, but there is also an aesthetic contemplation in tune with the tune.[52]

A third issue to reflect upon is akin to both the first and second, namely the question of direction. In the first mode, the word *Beobachtung* indicates a movement from the listening subject to the musical object. It is the standard position of the subject, investigating the world around it, objectifying as it observes. Then follows what can be seen as a turn; the soul is carried away by the flow of notes. The direction is still the same as in the case of the classical subject–object relation, but the difference lies in the subject losing itself. Can there be any other possibility in the text? Yes, there is that given by the circumstance that we are dealing with pleasure (*Genuß*), which seems to be the rhetoric-poetic reason why Wackenroder, curiously enough, says that 'one drinks in the sounds so avidly'. The verb *einflößen* ('drink in') introduces a new direction: the music flows, or indeed pours, into the listener like something liquid; ideas emerge from this flow and turn before the soul. Again, we have something that connects the two modes of listening, since that which happens in the second mode is the rise of ideas from the sensations of which the music is made – within the subject.

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[52] Cf. Wackenroder, *Phantasien über die Kunst*, in op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 205–8.

It has become obvious that the innate tendency to polarize the two modes of listening conceals their interconnectedness. Both modes deal with positions outside and inside of music, both have elements of passivity and activity, and both problematize the position of the subject. This close relation might be the reason why Wackenroder combines them when he returns to the problem the next time in his writings, now in fictional form. In *Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders* they are no longer separated; instead they seem to strengthen one another when Wackenroder, in his play with layers of fiction, lets the friar (the *Klosterbruder* of the title) relate the story of his friend Berglinger, a story of a young man leading a life very close to that of the young Wackenroder, listening to music in churches. Initially, the first mode of listening can be discerned: 'Not the slightest sound escaped him, and his keen attention left him in the end quite limp and exhausted. His soul, eternally in motion, was wholly a play of sounds';[53] but soon the imagination is activated and images are born: 'These many-sided moods [*Empfindungen*] now all of them impressed upon his soul new thoughts and visual images, invariably corresponding.'[54] This dialectic between pure play and visual imagining is later developed by E.T.A. Hoffmann.

Is the conflict between the two modes gone? There is reason to follow Besseler's ideas of a more primordial listening than the subjective *Stimmung*: two years after his inaugural lecture he returns to the concept, but now under the title 'Grundfragen der Musikästhetik'. This change might be a consequence of the development of the philosophy of Heidegger, who had been Besseler's teacher and who became a friend, since the philosopher's revolutionary work *Sein und Zeit* was underway and the phenomena of *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit* were being investigated and further elaborated. Here, Besseler distinguishes between a relation to music as object and a mode characterized by 'active, bodily-spiritual co-enactment'.[55] This active relation can be found in dancing, marching and working to music, but also in the religious use of music. Instead of the 'what' of objectified music, Besseler finds the 'how' of the performance of music. This 'how' is directly related to *Stimmung*, but then not the Romantic misunderstanding of mood; instead, it is *Gestimmtsein*, being-attuned, one of the 'fundamental states of our being'.[56] As soon as the social, non-musical occasion is lost and the music is perceived for its own sake, *Gestimmtsein* is lost, too.

Besseler may have been too concerned with criticism of not only the Romantic 'misunderstanding' but also the musical life of the bourgeoisie to realize that the fundamental facticity of our being might be exactly the concept of *Stimmung* in Wackenroder. It might also, admittedly, have been something un-thought in Wackenroder, but it is there as a possibility: there is a passive moment in

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[53] Wackenroder, *Herzensergießungen*, in op. cit., vol. 1, p. 133 (trans. in Le Huray and Day, op. cit., p. 753).

[54] Wackenroder, op. cit., p. 134 (trans. in Le Huray and Day, op. cit., p. 754).

[55] Besseler, 'Grundfragen der Musikästhetik', in op. cit., p. 62.

[56] Besseler, op. cit., p. 62.

Wackenroder's second mode where the music has put the subject of the listener into a *Stimmung*. It precedes the birth of concepts and fantasies, it is not directed at the music; but, just as in the first mode, the notes are likened to movements in water, this time not a stream but waves. We are dealing with a moment of ecstasy where the subject is erased or put outside itself. In this ecstasy, the listener is situated by the music.

*Hoffmann Hearing Romanticism before Romantic Music*

We have seen how for Kant the attunement between understanding and imagination is the grounds for aesthetic judgement, and when we take a step further within the Romantic movement, the stimulated understanding, the activated imagination and the tuning within a mood will be recognized and intensified. Here, Hoffmann is crucial, particularly his famous review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony (1810).[57] It is true that the first passage most theorists and commentators observe is the declaration of music as something autonomous and therefore beyond language: 'Music reveals to man an unknown realm, a world quite separate from the outer sensual world surrounding him, a world in which he leaves behind all feelings circumscribed by intellect in order to embrace the inexpressible.'[58] But commentators usually neglect the first, long sentence of the text, where the reviewer confesses that he has been 'utterly permeated by the subject' and where he apologizes for including what 'this composition has given rise to within him'.[59] In addition to the combination of analysis and verbal fantasies, Hoffmann's approach also includes embodied presence of music.

In calling not only Beethoven a Romantic composer, but Haydn and Mozart too, Hoffmann hears Romanticism long before the Romantic generation existed (to use the words of Charles Rosen).[60] According to Hoffmann, Romanticism means that music, for the first time, is experienced as an art of its own, and this is accomplished through an inner grasp of the essence of the art. That grasp can be made in different ways. While Hoffmann explains how the symphony is constructed, and he follows the thematic threads between the movements, these observations of interrelating structures and motifs are always connected to descriptions of how the music works, how the listener perceives it. Thus, Hoffmann investigates the beginning of the first movement with the main motif repeated twice, and this is put into a play that leads to the dominant, which intimates unknown mysteries in

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[57] E.T.A. Hoffmann, [untitled review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony], *Schriften zur Musik: Aufsätze und Rezensionen*, Munich: Winkler 1977, pp. 34–51.

[58] Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 34 (trans. in David Charton [ed.], *E.T.A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings: Kreisleriana, The Poet and the Composer, Music Criticism*, trans. Martyn Clarke, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989, p. 236).

[59] Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 34 (trans. Clarke, op. cit., p. 236).

[60] Cf. Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1995.

the listener's mind. The economy of Beethoven's composition is hailed, and he insists that precisely the economy of motifs has a certain impact on the mind of the listener: it is this overall pattern that 'maintains the spirit [*Gemüt*] in the state of ineffable yearning'.[61]

Hoffmann's descriptions are not only directed at the unspeakable and the ineffable, but from time to time he also elaborates how the listener embodies the music. One example can be found when he discusses the minuet, where he describes how restless yearning staggers to an anxiety that 'constricts the breast'.[62] What is this capability of music? When Hoffmann has commented on all the movements, he ends with a general discussion of the symphony. Here, he tries to do justice to the plurality of the symphonic work, and he takes the stance of an average listener who perceives it like a rhapsody; then, Hoffmann ends on the feeling which endures not only in the course of the symphony, but also afterwards. In the plurality, there is unity: 'The heart [*Gemüt*] of every sensitive listener, however, is certain to be deeply stirred and held until the very last chord by *one* lasting emotion, that of nameless, haunted yearning.'[63] This unity is called a 'mood', *Stimmung*. The term had been used only once before in the text, then in connection to something that is full of yearning in the symphony. Noteworthy is the combination of something both ineffable and specific, something that is impossible to define but is at the same time defining.

Perhaps no other text on music from this period has been analysed, commented on and reflected upon to the extent of this piece of criticism, yet the ending of the text has not received much attention. It seems to concern the engraving of the score, and then follows a comment on the four-hand piano arrangement:

> Normally the reviewer is not especially in favour of arrangements, but it cannot be denied that the solitary enjoyment in one's own room of a masterpiece one has heard played by the full orchestra often excites the imagination in the same way as before and conjures forth the same mood [*Stimmung*] in the mind.[64]

Hoffmann clearly does not possess the absolutely analytical mind that must steep into the score, and is hereby satisfied. Through recalling a performance of the symphony with an orchestra, pianists might be able to get the same excitation once again. And – for us of course the central formulation – the most important quality of the symphony lies within its mood, its *Stimmung*.

In his comments on the review, Mark Evan Bonds argues that Hoffmann develops a mode of listening in which the subject is free and co-operative. Haydn and Mozart 'lead' the listener into different surroundings, whereas Beethoven's

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61 Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 43 (trans. Clarke, op. cit., p. 244).

62 Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 46 (trans. Clarke, op. cit., p. 247).

63 Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 50 (trans. Clarke, op. cit., p. 250).

64 Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 51 (trans. Clarke, op. cit., p. 251). Trans. slightly revised: Clarke renders *Stimmung* with 'impressions'.

music 'opens up' the sphere of the sublime. Furthermore, he posits that Hoffmann's account 'traces a path by which the listener moves from the passive framework of rhetoric (Haydn and Mozart) to the active framework of philosophy (Beethoven): it is precisely this emphasis on the responsibility of the listener that distinguishes the new mode of listening from the old.'[65] Bonds has a point in saying so, but at the same time he excludes other elements of the text, all those elements that imply the tuning of the listener through a *Stimmung*. In fact, Hoffmann says that he has been penetrated, *durchgedrungen*, by the symphony; we have seen that the music holds the listener in its grip, and is even violent.

One could argue that these examples are only sediments of an older mode of listening, that Hoffmann was not able to free himself from the past when he tried to develop a new position for the listener. Nevertheless, we should be true to the text and its testimony of an overwhelming experience, an experience that seems to be the kernel of that musical listening: to be attuned to a mood, to be put into a *Stimmung*. Here, we can see how *Stimmung* intrudes into the act of listening, appointed to be a model of freedom but showing itself to be precisely the opposite. It is a lived experience, an elemental force, even an act of violence. It gives witness to facticity.

What, then, distinguishes the Romantic mode of listening? It cannot be attention, since attentive listening can be demonstrated prior to Romanticism.[66] It cannot be activity, since both Wackenroder' pioneering text and Hoffmann's paradigmatic example are explicit in their investigation of passivity. At the same time, Besseler is reductive when he stresses only the passivity of the Romantic listener: the play of imagination is a salient feature in both Wackenroder and Hoffmann, leading to a verbal richness that can be discerned in their other texts related to the musical sphere. Precisely this characteristic – imaginative force – is the most common trait in Romantic texts on music, sometimes turning to literature and architecture when finding parallels for the musical experience, sometimes being free phantasy. But it is not a free play of imagination. There is a framework or, to use a term better adapted for our context, a tuning of imagination in the *Stimmung*.

## A New Musical Sensitivity: From Schubert to Schumann

### *Discovering Ways of Feeling at the Piano*

In the second decade of the nineteenth century, starting with short works by Schubert, a new sensitivity is introduced in the genre of character pieces.[67] The

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[65] Bonds, *Music as Thought*, pp. 36–7.

[66] Cf. Riley, op. cit., and James H. Johnson, *Listening in Paris: A Cultural History*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1995.

[67] Cf. Willi Kahl, 'Das lyrische Klavierstück Schuberts und seiner Vorgänger seit 1810', *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, vol. 3 (1920–21), pp. 54–82, 99–122.

change was prompted by composers such as Václav Tomášek and his student Jan Václav Voříšek, who had begun to develop the piano miniature, with Tomášek's Six Eclogues and Voříšek's Impromptus op. 8 as key works. The Irishman John Field gave birth to the nocturne. Taking Field's novelty into account, with its repeated accompaniment figures, we should not forget Beethoven's 'Moonlight Sonata' (1801), which in its fantasy form forces the conventional sonata structure to break down. What Schubert actually did was to transform the unassuming miniature, with its Biedermeier character so carefully worked out by his Bohemian colleagues, into an emotionally dense format. It can be described as a shift from musical works depicting or delineating an emotion to works bringing forth an affective state, by which time the Romantic character piece was well established. The new aesthetics of Romanticism, heralded by Wackenroder, Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, at last gained a hearing from composers – Dahlhaus's remark that the Romantic aesthetics of music appeared without Romantic music is pertinent.[68]

There are substantial writings about this shift, reaching from Heinrich Besseler to Lawrence Kramer. Besseler focuses on the *Lied* when giving Schubert's 'Gretchen am Spinnrad' (1812) the pioneering role. Schubert found the technical device of a 'play figure' (*Spielfigur*),[69] a reiterated accompaniment figuration used from the first to the last bar which enables the composer to be emotionally penetrating in a new way. This procedure is then integrated with the character piece, with Chopin and Schumann as Besseler's main examples.[70] The Polish-American musicologist Karol Berger has re-actualized Besseler's point of view in *A Theory of Art* (2000), underscoring the role of the unification through the accompaniment figure, but also being observant of harmony and instrumental colour: 'The presentation of a mood or a state of mind in which one finds oneself requires a form unified by the rhythmic stream of a repetitive accompaniment, as well as by the harmonic and instrumental colour.'[71] This presentation is central in the musical form Berger calls 'Romantic piano lyric'. To Lawrence Kramer, the Romantic character piece is typically directed at the evocation of a particular mood or scene, and it was elaborated in association with the development of that magical 'musical machine' which was the grand piano: 'The association fostered a desire to explore as wide a range of feelings, moods, and states of mind as possible. The piano seemed to call for its own subculture of feeling; character pieces poured forth to answer the call.'[72]

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[68] Cf. Carl Dahlhaus, *Klassische und romantische Musikästhetik*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 468.

[69] Heinrich Besseler, 'Das musikalische Hören', p. 154.

[70] Cf. Besseler, op. cit., pp. 160–61. See also Besseler's article 'Spielfiguren in der Instrumentalmusik', *Deutsches Jahrbuch für Musikwissenschaft für 1956*, Leipzig: Peters 1957, pp. 12–38.

[71] Karol Berger, *A Theory of Art*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, p. 201.

[72] Lawrence Kramer, *Why Classical Music Still Matters*, Berkeley: University of California Press 2007, p. 145.

It seems to be reasonable to start to use the term *Stimmung* at this point in the history of musical composition, despite the fact that it had been known in the act of listening at least 25 years earlier. Even if there is an opposition between the notions of *Charakter* and *Stimmung*, the character piece of the Romantic era is well established as an overt exponent of musical moods.[73] That does not mean that all character pieces of this period present moods expressly, only that the musical term 'character' is not always telling for character pieces, to put it crudely. There is no need to designate a specific kind of character piece called 'mood piece'; it is enough to say that mood is characteristic of the genre. However, we find an interesting paradox here: the lyrical mode in the literary genre of poetry has traditionally been described in terms of musicality, where rhythm, rhyme and consonance are supposed to bring forth a melodic tone and where an atmosphere or mood is invoked; but the lyrical mode in music seems to come from the opposite direction, tending to draw near to some kind of poetic, vague idea.

The Romantic character piece has a seemingly clear position in the system of musical genres and subgenres, covering miniatures with poetic titles but also a whole range of forms in the nineteenth-century repertory for piano: the nocturne, the scherzo, the fantasy, the prelude, the ballade and the impromptu; and also dances like the waltz and the mazurka. In this sense – its widest – the character piece is set up against the classical forms of sonata, rondo and variations, but even so it can borrow structures from these same forms. Yet, despite its seemingly stable position, the term is ambiguous. A piece of music can be said to have character as soon as it is something more than mediocre. The term has more specific meanings in the moral sense, where character says something about a person, exactly in the way Körner used the term in his nowadays often quoted essay on music and character.[74] Having no character is not just bad in morals but in music, too. The musical term is older than the nineteenth century, though. An important part of French baroque music for cembalo and for lute must be contained in the genre.[75] Here, character is taken in its moral sense, and even if there are pieces expressly written as portraits of persons, the ones with titles like 'La coquette' and 'La turbulante' have the human character as their objective.

The character pieces of the *empfindsamer Stil* are closer to the moods introduced by Schubert. This is due to the general conceptual change concerning *Charakter*, turning from the central affect as typical and objective in the first half of the century to the affect or sensation (*Empfindung*) as something individual

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[73] Cf. Nicholas Temperley, 'Character piece', *The Oxford Companion to Music*, http://www.oxfordmusikonline.com/subscriber/article/opr/t114/e1302 (accessed 14 March 2012); Maurice E.J. Brown, 'Characteristic piece', *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, vol. 5, London: Macmillan 2001, p. 493.

[74] Cf. Körner, op. cit.

[75] Willi Kahl goes as far back as the *estampie*, medieval instrumental music, in the aesthetic and historical introduction to his collection *Das Charakterstück*, Cologne: Volk 1954, pp. 4–18, ref. p. 5.

and subjective in the second half.[76] Composers like Johann Friedrich Reichardt and Gottlieb Christian Füger gathered pieces dealing with one feeling or affect at a time, with titles such as 'Heiterkeit', 'Sehnsucht' and 'Ausgelassenheit'; but even if the music is worked out in a subjective direction, the objectification is still obvious: a certain feeling is made into an object for composition. This is also the time when C.P.E. Bach made his famous declaration that the musicians must be moved if they want to move, and Sulzer recommended that composers should be able to attune themselves to all kinds of feelings and passions.[77] Even though the general tendency in the comments on both the composer's and the musician's relation to the music is that they must feel the actual feeling, sentiment or sensation in their hearts, and then arouse that same sensation in the listener, this subjectivity leads to an intentional characterizing and thereby an objectification.

As already indicated, the new sensitivity was not unprepared, either in terms of composition or in terms of aesthetic reflection. No matter how open-minded Reichardt often was in his critical writings, as a composer he represented as late as 1782 an aesthetics at odds with the changing textures of Mozart and Haydn, and he was critical of the juxtaposition of different passions in the new works: he found the new sonatas, symphonies and concerts unnatural, since the music shifted between being glad and sad.[78] In a way, it was through being conservative that he managed to be radical.

To show how things should be executed, Reichardt published a piece of his own in his *Musikalisches Kunstmagazin* (1782), the piano piece 'Die Freude' composed for amateurs, and also a description of what kind of expression he had intended and how it came about that he was inspired to compose it. He tells his readers about a lovely morning in the countryside and describes how his joy was all jubilation, almost painfully strong. So, for the piece of music, he chose the hard, major tonality (he refers of course to *Dur*). He is in this context indeed using words like *Charakter*, *Leidenschaft*, *Empfindung*, *Gefühl* and *Ausdruck* – that is, all those concepts which should be distinguished from *Stimmung* if a systematic aesthetics of music is strived for; but it is nevertheless clear that the phenomenon he describes, the influence of a landscape over his mind and the emerging musical ideas, have to do with *Stimmung*. Therefore, the logic of *stimmen* leads a life of its

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[76] Jacob de Ruiter observes this change in *Der Charakterbegriff in der Musik: Studien zur deutschen Ästhetik der Instrumentalmusik 1740–1850*, Stuttgart: Steiner 1989, pp. 31–2. So does Neubauer, who describes the change as an internalization of imitation in op. cit., p. 75.

[77] Cf. Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, *Versuch über die wahre Art, das Clavier zu spielen,* vol. 1, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel 1957 (1753/62), p. 122; Sulzer, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 273.

[78] Cf. Reichardt, *Musikalisches Kunstmagazin* (vol. 1), in Johann Friedrich Reichardt, *Briefe, die Musik betreffend: Berichte, Rezensionen, Essays*, Leipzig: Reclam 1976, p. 119. This attitude was common in the musical aesthetics of his day; cf. Bellamy Hosler, *Changing Aesthetics of Instrumental Music in 18th-Century Germany*, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press 1981.

own in the normally neutral *bestimmt* (definite), used in a later passage, where he reflects on his own exemplifications of music with a specific character. Reichardt wanders through the countryside and is tuned by the landscape; he sits down at home and reads some beautiful poetry – in an astonishing way, he is able to embrace a rationalistic aesthetics and herald a Romantic one:

> Last time, I contributed with some piano pieces of *one* definite sentiment [*von einer bestimmten Empfindung*], emerging from an overwhelming feeling of my own. Most of my instrumental music comes to me in this way, however, sometimes through reading of passages of great or beautiful poetry. Possessed by such passages I put down the book, right upon the piano, fantasize, staying in specific movements, and I then write down that which has stuck so hard.[79]

Reichardt is certainly not the only composer before the Romantic era to reflect on the phenomenon of how something tunes the mind to a musical idea. Haydn once told his confidant Georg August Griesinger how musical ideas came to him when playing the keyboard:

> I sat down and began to fantasize, according to whether my mood was sad or happy, serious or playful [*nachdem mein Gemüt traurig oder fröhlich, ernst oder tändelnd gestimmt war*]. Once I had seized an idea, my entire effort went toward elaborating and sustaining it according to the rules of art.[80]

Here, Haydn uses the formulation *gestimmt* to indicate his state of mind. A pivotal difference between the composers is, though, that Haydn adheres to the traditional idea in rhetoric, saying that there is an *inventio* followed by an *elaboratio* according to the rules of art, whereas Reichardt says expressly that the moment of tuning had led him in the composing of the piece.

We cannot stay within the genre of character pieces. When John Daverio, inspired by Hölderlin's poetics, tries to reconstruct a 'finely developed strategy for manipulating musical "tones" or moods' in Schumann's Second Symphony he shows that Schumann was able to fuse the character piece and the symphonic work.[81] This strategy was also used in the Piano Concerto, where 'the dialectic between miniaturism and long-breathed symphonism is resolved'.[82] The still often heard criticism of Schumann – that he was only able to compose character

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[79] Reichardt, op. cit., p. 121.

[80] Georg August Griesinger, *Biografische Notizen über Joseph Haydn*, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel 1810, p. 114. Mark Evan Bonds has commented on this Haydn citation in *Wordless Rhetoric: Musical Form and the Metaphor of the Oration*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1991, p. 116, from where the translation is taken.

[81] John Daverio, *Robert Schumann: Herald of a 'New Poetic Age'*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997, p. 317.

[82] Daverio, op. cit., p. 313.

pieces and untalented in the complex sonata form – wholly misses the point: he restructured the sonata form using technical devices from the character piece.[83]

Lawrence Kramer is less speculative, but has the same tendency: 'The character piece tended to displace the multimovement sonata, already thoroughly colonized by Beethoven, as the piano's cutting-edge form. Nineteenth-century sonatas, Chopin's and Schumann's most prominently, often assimilate the traits and logic of the character piece.'[84] One of these traits would surely be what Besseler called 'play figure', the reiterated figuration with congruent rhythm and curvature. It moved from music for solo instruments into the *Lied*, where it was enriched, and then it migrated not only back into the field of character pieces but also into symphonic music, chamber music and opera.[85]

The consequence is that there is no reason to follow any genre boundaries when keeping the ears open for *Stimmungen*, for moods in music. The character piece for piano may be predisposed to moods, but that still does not mean that moods would be non-existent in 'absolute music'. Lyrical titles, programme texts and other paratexts may facilitate identification of the mood. But the mere heading does not draw the limit of possible moods, which can also be understood as a 'musical mood', that boundless concept used by many theorists of the nineteenth century (to be discussed later in this chapter). At this point in our investigation, it also seems to be reasonable to conclude that there is an established description of *Stimmung* in music, namely the musical state based on a reiterated figuration. This kind of presentation is manifest in the 'Romantic piano lyric', Karol Berger says, but it can also be found in all the musical genres.

### *Schumann: Between the Fugitive and the Eternal*

If Schubert was the composer who realized the potential in the character piece, it was Robert Schumann who was able to not only transfer the format to large-scale compositions, but also to change the notion as to how a large scale could be managed. Again, it was a question of sensitivity. An acute sensitivity for correspondence is characteristic of Schumann's *literary* style. His intense readings of Jean Paul (Johann Paul Friedrich Richter) are well known, but the fantastic and witty novels by that author are not the source of Schumann's usage of *Stimmung*, since the word is not of great importance in this prose. Schumann had further hardly read Hölderlin's reflections on *Stimmung*, even if he certainly knew some of the poems.[86] The bulk of the theoretical discourse on musical *Stimmung* was yet to be published. It is therefore reasonable to assume that it was an element of

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[83] Even the most 'absolute' of all forms, the fugue, was through Schumann turned into a character piece. Cf. Daverio, op. cit., p. 308.

[84] Kramer, op. cit., p. 145.

[85] Cf. Besseler, op. cit., pp. 157–62.

[86] Cf. Friedrich Hölderlin, 'Über die Verfahrungsweise des poetischen Geistes' (on *Harmonie*), 'Wink für die Darstellung und Sprache', 'Über den Unterschied der Dichtarten'

the literary style, emerging from a novel like Ludwig Tieck's *Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen* (1798), that stimulated Schumann.[87]

To Schumann, the term *Stimmung* was just one of many alternatives in his descriptions of how music and mind are intertwined. There are examples of a sympathetic resonance between the weather and the state of mind.[88] Schumann wanders between language, music and the affective sphere using the word *Seelenaccord*, 'harmony of the soul'.[89] This latter passage can be found in one of his sketches of a planned novel with the title 'Juniusabende und Julytage', sometimes written as part of Schumann's diary, 'Hottentottiana', and not always easily separable from the autobiographical notes. Therefore, the use of rhetorical figures and poetic expressions is abundant in the stylistically developed pages of his diary, especially when written by the young Schumann. One of these literary pages is a sketch from 26 October 1828 – originally a letter to his mother – where the reader is told about a moment of parting.[90] The landscape is autumnal, the narrator is bidding farewell to his home; but the scene is not merely nostalgic, since there are expectations for the future. Autumn and spring, sadness and joy, past, present and future are struggling with each other without being able to come to rest. In the mind, a weak minor chord resounds, and later on there is even the outspoken notion of the tuning of the heart into a gentle mood. Here we have some exact observations concerning *Stimmung* as a phenomenon: the dichotomy of inside and outside is eliminated; the time-consciousness is changed; and the gentleness of the landscape has become the gentleness of the soul.

Like Felix Mendelssohn, Schumann was literarily inclined in his compositions, but Mendelssohn combines this inclination with susceptibility to the concrete landscape in the creative act. In Schumann's instrumental music there is no parallel to the influence of the wild Scottish nature in *Die Hebriden*, the Third Symphony and the Scottish Fantasy op. 28, even though one must not forget that an important source of this Romantic idea of the Scottish landscape was the archaizing poetry of James Macpherson.[91] Mendelssohn's hesitation over whether to call his overture 'Fingals Höhle' or 'Die Hebriden', and finally deciding on the latter, is significant. There is a telling passage in one of his letters, written when Mendelssohn had begun to compose his 'Italian Symphony' during his stay in Italy 1830–31, and

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and 'Wechsel der Töne' (on *Ton*), in *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*, Berlin: Aufbau 1995, 2nd ed., pp. 388–422.

87 Ludwig Tieck, *Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen*, Stuttgart: Reclam 2007.

88 Cf. Robert Schumann, *Tagebücher*, vol. 1, Basel and Frankfurt: Stroemfeld and Roter Stern 1971, p. 117.

89 Schumann, op. cit., p. 100.

90 Cf. Schumann, op. cit., p. 126.

91 Cf. R. Larry Todd, 'Mendelssohn's Ossianic Manner, with a New Source: On *Lena's Gloomy Heath*', in Jon W. Finson and R. Larry Todd (eds), *Mendelssohn and Schumann: Essays on Their Music and Its Context*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1984, pp. 139–60.

not yet ready with his work on the 'Scottish Symphony' (which had to wait until 1842 to be completed): 'from 15th of April to 15th of May is the loveliest season in Italy – who can blame me for not being able to put myself back into the misty Scotch mood? Therefore, I have had to put the symphony aside for the time being.'[92] This is one of the primordial scenes of Romantic composing, being even more pregnant in the words of Beethoven about inspiration and musical ideas:

> They come unbidden, indirectly, directly; I could seize them with my hands, in the open, in the woods, on walks, in the still of the night, at dawn, excited by moods which are by the poet put into words, but by me into tones that sound and roar and storm about me till they stand before me in notes.[93]

The authenticity of the quote can be questioned,[94] but only in one sense: perhaps Beethoven never said these words, but they are emblematic in terms of the Romantic attitude.

For Schumann *Stimmung* is a kind of starting point for the creative process. Sometimes he describes his compositions as a kind of musical diary, where his emotional states are recorded.[95] In a dictionary article, he distinguishes between characteristic music (representing states of the soul) and picturesque music (representing the circumstances of life), he himself clearly preferring the first.[96] How close these notions actually are can be drawn from the fact that when writing on musical character he defines it as a disposition which expresses itself predominantly, or obtrudes itself in such a way that there is no way to interpret it otherwise.[97] However, concerning his own music, also being characteristic, he almost always refrains from saying that it expresses something specific. Most often Schumann seems to interpret his own pieces when he gives them titles or chooses mottos for them, and this also holds true for his comments on the conception of his works: he associates them with a period of his life, but that does not necessarily mean that his music is intended to represent a particular state of mind.

*Carnaval* seems to have especially activated Schumann's sensibility for *Stimmungen*: no other of his pieces has he described so often in terms of *Stimmung*

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92 Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, letter 29 March 1831, in *Briefe einer Reise durch Deutschland, Italien und die Schweiz*, Zurich: Niehan 1958, p. 123.

93 Oscar von Pander, *Beethoven: Der Künstler und sein Werk*, Stuttgart: Bürger 1948, p. 22.

94 It was first published in the periodical *Hallelujah*, vol. 4, no. 21–2 (1885).

95 For a comment, see Edward A. Lippman, 'Theory and Practice in Schumann's Aesthetics', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, vol. 17, no. 3 (1964), pp. 310–45, p. 327.

96 Cf. Robert Schumann, *Gesammelte Schriften über Musik und Musiker*, vol. 2, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel 1914, p. 207.

97 Cf. Schumann, op. cit., p. 207.

in its many different senses. It actually started with the conception of the piece, at least in retrospect. When Franz Liszt visited Dresden and Leipzig to give some concerts, *Carnaval* was one of the works he performed. Schumann was worried about the rhapsodic, carnivalesque nature of his opus. In a review Schumann wrote of Liszt's concert, he excused himself for having composed this old cycle of short pieces, saying that they were only a late example of a kind of play with symbolism often enjoyed by J.S. Bach in his time: 'One piece after the other was completed during the carnival season of 1835, in a serious mood, by the way, and under peculiar circumstances.'[98] If the time of conception seems to have been characterized by earnestness, this cannot be discerned in the music, because of its ever-changing character: he thought that the moods changed too rapidly to be followed by the audience. This long review is one of the texts where Schumann is most deeply involved with the question of *Stimmung*. It not only has to do with the musical works but also with the musician's relation to the audience: Schumann tells his readers that, concerning Liszt, they are dealing with a great mind, one who is able to tune his audience like an instrument.[99]

It was not the only occasion when Schumann felt these kinds of doubts concerning his cycle: when his beloved Clara was on tour in Paris (1839), he wanted her not to play *Carnaval* so often, since in there one piece offsets another and not everyone can stand it. Once again, he is worried about the audience. He blames Clara for being too keen on novelty: 'You would much rather have thunder and lightning right away and only what's new and unprecedented. There are old and eternal conditions and sentiments [*Zustände und Stimmungen*] which hold sway over us.'[100] From this context, it is clear that Schumann's usage of the term included both the volatile quality of *Stimmung* and a conception in which an eternal character was recognized.

Schumann hesitates about *Carnaval*. The musical moods change too quickly, despite the tonal coherence, despite thematic or motivic interrelations. Might it be possible that Schumann is talking about something else, not the structural coherence of the composition, but something coming from an insight into the phenomenon *Stimmung*? What if *Stimmung* has not so much to do with tonal organization and cross-references? Schumann seems then to suggest that the means of construction do not result in a specific mood. We should not try to analyse the material of the music if we want to investigate the mood of a piece of music. In *Carnaval*, we have to do with a masquerade without identities, staged by a composer who

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98 Robert Schumann, 'Franz Liszt', in *Gesammelte Schriften über Musik und Musiker*, Leipzig: Wigand 1875, 3rd ed., vol. 2, p. 164 (trans. in Robert Schumann, *On Music and Musicians*, trans. Paul Rosenfeld, New York: Pantheon 1946, p. 162).

99 Cf. Schumann, op. cit., p. 159.

100 Clara and Robert Schumann, *Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2, Basel and Frankfurt: Stroemfeld and Roter Stern 1987, p. 368 (trans. in *The Complete Correspondence of Clara and Robert Schumann*, trans. Hildegard Fritsch and Ronald L. Crawford, vol. 2, New York: Lang 1996, p. 31).

knows the whole bag of tricks, imitating other composers and quoting himself, mixing banalities with the sublime. He makes a musical scenery present that corresponds perfectly to the boisterous sceneries of Jean Paul, the playful use of different layers of fiction so brilliantly handled by Tieck, the eerie atmosphere in the tales of Hoffmann in which everyday experience is turned upside down by a sudden twist. In short, Schumann captures in music the state of universal play within literary Romanticism. Everything could be used as material in this play: old mythologies as well as the Christian creed, everyday life as well as the absolute.[101] It is more than a mental state, it is more than a relation to different arts; it is even more than a world view. I propose that we should call it a *Grundstimmung*, a fundamental attunement.

## The Long and Winding Debate of Music on Its Own

### *Music Leaving the Words Behind*

It should be clear by now that *Stimmung* was intimately connected to the rise of autonomous music. We have seen that it had a structural function in reflections by advocates for the autonomy of music, ranging from Herder to Wackenroder and Hoffmann. Yet, that is not tantamount to the formalistic notion of music: a forerunner for that tendency is Johann Friedrich Herbart, who aimed at grounding both psychology and music on mathematical principles,[102] but who also tried to cleanse away every subjective element in the search for beauty. About music specifically, he wrote that if we want to know anything about the beautiful and the ugly in music, we can only achieve this through the notes; it can only be a matter of notes.[103] Herbart admits that all aesthetical objects influence the mind when circumstances are good, but this subjectivity must be excluded in the understanding of what is beautiful. The beholders might think in their own terms and put much of themselves into what is heard, thereby giving too much weight to apperception, which ends in individuality and – moods.[104] This reduction, in music focusing on relations between the 'primary' notes and bracketing 'secondary' ideas or feelings,

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[101] Cf. Rüdiger Safranski, *Die Romantik: Eine deutsche Affäre*, Munich: Hanser 2007, pp. 133–4.

[102] Cf. Nadia Moro, *Der musikalische Herbart: Harmonie und Kontrapunkt als Gegenstände der Psychologie und der Ästhetik*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2006, p. 53.

[103] Cf. Johann Friedrich Herbart, *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Leipzig: Meiner 1912 (1813), 4th ed., p. 136.

[104] Cf. Herbart, op. cit., p. 141.

will have its continuation in Hanslick, but later also in the phenomenologists of the twentieth century.[105]

With the cultural scene of Paris as his example, James H. Johnson has shown what kind of problems music discourse ran into when music was emancipated from language: on the one hand, music was said to exist beyond language; on the other hand, metaphorical language was abundant when musical experiences were to be described despite that supposition.[106] In Paris this happened in the 1830s and 1840s, but the development was much earlier in the German-speaking sphere. One example is the outline for music criticism written by Hans Georg Nägeli in 1802 in *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung* – founded in 1798 and supporting Viennese classicism. According to Nägeli, it was the combination of 'methodic', 'pathologic', 'historic' and 'idealistic' perspectives that enabled the reviewer to have a 'purely objective outlook': methods of composition, affective influences on the listener, historical awareness and understanding of the idealistic or genial properties of a specific piece would lead to a complete judgement. Of greatest interest to us, the pathologic perspective is said to fathom the evocation of 'a specific mood' (*eine bestimmte Gemüthsstimmung*).[107] Whereas both the methodic and historic perspectives correspond to facts – there are laws governing the compositional methods, and history affords the critic with a context for every work – the pathologic and idealistic perspectives go beyond that which is possible to establish. Of course, genial composition cannot be subsumed to any principles, but Nägeli also suggests that at that time science had no proof of general laws governing the emotional impact of music on the listener.

These considerations point to tendencies which would come to the fore in the coming era; and Nägeli would return to *Stimmung* in a series of lectures on music in the 1820s, *Vorlesungen über Musik mit Berücksichtigung der Dilettanten*, where *Stimmung* is a central concept and mathematics is seen as one of main principles for both world and music. This time, the main distinction is made between *Stimmung* and *Affekt*: the auditory-oriented *Stimmungen* appear as a combination of two or more *Gefühle*, whereas the visually oriented *Affekten* combine *Anschauungen* (intuitions). Instead of states of mind, Nägeli speaks of movements of the mind: in music we do not find the constitution of the mind, but of a play. This play has no content; it possesses only forms. These forms, however, still have a relation to feelings. Thanks to this play of forms, the listening soul hovers in the immense region of feeling, always in a state of dynamism, moving from the greatest depth

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105 Cf. the editors' 'Introduction', in Frances Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou (eds), *Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics 1873–1893*, Santa Monica: The Getty Center for the History of Arts and the Humanities 1994, pp. 10–14.

106 Cf. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 270–75.

107 Hans Georg Nägeli, 'Versuch einer Norm für die Recensenten der musikalischen Zeitung', *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung*, no. 14 (1802), cols 225–37, cit. col. 234. A second part of the thesis was published in no. 16 (1803).

of the heart to the heights of bliss.[108] In an elaboration of the essence of music, what seems to be a reductive formalism turns out to be something else: in an eruptive sentence where the act of listening to music comes close to an experience of a dynamic world, Nägeli says that the 'run-up', the 'running' and the 'run-down' (*Anlauf*, *Gleichlauf*, *Auslauf*) of rhythm cause raised, floating and lowered spirits. Higher composition is supposed to only deal with this kind of form, to be experienced by the listener. In this way, music develops its play of forms and at the same time it expands the interplay of feelings.[109]

### *Hegel's Discontentment Concerning* Stimmung

One might be somewhat surprised to see that Nägeli never refers to the aesthetic discussion of his own times. When efforts have been made to find traces of influences in his lectures, they often point in the direction of Herder and Schiller;[110] but, generally, his thinking took place outside of contemporary debates. Nägeli's neglect can of course be excused concerning the two works taking their initial shape in these years, both of which would later be important for musical thought. In Berlin, Hegel held lectures on aesthetics for the first time in 1820–21, followed by three courses in 1823, 1826 and 1828–29 respectively, but these were published only after his death. And in 1819, the first version of Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* appeared, though fell short of causing the exceptional interest in his work seen in the second half of the century.

Schopenhauer is pivotal to musical aesthetics of the nineteenth century, but his contribution to the *Stimmung* concept in music is not extensive. We can recognize Schiller's observation that the affectivity of music does not relate to any object when Schopenhauer says that music does not express a certain kind of joy or distress, but these feelings *in abstracto*, without cause.[111] What he does do is reinterpret mood in terms of the will: music directly influences the will and therefore tunes (*umstimmt*) the will in a new way.[112] In the case of Hegel, the opposite is true: while the concept may not be used frequently, it plays a strategic role in his thinking on music. In Hegel's system, *Stimmung* can appear in the different arts, but especially in what the philosopher calls the Romantic arts (pictorial art, music and poetry). The concept always figures in the context of the subject and subjectivity, and it is most often understood as something unstable

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[108] Cf. Hans Georg Nägeli, *Vorlesungen über Musik mit Berücksichtigung der Dilettanten*, Hildesheim: Olm 1980 (reprint of the 1826 ed.), p. 33.

[109] Cf. Nägeli, op. cit., p. 42.

[110] Cf. Rafael Köhler, *Natur und Geist: Energetische Form in der Musiktheorie*, Stuttgart: Steiner 1996, pp. 65–80 and Dahlhaus, op. cit., p. 657.

[111] Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 1, Leipzig: Insel 1905–10, p. 351.

[112] Schopenhauer, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 1223.

and volatile: 'the momentary and most fleeting mood'.[113] The artwork preserves this momentary appearance, gives it permanence, just as it does any other feeling. Here, where Hegel reflects on poetry, *Stimmung* is linked to different states of feeling like melancholy, mourning and serenity, but it has an abstract reverse, too. It is precisely this two-sidedness, where *Stimmung* can relate not only to human feelings but also to empty abstraction, which is a concealed turning point in Hegel's musical aesthetics. I will follow this turn.[114]

*Stimmung* has a musical tendency, Hegel says, because when subjectivity starts to overshadow the object of a painting, pictorial art turns away from sculpture and architecture and directs itself to music. This dialectic between the arts is characteristic of Hegel's system, but each art still has an essence. What characterizes music, then? 'The principle of music is constituted by subjective inwardness'.[115] This most intimate interiority is, in fact, subjectivity, in total freedom, with no other foundation but itself. The composer is said to deal with this interiority – the sphere of music is supposed to be the human breast, but also 'the mood of the mind' – and the composer's most effective instrument is melody, the pure resounding of inner life.[116] Feeling (*Empfindung*) must be put into notes and must resound. In this way, music's starting point is the 'natural cry of feeling',[117] even though the composer must discern that naturalness is not enough: the notes must be put into a soul-laden relation with each other; with harmony and melody as basic components the cry should be transformed to art and the edgy movement of sentiment must be erased. Hegel is close to a theory of musical expression, even if he is quite clear about the necessary artfulness of music, but he had earlier already stressed that music deals with the abstract. It is the movements of the innermost self, its own movements, which are to resound in music: 'the object-free inner life, abstract subjectivity as such. This is our entirely empty self, the self without any further content.'[118]

Even if Hegel declares that music has nothing to do with space, only with time, he points out some parallels between music and architecture: in the shaping of gravitation, and in symmetry and eurhythmy. This brings new perspectives on what

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113 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, vol. 3, in *Werke*, vol. 15, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1986, p. 420 (trans. in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. Thomas Malcolm Knox, vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988 [1975], p. 1114).

114 As far as I know, there is no such study on *Stimmung* in Hegel's musical aesthetics. Adolf Nowak has, however, discussed the mood reverence (*Andacht*) in Hegel. Cf. Adolf Nowak, *Hegels Musikästhetik*, Regensburg: Bosse 1971, pp. 145–88. Dahlhaus touches upon the issue when he discusses Hegel's critical stance on absolute (or autonomous) music in *Die Idee der absoluten Musik*, in op. cit., pp. 83–6.

115 Hegel, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 420.

116 Hegel, op. cit., p. 196.

117 Hegel, op. cit., p. 196 (trans. Knox, op. cit., p. 938).

118 Hegel, op. cit., p. 135 (trans. Knox, op. cit., p. 891).

function *Stimmung* has, and the abstract character it may have. Music has its own harmonic laws, and they may be without any connection to expression of feeling, an architectonic character built according to musical laws alone. The parallel between the two arts should not be taken too far, Hegel says, since architecture deals with enduring symbolical forms of colossal format to be looked at from the outside, whereas the world of sounds rustles quickly away and is immediately drawn into the inner world of the mind through the ear, where they attune the soul to sympathetic feelings.[119] Then one asks oneself how the architectural music tunes the mind when there is no sympathetic feeling to be found. The journey to the reign of abstraction has begun.

In Hegel, the sensuous material in both music and poetry is the tone, but whereas the word has to do with sense, the sheer 'nonsensical' note is the goal of music. The world of musical sounds has some kind of relation to the mind and it can be in accord (*Zusammenstimmen*) with the movements of spirit, but it is only a vague sympathy (*Symphatisieren*).[120] The listener may perceive intuitions and representations, but they are his or her own, not encapsulated in the music. Abstraction is situated in the midst of the interiority, as pure subjectivity, and it is with exactly this that music must deal: music brings movement into the centre of human life, into the abstract self-apprehension of man.

As is well known, according to Hegel art must have spiritual content and expression; the beautiful is defined as 'the sensuous appearance of the idea'.[121] Here, music runs the risk of becoming nonsensical as soon as the notes are not conceived in relation to something meaningful and expressive. In the pure musical region, where notes are only put together, themes are developed and instrumental parts are interwoven *without* this connection; music is said to be not art at all.[122] Anything that enters the mind can be made into musical content, but the proper content of music is only the shrouding of content, the emotional movement. It is the form of feeling, not its content, which unfolds in music.

The concept of *Stimmung* is only a dimension of the aesthetics of feeling (*Empfindung*) in Hegel; but when it is used, it is usually to draw attention to a musical character, whereas feeling does not implicate that musicality. The relation to the environment disappears; the inwardness is accentuated. This inwardness is also a tendency to abstraction, which is a tendency of music itself. Commenting on the relation between music and text, Hegel finds a danger which is most interesting for us:

> The soul's pure feeling of itself and the resonant play of its self-apprehension is in the last resort merely a mood and so too general and abstract, and it runs the

119 Cf. Hegel, op. cit., p. 139.

120 Hegel, op. cit., p. 146.

121 Hegel, op. cit., vol. 13, p. 151.

122 Cf. Hegel, op. cit., vol. 15, p. 149.

> risk of not merely abandoning a closer indication of the content expressed in the libretto but of becoming purely empty and trivial.[123]

Abstraction is also emptiness. In this way, *Stimmung* is more characteristic for music than *Empfindung*, since it is inclined towards the dangers of abstraction. When music turns to its own element, where the pure musicality in a composition is focused, it loses its vital contact with content and risks withering away. This is the discontentment with music in the idealist tradition, in many ways a continuation of the time before the idea of autonomous music; in fact it is common ground for all philosophers since Plato who are inclined not to accept music alone.[124]

*Hanslick's Attack and Partial Retreat*

If abstraction could be seen as the great risk but also the logical consequence for instrumental music – and in this belief Hegel was not alone – Eduard Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* turned all of this upside down.[125] The famous definition of music as tonally moving forms (*tönend bewegte Formen*) is easily transposed to the abstract understanding of *Stimmung* if we may draw a possible parallel between the movements of musical forms and the resonant play of the soul's self-apprehension, as found in Hegel. Hanslick does not allow that. He admits that music can imitate the dynamics of feeling, but only their shape, not their objective. He affirms that music is more efficient than any other art when it comes to influencing the mind: 'With a few chords, we can be transported into a state of mind … . The other arts persuade, but music invades us.'[126] Interestingly, he accepts *Stimmung* if it is formulated as a strictly musical attunement. This happens when he refutes the idea of Beethoven being a composer who used real situations or states of mind as points of departure for composing. According to Hanslick, Beethoven had only used the objective fact as a means to facilitate the musical unity: the

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123 Hegel, op. cit., p. 200 (trans. Knox, op. cit., p. 940).

124 Some commentators have tried to show that Hegel's negative judgements on actual (instrumental) music do not amount to a misunderstanding of the principles of autonomous music. Cf. Julian Johnson, 'Music in Hegel's *Aesthetics*: A Re-evaluation', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 31, no. 2 (1991), pp. 152–62, and Lydia Goehr, *Elective Affinities: Musical Essays on the History of Aesthetic Theory*, New York: Columbia University Press 2008, pp. 1–44.

125 Eduard Hanslick, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen: Ein Beitrag zur Revision der Ästhetik der Tonkunst*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1991 (reprint of the first ed. 1854), p. 32. Unless otherwise stated, the references are to the first edition of Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, not the later ones. My reason for this is that the ambiguities in formalism can be more precisely accounted for in this way.

126 Hanslick, op. cit., pp. 58–9 (trans. in Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful: A Contribution towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music*, trans. Geoffrey Payzant, Indianapolis: Hackett 1986, p. 50). Payzant's translation is of the eighth edition, but in this case the wording is the same.

unity of the four movements of a sonata is grounded in the musical attunement.[127] This *Stimmung* has nothing to do with adjustment of pitch, but everything to do with the play of pitches. The formulation opens up a relation between the musical work and the mind. In the first edition of his book, Hanslick even adheres to the Pythagorean vision of a parallel between the music of the world (or universe) and human music. Commenting on *den geistigen Gehalt* of music, where this 'spiritual content' is put in contrast to tonal content, he rebounds upon the listener who is affected by music's 'sounding image of the great motions of the universe'. For a short moment, Hanslick is drawn to a kind of mysticism: 'Through profound and secret connections to nature, the meaning of tones is elevated high above the tones themselves, allowing us to perceive at the same time the infinite in works of human talent.'[128]

This passage illustrates how formalism can be harmonized with the Pythagorean vision, which actually forms its intellectual roots; but this connection has been retouched in later editions, just as Hanslick deleted many other formulations after being criticized by his friend Robert Zimmermann.[129] In his text the possibility of developing the concept of musical mood or attunement (*musikalische Stimmung*) is latent, only hinted at when he says that it can give unity to four movements in a sonata. However, since one of his main targets was the aesthetics of feeling so abundant in those days, Hanslick chose to get rid of all ambiguities. The rest is attack. Everything emotional in music is said to be secondary in relation to the moving forms, and this secondary status is labelled 'pathologic' (that is, related to the pathetic, to *pathós*): the more powerfully an effect in a musical work overwhelms us physically, the more negligible its aesthetic value.[130] If music is put to use as a means of producing a mood, it ceases to be perceived as art.

### *Fechner's Elaboration of* 'musikalische Stimmung'

We have to wait until Gustav Theodor Fechner before the latent possibilities of 'musical attunement' are made explicit. Fechner was the philosopher who, against the great systems of idealism, treated problems in aesthetics from the 'bottom up' (*Aesthetik von unten*), based on specific observations and often experimental investigations, and who made himself into an exponent of psychologism, the late-nineteenth-century movement that founded all branches of philosophy, from logic to epistemology, on psychology. In his *Vorschule der Aesthetik* (1876), Fechner

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127 Cf. Hanslick, op. cit., pp. 43–4.

128 Both quotations Hanslick, op. cit., p. 104 (trans. in Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought*, p. 108).

129 Robert Zimmermann's review in *Blätter für Literatur und Kunst* (1854) is reprinted in Dietmar Strauß's informative critical edition of Hanslick's book, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen: Ein Beitrag zur Revision der Ästhetik in der Tonkunst*, vol. 2, Mainz: Schott 1990, pp. 130–35.

130 Hanslick, op. cit., p. 69.

stands wholly at Hanslick's side when he declares that music cannot harbour any feelings, even if his main reason is that it cannot bring about associative ideas with any precision.[131]

Still, *Stimmung* lies at the heart of his reasoning about the direct factor (*direkter Factor*) of aesthetic impressions in opposition to what is only associative. How is that possible? We must turn back to Hanslick's formulation of musical moods. Fechner does not refer to him at this point; instead, he starts from the bottom by asking himself how music can give rise to impressions: they are due to modifications of tempo and rhythm, of changes in the rise and fall of pitch and dynamics. These elements of modification are summarized with the notion of musical attunements (*musikalische Stimmungen*), and they differ from the specific musical elements of melody and harmony – strictly musical because they cannot be found outside music. Sometimes the attunement of music is tuned like a mood which humans can be in even without the music, and he chooses to call these 'life-associated moods' (*lebensverwandte Stimmungen*): they are that which relates music to the other arts and to life, whereas the strictly musical attunements can only be characterized by the figures or passages on which they depend.[132]

Fechner distinguishes further between life-associated moods and feelings, but he does not rely on the conventional distinction grounded on the question of whether or not there is an object to be found; instead he speaks of the complex nature of their 'special associations',[133] which can be understood as the individual's subjective *association* to an object, but it does not specifically demand a *relation*. Mood is something more abstract and stable than feeling. Feelings have an element of mood, but they are more than that, and one and the same feeling can be found in different moods: love can be soft but also on fire, anger still or explosive; and when the love is on fire and the anger explosive, the same mood character might be used in music for both. At the same time, a feeling can be impossible in some moods: hate and fear cannot appear in light-heartedness (*Heiterkeit*) or melancholy (*Wehmut*) in violent excitement.[134] Without the existent or non-existent object as decisive for the distinction between mood and feeling, Fechner is not able to draw a sharp line between them, which can be seen in his exemplification of *Wehmut* not as a mood but as a feeling. The unevenness with which Fechner treats this, which for him is a central distinction, is a weak spot in his argument; but his observance of life-associated attunements as only a part of the much greater spectrum of moods or attunements is one of the clues to a better understanding of the phenomenon of *Stimmung*.

In the debate on autonomous music, Hegel saw the abstraction inherent in *Stimmung* as negative, whereas Hanslick accepted *Stimmung* when it was freed

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131 Gustav Theodor Fechner, *Vorschule der Aesthetik*, vol. 1, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel 1897 (1876), 2nd ed., p. 2.

132 Fechner, op. cit., p. 159.

133 Fechner, op. cit., p. 167.

134 Fechner, op. cit., p. 168.

from all emotionality, being a musical attunement, not mood. In Fechner, *Stimmung* appears as linkage between the affective and the formal aspects of music when he elaborates both *Stimmung* as attunement and *Stimmung* as mood. In English we have to choose; in German the same notion covers both possibilities. It seems to be the case that *Stimmung* hides the conflict, but another way of putting it is to say that the German notion houses both meanings, keeping them together, linking them to each other.

## Projection and Resonance: The Tuning of Worlds

### *In the Mainstream of Musical Aesthetics*

The last decades of the nineteenth century and the first ten years of the twentieth witnessed the final establishment of the *Stimmung* concept in the mainstream of musical aesthetics, even its popularization. We saw earlier that in 1878 Hermann Mendel's important musical encyclopedia included an entry on *Stimmung*; and even if the central affective term was *Gefühl*, this fact must be regarded as the confirmation of the term being incorporated into the standard terminology. It attracted composers, too: cycles or collections of short piano pieces started to appear under headings such as *Stimmungen* and *Stimmungsbilder*, composed by names such as Richard Strauss, Antonín Dvořák and Edvard Grieg. These works were not always written with the intention of being aesthetically radical; instead the open notion of mood allowed composers both to include mixed material under the heading and to attract the attention of the amateur music market. *Stimmung* improved business, with no doubt; fragile atmospheres and indefinable states of mind were to be found not only in music, but also in painting, at the theatre and at the opera house. The dominant aesthetics of this era, the psychologically founded theory of empathy (*Einfühlungstheorie*), had *Stimmung* as one of its main elements.[135] In the foreword to a major work of the school, Johannes Volkelt's *System der Ästhetik*, the author suggests that the most important development in the arts of his time is actually the greater ability to express moods.[136] When *Einfühlung* was discussed within the visual arts, it was in the context of *Stimmungsbilder*: landscapes evoking moods in a mesmerizing way. Here, state of mind and landscape converge. No other composer was more eager than Jean Sibelius to incorporate music into the picture.

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[135] On mood in the aesthetics of empathy, see Anna-Katharina Gisbertz, '"Stimmung" im Diskurs der Ästhetik und Psychologie um 1900', in Arburg and Rickenbacher (eds), op. cit., pp. 183–98. Her discussion excludes music, however.

[136] Cf. Johannes Volkelt, *System der Ästhetik*, vol. 1, Munich: Beck 1926, 2nd ed., p. vii.

Key to the theoretical modulation is Friedrich Theodor Vischer's reflections on the symbol, which had their roots in his Hegel-inspired *Aesthetik*[137] and which were shaped within a psychologically orientated aesthetics, with the treatise 'Das Symbol' (1887) as a major achievement. Here, through a process of symbolization, the shining moonlight, the red evening sky, the blue sea arouse a *Stimmung* which approaches the beholder, who gives the objective appearance the same name as the mood – longing, melancholy, hopefulness.[138] In his *Ästhetik*, Vischer had suggested that beauty must be understood as an act, not as something in the object itself; and with the elaboration of his thoughts about the symbol in the 1880s he was able to describe how the mind projected itself into nature, giving it a symbolic character.

This is common ground for the *Einfühlungstheorie*. But the Romantic landscape painting of the beginning of the nineteenth century, represented by names such as Caspar David Friedrich and Philipp Otto Runge, must also be taken into account. Their paintings disclosed the landscape in a way that made it into a mindscape. Friedrich wrote that the first demand on a painting was that it should put the spectator's mind 'in a beautiful mood'.[139] In his correspondence Runge often turned to questions of mood – he even thought that music was the 'harmony and tranquillity in all arts'.[140] Precisely this was central when the art historian Alois Riegl wrote his famous essay on mood as content in modern pictorial art, almost a century later: 'tranquillity and distant view' were the elements of mood giving a relief that compensated for the disenchantment and fragmentation of modern life.[141]

Different styles in landscape painting are also crucial to Moritz Geiger's critical reflections on the problem of empathetic act concerning moods.[142] When the theorists of empathy took the lead in the aesthetic debate, they described themselves as heirs of Romanticism.[143] Novalis had indeed assumed that there is no true understanding of nature without the ability to intermingle with all bodies

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137 Friedrich Theodor Vischer, *Aesthetik, oder Wissenschaft des Schönen*, Reutlingen and Leipzig: Mäcken 1846–57.

138 Cf. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, 'Das Symbol', in *Kritische Gänge*, vol. 4, Munich: Meyer & Jessen 1922 (2nd ed., 1887), pp. 420–56, ref. p. 445.

139 Caspar David Friedrich, *Die Briefe*, Hamburg: ConferencePoint 2005, p. 52.

140 Philipp Otto Runge, *Hinterlassene Schriften*, vol. 1, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1965 (reprint of the 1840–41 edition), p. 43. For further comments, see Julie Ramos, '"Ein uns hörbarer Laut aus der verborgenen Harmonie": Philipp Otto Runge et la *Stimmungskunst*', in Thomas, op. cit., pp. 51–68.

141 Alois Riegl, 'Die Stimmung als Inhalt der modernen Kunst', in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Augsburg and Vienna: Filser 1928 (1899), pp. 28–39, cit. p. 29.

142 Cf. Moritz Geiger, 'Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung', *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, vol. 6, 1911, pp. 1–42.

143 Cf. Moritz Geiger, 'Über das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Einfühlung', in *Bericht über den IV. Kongreß für experimentelle Psychologie*, Leipzig: Barth 1911, pp. 29–73, ref. p. 30; and Theobald Ziegler, 'Zur Genesis eines ästhetischen Begriffs', *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Literaturgeschichte*, new series, vol. 7, pp. 114–20, ref. p. 116.

at the same time as the subject 'feels in' itself in nature (*sich gleichsam in sie hineinfühlt*).[144] But their idea of *Einfühlung* had also to do with roots lying deeper in the history of ideas, namely the actual birth of the concept in the Enlightenment and the discussion regarding bourgeois tragedy.[145] To most empathy theorists, nature had no soul to which the human soul was akin; instead the subject projected itself into the matter, bringing it to an imaginative life. Therefore, they changed Novalis's all-embracing empathy, where man and world become a unity, into a subjective act directed at the environment. Or, as one of their promoters, Theobald Ziegler, put it: they did not take part in the 'Romantic mischief' of thinking that empathy had something to do with science; it was only an aesthetic and psychological principle.[146]

The most radical theory of empathy is found in Theodor Lipps, who assumed that all aesthetic pleasure is 'objectified self-enjoyment'.[147] The sphere of expression relevant for his theory seems to be almost all-inclusive: not only are all aesthetical objects animated, but so too are other kinds of visual forms, colours and tones. Significantly, his investigation of the empathetic act in *Grundlegung der Ästhetik* begins with the human face and ends with nature, the description of the latter being modelled on that of the former. Many an aesthetician dealing with *Stimmung* in music underscores harmony as the decisive parameter. Not so Lipps, who puts motion at the centre: every rhythmic movement corresponds to a mood. When there is rhythm, the soul is 'rhythmized' and the rhythm of the soul is mood.[148] Rhythm is objective, and the listeners feel themselves – however, in the objective rhythm. This means that pulse is not just pulse: it is the element of life, the element in which we live. The same counts for the sphere of tones, where apperceptive resonance puts what is heard as musical movement in relation to other experiences of movements. *Stimmung* is here something that radiates from the movement, and when the listeners identify themselves with the tones, they experience longing and peace, rejoicing and complaint.

This identification is total, since the ego finds its own ideal self there, expressing itself in the harmonies and sequences. The self is not imagined, 'but real i.e. a self actually experienced, a self that experiences a fully-rounded interior history in the

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144 Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberger), 'Die Lehrlinge zu Saïs', in *Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1999, vol. 1, p. 229.

145 Cf. Martin Fontius, 'Einfühlung/Empathie/Identifikation', in *Ästhetische Grundbegriffe*, vol. 2, Stuttgart: Metzler 2001, pp. 121–42, ref. pp. 126–7.

146 Ziegler, op. cit., p. 118.

147 Theodor Lipps, 'Einfühlung und ästhetischer Genuß', in Emil Utitz (ed.), *Ästhetik*, Berlin: Pan 1923, pp. 152–67, cit. p. 152.

148 In a superb book on the links between science and musical aesthetics in the second half of the nineteenth century, Antonio Serravezza says that Lipps defines the musical work as a 'rhythmic totality'. Antonio Serravezza, *Musica e scienza nell'età del positivismo*, Bologna: Il Mulino 1996, p. 204.

sound-structures that occur in succession and form themselves into musical units. The essence of music lies in this interior history.'[149] However, since the actual ego is directed at the music and merged into the tones, there is a discrepancy between *Stimmung* and *Einfühlung*. The direction of *Stimmung* is from environment or aesthetic object to viewer or listener, whereas the subject of *Einfühlung* is active and directed at the environment or the object.

Despite these conflicting concepts, Johannes Volkelt is prepared to say that all non-human entities are open to an empathetic symbolism of moods (*stimmungssymbolische Einfühlung*): nature, buildings, ornaments, music. Volkelt pays much more attention than Lipps to the difference between object and subject, but precisely music is held to be an art which undermines that difference. He emphasizes the almost intrusive character of music, saying that the tones seem to resound within us, to pervade us, to dig themselves into our selves.

Like poetry, music is thought of as an art where feelings have the indefinite form of *Stimmung*. The distance in relation to the visual form does not exist in music, and the feelings expressed in tones converge with the actual feelings of the listener in this subjective-accentuated empathy. It is hard for the listener to differentiate between the objective movements in the music, the subjective feelings that are produced by these movements, and the state of mind itself.[150] According to Volkelt, there are four different categories of empathy in music, the first three of which are mediated:

The first concerns sensations of movement, the second is empathy mediated by the lived body, the third is symbolism given in empirical knowledge (song-like character or pictorial music) and finally we have the unmediated acoustic empathy, the one closest to *Stimmung*. This last mode of empathy does not originate in any mediation, either in bodily response or in earlier experiences; instead, the tones merge into the corresponding *Stimmung*. In other words, Volkelt ascribes a special status to the musical *Stimmung*. It is not mediated, not symbolic, not associative; it is direct.[151] Again, a forceful and unmediated element is attributed to music: we saw it in Hanslick, and Fechner highlighted it. This element is not bound to language, it does not come to us through any association or symbolization; it is there, in the *Stimmung*.

Even if the subject–object relation is problematized by Volkelt, it is Hermann Siebeck who is able to put forward the most elaborate analysis of them all.[152]

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149 Theodor Lipps, *Ästhetik: Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst*, vol. 1, Leipzig and Hamburg: Voss 1914 (1903), 2nd ed., p. 481 (trans. in Bojan Bujić [ed.], *Music in European Thought 1851–1912*, trans. Martin Cooper, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988, pp. 303–4).

150 Cf. Volkelt, op. cit., pp. 162–3.

151 Cf. Volkelt, op. cit., pp. 223–8.

152 In his interesting article on the musical experience and the theory of empathy, Constantijn Koopman has put Siebeck's analysis in the foreground, but his criticism directed against Volkelt does not take into consideration the passivity of the listener. Cf. Constantijn

One reason is that he made the most substantial contribution to *Stimmung* in the musical field. It is not only described as the resulting totality of all content and its inherent emotional traits; since the mood merges with the perception of the object, the object appears to bear in itself a mood. If empathy can be seen as a movement, directed from the subject to the object, music seems to have the characteristic trait of changing the subject instead. That counts for mood in general, too:

> [W]hen we (in the given parlance) feel ourselves *into the object*, it will itself be drawn *into us*, and this latter perspective is even that which is characterizing and essential for the whole process. Mediated by the mood, the object will be an element of our emotional state.[153]

Here, mood is said to be primordial to the empathetic act, albeit in a two-sided process. However, even if the location of the object is changed – it is no longer outside the subject, but drawn into it – the subject is the active entity in the process. Therefore, the aporia of *Stimmung* and *Einfühlung* is never really solved, even if it has been under negotiation by all three highlighted representatives of the empathetic theory.

### *Collecting Moods*

Empathy seems to have almost unlimited access to the environment, symbolizing activity gives life to dead objects as well as rhythmic movements, and there is a hovering *Stimmung* above all things. The inner world expropriates the outer world. Instead of retreating into a totally empty self, the empathetic theory turns Hegel's route of abstraction around, giving the subject an almost infinite capability of expansion. This way of organizing the relation between subject and world can be studied in some collections of character pieces which give an indication of how composers have elaborated the notion of *Stimmung* – and its Scandinavian counterparts *stämning* (Swedish) and *stemning* (Norwegian) – working out different kinds of moods musically. We find the term used in titles and/or part titles from the later decades of the nineteenth century to the first decades of the twentieth century: for collections by Richard Strauss (1883–84), Emil Sjögren (1886), Antonín Dvořák (1889), Zdeněk Fibich (1892–99), Nikolai Medtner (1897), Edvard Grieg (1905) and Adolf Wiklund (1910). Heterogeneity characterizes all these collections, but there are two pivotal observations to be made: firstly, there are crucial connections made to landscapes; secondly, in all collections we find music distinguished by a reiterated figuration or an ostinato pattern.

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Koopman, 'Identifikation, Einfühlung, Mitvollzug: Zur Theorie der musikalischen Erfahrung', *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, vol. 58, no. 4 (2001), pp. 317–36.

[153] Hermann Siebeck, 'Musik und Gemütstimmung: Zur Psychologie der Tonkunst', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, no. 150 (1913), pp. 11–12.

The constellation of a pictorial and an affective element in *Stimmungsbilder* brought into the field of music is a complex notion. Yet, some important tendencies can be discerned in the three cycles or collections of works by Dvořák, Strauss and Medtner, all published under that title – Dvořák, however, adding 'poetic' in *Poetische Stimmungsbilder* (op. 85, 1889). First of all, reference is often made to an idealized landscape or a specific geographical place. Strauss visits *topoi* of Romanticism in his choice of scenery for his op. 9: a walk in the woods, a wellspring in nowhere, a ghostly moor.

The atmosphere of a castle ruin is evoked in Dvořák ('Auf der alten Burg'), but in another piece he also points out the mountain Svatá Hora, a place of pilgrimage in Bohemia. The German title *Poetische Stimmungsbilder* originated in the Czech for 'poetic moods', *poetické nálady*, but it has been suggested that Dvořák had taken notice of Richard Strauss's collection when composing his own set.[154] The two pieces with a landscape or with a specific place pointed out in the title are the most explicit examples of a connection between music and world, and thus the question presents itself about other examples of landscape music in Dvořák: there would be no reason to exclude other works like the piano duets in *Ze Šumavy* ('From the Bohemian Forest', op. 68) from the discussion on landscape, music and mood.[155]

The background in pictorial art of *Stimmungsbild* is reflected by Strauss and Dvořák as a musical counterpart of expressing the mood of a landscape. Medtner has, however, stressed the *poetic* mood picture in *Acht Stimmungsbilder* (op. 1, 1897). The pictorial element is mediated through the poetry of Mikhail Lermontov, first an angel crossing the sky, later a snowstorm. In the first piece, 'Prolog', there are no traces of musical imagery; but Medtner follows the general movement of the poem, presenting a celestial song that encounters material resistance and is only remembered at the end. In Lermontov's poem 'The Angel', a singing angel comes to the world, bringing a young soul that shall remember the celestial song forever, hopelessly trying to find the equivalent among the songs on Earth.[156] A more pictorial mode of presentation opens the fifth piece, 'Andante', where quickly wandering movements illustrate the snowstorm in which the tolling of bells and then the rhythm of a funeral march emerge, elements to be found in

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154 Cf. the discussion on the title in Peter Jost, 'Dvořák und Schumanns "Poetische Musik"', in Klaus Döge and Peter Jost (eds), *Dvořák-Studien*, Mainz: Schott 1994, pp. 156–70, ref. pp. 163–4.

155 In his article, Jost underscores the fact that Dvořák did not try to depict any real landscapes in the scenes from Bohemia; instead he speaks about a mediation between specific elements of *Stimmung* and the atmospheric qualities corresponding to them. Cf. Jost, op. cit., p. 163.

156 A translation of Lermontov's 'The Angel' by Patrick Thomson can be found in Nicolas Medtner, *The Muse and the Fashion: Being a Defence of the Foundations of the Art of Music*, trans. Alfred J. Swan, Haverford, PA: Haverford College Bookstore 1951, p. 5.

the prefixed quotation from Lermontov.[157] Both examples show a composer who adapts very freely a general tendency of a work of art transformed to another medium, sometimes using direct pictorial means, a technique Medtner was to develop in his *skazki* (tales). No less interesting is the fact that Medtner seems to have worked systematically: using character designations like *con impete*, *freddo*, *con humore* and *con ira* he clearly shows that he wants to distinguish between different states.

Abundance rules in Fibich's set called *Nálady, dojmy a upomínky* ('Moods, Impressions and Reminiscences') in Czech, but also having the German title *Stimmungen, Eindrücke und Erinnerungen* on the front page of the first editions, published in Prague (opp. 41, 44, 47 and 57, 1892–99). With a scope of 376 pieces, he had good reasons to allow his compositions to develop in different directions. *Stimmungen, Eindrücke und Erinnerungen* was composed during a love affair with a young pupil of his, Anežka Schulzová. The pieces are provided with dates; not always the date of composition, however, but often of the experience he wanted to reflect musically. This gives his output the character of a diary,[158] a lover's diary.

Except for the opening 'musical novella' of op. 44 and the whole last set, op. 57, Fibich differentiated between sections of moods, of impressions and of reminiscences. This was not done with rigour: the boundary between moods and impressions is unclear, whereas the reminiscences are often intended to capture a scene or a small narrative – or a mood.[159] Fibich said that he describes Anežka in different clothing in some groups of pieces, and these are placed in the mood sections in both op. 41 and op. 47, even if one could easily argue for their placement among the impressions.[160] Fibich's short compositions are atmospheric, gentle, sometimes shaded by melancholy; the atmospheric character counts for the majority of the pieces, not only for those headed by *Stimmungen*. We should of course keep in mind that the collections actually had a Czech title, but there are such important German elements in Fibich's life and artistic production that

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157 The quotation reads (in translation): 'The blizzard roars and the snow swirls, but breaking through from time to time the distant tolling of a bell rings out; it is the voice of the funeral.' Cf. Barrie Martyn, *Nicolas Medtner: His Life and Music*, Aldershot: Scolar 1995, p. 16.

158 So it was called by Anežka Schulzová herself in an introduction to Fibich's music, written under a pseudonym. Cf. Carl Ludwig Richter, *Zdenko Fibich: Eine musikalische Silhouette*, Prague: Urbánek 1900, pp. 34–5.

159 Cf. Zdeněk Nejedlý, *Zdeňka Fibicha milostný deník: Nálady, dojmy a upomínky*, Prague: Hudební matice umělecké besedy 1925. I thank Anežka Kuzmičová for her help concerning this book.

160 Cf. Gerald Abraham, 'An Erotic Diary for Piano', in *Slavonic and Romantic Music: Essays and Studies*, London: Faber 1968, pp. 70–82, ref. p. 73.

his gigantic undertaking must be mentioned in our context.[161] The sheer idea of composing mood pieces is bound to a Romantic musical aesthetics with Germany as its origin.

Not only Fibich included disparate material under the heading of moods. Grieg's *Stimmungen* (op. 73) starts with a searching, short piece called 'Resignation', but then six pieces follow without any specific musical or, indeed, verbal connection to the affective sphere. Again, though, the connection to landscapes can be discerned in 'Nächtlicher Ritt' (A Ride at Night) and a mountaineer's song. In *Stemningar* (op. 20), the Swedish composer Emil Sjögren brought together pieces as miscellaneous as Grieg's: most of the pieces in the set are composed in ternary form, some of them showing influences from Grieg, some with enriched harmonies of contemporary French music (Gabriel Fauré and César Franck); but the mixture of dances such as a Chopinesque waltz and another which is much more of a peasant's dance, together with pieces for the European salon, makes it impossible to find any general tendency in the material. Sjögren's younger compatriot Adolf Wiklund also used the mood concept in its widest sense when choosing the title *Stämningar* (op. 15, 1910) for six piano pieces: there is no clear difference between those pieces and his collections with conventional titles.

However, one common trait is to be found in all these collections: the both expressive and pianistic device of a basic figure in the accompaniment, used in all three or in the outer parts of the ternary form, or, when the piece is unitary, all the time. It is almost standard in the melancholic pieces. There is a haunting reiteration in the bass register in Strauss's 'Heidebild' (On the Heath) and Fibich's Lento in G minor (*Nálady/Stimmungen*, op. 41, part I, no. 24), where the atmosphere of the former piece is linked to a landscape, whereas the latter piece has a biographical background in a feverish attack of jealousy (Example 1.1 and 1.2).[162]

Example 1.1 Richard Strauss, 'Heidebild' from *Stimmungsbilder*, op. 9, bars 1–7




[161] Fibich's mother came from a German-speaking family, and his musical studies were mainly in German schools and conservatoires. In addition, he not only set German poetry to music but also wrote librettos in German.

[162] Cf. Nejedlý, op. cit., p. 185.

Example 1.2 Zdeněk Fibich, Lento from *Nálady, dojmy a upomínky*, op. 41, part I, no. 24




In 'Resignation' Grieg lets his figure rise into a pathetic outburst before ebbing away, and here it should be noted that the structure is present all the time (Example 1.3). An almost mystical tendency can be perceived in Dvořák's 'Auf der alten Burg' (Example 1.4) and in Medtner's 'Prolog' (Example 1.5), both of them with spatially conceived atmospheres but structured with different means. The nostalgic melancholy in Wiklund's 'Akvarell' (Watercolour) and the last piece in Sjögren's collection, Larghetto, is easy to perceive (Example 1.6 and 1.7).

Example 1.3 Edvard Grieg, 'Resignation' from *Stimmungen*, op. 73, bars 1–7




Example 1.4 Antonín Dvořák, 'Auf der alten Burg' ('Na starém hradě') from *Poetische Stimmungsbilder/Poetické nálady*, op. 85, bars 29–32



Example 1.5 Nikolai Medtner, 'Prolog' from *Acht Stimmungsbilder*, op. 1, bars 1–6




Example 1.6 Adolf Wiklund, 'Akvarell' (Watercolour) from *Stämningar*, op. 15, bars 1–4




Example 1.7 Emil Sjögren, Larghetto from *Stemningar*, op. 20, bars 1–6




All seven pieces can be said to be melancholic, but they evoke different kinds of melancholy. What is melancholy in music? How does it emerge? Taking the mental structure of pathological melancholy into account, often said to be a static pattern built on reiteration,[163] this trait common to all pieces mentioned here is a sign of accordance either founded on sheer convention or – more likely, I

[163] This preliminary characterization can be found in some standard examples of the literature on melancholy. Cf. Eugène Minkowski, *Le Temps vécu: Études phénoménologiques*

would assume – a musical structure or materiality answering to the state of being melancholic. Furthermore, melancholy has to do with temporality, where the flow of time has been slowed down and where there even may be an element of de-synchronization.[164] The modern term for melancholy, depression, suggests the element of pressure in bodily awareness. It is still much too early to say something substantial about the emergence of *Stimmung*, here first of all conceived in terms of the temporality of a musical event and a mental state, but also as an atmosphere related to space and the way the music moves. Perhaps there is a hint of the musical materiality, its heaviness in the bass pattern or lightness in the high register, and there is no reason to exclude the pressure inherent in the minor mode and the release in the major. It is not an isomorphism or intermedial metaphor; it is a first instance of how a *Stimmung* is not set, like a text, *to* music, but *in* music.

### *Jean Sibelius's Addiction to* stämningar

If the seven *Stimmung* collections discussed above show how composers of different aesthetic and national backgrounds could identify mood with the lyrical piece, it is Jean Sibelius who most committedly identifies himself with an aesthetics of *Stimmung*. As we shall see in Chapter 5, Gustav Mahler's works open themselves up for attunemental elucidation, and his famous comment that a symphony must be a world is perfectly suited to elaboration. However, he himself chose to delimit the conceptual width, describing the mere *Stimmung* as belonging to the past and preferring the transition between them, conflicts, humour and poetic ideas.[165]

Hans Pfitzner developed something of a theory of musical inspiration in which the element of *Stimmung* was salient. He explicitly turns away from any notion of mood as weak, gentle and associative (those characteristics criticized by Besseler),[166] and also from the idea that inspiration would be a mere whim: the musical idea is a unity of melody, rhythm and harmony, made even more complex in the act of composing (he describes *Tondichtung* as a means of *verdichten*, of making more

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*et psychopathologiques*, Neuchatel: Delachaux & Niestlé 1968, pp. 174–5 and Julia Kristeva, *Soleil noir: Dépression et mélancolie*, Paris: Gallimard 1987, p. 45.

[164] See for instance Thomas Fuchs, 'Melancholie als Desynchronisierung: Ein Beitrag zur Psychopathologie der intersubjektiven Zeit', in *Zeit-Diagnosen: Philosophisch-psychiatrische Essays*, Kusterdingen: Die Graue Edition, 2002, pp. 111–34.

[165] Cf. letter to Gisela Tolnay-Witt 7 February 1893 in Gustav Mahler, *Briefe*, Vienna and Hamburg: Zsolnay 1982, p. 107.

[166] Cf. Hans Pfitzner, *Die neue Ästhetik der musikalischen Impotenz*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2, Augsburg: Filser 1926 (1920), p. 266. The third chapter of this book and the treatise 'Über musikalische Inspiration' are Pfitzner's most important writings on this theme. Cf. op. cit., pp. 163–235, and 'Über musikalische Inspiration', in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4, Tutzing: Schneider 1987 (1940), pp. 269–307.

complex).[167] But an even more intense relation to mood at its creative aspects can be found in Jean Sibelius, and then intimately connected to the landscape.[168] This relation has become a stereotype, but through the composer's diaries we have a more reliable source for this discussion than the postcard aesthetics of standardized liner notes.

One way of dealing with this relation is to activate the semiotic possibilities, codified not only in programme music of different kinds, but also in opera and, later, film music. But since our investigation already indicates a phenomenon more primordial than conventional signs, we should look in other directions. We have unique material for an investigation on *Stimmung* or *stämning* in Sibelius thanks to the publication of his diaries in 2005. The affective word *stämning* is extremely frequent there: it (or the root *stäm-*) is used on almost every second page of the volume with his published notes – and this count does not include the different kinds of moods.[169] Even if the general character of his notes is impulsive and non-reflective, they give a hint of his attitudes to life and music. First of all, composing was closely connected to an inspired state of mind, most often described by Sibelius as 'being in the mood' (*vara i stämning*), whereas his many non-inspired days were spent 'in a bad mood' (*misstämning*). There is no obvious difference between the periods of composition covered in the diary, which ranges from 1909 to 1944 – that is, including the work on the Fourth Symphony to his last major composition, *Tapiola* (1924). The late period of silence, when he tried to compose his Eighth Symphony and eventually stopped composing, not only meant that he almost stopped keeping a diary, but also that the word *stämning* is no longer to be found.[170] When the moods fail to appear, Sibelius is no longer able to compose.

To Sibelius, *stämning* is not only a notion for music and the arts; it is also a kind of hub around which his whole being revolves. It is even life to him, since great moments make him feel alive: in nature when he hears the sound of the great migratory birds; at home when he walks through the rooms; at his writing desk when he has the inspiration to compose not only short pieces but also symphonic

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167 Hans Pfitzner, *Zur Grundfrage der Operndichtung*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2, Augsburg: Filser 1926, p. 22.

168 Daniel M. Grimley has discussed this theme in the essay 'Storms, Symphonies, Silence: Sibelius's Tempest Music and the Invention of Late Style'; in his preface to Daniel M. Grimley (ed.), *Sibelius and His World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2011, pp. ix–xii, 186–225; and in the article 'Music, Landscape, Attunement: Listening to Sibelius's *Tapiola*', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, vol. 64, no. 2 (2011), pp. 394–98.

169 To be exact, there are 136 instances on the 293 pages. Jean Sibelius, *Dagbok 1909–1944*, Helsinki and Stockholm: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland and Atlantis 2005.

170 In 1911, he wrote approximately 16,700 words in his diary, whereas the period 1928–44 only contains 1,700 words – and of these the years 1929, 1932 and 1936–42 do not contain any entries. Cf. the introductory chapter by the diaries' editor, Fabian Dahlström: Sibelius, op. cit., p. 19 and p. 23.

music. From time to time Sibelius comes back to his method or composition, or, perhaps better, his *lack* of method. He describes it in terms of 'open-air painting' *(plein-air-sätt*), in contrast to the systematic work of the German composers.[171] That is a less metaphorical expression than expected.

When, with elliptic formulations, he associates a visit to the Koli National Park – emblematic for its Karelian landscape – with the first ideas of a work with the working title 'La montagne', this is the first sign of the composition of what is probably the Fourth Symphony.[172] One needs then to beware of what can be called 'inspirational fallacy', a specific variant of 'intentional fallacy'. Koli's landscape is not a mountainous one, so even if Sibelius's first thoughts about the new symphony – bringing a harsher tone into his music than ever before – came to him when he walked through the Karelian landscape, he did not transform the impressions of it into music. Yet nature, with its woods and lakes, its birds and animals, resounds in him and gives him compositional ideas.

One of the most famous Sibelian references is to a musical idea made after the observation of the flight of swans in April 1915, namely the main theme in the finale of his Fifth Symphony.[173] The 'Swinging Theme' was not conceived in this moment; instead it can be found more than six months earlier in his sketchbooks (but that does not exclude a bird experience being the origin, since that is about the time they leave Finland).[174] What we find is a solemn movement that is attuned to an experience of nature, or an experience attuned to the music.

All this brings us to the question of how the compositional process was described by Sibelius. Technical descriptions are sparse in the diary. That has to do not only with the fact that the diary was not the right medium for reflections on technique, but also with the fact that the matter was not describable in words; or, as Sibelius very often says, that it is a way of composing of his own: it is a kind of dreaming in which he is attuned to composing. This state is distinguished from when he is forging (*smider*) the musical metal, or elaborating his musical motifs. When the themes come to him, he is attuned by them: 'I've been living in a new theme all day long. A wonderful mood.'[175] He not only composes the music, he lives the music: since the themes come to him, he is disposed by them; he is attuned to their being.

The *stämning* was set in contrast to the elaboration, which becomes clear in a comment on *Rakastava* (op. 14), which Sibelius wanted to go through once again before publishing it. Something needed to be done, but the re-working had its risks, too. He complains about the homophonic style, the clumsiness in the voice

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171 Sibelius, op. cit., p. 84.

172 Sibelius, op. cit., p. 36.

173 Cf. Sibelius, op. cit., p. 225.

174 Cf. James Hepokoski, *Sibelius: Symphony No. 5*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993, p. 37.

175 Sibelius, op. cit., p. 82.

leading; but he says that much can be lost if he re-works the composition – the *stämning*, since there is something of black soil about it, of Finland.[176]

Adorno was not wrong when he brought up *Boden* in the case of Sibelius,[177] but the invoked *Blut* had to do with the reception in Finland and Germany of the 1930s.[178] It is just a way of living, an experience of being alive. In a strange intuition, Sibelius writes: 'All in all: the first encounter in the world is your peace of mind and all mood.'[179] Thereby, he is touching upon a very original idea, but at the same time it is a thought-provoking conclusion about his own life and work. The world is given to man through the *stämning*, in a primordial way. This is not merely a mood. A world is opened up.

## Epilogue: Ernst Kurth, Phenomenology and Theodor W. Adorno

If the theory of empathy is a late nineteenth-century phenomenon, with its psychologism that would be disputed in different ways in the first decades of the new century, we can expect that the outspoken interest in *Stimmung* of that school of thought runs into problems at the same time as the theory itself is under attack. The phenomenologists formulated a devastating critique of the empathy theory, but they nevertheless took the term *Einfühlung* and reconceptualized it in order to come closer to the intended object (yet Lipps has recently made an unexpected reappearance within the theory of mind debate[180]). No wonder that the most important exponents of an aesthetic thinking where *Stimmung* was a major issue were psychologically inclined, but any impression that the psychology of music was concerned with only the emotional sphere is false. The most important name in the German psychology of music of this period, Ernst Kurth, orientates away from the emotionality of the empathetic theory, perhaps influenced by the emerging phenomenological movement.

Ernst Kurth is no phenomenologist.[181] His theory of music is founded on psychology, and he never referred to Edmund Husserl or the more musically

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176 Sibelius, op. cit., p. 112.

177 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Glosse über Sibelius', in *Musikalische Schriften IV*, *Gesammelte Schriften* (hereafter GS), vol. 17, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1998, pp. 247–52, ref. 249.

178 On Adorno and Sibelius, cf. Max Paddison, 'Art and the Ideology of Nature: Sibelius, Hamsun, Adorno', in Grimley (ed.), op. cit., 173–85.

179 Sibelius, op. cit., p. 252.

180 Cf. Dan Zahavi, 'Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz', *Inquiry*, vol. 53, no. 3 (2010), pp. 285–306.

181 For another judgement, see Arne Blum, 'Die Anfänge der Musikphänomenologie', *Journal Phänomenologie*, no. 33 (2010), pp. 6–19. The relation between Kurth and phenomenology is discussed in Lee A. Rothfarb's introduction to Ernst Kurth, *Selected Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.

interested phenomenologists in any substantial way. Still, in his own time he was viewed as one of the forerunners to the phenomenology of music; and, what is more, his handling of the concept of *Stimmung* is partly in line with the scepticism of that movement in those early days. One can say that there is a modern tendency in Kurth's formal interest, where the energetic characteristics are taken into the foreground. He is, nevertheless, a child of idealism, especially the metaphysics of Schopenhauer, which is obvious in his remarks on the forces of energy being the will. Another sign of his debts to the past century can be found in *Romantische Harmonik* (1920) when he comments on the Wagnerian *Gesamtkunstverk*: the creativity of the artist is said to start with the will to express that which has not yet become language, music, picture or gesture. It is only a fundamental mood, just like in Schiller's description of the creative act.[182] This is the unconscious source of Romantic creation and, according to Kurth, through the use of *Stimmung* this source is musicalized.

In *Grundlagen des linearen Kontrapunkts* (1929) the same concept is said to be irrelevant for the understanding of J.S. Bach, since it is too subjective in relation to the unworldly music of the great master of counterpoint.[183] Kurth writes that a listener who is used to searching for the expressive traits of music will be lost in Bach, taking his music for a dry, formal mastery. That means that the kinetic energy in music can be separated from the affective sphere, being something more objective than personal expressiveness. In his concluding work, *Musikpsychologie* (1931), Kurth also excludes the emotionality of music, concentrating on concepts like 'force', 'spatiality', 'matter', 'energy' and 'movement'.[184] The same holds true for the theoretical discussions in *Bruckner* (1925), which concern first of all form, dynamics and energetics, even if Kurth admits that the works can be seen as *Stimmungskunst*.

Ernst Kurth never uses the phenomenological term 'bracketing' (*ausklammern*) for this separation, and nor does his follower Hans Mersmann in his magisterial *Angewandte Musikästhetik*, even if that is what he means when he appreciatively describes what phenomenology has meant in aesthetics: 'The phenomenological position relieves the work of art of all associations and subjective relationships and judges it as phenomenon.'[185] This bracketing of the affective sphere can be found by many exponents of musical phenomenology in the first decades of the twentieth century. Waldemar Conrad declares that the first instinctive impression of a particular mood in a piece of music can be dismissed as sheer projection.[186]

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182 Ernst Kurth, *Romantische Harmonik und ihre Krise in Wagners 'Tristan'*, Bern and Leipzig: Haupt 1920, p. 34.

183 Ernst Kurth, *Grundlagen des linearen Kontrapunkts: Bachs melodische Polyphonie*, Bern: Krompholz 1929, p. 186.

184 Ernst Kurth, *Musikpsychologie*, Hildesheim: Olm 1990 (1931).

185 Hans Mersmann, *Angewandte Musikästhetik*, Berlin: Hesse 1926, p. 3.

186 Cf. Waldemar Conrad, 'Der ästhetische Gegenstand: Eine phänomenologische Studie', *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, vol. 3 (1908), p. 111.

Paul Bekker omits the affectivity of music in his outline for the phenomenology of music.[187] Werner Ziegenfuß agrees with Mersmann concerning the need for an objective conception of the musical work.[188] Instead, the investigations concern the single tone, the chord, melody, sound and perhaps above all different aspects of temporality and the movement of music (but, as we shall see further on, both temporality and mobility are decisive for *Stimmung*).

It is obvious that one of the adversaries of *Stimmung* in the musical aesthetics of the twentieth century was phenomenology. The death blow comes, though, with Theodor W. Adorno. It is not the case that *Stimmung* is a great concern for him. It was not an essential part of his thinking, and the term is almost exclusively used in his harsh criticism;[189] but it is his negative evaluation that is of interest to us. First of all, *Stimmung* is irrelevant to him because it said to be a dated concept. In the paralipomena of *Ästhetische Theorie*, he comments on the first complex of themes in Beethoven's D-minor piano sonata op. 31:2, and prefers the term *Atmosphäre* over *Stimmung*, which is said to be a concept of the past.[190] That is only one instance in a general strategy of avoidance. In the monograph on Alban Berg, speaking of how the composer uses the orchestra in *Wozzeck*, Adorno suggests that it has nothing to do with the enchantment of moods but, again, with atmosphere.[191] Not only in the book on Alban Berg but also in *Mahler*, Adorno deliberately dedicates a chapter to the 'tone' of the composer and focuses on the character (*Charakter*) of the music, and when *Stimmung* is used it has to do with something trivial or negligible.[192]

*Stimmung* is also made the keyword in an aesthetics that is totally at odds with Adorno's own. He sees Hegel as his own forerunner, said to be the first to rise up against the aesthetical sentimentalism that has an interest only in art as effect rather than in the artwork itself: 'This sentimentalism later became a concern with mood, a concept that has its own historical importance. For better or worse, nothing better defines Hegel's aesthetics than its incompatibility with the element of an artwork's mood or attunement.'[193] At play in Adorno's discussion of twentieth-

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[187] Cf. Paul Bekker, *Von den Naturreichen des Klanges: Grundriss einer Phänomenologie der Musik*, Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1925.

[188] Cf. Werner Ziegenfuß, *Die phänomenologische Ästhetik*, Berlin: Collignon 1928, p. 128.

[189] One exception is the early essay 'Schubert' (1928), where Schubert's 'perspectivistic' moods are separated from the 'decay of the art of moods' . Theodor W. Adorno, 'Schubert', in *Musikalische Schriften IV*, GS, vol. 17, pp. 18–33, cit. 26.

[190] Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, GS, vol. 7, p. 423.

[191] Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Berg: Der Meister des kleinstes Übergangs*, in *Die musikalischen Monographien: Wagner, Mahler, Berg*, GS, vol. 13, p. 431.

[192] Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik*, GS, vol. 13.

[193] Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetische *Theorie*, p. 407 (trans. in Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1997, p. 273). The translation is slightly revised.

century music is the question of modernism. The devaluation of *Stimmung* as a musical phenomenon is not made because Adorno finds the concept too unclear or musically irrelevant, but rather on ideological grounds. He dismisses *Stimmung* because it is held by him to be regressive. First of all, Adorno says, in modernity *Stimmung* has to do with light music, be it that which is to be found in cafés and restaurants or in the concert halls where Rachmaninoff and Sibelius are applauded. It is an ingredient of the commodification of music and of the culture industry in general:

> Functions such as warming people up and drowning out silence recasts music as something defined as mood, the commodified negation of the boredom produced by the grey-on-grey commodity world. The sphere of entertainment, which has long been integrated into production, amounts to the domination of this element of art over all the rest of its phenomena.[194]

Secondly, it has to do with the regression of listening, the emotional listening which is directed at the vibrant climaxes in the symphonic repertoire or at well-known arias. Thirdly, there is a connection to his blatantly sarcastic reckoning of the *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit*,[195] where not only Heidegger is brushed aside because of his vehemently idiosyncratic language, but to an even greater extent also the lesser figures of phenomenological, existential and anthropological philosophy. Included in these is Bollnow, whose eulogy to security in *Neue Geborgenheit* is brought to ridicule by a glimmering Adorno.

Most of the Adorno works referred to were published in the 1960s; the body of the aesthetics was posthumous. Still, the themes dealt with can be seen in Adorno's writings of the late 1920s,[196] and therefore the definitive shift to an era of modernism can be drawn from that time with Adorno as the prominent thinker. Furthermore, we should not forget that he had himself adopted some aspects of the dismissed concept of *Stimmung* in his own notion *Stimmigkeit*, or the consistency with which the idea of the musical work is realized structurally. In Adorno, a musical work can *stimmen* – but then in terms of consistency, not of attunement – and this *Stimmigkeit* puts the work of art in an antagonistic relation to reality; it takes the part of truth but it also means that the artwork is untruthful.[197] It is thought-provoking to ask oneself if late modernism, in its mood-evading tendency, does not also bear on *Stimmung*. Adorno complained about the monotony of serialism, but he did not hear the attunement of it.

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194 Adorno, op. cit., p. 375 (trans. Hullot-Kentor, op. cit., p. 253).

195 Theodor W. Adorno, *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit*, GS, vol. 6.

196 For instance, the juxtaposition of *Charakter* and *Stimmung* can be found in the article 'Die Oper Wozzeck', written in 1929. Cf. Adorno, *Musikalische Schriften V*, GS, vol. 18, pp. 472–9, ref. p. 475.

197 Cf. Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, p. 236.

We need Heidegger's thought to open our ears for such attunements. In fact, whereas Heidegger at the end of the 1920s reconceptualized *Stimmung* thoroughly, the aesthetics of music took another direction. Heidegger's student, Besseler, was practically the only musicologist to respond to his teacher's philosophy of *Stimmung*, urging his colleagues to engage themselves with this new field: 'it is regretful precisely for musicology that we, in a precarious way, are still missing more penetrating investigations and insights here'.[198] Besseler's request for an awareness of *Stimmungen* in music was evidently not heard at the time, but we shall now undertake what he once requested.

[198] Besseler, 'Grundfragen der Musikästhetik', p. 62.

# Chapter 2
# The Philosophy of *Stimmung*: Upheaval and Continuity

## Upheavals of Discourse

Through Martin Heidegger's thinking we can relate to music in a new way, or, rather, better understand one of the most common ways of listening to music. This is by no means evident. Heidegger's remarks on music are sparse. When he does discuss music, it is as an illustration of what he means, and therefore without any impact on his thinking (perhaps an exception is his treatment of the clash between Nietzsche and Wagner). The consequence of this is that his relation to music has been described in very negative terms: there is a silence on music in Heidegger;[1] it is claimed that he repressed it,[2] even censured it.[3] He has therefore been disregarded in musicological studies, with only a few exceptions in the last 30 years.[4] Musicology has not given any attention to the fact that some philosophers have investigated the musical dimension of Heidegger's thought, even though he may speak about *Stimmung* just as well as *Fuge* (fugue) and the act of *hören* (listening) in a metaphorical way.[5] However, this is not the place for asking why Heidegger almost never referred to music. What is important is that he treated *Stimmung* in a groundbreaking way, and that his followers criticized him, indeed, but also continued in his tracks. Some 15 years ago, it was possible to say that the investigation on *Stimmung* in Heidegger had just started;[6] now,

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[1] Günther Pöltner, 'Mozart und Heidegger: Die Musik und der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', *Heidegger Studies*, vol. 8 (1992), pp. 123–44, ref. p. 123.

[2] Andrew Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, p. 76.

[3] Claude Molzino, 'Logos et ruthmos: Le sens de la terre ou l'oublie de la musique dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger', PhD thesis, Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis 1998, p. 27.

[4] See the works by Thomas Clifton, John Covach, Lawrence Ferrara, David B. Greene, Bernhard Schleiser, F. Joseph Smith and J.P.E. Harper-Scott in the bibliography.

[5] Jean-François Mattéi discusses fugue in *Heidegger et Hölderlin: Le Quadriparti*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2001. David Espinet investigates listening in *Phänomenologie des Hörens: Eine Untersuchung im Ausgang von Martin Heidegger*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2009.

[6] Cf. Fredrik Svenaeus, 'Heideggers stämningsbegrepp' ['Heidegger's Concept of Mood'], in Aleksander Orlowski and Hans Ruin (eds), *Fenomenologiska perspektiv*,

philosophically, much has been done[7] but these studies have not been given any attention in musicology.[8]

*Sein und Zeit* is the starting point concerning Heidegger's treatment of *Stimmung*. The position of this concept in his thinking remained obscure until the publishing of his complete works had made available the early lectures on Aristotle from the 1920s; the investigation of boredom in the lecture course on the fundamental concepts of metaphysics in 1929–30; the different readings of Hölderlin in the form of lecture courses in the 1930s and 1940s; and, finally, the seminal but secretive *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. These publications are only the most important ones, published for the first time over the last three decades. They are all written with *Stimmung* as one of their fundamental elements, if not the key concept (with the exception of the early Aristotle lectures, where the roots of Heidegger's concept can be found).[9]

What was Heidegger's important step, then, which distanced him from the ongoing discussion of the affective sphere? The starting point for Heidegger can be considered as a way of thinking about the primordial aspects of life. The opposition between ordinary life and philosophy was to be dissolved, and an important move was to counteract theoretical objectification. It was precisely the understanding of *Stimmung* which made Heidegger's own approach extraordinary.[10] The present chapter will show the extent to which Heidegger's new formulation of *Stimmung* has repercussions on the musical understanding of that phenomenon. However, it is impossible to cut out silhouettes of his figures of thought and apply them to

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Stockholm: Thales 1997, pp. 142–70, ref. p. 142.

[7] See the books by Annalisa Caputo, Paola-Ludovika Coriando, Boris Ferreira, Byung-Chul Han, Romano Pocai and Peter Trawny in the bibliography.

[8] Karol Berger and Andrew Bowie situate their discussion in fields other than musicology – Berger in general aesthetics, Bowie in the philosophy of language. Passages on *Stimmung* or mood in music from a philosophical perspective can be found in Federico Nicolaci, *Esserci e musica: Heidegger e l'ermeneutica musicale*, Saonara: Il prato 2012; Joseph J. Koeckelmans, 'On the Meaning of Music', in Walter Biemel and Wilhelm-Friedrich von Herrmann (eds), *Kunst und Technik: Gedächtnisschrift zum 100. Geburtstag von Martin Heidegger*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1989; and Peter Trawny, *Martin Heideggers Phänomenologie der Welt*, Freiburg and Munich: Alber 1997, pp. 70–71 and 189–90.

[9] In the course *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* 1924, GA, vol. 18, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2002, Heidegger translates Aristotle's *páthos* with *Befindlichkeit*. This discussion is followed up in *Sein und Zeit*, and therefore there is a continuation from Aristotle's *páthos* to Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit* and the later *Stimmung*. Another important historical source of Heidegger's *Stimmung* is Augustine's *affectionem*, also translated with *Befindlichkeit* by Heidegger, and discussed in the lecture *Der Begriff der Zeit* held in 1924, GA, vol. 64, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2004, pp. 10–11.

[10] For a more detailed discussion, see Paola-Ludovika Coriando, *Affektenlehre und Phänomenologie der Stimmungen: Wege einer Ontologie und Ethik des Emotionalen*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2002, pp. 64–91.

the musicological field. Instead, it is necessary to bring in his way of thinking, to give an account of the different elaborations of the concept in his writings and to evaluate these in terms of musical relevance.[11] If this is done with exactitude, we will understand both why we should bring him in on his own terms and why his answers may be in need of supplement.

What are Heidegger's main contributions to the understanding of *Stimmung* in music? First of all, the importance of everyday life in his investigations of *Stimmung* leads to the assumption that we should take into account an everyday way of listening to music. Secondly, even if there is nothing in Heidegger that describes that common mode of musical listening, we can use his thinking about the work of art to see what consequences it has for music. The opening of a world in the work of art, central in Heidegger's thought, should be found in music, too. The question is how this world is constituted, and some hints in different works by Heidegger suggest that temporality, spatiality and mobility are three such dimensions, resting on the materiality put forth by this world.

The second part of the chapter is devoted to Heidegger's followers. It is thanks to them that a title such as the one chosen is possible: through Bollnow's critical assessment of Heidegger, Klaus Held's inception of a intercultural philosophy on the basis of *Stimmung* and Thomas Fuchs's treatment of the *Stimmungsraum* in his phenomenology of the lived body (*Leib*) we can discern a series of highly divergent yet interrelated studies that make a specific contribution to affectivity in Western thought. Their works have musical resonance and therefore lend further substance to the discussion on *Stimmung* in music.

## Heidegger's Contributions to the Philosophy of *Stimmung*

### *The* Stimmung *of Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology*

We can be moody or in a good mood, but even though our disposition may change, we are always in one mood or another. Heidegger makes this observation when he first discusses the affective sphere in *Sein und Zeit*. He seems to be at odds with the everyday experience; sometimes we feel as if we are in no particular mood at all, but he describes the lack of *Stimmung* as a pallid state and as such a *Stimmung*. One of the central sentences in the beginning of his analysis reads: 'The fact that moods can be spoiled and change only means that Dasein is always

[11] There have been suggestions on how to bring Heidegger's thinking into music whilst being true to him but at the same time bracketing his own view of music. Cf. Pöltner, op. cit.; Augusto Mazzoni, *Il dono delle muse: Heidegger e la musica*, Genoa: Il nuovo melangolo 2009; and Eduardo Marx, *Heidegger und der Ort der Musik*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1998.

already in a mood.'[12] The sentence is central not only because it underscores that mood is always there, but also because it indirectly points at a leap taken later on – from the ontic mood (*Stimmung*) to the ontological disposition (*Befindlichkeit*). Heidegger assumes that *Stimmung* is something familiar, being a part of the everyday experience; but within his fundamental ontology it must be understood ontologically, and therefore it is constitutive for the being of Dasein. The leap is hinted at when he describes Dasein as always being in a mood, since in the next step he says that *Befindlichkeit* is *gestimmtes Sichbefinden* – the disposition is how one finds oneself in attunement.[13]

The mood, and therefore also the disposition, comes over us without any specific reason. It breaks into our lives in a way that opens us: when we are in love, the face of the world has totally changed, and in anxiety there is nothing to be frightened of; *nothing* is a threat, and the world is shown to us, totally foreign and senseless. However, as already stressed, the more-or-less familiar mood must be understood in an unfamiliar way, ontologically. It is not just some kind of feeling; instead it is constitutive for Dasein.

One of these two examples, the state of being in love, seems to deviate from the customary way of distinguishing between *Stimmungen* and *Gefühle*: *Stimmung* is a phenomenon said to be without object and intentionality, but one can hardly imagine a person without an object for his or her love and thereby directed towards the loved one. Still, what Heidegger is dealing with is not the subjective and intentional feeling directed at a person; instead it is the disposition of being in love.

The French philosopher Michel Haar has found a poignant example of this distinction in Kierkegaard commenting on Cherubino in Mozart's *La nozze di Figaro*: according to Kierkegaard, Cherubino flirts with all women, not only single ones; he loves them all in an indeterminate way.[14] He has the *disposition* of being in love and tries to snare whoever comes near (one is tempted to add: be it man or woman). Haar comments that Kierkegaard's description is faithful to the non-verbal dimension of the phenomenon, which is a unity that precedes the division between subject and object. According to Haar, Heidegger considers *Stimmung* 'as a music complete by itself, as *attunement*, the *accord* that defines

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[12] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 134 (trans. in Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time: A Translation of* Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New York Press 1996, p. 126). Stambaugh spells 'Dasein' with a hyphen, 'Da-sein', but here and onwards I follow Heidegger's spelling. Another important difference is that she renders *Befindlichkeit* with 'attunement'; here it is changed to 'disposition', since I hold that 'attunement' is a better translation of *Stimmung* in Heidegger's thinking from the 1930s onwards.

[13] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 135.

[14] Søren Kierkegaard, *Enten–Eller*, in *Samlede verker*, vol. 2, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1994 (1843), pp. 74–5.

the profound coherence of being-in-the-world'.[15] Here, we do not find a clear distinction between *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit*, and in Heidegger it disappears not only in the writings after *Sein und Zeit*, but later on in this work, too. *Stimmung* becomes the one and only word, and it is only from context that the reader knows if it is used ontically or ontologically.

The reason why Heidegger takes notice of the phenomenon of *Stimmung* – which is normally held to be something indifferent, evasive or just disturbing for the mind – is that in his thinking *Stimmung* discloses the being-in-the-world as a whole and, as a consequence, renders the question of Being possible. Dasein is the being which asks questions about its own being, and therefore also may turn to the question of Being. This questioning is not merely intellectual, since it is determined by the specific disposition in which Dasein finds itself, and the different dispositions give different answers, some more fundamental than others. In *Sein und Zeit* the privileged disposition is anxiety (*Angst*). It is a 'fundamental disposition' (*Grund-befindlichkeit*), since it discloses the world as a world in a decisive way: there is *nothing* that threatens, there is *no* actual reason to get anxious, *nothing* means anything. No innerworldly object disturbs. All this makes anxiety different from fear (*Furcht*) because fear, as a feeling or emotion, is always directed towards an object. What holds for anxiety is also true for the other *Stimmungen*, but anxiety is more complete in its individualizing, distancing character.[16]

It is only possible to direct oneself towards something, towards the world, in a mood. This world is not to be equated with the totality of objects that can be found outside a subject; instead Heidegger says that the world is a 'referential totality' (*Verweisungsganzheit*), an open system of meaningful relations. The English translation of the term points at something concerning language, namely reference, but the fundamental relations Heidegger investigates are primarily those between tools, all those things Dasein uses in its everyday life. He wants to pursue his way back to a primordial relation to the world, and to see how it comes into presence in practical life. We can learn how to handle a useful thing like a tool as an expansion of our body, and that makes it not just an object, instead almost a part of ourselves. With this observation Heidegger wants to leave behind the customary way of understanding the structure of the world, and in fact his analysis leads to a radical break with the subject–object relation which had been decisive for the tradition of Western philosophy from modern times on.

Speaking about world, Heidegger could be expected to also elaborate his understanding of space. Space and spatiality are, however, not put into the foreground in *Sein und Zeit*. A reason for this is that the interpretation of Dasein is made in terms of temporality, since time is the transcendental horizon of the

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[15] Michel Haar, *Le Chant de la terre: Heidegger et les assises de l'histoire de l'être*, Paris: L'Herne 1985, p. 90 (trans. in Michel Haar, *The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being*, trans. Reginald Lilly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993, p. 40).

[16] Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 190–91.

question of Being. But this answer is not far-reaching enough: Heidegger finds that world, not space, is primordial. The world does not take place in space, as Descartes and with him scientific reasoning would have it; but space is founded in a world, a world that can be encountered in the order of things at hand. Dasein finds itself in a field of relations between different useful things; it is characterized by 'being-in' (Dasein as *In-sein*), and here spatiality is understood not as something abstract, but as having a character of 'de-distancing' and 'directionality'.[17] Through de-distancing, Dasein brings near the things at hand and thus deletes distance, and this bringing-near has taken a direction out into the region still to be discovered. The main principle has a formula: '*An essential tendency toward nearness lies in Dasein*.'[18] This way of relating to the world, on which space is founded, is a sheer contrast to space as something measured.

Heidegger's break with the conception of space as something measured has important implications for movement and space in music. It is a common presumption that musical movement and space are metaphors, even if they can be said to be 'metaphors we hear by' – to use Roger Scruton's phrase; that is, metaphors without which we would not hear the music as music.[19] They are indeed metaphorical in a context where space is defined as three-dimensional but, following Heidegger, this kind of space is a theoretical construct, secondary to the pre-theoretical world of Dasein. Later on, we will see how both notions can be related to the lived body (*Leib*), but, as Thomas Clifton has suggested in his musical phenomenology, it is possible to transpose the relational aspect of space to music: de-distancing and directionality answer to an orientation in the actual space into which the listener is thrown, where 'high' and 'low', 'far' and 'near', 'behind' and 'in front of' have a musical significance even if they cannot be given any exact position comparable to a point in physical space.[20] Heidegger's thinking – not only at this stage but later on, too – is never concerned with musical spatiality. Nevertheless, just as Clifton presumes, Heidegger's discussion on space can be enlightening if we want to understand musical spatiality.

The reason for this is that Dasein is always situated; with the hyphen Heidegger uses sometimes, Da-sein emphasizes that human existence is a being-*there*, thrown into a world. This might lead to the overhasty conclusion that disposition is primordial in relation to the world of Dasein, but Heidegger writes that the understanding of the world is equiprimordial with disposition. It is not the case that Dasein is first of all thrown into the world and then starts to understand, no more than Dasein begins to understand and then finds that it is thrown. The

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17 Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 104–5.

18 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 105 (trans. Stambaugh, op. cit., p. 98).

19 Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music*, p. 52. Scruton has changed the phrase 'metaphors we live by', taken from George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1980.

20 Cf. Thomas Clifton, *Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology*, New Haven: Yale University Press 1983, pp. 140–42.

understanding is already disposed (or attuned) and the disposition is already a part of the understanding. Understanding can be said to be an active relation to the world, whereas disposition is a passive relation. Understanding leads to Dasein's projecting of possibilities, and thereby Dasein has already started its interpretation of the world. This interpretation is made in discourse, a third central aspect of the being-in-the-world of Dasein. Here, one might conclude that discourse is something that comes before disposition and understanding, but Heidegger declares they are all equiprimordial.[21]

Granted that the act of musical listening opens up a world, Heidegger's interplay between disposition, understanding and discourse can be used to elucidate an approach to music, too. The musical world is opened up in a mood, and at the same time the listener has begun to understand what is at work in the music, with musical discourse put into play. Musical discourse is here not only to be understood as the rich terminology in the tradition of music (for Western music the different forms, the parameters, the harmonic systems, the motivic processes), but also as the ideas of and perspectives on music at any given moment in history (music as affects, expression, formal play). Still, even without our knowledge of these terms, musical discourse is active: discourse is not only words, but also the set of oppositions and differences brought into play in music.

Hitherto, all of Heidegger's investigations referred to are made in the first part of *Sein und Zeit*, which is set out to be the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein. In the second part of his work, the relation to temporality is investigated and assumed to be the primordial meaning of being of Dasein. Given the temporal character of music, there is reason to touch upon the relation between time and the moods. As we have already seen, understanding is an activity in Dasein, whereas disposition is passive. In terms of temporality, understanding is primarily founded in the future while disposition is founded in the past, mirroring activity and passivity respectively. Heidegger can observe the triviality that moods come and go, and that is certainly something ontic-psychological. But there is also the ontological structure of disposition in the existential-temporal constitution of moods: 'We solely want to show that moods are *not possible* in what they "signify" existentielly [*sic*] or how they "signify" it *except on the basis of temporality*.'[22] They cannot be conceived of without temporality.

When Dasein is in anxiety, the world has become totally insignificant, but at the same time one is brought back to the sheer, individualized thrownness. The peculiar temporality of anxiety therefore lies in the fact that it is grounded on having-been, and that it is out of this that the future and present temporalize themselves. Whereas the deficient fear is directed into the future in an inauthentic way, backing away from all possibilities and clinging nervously to that which is at hand, anxiety puts Dasein in a position where decisions can be made – or, to be more precise, where Dasein can choose to be authentic or inauthentic concerning

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21 Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 161.

22 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 341 (trans. Stambaugh, op. cit., p. 313).

the potentiality-of-being.[23] All moods have their foundations in the past. Even hope is grounded in the past, since even the elevating moods are possible only through the thrown ground of Dasein itself.[24] Heidegger does not exclude moods and dispositions other than anxiety, but at the same time he insists that these must be interpreted on the basis of the analytic of Dasein. Here, anxiety serves as model.

However, this should not overshadow the fact that Heidegger's conception of *Stimmung* (and, by inference, that of *Befindlichkeit*) is founded on its temporal character, and that it is an open question whether music has the capacity to be structured in the same way. Music unfolds in time. The act of listening follows this unfolding from the start, when the listener is thrown into the musical work and is, accordingly, disposed by its having-been. The advanced listener might know the most probable development of the piece; the average listener is less focused upon what will take place – nevertheless, understanding projects into the future. These two dimensions (Heidegger calls them *Ekstasen*, 'ecstasies') are founding the present, when the listener is busied with that which happens in the music. Temporality is, then, in *Sein und Zeit* understood as 'the future that makes present in the process of having-been' [*gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft*],[25] and this counts for the act of listening, too.[26] Accordingly, the elucidation of the temporal structure of the *Stimmung* may also be an elucidation of music.[27] When Heidegger turns to another *Stimmung*, boredom, it is in this direction that he moves.

*What Boredom Says (about Temporality and Susceptibility)*

In *Sein und Zeit*, disposition and mood have non-historical characters, even if historical change is implicit when Heidegger assumes that Dasein is thrown into a given world. A first step towards relativizing, yet not towards historicizing, *Stimmung* was made in the lecture 'Was ist Metaphysik?' in 1929. Here, Heidegger still focuses on anxiety, but he mentions the analytical possibilities in the positive mood of the love for someone and the negative mood boredom (*Langeweile*). Neither of these is actually used in his argumentation later in the lecture; they do not serve the purpose of being fundamental moods like anxiety, but both of them are viewed as moods that make manifest beings as a whole.[28] Things were

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[23] This is further discussed in *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA, vol. 24, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1997, 3rd ed., p. 407–8.

[24] Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 345.

[25] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 326 (trans. Stambaugh, op. cit., p. 300).

[26] Schleiser's understanding of music through *Sein und Zeit* is rewarding. Cf. Schleiser, op. cit., pp. 85–118.

[27] According to Federico Nicolaci, there is no doubt: music and Dasein share the same temporal structure; the 'original source' of Dasein resounds in the musical temporality. Nicolaci, op. cit., p. 25. I agree, but Nicolaci does not demonstrate this parallel.

[28] Martin Heidegger, 'Was ist Metaphysik?', in *Wegmarken*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1978 (1967), 2nd ed., pp. 103–21, p. 110.

about to change, though. That same year Heidegger held a lecture course entitled 'Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt–Endlichkeit–Einsamkeit',[29] including that which was to be his most extensive investigation of one specific mood, boredom. In the lectures, the concept *Stimmung* has a decisive role in the act of philosophizing, so there are reasons to dwell upon this course.

Central in the introductive section is that metaphysics, which is said to be the most important philosophical field, must be *experienced*, not studied as a discipline. The way to experience it is to be in the proper mood, and this is realized if one is gripped by the philosophical concepts (here Heidegger plays with the words *Begreifen*, *Begriff* and *Ergriffenheit* – 'understand', 'concept' and 'the state of being moved' – all in a close etymological relation to *greifen*, 'grasp with the hands'). To philosophize is to 'be gripped', and that happens in one or another fundamental mood, which always attunes man even if this is not perceived or understood. After the introduction, the task consists of awakening such a fundamental mood – it is not *the* fundamental mood of philosophy, but a specific one for the situation in which Heidegger and his students find themselves.

This is already an important change in comparison with *Sein und Zeit*, since there the only truly philosophical mood was anxiety, the only one that had a fundamental character thanks to its ability to bring about a distinctive disclosure of the world. The mood should be awoken, not forcibly brought out. This means that the fundamental mood is already present, even if it may be asleep. But the awakening is awkward. The mood should not be made conscious:

> If, however, we make a mood conscious, come to know of it and explicitly make the mood itself into an object of knowledge, we achieve the contrary of an awakening. The mood is thereby precisely destroyed, or at least not intensified, but weakened and altered.[30]

Then Heidegger starts to describe the *Stimmungen* negatively, describing what they are not. It would, he assumes, be false to say that a mood could be conscious when forced up from the unconscious, and no less wrong to say that, like a stone, a mood can either be present or not (as he claims is believed in psychology). When Heidegger has reached the end of his catalogue of negative analogies, he starts to say what moods are:

> A mood is a way, not merely a form or a mode, but a way [*Weise*] – in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-called proper being at hand

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[29] Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt–Endlichkeit–Einsamkeit*, GA, vols 29/30, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1992 (1983), 2nd ed. It is translated as *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1995. However, whereas they render *Stimmung* with 'attunement', I still keep to 'mood', changing it in the citations.

[30] Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 92–3 (trans. McNeill and Walker, op. cit., p. 61).

> of man, but that sets the tone for such being, i.e., attunes and determines the manner and way of his being.[31]

When he uses the word *Weise* in the double sense of 'way' (or 'manner') and 'melody', it may give the impression of being just a pun. But that is not the case. The mood is not to be found like something immediately at hand; rather it is to be felt, since it attunes the way of being. Heidegger's first negative thesis was that mood is not one of the beings, and now he says: 'In positive terms, mood is a fundamental manner [*Grundweise*], the *fundamental way in which Dasein is as Dasein*.'[32] Mood is not something merely subjective and ethereal; no, it gives subsistence to and makes possible the very foundation of Dasein.

How literally can we understand the musicality in Heidegger, here? Well, *eine Weise* is something like 'a good old tune'. But what, for instance, has 'Auld Lang Syne' (or better: the Swabian 'Am Necker, am Necker') to do with philosophic moods? Andrew Bowie has paid attention not to this formulation, but to an earlier one, from a lecture course held in 1925–26 on logic. Here, too, Heidegger speaks about *Weisen* of being, and Bowie suggests that 'all relate to what we associate with the function or the significance of "the musical"',[33] and he continues by apostrophizing Besseler's use of Heidegger's early philosophy in his lecture 'Grundprobleme des musikalischen Hörens'. Bowie supposes that Besseler uses the double sense of *Weise*, too, when the German musicologist says that there can only be music if it is completed (*vollzogen*) as a *Weise* of Dasein. I am not sure that we do find a play on words in Besseler, but I am directly sceptical about an occurrence in Heidegger at the same time (there are no references to music at this stage in his thinking).[34] With the lectures on boredom we clearly have a case of double meaning, however, and Bowie's conclusion is full of insight: Besseler's musical idea that the listener must carry through what is heard, transposed to the way of being, is at odds with the closed and stable system of 'existentials' in *Sein und Zeit*. This 'musical' insight can be found in Heidegger's lecture course from 1929 to 1930. From this time on, he begins to turn away from the fundamental ontology.

After this central discussion on mood, Heidegger sets out to find the fundamental mood that pervades his own time.[35] That mood is boredom, according to Heidegger, and he confronts other recent speculations (by Oswald Spengler,

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[31] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 101 (trans. McNeill and Walker, op. cit., p. 67).

[32] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 101 (trans. McNeill and Walker, op. cit., p. 67).

[33] Bowie, op. cit., p. 291.

[34] Heidegger held his lectures in Marburg in the winter of 1925–26 (winter semester, usually from 1 October to 31 March), with the formulation on *Weise* appearing in the middle of the course, whereas Besseler held his *Habilitationsvertrag* in Freiburg on 3 November 1925. We can therefore exclude that precisely this formulation influenced Besseler.

[35] According to Romano Pocai, this is the moment when Heidegger enters the field of politics, leading to his National Socialistic enrolment. Cf. Romano Pocai, *Heideggers*

Ludwig Klages, Max Scheler and Leopold Ziegler). Even if his choice is not essential for the proceedings of the present work, the discussion about time and boredom is of the greatest importance, not only due to the temporal aspects that unite music with mood, but also because of Heidegger's intriguing differentiation between three temporalities of boredom and their varying depth. Finally, through these investigations, Heidegger shows the appropriate way to deal with the mood without distorting it.

How is the *Stimmung* to be approached? From the start Heidegger dismisses the three usual ways of understanding or explaining a mood: in terms of cause and effect; situating it in the interiority of the soul; or understanding it as a metaphor. Instead he answers: 'determining our mood is here to be grasped as something attuning us in such and such a way, and this *being attuned* is to be grasped as the *fundamental nature of our Dasein*'.[36] It is already clear that the objectivation and even the excitation of the mood to be investigated destroy it. It should not be made into an object of our minds. Bracketing theories of consciousness to be found in psychology or the stream of lived experience in Husserl, Heidegger asks for the releasement (*Gelassenheit*) of the everyday perspective.[37]

The first kind of boredom to attract Heidegger's attention is being bored *by* something (*gelangweilt werden von …*). The situation Heidegger uses as an example is a man waiting at a railway station with four hours until the next train, trying to get time to move more quickly through passing the time, a *Zeitvertreib*. The very idea of 'passing the time' is central because it tells us that boredom has to do with time. Two elements are furthermore decisive in Heidegger's investigation, namely the state of being held in limbo (*Hingehaltenheit*) and of being left empty (*Leergelassensein*). The man at the station, waiting for the train, feels that time drags and that he is held in limbo. The station, which is a building where trains stop and pass by, cannot be what it is meant to be as there are so many hours to spend there before the train arrives. But the station is there, even if the train does not come, so it is the dragging of time that is central: 'It forces it to leave us empty. The station refuses *itself*, because time refuses *it* something.'[38]

The second version, a deeper one, is becoming bored *with* something (*sich langweilen bei etwas*). Here the scene is a party where nothing seems to be boring, since parties are for fun. Only afterwards it is obvious that everything has been a bore. There had been no need for distraction or passing the time because the whole party was a distraction. Unlike the station scene, where emptiness stays unfilled, emptiness instead emerges in the party scene. Time is not dragging; it is a time brought to a standstill.[39]

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*Theorie der Befindlichkeit: Sein Denken zwischen 1927 und 1933*, Freiburg and Munich: Alber 1996, esp. pp. 289–93.

[36] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 134 (trans. McNeill and Walker, op. cit., p. 89).

[37] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 137.

[38] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 158 (trans. McNeill and Walker, op. cit., p. 105).

[39] Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 191.

The third, last and deepest form of boredom is said to be unrelated to any specific situation, and it is described as when it is boring 'for one' (*wenn es einem langweilig ist*). Heidegger nevertheless illustrates this kind of boredom with an example: a stroll through a big city on a Sunday afternoon (and we must be aware of the fact that at that time Sundays meant that all shops were closed and the streets were empty). Here, passing the time is impossible. It is a quite peculiar boredom: it says how things stand concerning us. The beings have become totally indifferent as a whole, and those who are in this situation have also become indifferent to themselves, being one of the beings of this whole. Regarding the character of time, it is time beyond flowing and standing, time that as a horizon entrances Dasein.[40] It is very complex. But Heidegger knows that the phenomenon which it is so hard to formulate with precision is in itself something truly simple. It is a mood, something we could experience walking through the streets in a city of Germany in the 1920s, or today perhaps when we are in our own big home town in the summer and everybody, except the tourists visiting the sights, has gone on holiday. Until this point, there is nothing exclusive in this mood; it is something ordinary – yet extraordinary. What certainly is not ordinary is the position in which this mood puts us:

> It is boring for one. In this, the time that entrances as a whole announces and tells of itself as that which is to be ruptured and can be ruptured solely in the *moment of vision* [*Augenblick*] in which time itself, as that which properly makes Dasein possible in its actions, is at work. Thus we see, albeit only roughly, that on the basis of this entrancement of the temporal horizon as such and of the moment of vision that is also announced in this telling refusal, precisely this *unity* of *being left empty* and *being held in limbo* in the third form of boredom is *determined* through and through by the *essence of time*.[41]

The moment, *der Augenblick*, as something decisive, with an immense impact on the one who experiences it, is a concept with a long prehistory stretching from the ancient Greek philosophers, through Augustine and Luther, and onwards to Kierkegaard and the Romantics.[42] In Heidegger's case, the decisiveness makes him decisionistic.[43] It is one of many examples of Heidegger going to extremes in order to reach a convenient perspective on the being of man. The utmost negativity turns out to be changed into the true state of activity. In Adorno, too, the moment

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[40] Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 221–2.

[41] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 224 (trans. McNeill and Walker, op. cit., pp. 149–50).

[42] Cf. Koral Ward, Augenblick: *The Concept of the 'Decisive Moment' in 19th- and 20th-Century Western Philosophy*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2008. Hans Ruin discusses the concept in the chapter 'The Time of Historicity: *Augenblick*' of his doctoral dissertation *Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity through Heidegger's Works*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International 1994, pp. 176–209.

[43] Cf. Pocai's judgement on Heidegger in op. cit., pp. 289–93.

is an important theme, but now also situated in a musical context as *Durchbruch* (breakthrough), where all conditions are changed in one blow. This is a parallel to be elaborated later in a discussion of the temporal boundaries of attunement; here it is enough to indicate the musical possibilities inherent in a discourse of the moment, even if Heidegger leaves them without recognizing them.

For our concerns right now we can sum up Heidegger's investigation as follows. In a *Stimmung* such as *Langeweile*, Dasein is *gestimmt* in a particular way. The temporality of Dasein is changed, not in boredom in general but in the ways in which it is tuned by the specific boredom, dependent on how deep the mood is. In boredom, time can be dragging but can also be brought to a standstill, and can even manifest itself as an entrancing horizon beyond any movement or standstill. There is a threefold variety of temporality which gives Dasein different tempos. Also, the world is changed, the disclosure of the world. And even if Heidegger's interpretation is complex, sometimes hard to follow, the phenomenon itself, the *Stimmung*, is simple. It is still a mood, something ordinary, but taken into the conception of Dasein we are able to see it not as a psychological state or some object for our thoughts, but as something richer, more perplexing, more telling. All this richness is, though, hard to fathom in an investigation because you do not *have* a mood, you *are in* a mood. What is needed is a free, everyday perspective, not any elaborated theory of mind. I would, therefore, suggest that if we want to approach *Stimmung* in music, we should try to find an everyday way of listening to music.

## *The Work of* Stimmung

Until his readings of Hölderlin, there is hardly a word on *Stimmung* and the arts in Heidegger's writings and lectures – no specific artwork had been expounded.[44] Confronting Nietzsche in five lecture courses between 1936 and 1940, and in a number of treatises between 1940 and 1946, the aesthetics of Nietzsche and his thinking in the field of arts were focused on in the first part of what was to be published as *Nietzsche I–II* in 1965. Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin was parallel, with lectures starting in 1934 and ending in 1942. Something had happened to Heidegger's thinking. In 1934 he could say that a poem by Hölderlin reveals Being.[45] This relation to the poem was no doubt a way of thinking; the relation was *denkerisch*. There is never any ordinary aesthetical appreciation in Heidegger's words on poetry – not here, not anywhere – because he leaves aesthetics behind.

*Stimmung* is still central, despite this change. One may even claim that the word becomes more important. Thought always has to be attuned, Heidegger says; if not, it will be out of tune, and therefore something false. There have been

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[44] There is, however, a passage in *Sein und Zeit* on 'poetic speech'. Here it is said to be possible to perceive the mood in the intonation, modulation and tempo of the speaker, and that what might be heard is the disclosing of existence. Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 162.

[45] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'*, GA, vol. 39, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1999, 3rd ed., p. 6.

disputes concerning the status of these attunements and their relation to Dasein (and therefore to that which we outside Heidegger call the life of man). The word has been taken far away from the lifeworld of Dasein, so far that Heidegger at times does not speak about our way of existing, but a call from Being that only a few can recognize. This is also the moment when 'mood' starts to become inappropriate as a translation of *Stimmung*, whereas it at least partially covered the meaning in the earlier stages. Therefore, I will start to use 'attunement' in my discussions.

Heidegger's distancing of thought from psychology and science ought to make Nietzsche's sometimes crudely physiological aesthetics impossible to convert to his own thinking. It does not take long before the strife begins in the lectures. Heidegger starts to elaborate Nietzsche's words in what was published as *Wille zur Macht* (a book used as a reference by Heidegger, even though he knew this compilation was deceptive): 'My theory would be that *will to power* is the primitive form of affect, that all other affects are but its configurations.'[46] Heidegger takes the by now well-known path, claiming that both psychology and physiology are inapt for Nietzsche's questioning. No, it is more fundamental; it has to do with man's being *there*. Heidegger then discusses the difference between affect and passion (*Affekt* and *Leidenschaft*), but he discards them as he concludes that there may be an original and essential connection between them, a connection which can be understood only through a better understanding of the essence of feeling: 'Willing is feeling (state of attunement [*Gestimmtheit*])'.[47]

*Gefühl* is not *Stimmung*; feeling is not mood or attunement. Nevertheless, Heidegger will use his own thinking on *Stimmung* when trying to understand what Nietzsche means with *Gefühl* and also in what way *Rausch* (rapture) is considered to be the primary aesthetic condition. Why rapture? Because in his late fragments on the physiology of the art Nietzsche conceives of rapture as the principal aesthetic state. Yet Nietzsche seems to be far away from Heidegger's notion of attunement when he makes the proposition that aesthetics is applied physiology. Nietzsche's view could be said to be materialistic, and it surely is. It could also, like Heidegger slyly suggests, be characterized as nihilistic, but then, as he says, by someone who does not understand Nietzsche. In his late notes on aesthetics, Nietzsche writes that art is a distinctive countermovement to nihilism. This reaction against nihilism is founded on the lived body; when art fails, then the lived body is impoverished.

When Nietzsche wrote down his reflections, he had something extraordinary in mind, and Heidegger stresses the amplification of the sphere of the lived body. We should not separate physiology from psychology, Heidegger says through Nietzsche (or it might be Nietzsche who speaks through Heidegger): feeling is not just something emotional standing free from the body, it is feeling oneself where

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[46] Friedrich Nietzsche cited by Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. 1, Stuttgart: Neske 1998, 6th ed. (1961), p. 39 (trans. in Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vols 1–2, trans. David Farrell Krell, New York: HarperCollins 1991 [1979/84], p. 42).

[47] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 50 (trans. Krell, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 52).

the body is included in that self. At this precise point, Heidegger takes the German word *Leib* into account, meaning the lived body and not only the body as something physiological, and this is in some ways quite opposed to his earlier thinking:[48] 'Every feeling is an embodiment attuned in this or that way, an attunement that embodies in this or that way.'[49] A transposition has taken place in the reversal of words. Feeling is transposed into an embodying attunement, and Heidegger can go on heading towards Dasein's relation to beings as a whole. Rapture is an embodying attunement, but it is not at hand in the body or in the psyche: instead it is 'a mode [*Weise*] of the embodying, attuned stance toward beings as a whole, a stance which for its part determines the pitch of the attunement'.[50] Again, we find *Weise*, but here music as art must be said to be far away, since Heidegger in the same context has used Nietzsche's criticism of Wagner as a starting point for a dismissal of the notion of music as the first among the arts.[51]

In the next step, Heidegger corrects not only Nietzsche's idea of rapture but also Kant's aesthetics, which is said to be held back by an adherence to the concept of subjectivity.[52] However, the description of rapture as an attunement is part of an investigation of the *Grundstimmung* in Nietzsche. Aesthetics is traditionally concerned with beauty, and in bringing Kant into play Heidegger suggests that beauty is what attunes rapture. Hereby, Heidegger is in a position where he can conclude that both subjectivity and objectivity are annihilated in this state. By having a feeling for beauty, the subject goes beyond subjectivity; beauty is no object, since it attunes man through and through. The two basic words of Nietzsche's aesthetics, rapture and beauty, are something other than expected: they 'designate with an identical breadth the entire aesthetic state, what is opened up in it and what pervades it'.[53]

Again, Heidegger points at a position between subject and object, between subjectivity and objectivity. Later on in this chapter I shall ask what that is which is opened up in this state, but before then we should ask ourselves what Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche has brought about. Perhaps it tells us more about Heidegger than about Nietzsche, because Nietzsche forces Heidegger to relate to

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[48] *Leib* was an important element in Heidegger in the Aristotle lectures *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Physik*, but it changed with *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (GA, vol. 20, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1979), a lecture course held in 1925 which was a part of the preparations leading to *Sein und Zeit*. Here it is said that reality cannot be understood with *Leibhaftigkeit* as point of departure (cf. p. 300).

[49] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 100 (trans. Krell, op. cit., p. 100). Krell translates with 'mood' instead of 'attunement'.

[50] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 106 (trans. Krell, pp. 105–6).

[51] Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 85. See also Martin Heidegger: *Überlegungen VII–XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938–1939)*, GA, vol. 95, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2014, pp. 132–3, 136 and 149–50 (in the last passage, Nietzsche is criticized, too).

[52] Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 123–4.

[53] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 124 (trans. Krell, op. cit., p. 123).

a field that he normally leaves aside or brackets: the lived body. The lived body is attuned, and Heidegger underscores the tuning element, turning away from Wagner's excessive sentimentality to a restrained rapture. Therefore, we do not have to take his words on music as anything more than a stern criticism of Wagner (at least, his judgement is pertinent to Wagner alone). We have found yet another opening to music: the lived body being attuned.

Hölderlin is mentioned in this context, namely when Heidegger notes that the rapture in the later Nietzsche was preceded by two states in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, the Dionysian and the Apollonian. Although Nietzsche probably was not aware of it, Hölderlin had in the first of his now famous 'Böhlendorff letters' discussed the relation between the ancient Greek 'holy pathos' and the 'Junonian sobriety' of Western civilisation. This opposition, so Heidegger says, has to do with the fate of the Germans – and if this is not properly understood, 'history will wreak vengeance on us'.[54] The year is 1936 and Heidegger has begun his confrontation with the National Socialist movement after his involvement in it as rector for the University of Freiburg, a decision which he had described in terms of being in tune with the nationalistic revolution of 1933[55] – a fact that shows the vulnerability of a politics founded on *Stimmung*. Clearly, questions on *Stimmung* have to do with much more than enjoying reading a poem. As a matter of fact, in another lecture from the same period, Heidegger relates *Stimmung* with *Bestimmung* – attunement with determination or destiny. Art, great art, has to do with this: 'A great work is only possible from the fundamental mood, ultimately from the fundamental mood of a *Volk*. Great art too is only possible, if it arises from a fundamental mood.'[56]

So what really does take place when Heidegger reads? There is no better example of Heidegger as a receiver of the tuning-in of a poem than his reading of Hölderlin's hymn 'Germanien'. It is his first vast elaboration of Hölderlin's poetry, and also the one that introduces *Stimmung* in the field of the arts. In a way, Hölderlin changes Heidegger's thinking: it seems to be his reading of Hölderlin that changes his style to a much more poetic one. It is also through Hölderlin that Heidegger finds hints of a new, second beginning for philosophy (with the first beginning in the ancient Greek); and, finally, most interesting to us, it is also through Hölderlin

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[54] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 105 (trans. Krell, op. cit., p. 104).

[55] After having been installed as rector, Heidegger writes the following in the 'Black Notebooks': 'Finally: put into the creative co-responsibility of Dasein's *völkisch* truth. Fundamental mood.' Martin Heidegger, *Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*, GA, vol. 94, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2014, p. 112. The collective responsibility eradicates the personal responsibility in a highly dissatisfying way.

[56] Martin Heidegger, *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, GA, vol. 38, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1998, p. 130 (trans. in Martin Heidegger, *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*, trans. Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna, Albany: State University of New York Press 2009, p. 108).

that Heidegger widens the spectrum of *Stimmungen*.[57] Heidegger describes *how to read*, in particular the extraordinary hymns by Hölderlin. He starts with something new in his textual approach, where the creative moment is decisive for the way to read. It has to do with what the poem says (*das Sagen*), which is certainly much more than any content:

> The oscillating framework of the saying is the first creative oscillation, with a mere presentiment of language; it is the origin which already oscillates before any phrasing, not only concerning the word distribution and position, but also the choice of words. The oscillating framework of the saying, however, is from the outset tuned [*bestimmt*] by the poem's fundamental attunement, which procures the shape of the inner design of the whole. The fundamental attunement, though, is awoken from the particular poem's particular metaphysical place.[58]

The reader is supposed to situate him- or herself within the poem's sphere of influence (*Machtbereich der Dichtung*).[59] This act seems to be totally submissive, but Heidegger uses a more martial description: one has to fight oneself, discard any abstract meaning and preserve the sounding and oscillating framework of the words. Therefore one cannot speak about any conventional hermeneutics, but something closer to an obedient reliance on an *Urtext*. Heidegger seems to imply a kind of intimate say-along or even sing-along, but what has been said or sung by the poet cannot be wholly reiterated.

What is 'the saying'? It can be the act of writing poetry that both shows and reveals.[60] Slowly we are getting closer to the very high order of the poem: 'Poetry is institution; obtaining foundation of that which endures. The poet is the founder of Being.'[61] That is an astonishing assumption. The poets, the artists, do not only have an impact on their society (we are far from any notion of art as subject for disinterested pleasure). They do not only give voice to a nation. They are founders of Being (now called *Seyn*, a spelling commented on in next section, on the history of Being), but at the same time Being speaks to the poet and *Stimmung* as *Grundstimmung* is of greatest importance in this exchange. Heidegger says that it is necessary to consider 'that the voice of the saying must be attuned, that the poet speaks from an attunement, which attunement determines [*bestimmt*] the

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[57] Giampiero Moretti discusses the relation between Heidegger and Hölderlin concerning language and the history of Being (including aspects of *Stimmung*) with sensitivity in *Il poeta ferito: Hölderlin, Heidegger e la storia dell'essere*, Imola: Mandragora 1999. Cf. also Mattéi's *Heidegger et Hölderlin* and Wilhelm-Friedrich von Herrmann's *Die zarte aber helle Differenz: Heidegger und Stefan George*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1999.

[58] Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymnen*, p. 15.

[59] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 19.

[60] Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 30.

[61] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 33.

fundament and ground, and attunes the space through and through, on which and in which the poetic saying institutes a being'.[62]

This *Grundstimmung* 'discloses the world, which in the poetic saying receives the impress of Being'.[63] A musical expression is close at hand: it is a world-disclosive antiphon between Dasein and *Seyn*. But the attunement of the poem stems from the past. There is nothing outside time. We have come to an important point where temporality is touched upon:

> That which has been is still swaying, that which we in a way are ourselves, in that we, in bringing it in front of us, in preserving and carrying it ahead of us or even rejecting or trying to forget it, let it stand into our Da-sein.[64]

This temporalizing, which brings the past into the future in a primordial time, is said to be attunement's fundamental happening that grounds the poem.[65] And here we have *Stimmung* within the history of Being – the disclosure of the truth happens to a people in history, but not at once, only after the awakening of the fundamental attunement. But what has been opened up through the disclosure? Heidegger has already pointed out that the reader of Hölderlin does not only meet gods. There is a dealing with a world, too. This manifestation of a world is closely related to a fundamental attunement: 'The fundamental attunement determines [*bestimmt*] the place and the time of our Dasein in its being.'[66]

The opening up of a world in a poem where a fundamental attunement tunes could be expected when Heidegger deals with poetry (assumed to be the privileged art) in 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes'. In this central piece of his writings on the arts, Heidegger decisively turns his back on conventional aesthetics founded on perception, the subject–object relation and the form–matter structure. He even says that aesthetics in itself is something obsolete. It was published for the first time in 1950, but its origin was a lecture held in November 1935, hence in close vicinity to the Hölderlin exegesis. Surprisingly, the attunement of and in the poem, so central less than one year ago, is now not even touched upon. There is indeed a weighty discussion on the world of the poem or work of art, but it seems as if this world has nothing to do with any fundamental attunement. No, the main theme of the essay is the question of truth, and one of the ways in which truth is established is when it is 'put into work' (*ins Werk gesetzt*) in the work of art. We find even more obstacles for our investigation: even if Heidegger's discussion is said to be relevant for all the arts, music plays a diminutive role. Yet, in this treatise we find keys to the understanding of *Stimmung* in music. One of these keys is to be found

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62 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 79.
63 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 80.
64 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 108.
65 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 109.
66 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 141.

in the strife between world and earth in which the truth is said to happen in the work of art.

What Heidegger means by 'world' changes over time. In *Sein und Zeit* 'world' meant the referential totality of first of all tools. In the treatise on the work of art 'world' still has to do with a horizon of meaning or of meaningful relations, but now the aspects of everyday practicalities are set aside and the notion of a cultural configuration is put forth.[67] The easiest way to understand what 'world' means in this context is to listen to what Heidegger has to say about an ancient Greek temple standing in a valley enclosing a statue of a god. It is not just a building, since it makes the god present: it conceals the god within its walls, but opens itself up through the portico. The temple gathers the possibilities of the Greek people who live around it – governing their ideas of birth and death, managing victory and causing decline.[68]

The temple is built on rocky ground, Heidegger says, standing firm when a storm is raging and when the sun shines, hence making the violence of the storm manifest just as the invisible air is made visible. The world of the work of art brings forth the earth (*Erde*). In the case of architecture, the earth is the stone and the ground, but every art has an earth of its own: 'The rock comes to bear and to rest and so first becomes rock; the metal comes to glitter and shimmer, the colors to shine, the sounds to ring [*Klang des Tones*], the word to speak.'[69] The work, the world and the earth are intertwined: 'The work moves the earth into the open of a world and holds it there.'[70] Here, Heidegger indicates a conflict between world and earth: the world has a tendency to give meaning to the earth bringing it into the open, and the earth has a tendency to draw the world into itself and its concealment. It is, however, difficult to capture the last keyword, *Erde*. In my very schematic account, there is already an oscillation between earth as silent stones of the temple, the ground upon which the temple is built, and the neighbourhood of the temple. Earth is where the people who gather in the temple live, their *Heimat*. It is both part of history (being a neighbourhood) and resistant to the historical change of worlds, even transgressing epochs.[71]

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[67] Michel Haar has pointed out how Heidegger has enlarged the definition, going from the equipmental level to moral and political choices, offered in an epoch of history. Cf. Haar, op. cit., p. 123.

[68] Cf. Martin Heidegger, 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', in *Holzwege*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1994 (1950), 7th ed., pp. 1–74, cit. pp. 27–8.

[69] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 32 (trans. in Martin Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, p. 24).

[70] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 32 (trans. Young and Haynes, op. cit., p. 24).

[71] Haar writes that unlike the changing worlds (and epochs), earth is characterized by a trans-epochal determination. Haar, op. cit., p. 128. In Heidegger's text, the worlds come and go, but earth is not mentioned when historical change is discussed.

Thus, 'world' seems to be much more stable as a word indicating the horizon of meaning – but there is ambiguity here, too. The notion of the world of poetry bringing the word to speak has an obvious bearing on questions of meaning. Heidegger, though, used the temple as his first exemplification, and this because of its non-referential status. A temple does not portray anything. Concentrating on the aspects of the whole of meaning, or the horizon of meaning, many commentators neglect the appearance of the temple, a materiality that cannot be equated with the earth but has to do with the appearance of the work. When the temple work is towering up, it opens up a world in the sense of a relational context – but also a world to walk around in. These two aspects are not separable, since the space inside the building is the meaning of the temple. Suddenly, we have an unexpected opening into music: a pillar portrays nothing, neither does a chord; yet, the stone is in the building and the tone in the musical work. The tone-work sets up a world, just as a temple work does.

Heidegger does not say how the musical world 'worlds' (*Welt weltet*), but since he speaks of the work of art in general, we may find something that counts for music, too. Music cannot be separated from the world described when Heidegger spoke about the Greek temple: we can assume that there were musicians, too, playing inside or outside the temple, taking part in the religious rites and the everyday world. Every musical work has its origin in a world with an existing performance culture for which music was composed: an eighteenth-century court in a small German state; the nineteenth-century concert halls in Vienna; twentieth-century media like the radio; or the twenty-first-century medium of the internet. Music was thought to depict the affects and then to give expression to the innermost feelings, but it has also been held to be nothing but a glass bead game.

All of this has to do with the world as an epoch, but this world is intimately intertwined with the original thrust brought by the work, the setting-into-truth of art. Musically reading the following central sentence in Heidegger's treatise, we might come closer to the understanding of the world of the musical work of art: 'By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their distance and proximity, their breadth and their limits.'[72] The opening of the world establishes the meaningful relations between slow and fast, between width and narrowness; the opening of a musical world establishes a specific mobility and spatiality. If we recall that Heidegger says that the fundamental attunement governs the time (and place) of Dasein, we can include temporality, too. Thus, just as the temple brings forth its stone and rests on the ground, the work of music brings forth its tones, or rather sounds, and fills the air with its vibrations. All of a sudden, we have four hints of how the world worlds in the musical work of art: it has its temporality, spatiality and mobility, bringing forth its materiality.

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[72] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 31 (trans. Young and Haynes, op. cit., p. 23).

*Stimmung in the History of Being* (Seinsgeschichte)

With the Hölderlin lectures, the point is definitely reached where *die Kehre*, the famous 'turn' in Heidegger's thinking, has taken place.[73] Obviously, *Stimmung* has not at all lost its central role within Heidegger's thought; when he starts to develop his idea of a history of Being, it becomes even more important than before.[74] Now, he writes that 'as the "tune" [*Stimme*] of Being [*des Seyns*] attunement tunes the en-owned (what is attuned to grounding the truth of Being [*des Seyns*]) into a fundamental attunement.'[75] It can be said that the concept has not been systemized in a new way since *Sein und Zeit*; what has changed is only the approach to the question of Being.[76] But there is an undisputable change, too: *Stimmung* has become multilayered in two different ways. Firstly, as we shall see, the duality of *Stimmung* and *Grundstimmung* becomes fourfold. Secondly, the different kinds of *Stimmungen* turn out to be composed, partly due to the new differentiation just mentioned. This is not the place to discuss Heidegger's notion of 'the history of Being' in any depth – the intriguing but cumbersome idea that Being is given (or indeed refused) in different ways in history, and therefore that truth is changed through the ages; but something on the matter will be hinted at in the following discussion about the multilayered *Stimmung* in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, in the less esoteric elaborations in the lecture 'Was ist das – die Philosophie' and in the lecture course *Grundfragen der Philosophie*.

The first thing to point out: that which in *Sein und Zeit* was described as a relation of Dasein to Being is here a relation between *thinking* and Being (a change which is indicated with the new, archaic spelling, *Seyn*).[77] Being has been given in different fundamental attunements through history, and if that attunement is

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[73] Heidegger speaks of the turn in three different ways: 1) The turn refers to the new turning of *Sein und Zeit*, in the never completed third part. 2) It refers to the turning away from the fundamental ontology to the history of Being with the essay 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit' (1930) as an important step. 3) There is a turn within Being itself, a turn which influences all later writing of Heidegger. Cf. Sven-Olov Wallenstein, 'Heidegger's Turns', in *Essays, Lectures*, Stockholm: Axl 2007, pp. 73–4.

[74] Cf. Hans-Helmuth Gander, 'Grund- und Leitstimmungen in Heideggers "Beiträge zur Philosophie"', *Heidegger Studies*, vol. 10 (1994), pp. 15–31, p. 22.

[75] Martin Heidegger, *Besinnung*, GA, vol. 66, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1997, p. 320 (trans. in Martin Heidegger, *Mindfulness*, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary, London and New York: Continuum 2006, p. 284). Translation revised.

[76] In *Das Ereignis*, Heidegger comments on *Stimmung* in *Sein und Zeit* in a way that emphasizes continuity, not breaks. Martin Heidegger, *Das Ereignis*, GA, vol. 71, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2009, p. 218. Cf. also Coriando, op. cit., p. 146.

[77] When discussing *Beiträge*, I am following the translation *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999. Emad and Maly use a hyphen to mark the difference between *Sein* ('being') and *Seyn* ('be-ing') but, like earlier instances in my work, I employ 'Being' together with the word *Seyn* in brackets.

lacking in thinking, it is not what it ought to be (it is nothing but 'a forced rattling of concepts and empty words').[78] After the turn, Heidegger starts to say that the whole thinking has come to a new, second beginning. This beginning is different in comparison with the first beginning, among the Greek philosophers, but still maintains a relation to it. By now the fundamental attunement has changed, but Heidegger hesitates to give it a name, so it has different names: *Erschrecken*, *Verhaltenheit*, *Scheu*, *Ahnung*, *Er-ahnen* (startled dismay, reservedness, deep awe, intimating, deep foreboding).[79]

From this we may conclude that the character of the *Stimmungen* has changed from moods that exist in everyday life (or can be recognized by most people) to something that seems to be quite foreign to affectivity. We must be aware that these attunements are so closely bound to a new mode of thinking that at times they might be foreign not only to recognizable moods, but also to what has hitherto been called *Stimmungen*.

The second thing to point out is the architectonics of the work. *Beiträge der Philosophie* is built in eight parts, but six of these are said to be written in a *Fuge* – not primarily in the musical meaning of a fugue but in the architectural meaning of a joint. However, one should not forget that Heidegger often lets multiple meanings of a word remain in play.[80] Most of these fundamental attunements have a specific guiding attunement (*Leitstimmung*) as their tuning element, and all of them can be subsumed under the fundamental attunement of reservedness (*Verhaltenheit*).[81] The whole conception of the work is said to be founded on attunements, and even though not all of them have a clearly specified guiding attunement, these are specified for the majority. Still, a reader cannot easily recognize their impact on thinking – in contrast to the elaboration of boredom in *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. Attunement is part of a quite esoteric thinking, and its relevance to things beyond that quietism seems to be unclear.

But is that really the case? In her study *Affektenlehre und Phänomenologie der Stimmungen*, Paola-Ludovika Coriando elucidates what she calls a threefold dislocation of the gaze following the treatment of *Stimmung* in *Sein und Zeit*.[82] Firstly, reservedness takes the lead position as the *Grundstimmung* in place of anxiety. Secondly, instead of the *possibility* of an *ethos* of authenticity of anxiety

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[78] Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, p. 21 (trans. Emad and Maly, op. cit., pp. 15–16). Emad and Maly translate *Grundstimmung* with 'grounding-attunement', which I refer to as 'fundamental attunement'. The hyphen is also deleted here as in the translators' 'guiding-attunement' for *Leitstimmung*.

[79] Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 21–2.

[80] *Fuge* meaning 'joint' is a Germanic word, not to be confused with the *Fuge* in the sense of the musical form fugue, a word with Latin roots (*fuga*, 'flight'). But, as Michael Inwood has commented, this latter sense 'cannot invariably be excluded from Heidegger's use'. Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, Oxford: Blackwell 1999, p. 205.

[81] Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 395–6 (trans. Emad and Maly, op. cit., p. 277).

[82] Coriando, op. cit., pp. 147–8.

in *Sein und Zeit*, reservedness already is an *ethos*. Thirdly, while the interpretation of anxiety had to do with Dasein in general, reservedness concerns only the few with insight. Reservedness is part of an interim between the first beginning and the second one, the forthcoming non-metaphysical era. This notion of an interim is taken from Hölderlin, who spoke about a withdrawal of the gods, their absence and then their second coming. Hölderlin was part of an era where the gods had flown, and to Heidegger this is also true for his own time. In Hölderlin, Heidegger finds the fundamental attunement of sacred grief (*heilige Trauer*) when, at the beginning of 'Germanien', the poet laments that it is impossible to call on the old gods. But the absence of gods brings a new relation to them. Such grief will not become petrified in despair, but will stay open.[83]

In the same way as the gods in Hölderlin's poem have flown, there are only traces of the early Greek thinking left. Just as in the future there will be a return of the gods, or the second coming of the one and only God, thinking will have another beginning. Specific attunements are to be heard of in this interim, both in thinking and poetry, and the period has sacred grief as a fundamental attunement for poetry and reservedness for thinking. But these attunements are neither solid nor entirely homogenous: 'in the essence of the fundamental attunement, in accordance with its inwardness, the counter-attunement is to be found enclosed'.[84] Heidegger finds an illustrative example in an epigram by Hölderlin, where the poet bespeaks the joy speaking out from a state of grief.[85] In the same way, reservedness includes other attunements, and in *Beiträge zur Philosophie* the most important of these are the guiding attunements. As the different guiding attunements are important in the different joints in *Beiträge*, it can be said that they are representative of the different steps of the history of Being, even if they are not to be identified as lower or higher states of development.[86]

It is clear that the scarcity of attunements and moods in the earlier Heidegger has now been replaced with an abundance. Not only has the dichotomy of *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit* been replaced by a set where the prefixes *Grund-*, *Gegen-* and *Leit-* specify which sort of *Stimmung*, there is also a richness in names and kinds. In one and the same fundamental attunement, one can find counter-attunements and guiding attunements. The fundamental attunement is not monolithic, but can be described as composed with a kind of counterpoint, where different voices are to the fore at different times. Sacred grief would not be a fundamental attunement without the counter-attunement joy, which sometimes reaches the surface and is easily recognized.

This abundance becomes even richer in the late lecture 'Was ist das – die Philosophie', where Heidegger discusses three different fundamental attunements,

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[83] Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymnen*, p. 87.

[84] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 148.

[85] 'Viele versuchten umsonst, das Freudigste freudig zu sagen, / Hier spricht endlich es mir, hier in der Trauer sich aus.' Hölderlin cited by Heidegger in op. cit., p. 118.

[86] Cf. Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, p. 6.

decisive for their different eras: astonishment in ancient Greece, doubt and certainty in the modern times (here Descartes is of great importance) and for his own time 'fear and anxiety' mingled with 'hope and confidence'. Attunement is the tuning-in of the voice of Being (*Stimme des Seyns*), and even if it is outside language, it demands to speak out. Therefore, we have a fundamental attunement which is decisive for the words, and if there is consistency in Heidegger's thinking one might think of other ways to respond or to give resonance to what Being (*Seyn*) says, or even attunes to, still being attuned to that fundamental attunement.

The threefold differentiation between the fundamental attunements characteristic for the three eras indicates that all of them are still within reach, even today. They may not be awake, but they can be awoken. It has already been clarified that a mood or an attunement, according to Heidegger, cannot be made into an object of knowledge. In the lecture course *Grundfragen der Philosophie*, he even says that the philosopher who knows the attunement reservedness shall not speak aloud about it. And the fundamental attunements of the past are past; they are not part of the present time.

Yet Heidegger tries to reconstruct or reconstitute the fundamental attunement of ancient Greece. It had already changed in ancient times, Heidegger says, as truth was seen not as unconcealedness but as correctness.[87] Taking the question of truth as the point of departure of his investigation of the historicity of attunements, Heidegger claims that it is obvious that a fundamental attunement from the past cannot still be fundamental. Nevertheless, he makes some important concessions: it may be so that '*our* basic position toward beings is not any more and never again will be that of the first beginning'; nevertheless, this position 'remains determined by it as a counterthrust'. Theirs was the fundamental attunement of wonder, but we think we know what we mean when saying that 'the stone *is*', that 'the sky *is* overcast'. To us, the Being of beings is 'the most obvious of everything obvious'.[88]

Well, if anyone in modern times had been gripped by the question of Being, then it was Heidegger himself. It may be that astonishment is impossible as a fundamental attunement in the modern era, and in the time to come. The relation to the world has changed, or it is a different attunement which tunes the Dasein in its existence. This tuning is fundamental: 'it is the attunement that transports, transports us into this or that fundamental relation to beings as such. More precisely, *attunement is what transports* us in such a way that it co-founds the time-space of the transporting itself.'[89] But there are traces to be found. The present fundamental

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[87] Martin Heidegger, *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik'*, GA, vol. 45, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1984, p. 149 (trans. in Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected 'Problems' of 'Logic'*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1994, p. 129).

[88] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 184 (trans. Rojcewicz and Schuwer, op. cit., p. 159).

[89] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 154 (trans. Rojcewicz and Schuwer, op. cit., p. 134). They render *Grundstimmung* with 'basic disposition', but here it is changed to 'fundamental attunement'.

position towards beings is a counterthrust to astonishment, and therefore also determined by it. If that is the case, astonishment may still be swaying, and it plays the same role that the attunement in the poem does for the late-coming reader – if that reader has open ears. That is to say that attunements of the past can be a part of the being to come. The fundamental attunement has changed, but at the same time it may still be oscillating.

With the set of four kinds of attunements and a multitude of specific moods, and bringing them all into the history of Being, Heidegger has thus created a highly complex system, even if the only systematic approach is made in *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger is sometimes worried about too direct a parallel between his idea of attunement and music: 'The tuning understood in this sense is not music of accidentally emerging feelings which only accompany the correspondence.'[90] But the problem here is not music itself: again, it is an understanding of music as being the language of feeling; or, from Heidegger's point of view, the attunements as being able only to accompany primary qualities. There are no formal obstacles for transposing Heidegger's hidden system of attunement to music, even if Heidegger himself is totally uninterested in, or even hostile to, such a manoeuvre.

What kind of elements can be transposed? *Sein und Zeit* showed the disclosive capacities of *Stimmung*. In *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Heidegger's investigation revealed the differentiation between the modes of boredom through temporalities. The world of the work of art as temporality, spatiality and mobility, resting on its materiality, was hinted at in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*. In *Beiträge zur Philosophie* Heidegger suggests the composition of or accordance between different *Stimmungen*.[91] In the works and lectures after the turn, there is a new awareness of history and change, including the question concerning truth, which may put us in a better position to understand the affectivity or emotivity of music in its different shapes. That will take place in the next chapter.

But before that, I shall turn to the other philosophers of *Stimmung*, who all have Heidegger as their point of departure, or at least, in some cases, as an important reference. They all try to either criticize Heidegger for being too narrow in his approach or to develop what has been hinted at but never fulfilled in his thinking. Sometimes, the criticism is justified, but, as will become clear, many blank spaces have been filled with the publication of lectures and unprinted theses in recent decades.

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[90] Martin Heidegger, 'Was ist das – die Philosophie?', in *Identität und Differenz*, GA, vol. 11, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2006, p. 21 (trans. in Martin Heidegger, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde, London: Vision 1958, pp. 77–9).

[91] It seems to me that Trawny thinks along the same lines when he writes that joy blossoms in the *Grundstimmung Trauer* of the adagio of Mahler's Ninth Symphony. Cf. Trawny, op. cit., p. 189–90.

## A Revised and Applied Heidegger

One of the great virtues of Heidegger's thinking can also be seen as his weakest point: his monothematic question of Being. During his darkest periods, it made him deaf to the existing world and its people; instead, he dreamt of a 'purification *of Being* from its deepest deformation through the supremacy of beings'.[92] For him, every way, every path leads to Being, even when he seems off the beaten track. With this distinctive movement of thought, Heidegger made *Stimmung* into a central philosophical concept; it had certainly been important in the aesthetics of Romanticism, but until Heidegger no one had given the concept a central position in a systematic philosophy.

However, there are also other perspectives, related but often competing approaches that shall receive some attention here. They are not as groundbreaking as Heidegger's perspective, but they share one crucial characteristic: they are multithematic, not monothematic. They are all philosophical, but from different branches of the discipline from Heidegger: the philosophical anthropology of Otto Friedrich Bollnow, the cultural phenomenology of Klaus Held, the cultural-historical anthropology of Peter Sloterdijk, the phenomenological anthropology of Thomas Fuchs, the 'new phenomenology' of Hermann Schmitz, the 'aisthetics' of Gernot Böhme. Obviously, reading the labels one can see that they are linked in different ways. They are all heirs to the nineteenth-century German thinking; they are all founded on Dilthey's hermeneutics, Husserl's phenomenology or Heidegger's thinking. If only one characteristic should be drawn out, it might be the interpretative trait.

My first theme will be the expansion of the set of moods, since Heidegger concentrated on anxiety and boredom. The temporalities of these moods are especially interesting. No other study matches the exact and differentiated analysis of a specific mood in Heidegger's treatment of boredom, but he was much less specific concerning other moods. Here, Bollnow has much to say. The second theme is that which is called *Leib* in German, the lived body, so neglected by Heidegger in most of his writings. This lived body is the scene for *Stimmung*, not the least in music. Whereas Fuchs and Schmitz both contribute to a better understanding of the lived body, Böhme's account also concerns music. The third and last theme is perhaps more surprising, since it begins with spatial aspects of music, but then turns to cultural issues concerning *Stimmung*. Since *Stimmung* has to do with culture, this is not such a strange theme at all, and we shall touch upon the question of whether different *Stimmungen* can characterize different cultures and also separate them. This theme rests on the philosophical work by Held, with Sloterdijk pointing at a wider scene, touching upon music.

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[92] Martin Heidegger, *Überlegungen XII–XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941)*, GA, vol. 96, Frankfurt: Klostermann 2014, p. 238.

Therefore, this completion of Heidegger's thinking is not only of philosophical interest; it is also of greatest importance for the understanding of the fundamental phenomenon of *Stimmung* in music – its temporality, spatiality and corporeality.

*To Live with Joy: Bollnow's Correction*

So far in this work, all investigations of *Stimmungen* have been of negative or depressive states. The preliminary investigation in Chapter 1 concerned musical melancholy. Then Heidegger followed, with his exegeses of anxiety and boredom. When Otto Friedrich Bollnow criticized Heidegger and what he himself called 'existentialism' – in his vocabulary reaching from Heidegger and Karl Jaspers in Germany to Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus in France – his criticism concerned their one-sidedness, their gloominess, their extremism.[93] Being a philosophical anthropologist, his main concern was, according to himself, to be true to life – not only to the borderline situations of human existence, but also to man's whole being.

Bollnow's broader approach is of course relevant for an investigation of *Stimmung* in music. What about the magic playfulness in Mendelssohn's overture to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*? What about the rapture in the finale of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony? What about the solemnity of the introduction to the first movement of Bruckner's Fifth Symphony? Is it possible to differentiate between that solemnity and the festivity in Brahms's *Akademische Festouvertüre*? I think that most listeners would answer yes to the last question, but then turn to deep frustration when trying to point out in which ways these two moods differ. In the following, I will analyse Bollnow's elaborations of different uplifting moods to see if they give some hints of how to differentiate them.

Yes, says Bollnow, people might experience anxiety and they can be bored, but they are more often quite satisfied and striving for something – and they may even be happy without being inauthentic. The tragedies of Sophocles and the sacred grief of Hölderlin are possible to use in philosophical elaborations, but Bollnow reminds us of the joyfulness of the same Hölderlin, the characteristic lightness of late Rilke. Certainly, Bollnow was able to see that Heidegger was not as single-minded as he had thought when the first edition of *Das Wesen der Stimmungen* was published in 1941. Two years later Heidegger held a speech on happiness in Hölderlin at the memorial held for the centenary of the poet's death, a circumstance that Bollnow comments on in a later edition of his book. Nevertheless, Bollnow was right to point out a negative inclination in Heidegger at the same time as he admitted that there were philosophical reasons behind it. So he developed the philosophy of *Stimmung* further, with Heidegger as his starting point but with his own insistence on the importance of the bright side of life.

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[93] This critical discussion started in 1941 in Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Das Wesen der Stimmungen*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1995 (1941), 8th ed., and continued in his *Existenzphilosophie*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1943.

When Bollnow carries through the discussion in *Das Wesen der Stimmungen*, it is with the observation that in ordinary language Germans speak about *gehobenen* and *gedrückten Stimmungen*, or high and low spirits. In the negative language of Heidegger, *Stimmung* has to do with Dasein's burden, the thrownness of being-in-the-world; but Bollnow argues that being in an uplifting mood, weight is replaced by a movement upwards. Thus there is a distinction to be made between uplifting and depressing moods, but the different moods cannot be systemized, Bollnow declares – at least not from his philosophical-anthropological standpoint: every new mood will change the essence of the human being. However, he admits that common language can give a provisionary overview: there are high moods and low moods as well as moods such as reverence, solemnity and festivity, which are placed somewhere between.[94]

Bollnow's overview is obviously provisional, and he does not describe the characteristics of the moods in any detail. But before he turns to joy and its relation to the temporality in Proust, in Nietzsche and in pathological intoxication, he gives some attention to rapture (*Rausch*), characterized by being non-directed and totally dominating. In early and late Nietzsche Bollnow finds the most excellent descriptions and shapings of rapture, saying that the Nietzsche of *Die Geburt der Tragödie* specifies it as the dissolution of the individual through collectivism and closeness to nature; it is a kind of total tuning-in with the world. In the writings of the later Nietzsche some other characteristics appear: the feeling of potency is stressed, the perception of time and space widened. Indeed, time seems to reach a standstill; sensibility is more acute, as is understanding; the perception of reality is changed.[95]

The uplifting moods are characterized by changes in three areas: the sense of community, reality and time-perception. Anxiety and boredom are negative and make the human being lonely, whereas joy makes him or her into a part of the surrounding society or world: that which gives support to life in general and to the community in particular is always disclosed in the mood of joy.[96] All *Stimmungen* have an impact on the relation to reality, Bollnow says, with consequences for our knowledge about the world. The discussion on time-perception waits until his investigation of joy, but we can look elsewhere for more substance, namely to Bollnow's later work – *Neue Geborgenheit*.

Here Bollnow takes the discussion further. He even happens to give a reply to a passage in Heidegger when describing the mood of Sundays, albeit not the deep boredom in a big city (that was Heidegger's Sunday mood) but the joy in the countryside. Families are preparing for the holy day, tidying the house. The heavy duties of the working week can be set aside, and they are pervaded by

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94 Cf. Bollnow, *Das Wesen der Stimmungen*, pp. 43–53.

95 Cf. Bollnow, op. cit., pp. 83–90.

96 Cf. Bollnow, op. cit., p. 102.

a lightness particular to these days, and the feeling that everything is in order.[97] These words characterize the state of joy – its lucidity and order, its lightness and light. This joy is specific; it concerns the weekly celebration. Bollnow makes an important distinction between *Feier* (celebration) and *Fest* (festivities), between *Feierlichkeit* (solemnity) and *Festlichkeit* (festivity).[98] He begins with solemnity, which cannot be sorted into either the high or low moods: it is both characterized by weight and elevation. It is to be found at every level. Laughs are forbidden, loud voices too. No hasty movements are allowed; the tempo is moderate. But not all slow movements are solemn; they have a typical scheme: you stride along with your head held high.[99] In celebration, music is a common element. It is even so that music is essential: it makes man completely attuned, breaks into everyday life and transports the listener from a temporality that is directed towards a goal into a state where 'the voice of timelessness' prevails.[100]

*Fest* is not *Feier*. In his anthropological, often barely philosophical description of festivity, Bollnow includes colours, dress, decoration. More interesting is his declaration of free floatation as the attunement of the festivities. Again, music has a specific function, but this time the weight of celebration is changed to a whirling, uninhibited lightness.[101] This is music made for dancing, and what has been said of the music also accounts for the dance. The free-floating movements of festivity are compared with the solemn ones of festival; taking the actual rites or rules for both festival and festivity into account, Bollnow can give reliable descriptions of both states. It is not by chance that these two moods are easy to transfer to music because of the presence of music in the celebration of a festival or a festivity. Too solemn a music will destroy any festivity, and tunes which are too light-hearted would be vulgar and unacceptable at a ceremony. But how can we distinguish between the moods of a festival and a festivity? We need to move towards the question of temporality.

Bollnow cannot accept what he describes as a focus on the intense moment of anxiety in Heidegger, so he follows up his own wider range of moods with an investigation of the different temporalities found in these. They are the temporalities of normal life, of joy: all those states of mind that Heidegger had put aside; sometimes, it seems, not only because of his systematic needs but also because of their lack of drama. All moods have a temporality of their own, a specific structure. It sounds reasonable that no mood should give its pattern of temporality to another, especially when there is no kinship between them. In despair and depression time never seems to end, but in play and joy it is as if time flies. Describing the temporality of joy, Bollnow finds that the sense of time

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97 Cf. Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit: Das Problem einer Überwindung des Existentialismus*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1955, p. 206.

98 Bollnow, op. cit., p. 217.

99 Cf. Bollnow, op. cit., p. 219.

100 Bollnow, op. cit., p. 221.

101 Cf. Bollnow, op. cit., p. 226.

disappears in states of complete joy. What he has described as the proclamation of the character of burden in the existentialist philosophy seems to be totally absent. Remarkably, in this temporality time too seems to be absent: the cancellation of time into eternity happens in a moment that has soon passed, something that he calls a standing now or an eternal presence, distinct from a broad time span.[102] Hereby, he turns to mystics; but he could as well have turned to those musical events where reverberations of eternity seem to be present in the evanescent moment (like in the last movements of Messiaen's *Quatuor pour la fin du temps*).

In *Neue Geborgenheit*, Bollnow also describes how time goes by when one is present at festivities – another kind of joy. This temporality is not the time-experience of the teleology of busy life or the moment of decision, but 'of a *time that rests and hovers in itself*'.[103] Timelessness is to be found in the complete joy, the ever-circling time of festivities. This circling structure is, according to Bollnow, essential for dance and music. Time loses its directedness, since it turns back in repetitive periods – just like music, especially music for dancing, often repeats structures that are already well known. The sense of future is lost; instead being comes to rest. The circling movement is a part of the greater circle of life and the year (obviously, Bollnow does not discuss the parties of today), and this means that they adhere to mythic temporality and to a kind of metaphysical time.

But Bollnow also turns to literature to find evidence of temporalities outside clock time. The first example is Marcel Proust's novel *À la recherche du temps perdu*, and especially the last part, 'Le temps retrouvé'. The nexus of Bollnow's discussion is exactly the cancellation of the time flow, the definition of joy in temporal terms. On the experience of remembrance, Bollnow writes that it does not mean to turn back to what is past, instead to turn to a concealed stratum of essence; it is a Platonic *anamnesis*.[104] What he refers to is the non-intentional remembrance of specific situations through something trivial, most emblematic in that famous eating of a Madeleine biscuit soaked with linden-flower tea. In the novel, the narrator, Marcel, becomes a part of his vivid recollections, and in a way that seems to erase the time which has passed. It is not a subtle reading; it does not delve beyond the surface of Proust's work, but it does work within Bollnow's mode of thought.

The musical aspects of this way of remembering are left out of the discussion. It is even a trait of the music Proust listened to when writing his work, especially César Franck's Violin Sonata in which a theme from the slow movement recurs in the finale.[105] This recurrence, however, does not mean that one steps back into an earlier mood, since minor is changed to major and the tempo is fast, but more of the sheer joy of recognizing in a new form something which is well known. This

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102 Cf. Bollnow, op. cit., p. 177.

103 Bollnow, op. cit., p. 234.

104 Cf. Bollnow, op. cit., p. 213.

105 On Proust's music-listening habits, see Joël-Marie Fauquet, *César Franck*, Paris: Fayard 1999, pp. 631–71.

is not just to suggest a musical parallel to Bollnow's discussion; but, as we shall see, it points at his tendency to look for what art says instead of perceiving how it is said.

Bollnow's second example is the 'great noon' in the writings of Nietzsche. That is a theme which occurs in many different contexts: in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, 'Der Wanderer und sein Schatten' from *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* and the poetry. Like Proust, Nietzsche elaborates a return, albeit the eternal recurrence. Here it is necessary to distinguish between the metaphysical premises and the phenomenon of time implosion, even if Bollnow is unclear on this point. Commenting on a passage in *Zarathustra*, Bollnow writes that this is an experience both of eternity breaking through temporality and of the completeness of the world, something that had already appeared in the Dionysiac state.[106] Bollnow refers to the passages in *Zarathustra* but he prefers an earlier version in 'Der Wanderer ohne Schatten', since it was written before the formulation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. First we have a kind of initial formulation of an experience, then comes the doctrinal interpretation. What is therefore so important here? It is the 'time without goal' (*Zeit ohne Ziel*) – a time without future, a time that rests in itself and therefore is eternal.[107]

Bollnow seeks philosophical or aesthetic programmes in the texts of Proust and Nietzsche. What he hopes to find, exemplified by the earlier version of Nietzsche's formulation of 'the great noon', is a genuine formulation of a personal experience. However, it is not only doctrines that are a problem for him, but also literary conventions. He looks for descriptions of temporality but does not observe any literary or aesthetic characteristics. Proust's and Nietzsche's texts not only describe a particular state or temporality, they are also states and temporalities themselves – and produce states. Despite this interpretative violence, Bollnow's differentiation between different temporalities in different moods is essential for the understanding of moods in music. Since there is no relevance in any reasoning about the authenticity or inauthenticity of the musical moods, Bollnow's insistence on the varieties of moods – where their temporal character is decisive for the evaluation and identification of a mood – is highly fertile for the understanding of music. The timelessness or circling temporality of complete joy, the beyond-the-time experience in Proust's joyful remembrances, the time without goal in Nietzsche; these are all varieties of a timelessness which not only decides the actual mood, but is also within reach of the temporalities of music.

### *The Resurrected Body: Schmitz, Fuchs and Böhme*

Many of the thinkers invoked in this second part of the chapter direct severe criticism against a dualism that is often said to derive from Descartes at the beginning of the modern era. They maintain that one of the perspectives on the

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106 Cf. Bollnow, op. cit., p. 221.

107 Bollnow, op. cit., p. 222.

human being had been forgotten or expelled, namely the 'lived body', rehabilitated in phenomenological thinking in Germany and France, and then called *Leib* and *corps propre* respectively. In his revision of phenomenology, called 'new phenomenology', Hermann Schmitz tells his readers about a history of oblivion of the lived body, said to be a consequence of what he calls 'introjection'. In the period from the fifth century BC onwards, Greek thinking is said to have had two ways of understanding the relationship between man and his world: the first understood man as something embodied, open to the tuning forces of his world and in a relation to the world characterized by resonance; the second was founded on a subject with an interiority contrasting to the world outside, connected to it through the body.[108] According to Schmitz, feelings should not be conceived of as being something subjective; instead they are powers in the world around us, taking us in their grip. Such was the Homeric man, while Socrates with his reflection gave birth to the introjected man. We can recognize that figure of thought from early Nietzsche.

But even in the philosophy of Heidegger, *Leib* is almost absent, as has already been made clear. It is true that he discusses the lived body in the lectures preceding *Sein und Zeit*, but in his main work Heidegger declares that it is a field with its own problematic and therefore something to put aside.[109] One of the foremost thinkers who have lately been taking the lived body into account, Gernot Böhme, considers it astonishing that we cannot find human existence as *Leib* in Heidegger.[110] Even if there have been explanations for that – with references made to the fact that the lived body can be found in *Sein und Zeit* but not in a thematic interpretation[111] – and even if we should not forget the discussion on the matter in *Nietzsche I*, we may assume that it is a consequence of Heidegger's ever-more critical attitude towards *Lebensphilosophie* and philosophical anthropology during the 1920s. While it is with Nietzsche that the lived body first comes to philosophical attention, and while modern sciences mostly follow Descartes, phenomenology has developed this thematic field from Husserl to Thomas Fuchs, Bernhard Waldenfels and Gernot Böhme.[112]

The starting point is the everyday experience of living: normally, we do not distinguish between body and mind. However, as soon as we are sick or injured,

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[108] Cf. Hermann Schmitz, *System der Philosophie*, vol. 3, part 2, Bonn: Bouvier 1969, pp. 18–19.

[109] Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 108.

[110] Cf. Gernot Böhme, *Aisthetik: Vorlesungen über Ästhetik als allgemeine Wahrnehmungslehre*, Munich: Fink 2001, p. 76.

[111] Herrmann writes that this theme is bracketed since the ontological analysis of Dasein is a part of the question of meaning of Being, and in this questioning the lived body is not essential. Wilhelm-Friedrich von Herrmann, *Subjekt und Dasein*: *Interpretationen zu 'Sein und Zeit'*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1985 (1974), 2nd ed., p. 140.

[112] A historical overview can be found in Thomas Fuchs, *Leib, Raum, Person: Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 2000, pp. 29–85.

the lived body captures our attention, since it does not work as it should. Thomas Fuchs has described that which he calls the spaces of the lived body: first, directional space (perception and movements) and attunemental space (affectivity); but to get an overview of the human being he also includes personal space, lived space and, finally, the historical lived body.

Our concern here is of course the attunemental space, *Stimmungsraum*, not because of what Fuchs calls it, but because of the characteristics he finds in this spatiality. It is in this space that the different expressive processes appear – those of atmospheres, moods and feelings; it is the affective sphere. With his descriptions and interpretations of this space, Fuchs shows not only how the human being relates affectively and cognitively to the world, but also how the world affects the human being. The lived body is like a resonating chamber (*Resonanzkörper*) for the expressions around it, which are recognized through the 'pathic' element of perception, changes in the disposition and the dynamics. Fuchs calls this embodied resonance, *leibliche Resonanz*.[113]

The human being responds to expressive characters (*Ausdruckscharaktere*) and, according to Fuchs, these have such a far-reaching impact that he calls them an 'alphabet' of the attunemental space.[114] They are physiognomic qualities of experiences, showing themselves as a whole (as *Gestalt*) and not as separate elements. Again, Fuchs points to a parallel with language, saying that the semantics of the attunemental space are grounded in embodiment. It is due to the same kind of resonance that different experiences, even when perceived through different senses, can be associated. Trying to give the reader some examples of how the likeness actually works, he discusses the expression 'dry humour'. How can something comical be dry? Just as the touch of dry grass can be scratchy, the dry joke has a kind of scratchiness: '*Thus the likeness is founded through the same resonance of the lived body*. The lived body *transposes* these different, but similar experiences into one another.'[115] Therefore, the lived body is not just a resonating chamber, but also the place where the different senses communicate, where synaesthesia appears, and the birthplace of metaphorical expressions like 'a smiling countryside', 'a wretched sea' and 'a musical landscape'.

The fact that children often find likenesses between different things and that an infant reacts intuitively to the smiling face of his or her mother, and starts to smile even though unable to know the meaning of it, indicates a way of relating to the environment that disappears with a greater ability to reflect and with the separation between subject and object. Some people retain the ability to find these likenesses, but certainly not all.[116] However, this capacity may be developed through a perceptual differentiation between different qualities in the world, but

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113 Cf. Fuchs, op. cit., pp. 197–200.

114 Fuchs, op. cit., p. 200.

115 Fuchs, op. cit., p. 200.

116 Cf. Fuchs, op. cit., pp. 206–13.

at the same time the reflective and symbolizing mind distances itself from the resonance within the lived body:

> The pathic element of perception is overridden by the gnostic. The space of mood, characterized by presence, becomes ever-more superimposed by a cognitive and rationally structured space of lasting facts. The result of this is finally the tendency of unmasking expression as mere appearance, of 'disenchantment of the world'.[117]

This quotation is of greatest importance for musical listening. What Fuchs calls 'pathic' and 'gnostic' elements has to do with expressiveness and structural knowledge: we can remember that Hanslick saw expression in music as pathological, whereas he proposed a disenchanted way of listening to the structural qualities of music.

Such a pathic element of perception can give us a key to the relationship between affectivity, music and space. Fuchs refers to Schmitz when describing how the musical movement is transformed to bodily gestures in a dance that moves the mind; these gestures are emotions in the sense of movement. The lived body is a transformer, bringing together different spheres of human existence: emotion, perception, intellect. Thus, when Hermann Schmitz tries to explain the spatiality of feelings, music is his model. Feelings have a specific spatiality, Schmitz says, and in this there is an accordance with music.[118] His main issue is the vertical dimension: a movement upwards in a scale is perceived as exactly that, a movement from a lower to a higher step. It is a spatiality in a dimension other than optical or tactile space; but the movement is not just a metaphor, it is also a movement in auditive space.[119] Schmitz even complains about Ernst Kurth, whom he criticizes for having had the 'un-phenomenological' idea that spatiality is only associative.

Gernot Böhme has used this notion of spatiality in music, too. It is not just the position of a sound in space, actual or virtual, but also the spatiality of every tone: 'It depends on the *how* of fulfilment, the spatial shape, in which a tone is present.'[120] This 'how' opens up a passage to conventional pictorial descriptions of music, where tones can be said to move like flames; they can be torn apart, they can move away and return. Böhme avoids the easy way out, which would be to accept these formulations as metaphors only. The 'how' is the embodied presence of the tones or the notes. That is why Böhme suggests that music is primarily an art of space, not of time. Musical spatiality is actually the expanded spatiality of the lived body: music articulates a spatiality of its own, perceived by the listener.

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117 Fuchs, op. cit., p. 239.

118 Cf. Schmitz, op. cit., p. 194.

119 Schmitz, op. cit., p. 201.

120 Gernot Böhme, *Anmutungen: Über das Atmosphärische*, Ostfildern: Tertium 1998, p. 77.

However, Böhme does not only criticize the old notion of music as the art of time, but elsewhere he also concludes that he has found the solution to that age-old problem of musical influence on the emotions. Music is a modification of the space of the lived body, he says: 'Music forms the listener's disposition in space, it affects directly the economy of the lived body.'[121] Even if Böhme's is an aesthetics of *Atmosphären*, not of *Stimmungen*, we should observe that he calls *Atmosphären* a quasi-objective *Stimmungen* – the atmospheres of building or of a cityscape are attuned spaces.[122]

We should remember that Heidegger, too, had contributed to an alternative perspective on space and spatiality – something that Clifton developed in music. However, the phenomenology of the lived body pursues this approach in different directions. It tries to give a better understanding of how music moves in a twofold sense: how we can speak about the movement of music at all, and how music affects the listener. These two different meanings are related to each other because music moves the listener with its movement – and this experience of movement depends on the lived body. The listener does not relate to music as something going on outside him or her, trying to respond to it within; no, the listener is already out there in the music, in that which is a world. Or perhaps even better, just like *Stimmung* is a hybrid, music is placed beyond outside and inside.[123] If the aesthetics of empathy described a relation to music in terms of subjectivity, where the subject identifies itself with the musical movement, the phenomenology of the lived body describes the relation in terms of resonance or of attunement with a world; but in the same stroke it eradicates the difference between subject and object, between inside and outside.

Now, Fuchs's observation that cognitive ability outweighs the pathic element in a process he called disenchantment can be transferred to musical listening: in a rationalized relation to the musical work or object, the lived body is nothing more than a phantom limb, and the mood cannot be approached. At the same time, the process of disenchantment, *die Entzauberung der Welt*, is a historical process. It may be that the lived body is only relevant for specific periods in history (also in the history of an individual), and therefore a conception of *Stimmung* grounded in the lived body would be linked to that historical point. This is a general problem for any thinking concerning *Stimmung*, and we will have to wait until the second part of this work, where the conceptual boundaries are discussed, to solve this problem.

### *Spatial and Cultural Aspects of* Stimmung*: Sloterdijk, Held and Böhme*

Atmospheres tune those present in the space where music sounds. That is not a new insight. In cathedrals, the magnitude of the sacred space can be amplified by music. It is an example of traditional mood-making, of a production of an atmosphere;

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121 Gernot Böhme, *Architektur und Atmosphäre*, Munich: Fink 2006, p. 78.

122 Böhme, *Aisthetik*, p. 47.

123 Cf. Frei, 'Jenseits von "außen" und "innen"', pp. 196–207.

it is a cultural and ideological investment. This kind of production – Böhme calls it *Erzeugung von Atmosphären* – can be found elsewhere, too. One of Böhme's examples is a performance of a play, where the atmosphere of Spain or perhaps the 1920s as a period can be suggested by music (often in a very stereotyped way, one must add). At the theatre, in films, music may have a signifying character – but then the element of tuning is forgotten. Some other examples of mood-making clarify what this tuning is and how it can be instrumentalized. The atmosphere in a restaurant or a bar is highly dependent on what is heard, especially when music is played on the stereo – if the music is inappropriate, the guests will be estranged. Elevator music, muzak in shopping malls, the music in the dentist's waiting-room – all kinds of functional music are used to create different atmospheres. The music shapes the space, and the person in the lift has a distraction; the shopper is activated, the dental patient is relaxed. The music tunes the one who is listening; the listener is attuned.[124] Of course, one can say that Spanish guitar music heard in a performance of a play by Lorca *signifies* Spanishness, or that it brings associations of Spain. But the other examples show that the listener (the visitor, the flâneur, the patient) is supposed to be affected by the acoustical milieu, and the way to do this is by creating or designing a space of sound.

The philosophical awareness of the exact intonation of spaces is not old. Ludwig Binswanger formulated the concept of attuned space in 1933.[125] It was further elaborated by Bollnow in *Neue Geborgenheit*,[126] where he describes the requisites for a festivity and the experience of expansion, and he followed up his investigations in *Mensch und Raum* (1963).[127] However, a breakthrough for this kind of investigation into what seems to be almost too evasive a phenomenon is Peter Sloterdijk's trilogy *Sphären* (1998–2004).[128] We have already noted some important passages on space and spatiality in *Sein und Zeit*, but there are nevertheless good reasons for Sloterdijk to suggest that a revolutionary cell is hidden in Heidegger's work. Sloterdijk says himself that his *magnum opus* is partly a development of the 'pinched' theme of spatiality in Heidegger's first major work and the preceding lecture courses.[129]

*Stimmung* is perhaps not at first sight of great importance in Sloterdijk's trilogy, but the term is recurrent in his interpretations of the different spheres, reaching from the intimate sphere of the unborn child in the womb to the globalized world and even to the cosmos. The spheres are always there, in Dasein's relation to itself, to the world and to the culture. Here, we shall touch upon one of the 'medium-sized'

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124 Cf. Böhme, *Anmutungen*, p. 81 (cf. also pp. 71–84).

125 Ludwig Binswanger, 'Das Raumproblem in der Psychopathologie', *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, vol. 145, no. 1, pp. 598–647.

126 Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit*, p. 238.

127 Cf. chap. 'Der gestimmte Raum' in Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Mensch und Raum*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1963, pp. 229–43.

128 Peter Sloterdijk, *Sphären*, vols 1–3, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1998–2004.

129 Sloterdijk, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 345.

spheres, namely the cultural sphere, whose inhabitants are attuned to its rhythms and melodies, its political and religious rituals, and its language communities. The cultural sphere is full of resonance and repercussions; it is ever changing, but at the same time it can give its inhabitants the strength to survive even in the most devastating conditions.[130]

In Sloterdijk, spatiality is the cultural premise which every individual is born into and developed within. This space deviates not only from the geometric space, but even from the phenomenon of space – it is exactly the *sphere* in which Dasein lives. It is impossible to take this sphere away from the human being because this being is such that it is situated in a sphere. The sphere gives shelter to man; it protects him from brute nature. Human beings are, so Sloterdijk writes in a formulation which is typically both rhetoric and poetic, 'the life forms designated to be floating beings – if floating means depending on divided moods and shared assumptions'.[131] Sloterdijk's contribution to the thinking of mood is his elaboration of being-in-the-world in his own terminology: being-in-spheres (*In-Sphären-sein*). The different cultures and communities not only have assumptions in common – defining what is part of them and what is not – but, as Sloterdijk observes, they are joined by a mood; they are attuned communities of different orders. These spheres stretch from the most intimate to the global. They always accompany Dasein, from the moment when the sounds, the temperature and the inner movements can be felt by the foetus in the womb, to the moment of dying when the waiting has been a terrifying passage to extinction or a dwelling in the sphere of assurance that serenity awaits.

Music is inscribed in Sloterdijk's thinking – from early on in reflections about hearing and listening,[132] also formulated as a question of where we are when listening to music[133] – but then in terms of the earliest phases of a human life and as a negation of Descartes's ego. The repercussions of music on the cultural sphere can only be deduced from his general description of how one sphere is followed by another in history, and how one sphere is placed within a greater one. Sloterdijk characterizes Dasein as resonance, as evasiveness, as groundlessness; but even if melody and ritual are placed on the same level, the traces of the melody in the gigantic, resonating phenomenon called culture are hardly ever followed through.

Instead, Sloterdijk invests all his interest in the early history of every human being – perhaps even prehistory since he goes back to the uterine phases of the foetus. In his interpretation of the siren episode in the *Odyssey*, the music is not the

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130 Cf. Sloterdijk, op. cit., p. 58; see also pp. 45–8.

131 Sloterdijk, op. cit., p. 46 (trans. in Peter Sloterdijk, *Spheres*, vol. 1, trans. Wieland Hoban, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) 2011, p. 46).

132 Cf. Peter Sloterdijk, 'Tonalität als neue Synthese', *Kopernikanische Mobilmachung und ptolemäische Abrüstung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1986, pp. 77–120.

133 Cf. Peter Sloterdijk, 'Wo sind wir, wenn wir Musik hören?', in *Weltfremdheit*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1993, pp. 294–325.

sirens' own lascivious call; instead the sirens sing exactly the song the seamen want to hear. According to Sloterdijk, music is a recollection of a phase before birth, when the foetus is able to hear the rhythm of the mother's heart, and especially the song without words of her voice. Instead of Lacan's 'mirror stage', Sloterdijk speaks about a 'siren stage', when a voice seems to sing about the becoming of the subject: 'By listening closely, the incipient subject opens up and moves towards a particular mood in which it can perceive what is its own with wonderful clarity.'[134] Thus the mood is present before the subject has become a subject; it is part of the becoming of the subject. Again, *Stimmung* is situated at a point in time before the separation between subject and object as well as before any reflective act. Of course, this may have great ideological and political consequences, since it is without protection from different versions of listening to his master's voice; the siren effect can result not only in societal integration, but also in mass psychosis and in ideas of being a 'chosen people'.[135] However, Sloterdijk does not develop the musical aspects further.

In Klaus Held's discussion of the possibilities and limits for understanding between cultures we find a parallel with Sloterdijk's grand theory of the spheres, but of slightly more modest dimensions. Like Bollnow, he wants to widen the spectrum of *Stimmungen*, but he does so without changing the direction of his thought to philosophical anthropology, as does Bollnow. The starting point for his revision is the introduction of the mood *Scheu* (awe) as the positive counterpart to *Angst*.[136] *Scheu* is taken from the Greek word *aidos*, and it emerged from the state of wonder (*thaumázein*) in which philosophy was born in ancient Greece: the astonishment of being was transposed into awe, since man understood that the world lies out of reach. Awe means that man started to respect others around him, the society and environment in which he lived (we can remember that in *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, Heidegger treated *Scheu* as one of the *Leitstimmungen* of the second beginning). Moreover, Held does not believe that *aidos* was only relevant in the world of ancient Greece, but he holds that it is one of the fundamental attunements of European culture.

The standing in awe before everything newborn says something about a readiness to start anew. From it also comes a respect for the different worlds of the human kind, not only for the surrounding culture, but also for foreign worlds. Even democracy and belief in human rights is derived from awe, Held suggests. Of course, he is forced to acknowledge that European culture has not always been true to the fundamental attunement awe: there have been times of religiously motivated estrangement for what is alien and times of colonialism; but when awe is allowed to prevail, then European culture is said to be true to its roots.

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134 Sloterdijk, *Sphären*, vol. 1, p. 513 (trans. Hoban, op. cit., p. 503).

135 Sloterdijk, op. cit., p. 517.

136 Klaus Held, 'Grundstimmung und Zeitkritik bei Heidegger', in Otto Pöggeler and Dietrich Papenfuss (eds), *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, vol. 1, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1992.

Held's main contribution to the philosophy of *Stimmungen*, however, is not his endeavour to correct what he finds problematic in Heidegger's choice of *Grundstimmungen* – problems that according to Held can explain why Heidegger took the wrong political path in the 1930s; instead the contribution is his discussion on *Stimmung* in intercultural understanding. According to him, different *Grundstimmungen* in different cultures may explain why there may be fundamental disagreement or discord between different parts of the world. One of his examples (running the risk of being oversimplified) is the contrast between an individually orientated West and a family-orientated East. Even if family as *oikos* was central in the ancient Greek understanding of society, the democratic inclination developed into the modern Western individuality. In the East, Held says, the family with its inherent hierarchy continued to be the most important element in the constitution of a society. These differences have to do with different *Grundstimmungen*. Pointing out harmony as the definitive cultural model of East Asia, Held suggests that *Stimmungen* play a central role in the relation to the West:

> Yet, a deep mood of the need for harmony and the basic habituality that is rooted in the latter – therefore granting the individual integration into the primary events or states – exclude from the very beginning that the individual could become a subject in a grammatical or ontological sense.[137]

Even if Klaus Held's thinking has been introduced in a schematic way, the relevance of *Stimmungen* in the discussion of intercultural relations is obvious. Held gives a central role to language in this interplay, characterized by accord and discord between the cultures; but since the *Grundstimmungen* are said to seize Dasein in an intense moment, putting it into a state of speechlessness, language does not seem to be the origin of that state. There are reasons to believe that the different musical systems to be found around the world could be of great interest for the understanding of not only the state of speechlessness, but also the question of how different *Grundstimmungen* can respond to each other, through accord and disaccord, resonance or lack of resonance. These issues will be followed up in the epilogue of this work.

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[137] Klaus Held, 'Möglichkeiten und Grenzen interkultureller Verständigung', in Chan-Fai Cheung et al. (eds), *Essays in Celebration of the Founding of the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations*, published online at http://www.o-p-o.net 2003, p. 12 (accessed 29 May 2011) (trans. as 'The Possibilities and Limits of Coming to an Understanding between Cultures', trans. James M. Thompson, in Cheung et al. [eds], op. cit., p. 10 [accessed 29 May 2011]).

## Stimmung *Re-Attuned to Music*

There is an anecdote about how Heidegger, having listened to Schubert's great B♭-major sonata for piano, said that this is impossible in philosophy.[138] This is telling, not just because the anecdote clearly says that Heidegger could hear more things than he brought into language, but also because it indicates that Heidegger's thinking cannot be simply transposed to music. 'Language is the house of Being', he writes, but even if music can be looked at as a language, music is not at home, *zu Hause*, in Heidegger.[139] His reluctance, to put it mildly, to bring music into philosophical matters is no temporary attitude; no, described as an art of feelings, music can be a threat to thinking. However, that is a highly questionable view on music, and even if we cannot expect that Heidegger would have sympathized with any formalistic notion of music, we have been able to see that his philosophy is opened up to a thinking about music that does not equate affectivity with emotionality.

Here, *Stimmung* is central. The emergence of a world is that opening in Heidegger's philosophy: in music, too, a world is opened up. Heidegger never says how, but there is no doubt that such an opening must happen according to the particularities of music – not according to the world in poetic language or in pictorial art. This musical world is opened up in a *Stimmung*; its temporality, mobility and spatiality are attuned, bringing forth materiality, and the attunement is exactly the *Stimmung* of music.

Heidegger has been criticized for being too narrow, too negative and too individualized in his choice of *Stimmungen*, but these judgements have been shown to be wrong, at least to a certain extent – the publishing of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* shows a wide spectrum of *Stimmungen*. His differentiation between different subgroups of *Stimmungen* (in *Stimmung*, *Grundstimmung*, *Leitstimmung* and *Gegenstimmung*) is another development that can be fruitful for the musical understanding of *Stimmung*. However, even if things were not as bad as Bollnow thought, his own contribution to the philosophy of *Stimmung* also enriches musical understanding. In his investigations of affirmative moods like joy and festivity, and compounded moods like solemnity, he describes temporality and mobility in a way that is highly relevant for our investigation.

The lived body is the scene of affective life. Through investigations of the lived body we are able to better understand the affectivity of music. The lived body is like a resonating chamber, giving resonance to what happens around us, and music is something that happens. To Böhme, the lived body is the key to how music affects us: music modifies the listener's disposition. However, we can neglect it, too, stop listening to it. In conventional musical analysis, there is no trace of any

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[138] Cf. Rüdiger Safranski, *Ein Meister aus Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit*, Munich: Hanser 1994, p. 385.

[139] Martin Heidegger, *Über den Humanismus*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1991, 9th ed. (1947), p. 5.

lived body – often, there is no trace of listening either. Fuchs pointed out that in the process of disenchantment the abilities of the lived body are lost. Sloterdijk's description of a pre-natal listening, decisive for our coming to an understanding of music, is a blatant example of the circumstances in which we are attuned. There is, he writes, a register of a pervasive regression involved. However, even a lack of *Stimmung* is a *Stimmung*. Heidegger's ideas of the fundamental attunements of the different periods of history, a diachronic difference, are transposed to a synchronic difference in Held's cultural investigations of *Grundstimmungen*. Even a totally enlightened culture has its own attunement, and Held speculates on the possibility that different fundamental attunements can obstruct intercultural communication. To facilitate communication, we should be made aware of harmonicity and inharmonicity, periodicity and aperiodicity, and attunemental spectra.

We are now much closer to the attuned world of music. Many of the circumstances have reached a clearing, and one could expect that the next step would be a theory of *Stimmung* in music. However, as has been indicated, a theory may not be appropriate if we want to approach *Stimmung*.

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# Chapter 3
# Playing in Between

## The Poetic Potential of Attunement

### *A Question of Language, and of Having a Method or Not*

Since I have been insisting that *Stimmung* (as well as its counterparts in the Scandinavian languages) has no exact parallel in English (or French or Italian), it seems necessary for me to assume that the phenomenon is so intertwined with particular linguistic aspects that a transfer to any another language area is impossible. This, in its turn, seems to have the consequence that only those who are well acquainted with the notion, perhaps even born into one of the languages where it exists, can get *gestimmt* by listening to or by playing a piece of music – an absurdity, certainly, and totally at odds with my assumption that human existence is always attuned. However, the problem should not be approached in this way: instead, we should realize that with the help of a word like *Stimmung* we may elucidate the listener's relation to music more clearly than if we only have 'mood' or *atmosphère* at our disposal. Words do not just relate to reality; they change our notion of what is real, and they create reality. That is the consequence of the world-disclosure of language.

The word *Stimmung* has the advantage of being part of an etymological mycelium that brings forth the complexity of the phenomenon at its different stages, so when I establish the term 'attunement' later on in this chapter, it may seem to be a risky business. However, I will draw upon the sedimentary insights to be found in *Stimmung*, and therefore try to keep the internal connections intact when using attunement. A listener or musician who is *gestimmt* by a piece of music is in tune with it; the attunement will be as hard to grasp as *Stimmung*; the world-opening characteristics of *Stimmung* will be found in attunement. Still, this transfer between languages, this translation, has an impact on the understanding of that always unfixable phenomenon. Attunement is less concrete and much less emotional than *Stimmung*, but this only heightens the overall tendency of how the phenomenon has been understood by its most probing interpreters. *Stimmung* is not translatable into the set of emotional classifications in psychology; and it should not be, since it is not a special kind of feeling or emotion. And, finally, attunement does not have the Romantic heritage of *Stimmung*. I shall not have to fight any sentimentality (Besseler was forced to do so).

Another linguistic obstacle concerns what really can be said on the basis of the history of a concept. That kind of historiography does not describe what a phenomenon is (or was), only the changes of conceptualization. At the same time,

every concept has a history to be confronted. In other words, the phenomenon is not tantamount to some specific historical usage of the word; but language is nevertheless decisive for our understanding of that phenomenon. Any reliable discussion of the phenomenon must be historically informed, but there is no definitive truth in the historical word usages. In this history of *Stimmung* it has become clear that in speaking about *Stimmung* in music we have entered a field where we are short of words, or where words seem to be more imprecise than they usually are. That is a third obstacle, closely related to the *topos* of the ineffability of music, reaching from Plato to Jankélévitch. The treatment of this problem in formalism, which makes it an irrelevant question, is highly unsatisfying, since it obscures or even obliterates one of the most fundamental traits in the act of listening to music. We saw that Hoffmann paradoxically maintained that concepts were unusable when describing affective characters in music (here, Hoffmann writes about something that I would call *Stimmung*, even if he calls it *Gefühl*), but that did not prevent him from speaking about a quite recognizable feeling of longing – that 'unnennbare, ahnungsvolle Sehnsucht' (a paradox in itself). To Hegel, instrumental music always runs the risk of being an empty abstraction, 'eine bloße Stimmung', but Hanslick turns this to an advantage, speaking about the possibility of *musikalische Stimmungen*, with a wholly unessential relation to the world of human feelings and only describable in formal terms. This flaw must be dealt with.

Still, language does not only bring obstacles, of course. Only through language, through words and concepts, can we describe the world and the phenomena in this world. It puts us in a position where we can reflect. Following Heidegger, though, *Stimmung* is distorted by this act of more or less explicit objectification: in the same moment as we begin to reflect upon the *Stimmung* it evaporates. To him, the problem of language is not that the words are wrong or inexact; rather, it is representation itself. Language – normal language and technical terms – has an inherent tendency to objectify, and this tendency destroys the phenomenon of *Stimmung* since it is not an object. The only way to overcome this problem is to change the relation between language and phenomenon, to allow the language to be *gestimmt* by the *Stimmung*; indeed, to let oneself be attuned.

If this is to be achieved in musicology, conventional analysis is no longer an option as a point of departure. The traditional methods of harmonic, rhythmic and thematic analysis definitely objectify the musical work; so do the highly sophisticated methods of Schenkerian analysis and pitch set analysis. In other words, this holds for all methods of investigating music as a kind of grammatical and structural system. The same problem, now in other guises, reappears when we consider other theoretical positions. The different methods of interpreting music through hermeneutics, semiotics and critical theory have the same distancing inclination, even if their epistemologies are totally different. Each of them has its virtues, but when it comes to *Stimmungen* they are unfit for the task.

So we find ourselves in what seems to be the contradictory position where we are in a need of a method, but where the systematic procedure of methods reduces the phenomenon to be investigated, and where even the notion of investigation

may be problematic. What we need is a way to let the phenomenon come forth and be sheltered in language. Thanks to the investigations made in the first two chapters, it is possible to open a space of interplay between the musical and philosophical concepts of *Stimmung*. This space in between is actually a way of listening, allowing *Stimmungen* or attunements to come forth in their musical worlds according to their manner of tuning, and consequently it is a mode of listening that should be called 'attunemental'. In order to understand what this kind of listening is, we should scrutinize the efforts made by those who have tried to capture *Stimmungen*, although they be outside the domain of music. We will come to realize that the dimensions of the musical world are decisive for how the listener is attuned. This is precisely what will take place in this chapter.

## *Modulation of Literary* Stimmung

My main assumption is that *Stimmung* – just like its less complex counterparts, 'mood' in English and *atmosphère* in French – is indispensable in musical discourse, and it is certainly common in both academic and non-academic texts on music. At the same time, the concept has not been given a satisfying foundation – either in the past or in contemporary musical discourse. My account of the matter has continuously dealt with discussions about *Stimmung* in music, but then the phenomenon has almost always been taken in its generality, abstracted from the concrete musical works of art or generalized in the act of listening. Even if the concept has attracted much attention in the last five years, musicology has not really taken advantage of the situation. Can any other discipline contribute to musicology?

It comes as no surprise that the main attention to the phenomenon of *Stimmung* is to be found in texts on literature, especially poetry. Admittedly, the (latest) renaissance for the concept has also brought about some fine studies on pictorial art;[1] but even if Gernot Böhme suggested that music is not primarily an art of time but an art of space, this spatiality is of a different kind from the space in paintings and pictures. Another interesting field would be film, not only because music often functions as a mood-producer there[2] but also because the articles published on film

[1] A book-length study is Kerstin Thomas, *Welt und Stimmung bei Puvis de Chavannes, Seurat und Gauguin*, Berlin and Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag 2010.

[2] This is an important field of film music studies. Mood is commented on in books such as Claudia Gorbman's *Unheard Melodies: Narrative Film Music*, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1987 and Royal S. Brown's *Overtones and Undertones: Reading Film Music*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1994. Mood-making is one of the roles for music in Annabel J. Cohen, 'Music as a Source of Emotion in Film', in Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda (eds), *Music and Emotion: Theory and Research*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001, pp. 249–72.

in the context of *Stimmung* studies tend to deal with pictorial or literary aspects, not dynamics or rhythm.[3]

The parallel between music and literature, as temporally oriented arts, is a strong one. Therefore, we should turn to poetry, to prose. Recently, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht has revitalized the concept in literary discussions. In contrast to most other scholars commenting on *Stimmung*, he does not situate it in an exclusively historical context, describing it as an aesthetic strategy of the past; but he ascribes a great potential to it in a contemporary context. Calling one of his essays on the theme 'Reading for the *Stimmung*?', he points to a specific approach to literature, however, presuming that this is the way most people read literature today, often not aware of their way of reading.[4] Central in his discussion is the non-theoretical approach. It is true that the literary text is said to affect its readers in a material way: 'textual tones, atmospheres, and flavours' are never totally independent of the material components;[5] but that does not mean that textual analysis is of any help.

In Gumbrecht, we find a radical theoretical scepticism: 'Given their uniqueness and their non-semantic substance, I am sceptical about general "theories" to explain and about "methods" to detect *Stimmungen*.' Yet, he gives his reader some guidelines:

> What first draws our attention to a potential of *Stimmung* condensed in a text will always be an individual word or image, a fragment of a sound or a rhythm. Once we are thus alerted, we may try to describe what we get wrapped into when we read a specific literary text.

Most interestingly, Gumbrecht then assumes that the element of *Stimmung* is transported into literary criticism, herewith repeating Heidegger's urge concerning philosophy, albeit in a more modest way: 'The tone and the gesture of our writing will then likely begin to converge with the literary text we are dealing with, rather than depart or keep distance from it.'[6] Elsewhere, Gumbrecht holds that *Stimmung* is one of the 'latent' characteristics of the text, something that is not only hidden but that also has a tendency to hide. The elements producing *Stimmungen* are as multiple as the *Stimmungen* produced, so that is one reason why there is no simple way to grasp the *Stimmung*. But the problem is even more general: 'there

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[3] Cf. Regine Prange, '"Comme au cinéma. Le ciel est bleu.": Zur ästhetischen Tradition der Himmelsschau und ihrer Bedeutung im Frühwerk Jean-Luc Godards', *Figurationen*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2010), pp. 39–67, and Ulrich Johannes Bell, 'Stummfilmszenen: Atmosphäre und Aura eines "überholten" Mediums (bei Hoffmann, Auster, Llamarzares)', op. cit., pp. 83–99.

[4] Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, 'Reading for the *Stimmung*?' As already stated, his essay was preceded by a series of articles in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, highlighting the 'neglected theme' (*vernachlässigtes Thema*) of *Stimmungen* in literary studies.

[5] Gumbrecht, op. cit., p. 215.

[6] All three quotations: Gumbrecht, op. cit., p. 220.

is no inductive or deductive pathway that could lead us from a specific *Stimmung* (pointing to the presence of something latent) to the identity of that which is present and latent in it'.[7]

Gumbrecht never mentions Emil Staiger, the influential Swiss literary hermeneutist of the 1940s and 1950s, but there are many parallels concerning their views on *Stimmungen*, despite the fact that Gumbrecht raises severe criticism of the flourishing hermeneutics in the humanities. Staiger's most explicit discussion on the topic is found in his *Grundbegriffe der Poetik* (1946), where he distinguishes between three literary styles: the lyrical, the epic and the dramatic. In the lyrical style, *Stimmung* is the most characteristic element.[8] Clearly influenced by Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, Staiger underscores that *Stimmung* is nothing internal, no inner state of mind, but in it we are 'out there', in a world that cannot be separated from us: 'Mood discloses Dasein more immediately than every intuition and every comprehension.'[9] His conception of the lyrical style is totally adhering to Heidegger's discussion of temporality, and he uses a direct citation: 'attunement is primarily grounded in having-been … the existential fundamental nature of mood is a *bringing back to* … '.[10] Therefore, the poet recollects not only what has been in the past but, paradoxically, also what is present and what will pass.

Is Staiger able to give us a clue as to how someone is attuned to a work of art? 'The lyrical becomes instilled [*eingeflößt*]. The reader must be open if the instillation shall succeed. He is open when his soul is attuned like the soul of the poet.'[11] We can observe that uncommon verb *einflößen* in Staiger's formulation, 'instil' – the same one used by Wackenroder when commenting on the relation between the listener and music. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the way to open oneself to a poem is likened to the first bars of a *Lied* by Schubert, Schumann, Hugo Wolf: a curse that falls upon everything outside the poem, and at the same time opens the heart. The reader must concentrate in the same way as if he or she had composed a short musical introduction to a *Lied*.

Typically, Staiger refuses to give something more than a musical simile. Instead, he turns away from a more precise description with a programmatic criticism of every attempt to find a justification:

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[7] Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, 'How (If at All) Can We Encounter What Remains Latent in Texts?', *Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas,* vol. 7, no. 1 (2009), p. 90.

[8] John Daverio has observed the musicological relevance of Staiger's discussion (also made in relation to Heidegger), but he only mentions the parallel between the lyrical mode and musical temporality. Cf. John Daverio, *Crossing Paths: Schubert, Schumann and Brahms*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002*,* p. 48.

[9] Emil Staiger, *Grundbegriffe der Poetik*, Zurich: Atlantis 1946, p. 65.

[10] Staiger, op. cit., p. 237. Staiger cites Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, p. 340 (trans. Stambaugh, *Being and Time*, p. 313).

[11] Staiger, op. cit., p. 51.

> Justification in poetry is indelicate, as indelicate as when a lover justifies his love to the beloved with reasons. And just as little as he is obliged to justify must he strive to elucidate obscure words. Anyone being in the same mood has a key that includes more than well-ordered intuition and consistent thinking.[12]

This is the heavily criticized stance of Staiger, varied in *Die Kunst der Interpretation* with the demand that the sensitive reader must have 'a rich and sensitive heart, a mind with many strings, which responds to the most varied tones'.[13] All this sounds nice, but it is simply an anti-intellectual attitude, hopelessly antiquated through the identification of the reader with the poet and his or her presumed feelings.[14]

Yet, even if there are weighty theoretical problems in the notion of identification, Staiger's refusal to base his response to the text on any specific observations must be taken into consideration. It is, Staiger says, impossible to point out specific elements as responsible for the tuning-in of the poem. The theoretical problem leads to the conclusion that we cannot formulate a *method* for the investigation of *Stimmungen*, just as Gumbrecht maintained, let alone a systemized and well-founded *theory*.

According to Staiger, the reader of a poem has to be utterly sensitive and has to have a rich emotional life to be able to respond to the text – or perhaps, even better, to resonate. The magical moment of resonance is a kind of *unisono* sung by the poet and the reader. We saw in Chapter 2 that Heidegger is a little more specific in his demands. The poem is a *Schwingungsgefüge*, a 'swinging framework' that tunes the reader. Through a struggle with him- or herself, the reader must open him- or herself to the poem, and this openness can be circumscribed as a capitulation. The fundamental attunement is awakened from the metaphysical position of the poem; or, to put it another way, the poetic saying is characterized by how Being is given at the time. But it is not only a reading that finds out a specific metaphysical position, trying to decode a codified message. There is also the sounding and swinging framework (*Klang- und Schwingungsgefüge*), which can be traced in the word distribution and the choice of words. One might be tempted to say that this is a way to describe what is often called 'the musicality' of the poem, but this usually merely implies that the poem is full of singing rhymes and alliteration, suggestive rhythms and intonations, and has nothing to do with the understanding of the work.

What Heidegger wants to avoid is that which philosophically inclined interpretations of poems often do, namely to reduce the poetry to some kind of content. That always seems to be a bad habit of reading poetry, and especially so

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[12] Cf. Staiger, op. cit., pp. 51–3, cit. pp. 52–3.

[13] Emil Staiger, *Die Kunst der Interpretation: Studien zur deutschen Literaturgeschichte*, Zurich: Atlantis 1955, p. 13.

[14] For a different critical evaluation of Staiger's notion of *Stimmung*, see Dieter Lamping, 'Das "lyrische Ineinander": Ein Rückblick auf die Stimmungs-Theorie Emil Staigers', in Reents and Meyer-Sickendiek, *Stimmung und Methode*, pp. 281–90.

in an investigation of *Stimmungen*. Yet, reading Heidegger on Hölderlin we still do not find any direct traces of sensitivity unconcerned with the meaning of the poem (that would change in his later texts on Trakl and George, but by then *Stimmung* had lost its central position in his thought).[15] One might argue that Heidegger writes in the way he does due to such sensitivity that without it something else would have turned up, but some comments on or observances of the sounding poem would nevertheless have been appropriate.

The interest in the metaphysical position of the poets has another impact: the sheer number of poets is very small, and the *Grundstimmungen* are all of an elevated kind. It is not just *Trauer* but *heilige Trauer*; mortals and gods join in *das Festliche*. Anyone interested in the *Stimmungen* of music seems to be forced, following Heidegger's own readings of his poets, to go in the same direction, excluding what is less extravagant. That would not be uninteresting; but if one wants to say something that covers the whole sphere of music, this limitation is much too restrictive.

However, even if the poets most often invoked by Heidegger are those already mentioned, there are counterexamples, too. One of these is to be found in the famous correspondence between Staiger and Heidegger on a poem by Eduard Mörike (a discussion later commented on by Spitzer).[16] Mörike is not one of the major poets, at least not in comparison with the poets Heidegger usually read. He is a latecomer, who turns around and looks at the past with awe. So he does in the poem 'Eine Lampe', which describes an old, outmoded lamp:

> Ein Kunstgebild der echten Art. Wer achtet Sein?
> Was aber schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst.
>
> [A work of art of the true kind. Who notices it? / Yet what is beautiful seems blissful within itself.][17]

The starting point of the discussion between the literary scholar and the philosopher is the word *scheint* in the last line. Is it to be understood as *lucet* (shines) or as *videtur* (seems)? Heidegger, who argues that Hegel's aesthetics are present in the poem, suggests that it was the former; and Staiger, who believes that Mörike, not being an intellectual poet, has nothing to do with Hegel, uses *scheint* in the

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[15] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Stuttgart: Neske 1957.

[16] Cf. 'Zu einem Vers von Mörike: Ein Briefwechsel mit Martin Heidegger von Emil Staiger', in Martin Heidegger, *Denkerfahrungen 1910–1976*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1983, pp. 43–59. Staiger published the letters and commentaries by himself and Spitzer in the journal *Trivium* in 1951. A translation, completed by the remarks by Leo Spitzer and Staiger's response to them, has been published as 'A 1951 Dialogue on Interpretation: Emil Staiger, Martin Heidegger, Leo Spitzer', *PMLA*, vol. 105, no. 3, pp. 409–35 (hereafter referred to as 'A 1951 Dialogue').

[17] Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 43 (trans. in 'A 1951 Dialogue', p. 413).

latter meaning. Interestingly, Heidegger is not only prone to agree with Staiger that the *Stimmung* of the poem is melancholy (*Wehmut*), but he also qualifies it as a *Grundstimmung*. The question in the poem about who might be interested in this old lamp is nostalgic, Heidegger says, because the implicit answer is that nobody is any more, or perhaps only a few people. And he comments:

> The question is uttered sadly. Melancholy speaks in the poem because the work of art in its essence escapes man. The poet can be affected by this melancholy mood, however, since he is one of those who remain sensitive to the essence of the artwork. It is for this reason, too, that the melancholy mood cannot depress him. He holds his place against it.[18]

It is something extraordinary. That has to do with the obvious sensitivity for the tone in the poem, but it is only the first step into something that changes ideas about Heidegger's relation to poetry. Heidegger, who otherwise only shows an interest in reading a small group of outstanding poets, not only includes Mörike but also deals with a *Grundstimmung* that emerges in a poem by a simple 'epigone': 'As an epigone, he has evidently seen more and borne more than his predecessors have.'[19] Just as was the case with the discussion about the different *Stimmungen* and *Befindlichkeiten* in *Sein und Zeit*, focused on anxiety but also relevant for all other *Stimmungen*, Heidegger's point of reference is the elevated *Stimmungen* like those in Hölderlin – but this no longer excludes lesser poets and more marginal *Stimmungen*. (I must add that Spitzer in an inimitable way brought all his skills in 'historical semantics' into play when commenting on *scheinen*. Staiger had the last word and, in defending that the *Stimmung* really was melancholic, he also said that the whole discussion had imposed heavily on the poem. They surely had been *unfein*, indelicate, in their treatment – especially Spitzer, we may presume.)[20]

A swinging framework arising from the word distribution and the choice of words: even if we do not fall prey to an associative reading where something that swings might hint at the vibrations of a tone and where *Gefüge* is dealt with as a curious German expression for 'fugue', the sparse methodological comments about how to relate to *Stimmungen* cannot lead to any better understanding of *Stimmung* in music. A tone of a question in a poem, heard as an inner voice when reading: here we have an occasion where the traditional idea of how music relates to language – namely a musical phrase imitating the voice uttering words with a

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18 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 55 (trans. in 'A 1951 Dialogue', p. 425).

19 In Heidegger, op. cit., p. 57 (trans. in 'A 1951 Dialogue', p. 426).

20 Cf. 'A 1951 Dialogue'. Hans-Georg von Arburg has commented on the discussion between Staiger, Heidegger and Spitzer, arguing that Spitzer has the most clever solution for dealing with *Stimmungen* in the act of reading, namely through the interplay between a first harmonious *Stimmung* and a second, discordant one. Cf. Hans-Georg von Arburg, 'Stimmung und Methode? Überlegungen zur Staiger-Heidegger-Spitzer-Debatte', in Arburg and Rickenbacher, *Concordia discors*, pp. 245–59.

specific contour, telling the listener something about the emotional state of the speaker – may be actualized. Yet, even if one should not ignore the importance of such an imitation for musical understanding, it is unlikely that this kind of detail in a musical performance is decisive for the *Stimmung*.

No, even if Heidegger's *denkerische* readings of poetry do say something about what *Stimmung* is, they give no hint of which way to consider when we turn to another art. It is another text that gives the direction, namely Heidegger's *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. Not that Heidegger suggested a blueprint for the investigation of *Stimmung* there; but, as already stressed, when his phenomenology of boredom was developed, he offered some themes that might be useful in music, too. One of the major differences between the three different kinds of boredom concerns temporality: time is dragging in the first kind of boredom; it is brought to a standstill in the second; and in the last it manifests itself as an entrancing horizon beyond any movement or standing. Being the art of time *par excellence*, music can likewise change temporality.

The second hint was given when in *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'* Heidegger said that the fundamental attunement determines the ground and space of the poem, and discloses a world. The third hint came when he expounded the setting up of a world in the work of art, including the musical work, in 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes': when the world worlds, all things gain their mobility and spatiality. The fourth hint, from the same text, concerns that upon which the world rises, namely earth, which in music is the tone or sound (*klingender Ton*). If these four hints are combined, we might come closer to the solution of the problem. We have the world with four dimensions, and step by step we might come closer to the formulation of the central questions concerning the musical work and attunement.

But we cannot simply transfer philosophical terms to conventional musical terms. For instance, temporality is not tempo. A difference between the two notions is that tempo can be measured easily: for instance, Béla Bartók indicates ♩ = 60 (56–63) in the introductory Lento of his first quartet, and in *Le Marteau sans maître* Pierre Boulez prescribes that the tempo ♪= 60 should be held 'rigoureusement exact' in the beginning of the Lent of 'commentaire I de "bourreaux de solitude"'. This has obviously little to do with the temporality that reigns in these works. Furthermore, temporality is not rhythm. Whereas the rhythmic design in Elliott Carter's way of composing can be described, this description says nothing about the temporality. When one elucidates the temporality of music, the musical work is not an investigated object; instead the temporality is unfolded. The temporality of music is how time passes in music when someone listens, not how the rhythmical structure is constituted.

Even more central is the question of world, since the dimensions of the world are the world itself: the setting up of a world in the musical work cannot be reduced to something measurable and fixable. One cannot find a world in a description of the development of the themes of a movement composed in sonata form, just as one can scarcely hope to find it in the statistics of a musical work analysed

with set theory. Admittedly, the development of themes and the unity of motifs may indicate how the world is set up, but they are only marginal aspects of the worldliness of the work; they say how the work is constructed, but not how the world is worlding in the work of art.

Heidegger only mentions the musical work in his text on the origin of the artwork. He says that, like all other arts, music has its 'earthy' aspects, namely that which makes the note sound. The musical work of art allows the note to come forth, out into the open of its world. Still, we seek in vain if we want to read something on the worlding of this musical world; there is nothing in that central text – and nothing elsewhere in his works. To be able to proceed, we will therefore have to auscultate this text in order to find out if something can be transferred to the question of the world of the musical work; but we can also to look for alternatives by philosophers relating to Heidegger's discussion.

Firstly, one of the central formulations in Heidegger's text on how the world worlds is: 'By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their distance and proximity, their breadth and their limits.'[21] Here, the world makes room for spatiality, with its own kind of distance and closeness, but there is also a temporality of its own kind where rest or haste prevail.[22] It is not relations between points in three-dimensional space, but something that is distant or close in a specific spatiality; it is not a matter of definable points in time, but something that brings forth moments of rest or of haste. These relations can be said to be two kinds of relations constituting musical meaning, where meaning does not implicate any referentiality but where it is constituted in terms of strictly musical relations.

Instead, we may learn something more from the discussion on *Stimmung* in literature (combined with Heidegger's phenomenological investigation of boredom). Heidegger, Staiger and Gumbrecht all agree on the impossibility of developing a theory or a method to detect *Stimmungen* – yet, they have all been dealing with these in different ways. The *Stimmung* is not *something*, not an object that can be investigated, but nevertheless it is there: the reader is attuned. They have all three testified that they have been attuned, and then 'musical' aspects play a prominent role in these testimonies: the melodic shape of the inner voice of a poem (Heidegger); the sounding and swinging framework (Heidegger again); the metaphor of an attuning and preluding piano part in a *Lied* (Staiger); a specific sound or a rhythm (Gumbrecht). The character of simile of all these examples (except for Gumbrecht's) seems to be clear, so what shall we do when we turn to

[21] Heidegger, 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', p. 31 (trans. Young and Haynes, in *Off the Beaten Track*, p. 23).

[22] Mikel Dufrenne has elaborated the notions of temporality and spatiality of the musical work, responding to Heidegger's 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes': according to him, the rhythmic flow indicates the temporality, whereas the harmony indicates the spatiality; however, the notion of a musical world appears only when Dufrenne discusses another element of music, the melody. Cf. Mikel Dufrenne, *Phénoménologie de l'experience esthétique*, vol. 1, *L'Objet esthétique*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France 1953, pp. 241, 242 and 234.

the art that has been giving the impulse to the notions? There seems to be no way to circumnavigate the obstacle put up by the non-objective character of *Stimmung*. It is the same in music as it is in literature. But perhaps is not the testimonial character – to which Gumbrecht pays attention when he speaks of the reader being wrapped up in something; Heidegger when in the lecture on boredom he awakens exactly this mood; or Staiger when he speaks of how the readers must open themselves to the flow of the poem – a weakness. But rather it is the small gate, the narrow way that leads to the *Stimmung* that is still alive. In that case, the same might be supposed to be a possibility in music, too.

Accordingly, my presumption is that the only way to deal with musical *Stimmungen* in language is to give a testimony of them. But, disagreeing with Gumbrecht and Staiger, I am not inclined to say that there is no way to draw up guidelines for what I will call the elucidation of attunements. Temporal aspects and the emergence of a world are central in Heidegger's discussion about *Stimmung*. The emergence can only be testified if listened to: the world is strictly auditory. So, what I shall propose in the next section of this chapter is a way of listening, an attunemental mode of listening. It is not directly focused on the attunement because, had it been thus, the attunement would have disappeared. Instead, the act of listening will give a testimony of how the world is worlding, that is, it will not describe the world but testify to its worlding. The attunement tunes the world, and being in the apt mode of listening the listener will hear how this happens.

No specific element can be said to give birth to attunement, and therefore we cannot have a summary for detecting what we are looking for. But when the attunement changes, time is also changed. So the question is: *What kind of temporality belongs to this world?* In the attunement, space is changed: *What kind of spatiality belongs to this world?* When time and space change, the movements in it also change: *What kind of mobility belongs to this world?* And, finally, all these changes are materialized; or, more exactly, they rest upon a sound and let this sound come forth, be it heavy or light, be it hard or smooth: *What kind of materiality belongs to this world?* These four questions can be said to be four main themes in the attunemental elucidation. They do not force themselves upon the music; instead they let it be. They will not point out any details, but lead to the emerging temporality, spatiality, mobility and materiality. And hereby, we may verbalize the attunement, understand if it has a name or if it is nameless; perhaps we may even verbalize the attunement attuned to it, giving voice to an attuned verbalization.

## The Attunemental Mode of Listening

### *The Musical World and Its Dimensions*

We have to do with a common experience that every listener knows everything about until he or she has to explain what it is. In English, it has usually been called 'mood', but this notion is limited compared with *Stimmung*, although in

the following description of the mode of listening adjusted to that phenomenon it seems to be the right moment to use an English word. Thus it also seems to be legitimate to use 'attunement', since it answers to the flexibility of *Stimmung*, connecting the tuning of an instrument with the human mind and combining a primordial passivity with an openness where activity is made possible (here Wackenroder had much to tell us in Chapter 1). This attunement cannot be reached through an analysis of a piece of music, since it is impossible to say that a specific rhythm, a certain combination of chords or a contour of a melody is the reason why the attunement emerges. Yet, without rhythm, without chords, without a pitch contour (at least one, though normally all of these elements) the attunement does not emerge. It cannot be localized in the subject of the listener, since the idea of a subject and an object is not compatible with the phenomenon.

The number of negations can be enlarged. Since a simple relation between a musical structure and the attunement is impossible to discern, we cannot speak about the attunement as an example of music as a language of feelings. Further, even if there might be some parallels between the attunements and the conventional set of feelings – like fear, happiness, fury and enthusiasm – there must be room for the kind of attunements which in the history of musical aesthetics has been called *musikalische Stimmungen*, 'musical moods'. It may be that the attunement can be given a name, often a conventional one at that, but the range of attunements cannot be limited to the names at hand. We can describe these attunements, they are not something foreign to language; but normally, if they have been given a name, they are changed and stabilized in a way that distorts them. Yet, we may verbalize them without distorting them, but only if we find a way of doing so that precedes the naming of them (thereby protecting them from being something akin to musical concepts, as if all music were a gigantic list of leitmotifs).

Consequently, we cannot start with a set of affective terms and see if they can be combined with an actual piece of music. We have to start with the 'tuning-in' of the music, the musical world. But to listen to music does not always mean that the listener is attuned to it. The attunement can fail to appear. In these cases, the listener can still be able to say that the piece of music is a sad one, or a bright one; if the listener knows the terminology, the reason why the impression is such and such might be pointed out. In other words, the character of the music can be defined without the appearance of the phenomenon of attunement. Character is not attunement.

In the following, I shall describe different dimensions of the musical world in which the listener partakes, being musically attuned. Accordingly, I shall pose thematic questions on temporality, spatiality, mobility and materiality. These questions all have to do with listening; they ask for the way in which the world comes forth when a musical work is listened to. There is no reason to believe that there are no other dimensions of any importance, but those mentioned here are the most salient: the crucial point is the worlding of the world, not the dimensions themselves.

*Temporality* Attunement emerges when the listener and the music enter into a particular relation. It is not enough to say that we as listeners partake in the flux of music, even that we are a part of it. No, attunement is when the musical time is the listener's own time. When there is attunement, the music tunes the listener in a primordial way – that is, not necessarily through imposing itself upon the listener, but also through releasement. Alfred Schütz has described this partaking as a 'tuning-in' that is common to both the musicians and the audience, an observation that establishes the experience of time as shared.[23] Most often, this attunement takes place when we want to have a musical experience, but sometimes the music tunes us when we are not prepared for it (passing a loudspeaker at the supermarket) or even against our will (being in a situation where we are forced to listen to a kind of music we detest). Sometimes, we have to battle against ourselves to be attuned, but even then attunement emerges on its own terms.

When attuned, the listener's sense of time is determined by the music, and this aspect can therefore be described as the musical *temporality*: time then passes with a sometimes stable, sometimes changing character. Hegel writes that the tone 'sets the self in motion by means of the temporal movement and its rhythm',[24] a relation that can be expressed in words less bound to interrelations between self, ego, subject and object: the relation between tones and listener is such that when the musical sound is in force, its temporality is also the temporality of the listener; it attunes the listener with means of temporal movement and rhythm.[25]

The attunement does not happen in a now. We should remember that Heidegger conceived of *Stimmung* as being grounded on having-been, and future and present temporalize themselves out of this. Therefore, the attunement has always already happened, and the present and future are founded in this happening. Having already happened, the attunement is not present; it belongs to a passed moment and it is out of reach. This is an aspect of the passivity of attunement, whereas understanding is directed into the future, working out the future actively. However, even if all attunements are grounded on having-been, they may also have a tendency concerning present and future. In one of Heidegger's modes of boredom, time was brought to a standstill, and hope speaks about prospects. Therefore, the listener still stands out in temporality in three different ways: having-been, present and future. But attunement is not a now-point with a having-been and a future; instead the present and the future are temporalized out of the having-been.

How does this happen when listening? Take for instance the beginning of the Adagio in Bruckner's Symphony No. 8 (Example 3.1): the directed but open temporality in the first, long wave of sound; and then a second coming that

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[23] Cf. Alfred Schütz, 'Making Music Together: A Study in Social Relationship', in *Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory*, The Hague: Nijhoff 1964, pp. 159–78.

[24] Hegel, *Ästhetik*, vol. 3, p. 156 (trans. in Knox, op. cit., p. 908).

[25] Cf. Andreas Luckner, 'Zeit, Begriff und Rhythmus: Hegel, Heidegger und die elementarische Macht der Musik', in Richard Klein et al. (eds), *Musik in der Zeit: Zeit in der Musik*, Weilerswist: Velbrück 2000, pp. 108–38.

Example 3.1 Anton Bruckner, Eighth Symphony in C minor (1890 version, ed. by Leopold Nowak), third movement: Adagio, bars 1–28




Vn. I & II + Fl., Ob., Clar.
17
Vn. I & II
breit und markig
Hn., Tuben, Trbn. & Cb.-Tuba
Vla.
Vc.
Vla.
Vc. & Cb.
Cb.
23
Vn. I & II + Ob. & Clar.
lang gestrichen
Vn. I & II + Vla.
Vla., Vc. & Cb.
Vc. & Cb.
Trbn.
Hn. & Cb.-Tuba
Harp
26
Vn. I & II + Vla.
Vc. & Cb.
Harp

emerges out of the stillness without any urge to continue (from bar 21). The initial slow rocking rhythm (yes, of course we can perceive the syncopated rhythm establishing the rocking quality, but as soon as it is pointed out it wholly dominates the attention, with the consequence that the world disappears or is biased) is a gentle moving on; and then, in the next step in the course of events, the music seems to slow down despite its stable pace. Even if the tempo has not changed, the temporality, or the flow of time inherent in the music, is changed.[26] Being that temporality, the listener is changed, too.

Obviously, there is an interplay between the three temporal modes – having-been, present and future – in the elongated wave of sound from the beginning, with the melody slowly unfolding itself in a series of phases that indicate a continuation, but always with the point of reference in the initial rocking rhythm. Then the new, slower temporality establishes a situation where the three temporal modes are working in a new way, now forming a course of greater stature. However, the change of temporality does not mean that there is no relation between the first and the second temporality. There is a relation back to the first temporality in play when the new temporality is established, even though the music seems to proceed towards an open future.

*Spatiality* Temporality is perhaps the most explicit element in the phenomenon of being-in-tune, but attunement is not restricted to this: temporality is only one of the salient dimensions of the world. This world we can only listen to. It is a strictly auditory world. Everything that happens in this world depends on its status of being auditory. If movements are auditory, they cannot be described as following a line from one point in space to another, like a movement in space. Hence, it is not space in the conventional sense, but a musical *spatiality*.

Physical space might be of importance for the aesthetic experience (this kind of space is the distance between musicians and audience in the concert hall, or the perception of a distance when listening to music on the stereo), but it has no relevance for the spatiality that emerges in the attunement. Movement in music indicates 'a movement from … to … ', but there are no specific points to look for. Of course one can consult the score and say that a musical process begins in one bar and ends ten bars later, leading from one point to another, but this kind of observation does not provide an answer to how the music continues out of a past and, further, is drawn into a future. In music, the 'points' are only hinted at,

[26] It is, and this goes without saying, a matter of interpretation. The score is clean, only indicating 'breit und markig' before the entry of the second theme. Eugen Jochum/Hamburg State Philharmonic (1949) dissolves the first bars in a dark haze and brings the temporality into a standstill before the second theme (DG 449 758–2, 1997). Bernard Haitink/Royal Concertgebouw Orchestra (1960) is a little bit quicker, but in this interpretation the syncopated rhythm is rocking and the transition over the cadence without delay – the temporal change is underscored (Philips 442 040–2, 1994).

they are ever-changing. Yet, if the listener is going to tell somebody about this spatiality, it must be indicated in some way or another.

In Bruckner's Adagio, the first movement starts within a narrow spatiality, but it is widened and opened up. This very simple change can be described in a more complex and detailed way. The first 17 bars contain a culmination reaching from the slowly rocking chord in D♭ major to a rising pillar in A major, a change where the rhythm and the steady D♭/C♯ in the contrabasses give a stable reference, but where there is a striving forward without a defined goal and where the A-major chord is destabilized by not being in root position. In the beginning, the tonal range is limited to two and a half octaves but is then expanded step by step to almost six octaves; and here another dimension of the spatiality emerges, stretching out a closed space into an open one. Here, we are back in the first, simple wording, which actually is more exact, telling us about the spatiality of the world that emerges. Furthermore, the first dimension can be said to indicate the horizon of the spatiality, whereas the latter indicates a vertical dimension.

These spatialities are not abstractions or metaphors; from an attunemental point of view this is how the music is embodied. Musical spatiality is nothing other than the expanded spatiality of the lived body: the music articulates a spatiality that changes the listener if he or she is attuned to the musical event. Where are we when we listen to music? Sloterdijk's question is vital for the act of listening.[27] We are not in the concert hall, we are not sitting on the sofa and we are not using our earphones on the bus. However, the earphones give the best illustration of what happens, since they block out the surrounding world: that is also what happens on the sofa. In the concert hall, the audience both listens and looks, but the world is musicalized (it is not by chance that we speak about an auditorium). The musical world invades the listener, and the spatiality coming forth is the one of the music, an auditory spatiality. It is important to stress that this spatiality is primordial in the act of listening. Bars can be pointed out, structures can be unveiled, analysis can be used as a tool; but nothing here explains the spatiality. We are alerted by a detail, as Gumbrecht would say, but we can only give a testimony; there is no technical evidence.

*Mobility* In this world, we find movements, not only in the sense of being a movement 'from … to … ', but also such as giving character to the music. It may not seem necessary to introduce something like movements when the notion of temporality is already there, but there is a difference between the temporal unfolding and the specific movements, which are constitutive for the overall dynamic character of the world. The 'being-there' in music has therefore not only to do with temporality and spatiality. Closely connected to both, but a dimension in its own right, is the way the music moves, and therefore how it moves the listener or even how the music is the listener's movement. Following the word formation of *temporality* and *spatiality*, and indicating the same kind of ecstatic

[27] Cf. Sloterdijk, 'Wo sind wir, wenn wir Musik hören?', pp. 294–325.

position – not residing in the subject, but being in the music – I suggest that this kind of movement be called the *mobility* of music. The mobility has to do with the temporality, since the temporality of a musical work of art is dependent on how the music moves; but one should distinguish between the manner in which time is unfolded and the character of movements.

In the mobility of music, musical gestures have their place, but so does the sense of direction or non-direction in terms of teleological forms. Still, the notion of mobility must not be understood as another name for different musical forms, like binary and ternary form, and sonata form and rondo, all of them analytical terms, but instead it answers to the principle of movement inherent in these forms. Furthermore, the mobility of music has to do with the embodied movements which are discerned as changes in the disposition and dynamics of the lived body; and even if Fuchs's idea of an alphabet of the attunemental space (*Stimmungsraum*) and Schmitz's prospected alphabet of feelings must be discarded, the movement of the embodied music must be taken into account.

Mobility responds to a pronounced theme in the aesthetics of music, where musical movement leads to different formulations of an energetic conception of music, including its form.[28] From Herder to Kurth and Mersmann, and to Theodor W. Adorno and Roger Scruton, the way music moves is also the way in which music moves us. Even Hanslick puts movement into the centre of his musical aesthetics, speaking about *tönend-bewegte Formen*, a phrase that would become the cornerstone of the formalist creed. The status of movement shifts, as we can see: some of the authors treat it as a metaphor (Kurth and Scruton), while some of them try to resist the solution of taking it metaphorically (Hanslick and Adorno);[29] but without it music is no longer music. I suggest that the introduction of the lived body gives the necessary ground upon which this mobility can be understood: as the musical mobility of the lived body.

Again, we can bring in Bruckner's Adagio for a hearing: the rocking mobility is introduced from the beginning; long-spun melodic lines emerge; a directedness can be discerned; and the flow desires to reach a rest that never appears. Instead of being released, the flow slows down and begins to tower up, with the rocking rhythm becoming fixated at the first climax, followed by a long fall in the violins, down to the fundament. Everything seems to start anew, but with the first wave as a point of reference: in a way the form of the wave is the same, from a meek start to a magnificent gesture; but the mobility has an entirely new character, now solemn and circumscribed before being released in a glittering movement downwards from high above. Proceeding through this introductory section, more and more types of mobility follow, all of them contributing to making a musical world present. Each kind of mobility can be described in terms of embodiment, and they change the dynamics of the lived body of the listener. Here, we are touching upon

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[28] Cf. Köhler, *Natur und Geist*.

[29] Cf. Lydia Goehr, 'Doppelbewegung', in *Elective Affinities: Musical Essays on the History of Aesthetic Theory*, New York: Columbia University Press 2008, pp. 1–44.

the spatiality of music, since the movement has an embodied direction or describes a curve. Still, since the mobility cannot be reduced to either the temporality or spatiality, and not being a combination of those elements, it should be elaborated as an aspect of the attunemental mode of listening.

*Materiality* A last theme is the *materiality* of music, that which is put forth by the world and upon which the world rests. Here, again, some points are in common with the other themes, perhaps not temporality, directly; rather spatiality and mobility (and therefore, indirectly, temporality). The materiality comes forth in what is hard and what is weak, what is heavy and what is penetrating, or what is atmospheric and embracing, but also in different kinds of structures or, contrarily, in decomposition and dissolution. Ernst Kurth makes a pivotal point when he describes two roots to the materiality (he speaks then, however, about the impression or even the illusion of it): on the one hand a materiality that appears in the dynamics, which is close to the mobility just described; on the other hand the sensation of the tone, in contrast to the note.[30] In the latter case, we are close to that which Heidegger called earth, but then earth as integrated in the world being the fundament upon which the world opens up. That is also how it shall be understood here.

Materiality is, perhaps, the most enigmatic of all the four themes, not in itself but in relation to Heidegger's *Erde*. It is something that is both brought forth in the world and concealed in senselessness. If the work articulates a struggle between world and earth, then earth is withdrawn from the historical world. However, earth cannot be said to be without any relation to that historical world – the work opens a world and sets it back onto the earth, which comes forth as ground. But if the stone in the Greek temple offers resistance to the historical world, the tone of the instrument is in many cases not just withdrawn, but extinct. In a parallel case, Gumbrecht assumes that the materiality of language, its rhythm and its rhymes, is a substance that defies history.[31] I would not go as far as that, not only because of the troubles a concept such as substance brings about; but I would say that despite the fact that performance practice changes and instruments literally fall apart, there is a concealed materiality that endures.

Even if Heidegger seems to bring about a new understanding of the work of art when he introduces *Erde* in his thinking, and even if he does not relate his notion of *Klang* (the musical sound) to musical aesthetics, we can find earlier attempts of thinking along the same lines, of course without any relation to Heidegger's ever-present question of Being. Musical materiality is that which both disturbed and challenged Schiller in his few approaches to music: eradicating self and rationality, being incompatible with ideas and concepts, a material force that must be shaped to be appreciated. Its impact is unmediated; it is the 'direct factor' of music according to Fechner, and Volkelt stressed the directness, too, contrasting

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30 Kurth, *Musikpsychologie*, pp. 137–8.

31 Cf. the discussion in the last section of this chapter.

it to the listener's empathetic capacity for finding analogies between music on the one hand and on the other hand movements in the outer world and the perception of the body.

As soon as this materiality is described, language brings to it meaning and order, and this changes materiality into something that it is not; brought to unconcealment, it is also concealed. But the materiality is not only concealed; it is also brought forth in the world. It might be the clarity of the first movement of Mozart's Piano Sonata in C major (KV 545) where the musical order is established immediately by the Alberti bass – the hierarchies are there at once, structures relying on a stylistic scheme; or, to choose an opposite to Mozart, the unclear beginning of Janáček's *Dans les brumes*, with its amorphous sonorities.

Turning to the Bruckner movement one last time, the darkness in the first bars – clearly deriving from the steady bass movement, shaded in different ways when other layers emerge – is suddenly changed in the second part of the opening section through 'heavenly' chords in the violins (so Kurth calls them) with the meanders of the harp's broken chords shining through. Here, we have a change in terms of light – the dominance of high strings and the brilliance of the harps – but also of the kinds of mobility and structure, where the austerity has changed into clarity. Here, the sound is put forth in the world; for a moment it is as if that which upon music rests, the pure *Klang*, shines through with a strong light before being concealed once again.

I have come back to Bruckner's Adagio many times now because it is a telling example of how a world emerges in music, and of a work that has an extraordinary capability of tuning a listener. But there are also other worlds, distinct like Mozart's or indistinct like that of Janáček. There is a world in all music, and every musical world is a stage for listening.

Is it possible, then, to say something about the attunement of the Bruckner example? Well, we have only touched upon the world emerging in that movement, commenting on the first half of the exposition, so it is impossible to say anything about the movement as a whole. Nevertheless, attunements are established at once, even if they may be hidden. We seem to be close to Bollnow's description of a *Stimmung* characterized by both weight and elevation, that procedural mobility of a celebration where directedness is turned to timelessness – *das Feierliche*. And the score says *Feierlich langsam; doch nicht schleppend*. This time, the naming was easy, but this swiftness is telling: the naming says little about the emerging world; this role is instead taken by the testifying statement of what takes place.

The proposed mode is a listening that opens itself up to the world worlding in the musical work. This worlding is found in all music, but the magnitude, the intensity, the wealth of details, the suggestiveness all differ. The world is no object. We cannot reach out to it, investigate it in different ways and with different means, since it resists objectification – or better: it is disclosed but turns away as soon as it is objectified. The listener does not act as a subject: listening in this way means neither investigating a musical object to find out what happens nor turning inside to see what has happened; instead, it is being in the music.

Therefore, what I am suggesting is not a theoretical framework for the investigation of attunement, but a mode of listening which turns to the musical world opened up by the musical work. If we ask questions about temporality, spatiality, mobility and materiality we partake in the world; indeed, they elucidate how the world is presenting itself. They are not separated from each other, like new terms for what we already know as the parameters of music, parameters which facilitate analytic reasoning about music; instead they are intertwined, partly covering each other, naming the same event in music in different ways. They are not analytical tools, but starting-points for the elucidation of how the listener is 'wrapped into' something (to use Gumbrecht's phrasing) or how the *Grundstimmung* discloses the world (to use Heidegger's expression). Finally, it is not a model for the investigation of an object, but simply a mode of listening, where object and subject are left behind as misleading conceptions of what concerns the phenomenon of attunement.

*Historicity in a Double Sense: The Situated Listener*

The meeting with the musical world is characterized by the historicity of the human being. Since the core of my argument is a mode of listening, the musical work of art is not expected to be found in the score, but in the presentation or interpretation of the work. It is easy to see why. The world of the musical work differs definitely when interpreted, in concretizations. When Arthur Schnabel is heard playing the slow movement of Beethoven's *Hammerklavier* sonata as it was recorded in the Abbey Road studio no. 3 in 1935, the mobility is of a totally different kind in comparison with the interpretation made in the same studio by Solomon Cutner 17 years later. Schnabel's version is very slow (17′56),[32] Solomon's extremely slow (22′20).[33] It is exactly this slowness, when put in relation to the pianists' mastery of organic development, which is characteristic in their interpretations; but whereas Schnabel always has a direction, Solomon can put his musical lines at rest or even dissolve the structure into a Chopinesque daze.

As we know very well, there may also be great differences between performances of one and the same interpreter, like Wilhelm Kempff rendering the same movement in his second recording of the cycle in the 1950s and his third in the 1960s. The recording from 1951 is not only more than a minute faster (15′21) than the one made in 1964 (16′31), but also the temporality is more directed forwards through a mobility that has a dance-like fundament of a waltz, albeit a slow one.[34]

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[32] Ludwig van Beethoven, *The Complete Piano Sonatas*, Arthur Schnabel (piano), EMI CHS 7 63765 2, 1991 (1935).

[33] Ludwig van Beethoven, *Beethoven Edition*, Solomon Cutner (piano), Brilliant Classics 93553/95, 2007 (1952).

[34] Ludwig van Beethoven, *The Piano Sonatas*, Wilhelm Kempff (piano), Deutsche Grammophon DG 447 966–2, 1995 (1951); Ludwig van Beethoven, *Piano Sonatas*, Wilhelm Kempff (piano), Deutsche Grammophon DG 453 724–2, 1997 (1964).

Consequently, when the description is made of how the attunemental mode of listening meets a musical work, it must be made clear which concretization is the point of departure.

However, the reading of a score may also be an act of listening. This reading differs from the ordinary analysis of the score through the interpretation: at the same time as the work attunes the reader/listener, the interpretation renders the musical work in a specific way: defines the temporality, spatiality, mobility and materiality of that work. It means that the complete reading of the score is an artful interpretation.

Another essential aspect concerns the musical work of art being made present in different ways in different acts of listening. If the interpreter has been *listening* to the musical work, the listener listens to a 'listening', just as a literary scholar who investigates reception history must handle different readings of one and the same literary work. We must then be aware of our not being able to accomplish the same kind of listening as the audience of the past when we hear the recording of, say, Vladimir Sofronitsky playing Scriabin's Piano Sonata No. 3 for radio listeners in the former Soviet Union. That is a commonplace. In attunemental terms, history changes the conditions for the temporality inherent in the music as well as its spatiality and mobility, whereas the materiality is more ambiguous: being part of the world, it changes just like the other dimensions; but, answering to that which Heidegger calls *Erde*, it is also withdrawn from the historical world.

Even if the circumstances for the attunement have changed, we can also be at least partly attuned to the world of those past days: through the act of listening the past resonates in the present. There is a historical dimension to the attunement in the musical work and its emergence. It may be that the attuned world escapes the listener; that the music does not speak, or seems to speak a dead language. That does not mean that the attunement is something determined solely by the present, a kind of construction made by a modern subject, because the attunement might be awakened in the act of listening. It may be foreign to the listener, it might be impossible for the listener to be attuned by it; but at the same time that which seems to be foreign may also give resonance when listened to.[35]

However, in music we have to do with worlds much more distant than the one made present for the Soviet listeners of the 1950s. World in Heidegger has not just to do with the meaning of slow and fast, of width and narrowness; it also concerns attitudes, convictions and faith. In the period of societal upheaval in Germany of the late 1920s and the 1930s, the concert system of the bourgeoisie suddenly

[35] Compared with a hermeneutics of a Gadamerian kind, this approach does not aim at meaning, it does not rely on an unbroken *Wirkungsgeschichte* and the relation to the past is not formulated in terms of a fusion of horizons, but as resonance. I would like to mention Anders Olsson's *Den okända texten: En essä om tolkningsteori från kyrkofäderna till Derrida* [The Unknown Text: An Essay on the Theory of Interpretation from the Fathers of the Church to Derrida], Stockholm: Bonniers 1987, which has long been important for my apprehension of hermeneutics.

lost its relevance, and the inwardness of Romantic music-making was felt to be an anomaly. This musical culture survived because its strength was greater than the forces that threatened it. Should not these attitudes and convictions, this faith that makes music into a kind of religion substitute, be separated from the thematic auscultation of temporality, spatiality, mobility and materiality? Does not 'world' mean two different things here? In Heidegger, the work of art is changed into an object (*Gegenstand*) when the world of that work dies. The ancient Greek temple is no longer a sacred place; it is just a building or a ruin to be investigated by archaeologists or consumed aesthetically by tourists. What about the musical worlds and their attunement?

A banal but telling example is the musical element of the 'Christmas spirit' (or, as it is sometimes called, Christmas mood). The atmosphere of Christmas is to no small extent dependent on music: all those Christmas carols, songs, dance games, and even purely instrumental music like Corelli's 'Christmas Concerto'. However, this world has changed, too, even if the songs are the same: if all this music made Christmas into the holy night 50 or 60 years ago, then thorough secularization has changed its meaning today. It is still Christmas, but not sacred (at least not to the majority of Europeans). The world is another.

What has been described in quite general terms here is thoroughly elaborated by Heidegger. In his *Seinsgeschichte*, Being is given or refused in different ways, depending on the point in that history. Every new era is characterized by a specific *Grundstimmung*, or tuned by a fundamental attunement: *die Stimmung ist die Stimme des Seins*, the attunement is the voice (or, indeed, tuning) of Being. If, then, every important work of art has to emerge from a *Grundstimmung*, the work is also characterized by it. The dilemma is that the *Grundstimmung* tuning the work of art might be other than that of the listener; and only if that *Stimmung* is still latent, still able to be awakened, can the listener resonate with the world of the work. If the world is gone, the listener may still resonate, but then not according to the primordial world disclosure.

In music, the circumstances are even more complicated: in order to make the work present, the musical work of art must be played and interpreted. The musicians may be called *listeners*, listening to the work as they play and making the work present to the actual listener. But in music we are also dealing with past recordings, being made sometimes 100 years ago, and therefore stemming from another era. It is true that most recordings come from one and the same era, our own, and hence are probably attuned to the same fundamental attunement. If we follow Heidegger, ours is the era of technological enframing (*Gestell*), and certainly all kinds of recordings are examples of that enframing; yet, following him it seems as if the fundamental attunements have changed. Heidegger wrote about anxiety in 1927, spoke about boredom in 1929–30, brought reservedness into the foreground in the 1930s. This variety might give the impression of a thinker who hesitates or changes his mind, but it also points at a potential of different *Grundstimmungen* being present at the same time, being fruitful for a musical elucidation. Still, one may expect a historical difference, able to be elucidated

as an attunemental difference, between the 72-year-old Joseph Joachim playing the Prelude of Bach's G minor sonata for violin solo in 1903[36] and the listener of today. Brahms's friend, deeply rooted in the musical traditions of the nineteenth century, is not a part of our times in the way in which, for instance, Jascha Heifetz is, who made his first recordings only seven years later. Whereas Joachim's style of playing, well balanced but with small errors in details, shows how different the attitude to recording and interpretation was at the time in comparison to our own, Heifetz is one of the major examples of a musician whose brilliant, flawless technique seems to be wholly adapted to the era of recordings and reproduction. Nevertheless, both of them are characterized by an ideal of playing correctly and being faithful to the work.

A preliminary and schematic attunemental elucidation would therefore say that Bach's prelude – being a seemingly free, introductory moment before the highly regulated fugue in four parts that follows, yet written out in every detail and hence totally closed – is rendered by Joachim in a way that preserves the fundamental attunement of certainty, even if the superfluous layers of his interpretation may deviate from what would be expected by modern ears. Here, the attitude concerning affects and expressivity is left aside, all in order to suggest something about the fundamental attunement in the relation between the piece, the interpreter and the listener.

If, up to now, the importance of historical layers has been stressed, how then can the relation between listener and the music in the attunemental mode of listening be described? When the listener is attuned to music, there are no such things as 'outside' and 'inside'.[37] In the phenomenon of musical attunement, the temporality of the music is the temporality of the listener, and that accounts for the spatiality, mobility and materiality too. When something around the listener intrudes, when he or she becomes aware of someone making a noise in the audience, when the light in the concert hall is changed or a person starts to walk around, then the spell of the attunement runs the risk of being broken. The listener is not in the everyday world, but in the world of the musical work, a world without time and space, but with temporality and spatiality, with mobility and materiality. The listener does not identify him- or herself with the work, because the identification can only be made when there is a distance between subject and object from the start; nor does the listener let himself or herself sink into the music in an empathetic act, since the subject in that case has to move itself in a specific direction. Both alternatives call for a reflection or at least an intentional act, which is incompatible with the attunement. Following Gernot Böhme, the

[36] Both work and interpreter are qualified to be exemplary exponents of *Grundstimmungen*. Cf. *The Great Violinists: Recordings from 1900–1913*, Testament SBT2 1323, 2003 (1903).

[37] That is also the position of Peter Trawny (cf. *Martin Heideggers Phänomenologie der Welt*, p. 71). and Jan Frei (cf. 'Jenseits von "aussen" und "innen"').

lived body has to be juxtaposed with the conception of a fixed body, which is the borderline between the outside and the inside.

Furthermore, it seems to be reasonable that different kinds of music let different worlds emerge. The world of the Mozart piano sonata is not the same as that of the Bruckner movement; they not only behave in different ways, they also wrap the listener into different worlds, one of them allowing the listener to partake in a playful mode, the other being almost obtrusive in its attunement. The attunemental mode of listening does not imply one and only one fixed relation. Instead, attunement is that which situates the listener, and this is what regulates the relation between listener and music. The attunement, which in itself can neither be made into an object nor be said to be subjective, institutes that relation. It is that which makes the relation possible in the first place. Therefore, the attunement may have the characteristics of mood, letting the listener sink into the music; but it may also put the listener into a state of playfulness, where the subject is set free in relation to the musical events.

*The Mediated Relation to Conventional Analysis*

The different themes that have been presented above are open to certain objections concerning analysis. Are they not just some new notions in an analytic scheme? It may be true that tempo is not temporality, form not mobility; but is not the tearing apart of analysis inherent in the different headings? Another kind of objection concerns the unclear boundaries between the themes: since we already have the different parameters of music – where pitch gives rise to melody and thematic material, where rhythm can be said to be a foundation of movement and timbre is a much more clarifying word than materiality, all of them clear-cut and well defined, especially in relation to one another – why bother about finding new headings which are both abstruse and overlapping? The objections are interconnected. The obvious overlapping that takes place is one reason why the themes do not execute some kind of hidden analysis: the temporality is intertwined with the mobility; the spatiality cannot be understood without some kind of mobility; the materiality changes the spatiality of the work. Therefore the act of listening in the attunemental mode is not the same as analysis; it is not tearing the music apart.

But does that mean that conventional analysis must stay silent?[38] It is a question of explanatory power. Conventional analysis is (at its best) actually quite modest: it does not do anything other than identify specific traits in the musical work, such as harmony, rhythm, themes and form. Concomitantly, the wider issues of musical meaning, emotionality and societal impact are usually not included, so one can only ever find an unspoken claim or underlying presumption that the analysis says

[38] Lawrence Ferrara has discussed this issue of 'conventional methods'. His own eclectic solution, however, does not solve our problem: in his partly phenomenological model music is still objectified. Cf. Lawrence Ferrara, *Philosophy and the Analysis of Music: Bridges to Musical Sound, Form, and Reference*, New York: Greenwood 1991.

what the work really is or what it is about. The modesty lies in the limits set by the analyst, but there is of course an active exclusion making the modesty aggressive: questions of meaning, affectivity and societal impact are dispelled.

Schenkerian and post-Schenkerian analysis is, though, more pretentious. My conception of an attunemental mode of listening, as already stated several times, is not intended to be a method of analysis. When analysed, the attunement stays silent or becomes distorted. Analysis, of whatever kind, is not the way to attunement, but that does not mean it is of no interest at all. The reason is that analysis usually comes as the first principle in dealing with music, whereas I assume attunement to be primordial in the act of listening. The world is opened up in an attunement, and that means attunement is that which allows us to perceive different events in this world as events at all; and, being attuned to the musical work, we can bear witness to that world and its constituent characters (the analysing musicologist is also attuned, but we hardly ever see any signs of his or her being attuned to the world of the musical work). The temporality, spatiality, mobility and materiality of a musical work cannot be measured; the emerging of an attunement cannot be reduced to a detail in the work. Nevertheless, analytical findings give a heuristic orientation of the piece.

Attunement cannot be explained through musical analysis, but through different types of analysis one can suggest different interpretations of the attunement. These interpretations may have something to do with questions of form or musical syntax: the harmonious structure of classicism of course has an impact on the attunement, but the starting point must always be the attunement, which then leads to everything from overall characteristics to specific qualities. Long, stretched-out trajectories of chords, helping us to understand the harmonic development, have something to say about the general movement of a musical artwork. Key relations can give a hint of changes within a movement of the work, or the shift of attunement between different movements in a multi-movement tonal work. The idea of non-functional tonal forces and centres in atonal music are likewise signs that can be used when the elucidation of attunement is made. However, they are not technical evidence. At most they are circumstantial evidence.

## Elucidating in the Attunemental Mode: Beethoven's *Heiliger Dankgesang*

When *Stimmung*, now understood as attunement, was modulated back to music from the literary field, something happened that we recognize from earlier confrontations between music and language: that which seems to be a release from questions of interpretation and meaning in literature appears to be a movement directed towards the sphere of meaning in music. The paradox was also to be found in the understanding of what 'lyrical' is: lyrical poetry is attracted to the state of music, and lyrical pieces in music are attracted to a poetic state. So, when Gumbrecht says that *Stimmungen* in literature have a non-semantic substance, out of reach of hermeneutic excesses, the old paradox comes back in new guises,

because in the musicological understanding of *Stimmung* that phenomenon is thought to come close to some kind of meaning.

Gumbrecht writes about substance, about presence. He clearly distances himself from earlier hermeneutic stances where the understanding of a poem equates to an empathetic act of entering into the psyche of the poet. Instead, he turns to the materiality of the poem, the *Stimmung*. The materiality seems to be unchanged through history: when he reads Shakespeare's sonnets, the material sound of the words is supposed to bring Shakespeare's times back into presence, into the present. He speculates about the presence of a linguistic substance in the alexandrines of Corneille and Racine, which it is possible to perceive again and to be attuned by. At the same time, he cannot exclude meaning, since the *Stimmung* can be evoked only in a combination of the sound of the words and their meaning. But he is not interested in any potential for meaning, because according to him meaning is secondary in the aesthetic appreciation of these historical presences.[39] However, this physical presence is not something that can be measured; instead it seems to be something like the earth in the interplay between world and earth in Heidegger's conception of the work of art. Earth is something that is both set forth and concealed in this world. It is both senseless and that upon which meaning rests.

Now we can return once again to music. Attunement can be a way of staying within music without putting words to the experience – but it may also be a way of letting music enter the reign of language. This act of understanding is not a superficial element of the attunement; it allows the attunement to speak. Still, if the understanding is not to be a sheer construction existing alongside the musical work, the elucidating exegesis must be attuned to the attunement of the work, not conceived as words transporting something from the music to the texts, as if the words were containers to fill with affectivity or any other content, but as the transport of the reader into the attunement of the music to which the text gives its testimony. This is the meaning of staying in the sway of music when elucidating it: to let it stand out, to let it come forth into the light. Writing is then an enactment of the musical work, which is a formulation that keeps intact the notion of the worlding of that work.

It is worth remembering that Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* spoke about an equiprimordiality of the three existentials in play when the world is disclosed for Dasein, namely 'understanding', 'disposition' and 'discourse'. Being *gestimmt*, Dasein is also understanding, and a part of discourse. If we transpose this into the attunement of music, we may say that being attuned is not opposed to understanding; instead, it also means beginning to understand. This understanding is discursive, and not simply linguistic. In this context discourse means to articulate what is intelligible. There is no fundamental difference between the articulation in natural languages and the articulation in some other medium, like musical

[39] Cf. Gumbrecht, chaps '*Stimmungen lesen*: Wie man die Wirklichkeit der Literatur heute denken kann' and 'Vielsichtigkeit der Welt in Shakespeares Sonetten', in *Stimmungen lesen*, pp. 7–43 and 56–73.

thoughts. What matters is that the attunement tunes understanding and discourse: if this attunement stays away, then there is only an exercise of structural analysis and motif relations, or the empty rattle of words and concepts.

But what is the attunemental elucidation like? I have described the different dimensions of the world in relation to passages principally from Bruckner, but how can an elucidation be carried out?

There are pieces of music, or movements of musical works, that seem to call for an attunemental elucidation. The third movement of Beethoven's String Quartet in A minor op. 132 is such a piece (Example 3.2), even though the composer himself seems to reveal it all when he characterizes it as a song of thanksgiving to the deity (*Heiliger Dankgesang eines Genesenen an die Gottheit*). Anyone who reads comments on the movement can easily come to know the main contrast in it – that between the hymn in the Lydian mode and the dance of regained spirits; but then little is in fact said about the thrust to be discerned in the music. Anyone who takes a look at the score can conclude that the movement has an ABABA structure. Without effort it is possible to reconstruct a choral melody which is perfectly periodic with its four-measure phrases, but introduced and later separated by short, imitative passages or interludes. However, we do not *listen* to the music in this way: we can *hear* structures and parts, still having a musical experience; there are even musical interpretations of this movement trying to stress the phrase structure of the chorale in the first A-section,[40] but that is a square approach to the work. It separates something that defies separation; it makes something clear-cut out of the ambiguous. We hear, then; we do not listen.

To listen, instead of hearing: the music starts with a simple step, answered by the same kind of movement in the other instruments, one at the time. It is a first, singing phrase and imitative responses; clarity reigns. But it also opens a free spatiality. Being song, the mobility has no clear grouping, so when the slow but wandering motion stops not much can be expected, even if there is a hint of a closing gesture. That anticipation shows itself not to be valid; instead the already slow movement has acquired a mobility that seems to be almost immobile.[41] Here, we have entered the hymn proper or, better, a four-voice chorale; but this reference to sacred music is not to be interpreted as a sign of religiosity, rather as sounding piety. The voices are transformed to almost immobile chords hinting at eternity, a temporality beyond time (if the tempo is extremely slow, the polyphonic structure

[40] As do the LaSalle Quartet in Ludwig van Beethoven, *The Late Quartets*, LaSalle Quartet, Deutsche Grammophon 453 768–2, 1997 (1975).

[41] Again, it is a question of interpretation. An authoritative rendering like that of the Busch Quartet from 1930s has this quality, just like Quartetto Italiano in their interpretation made in the 1960s and the Guarneri Quartet of the late 1980s. Cf. Ludwig van Beethoven, *The Late String Quartets*, Busch Quartet, EMI 5 09655 2, 2008 (1937); Ludwig van Beethoven, *The Late String Quartets*, Quartetto Italiano, Philips 464 684–2, 2001 (1967); Ludwig van Beethoven, *Complete Works*, Guarneri Quartet, Brilliant Classics 93553/41, 2007 (the 1980s). The LaSalle Quartet, with a quicker tempo, does not achieve this.

Example 3.2 Ludwig van Beethoven, String Quartet in A minor, op. 132, third movement: 'Heiliger Dankgesang eines Genesenen an die Gottheit, in der lydischen Tonart', bars 1–8 and 30–35




is dissolved into changing chords). What had started as an open space where the imitative voices could move freely is now changed to an organized and delimited spatiality where all movements are assembled.

I would suggest that the salient dimension of the world emerging in this movement is its mobility. Of course, we find the most obvious change of mobility when the very slow choral sections are interrupted by the two dance-like sections further on, but the slow passages themselves are not uniform, as we have seen. However, if the music has something to say about the sacred, it is in the temporality that is implied: the music goes back and forth between a temporal direction and its dissolution, standing on the threshold to eternity. It happens five times before the great change, when all of a sudden undirectedness is replaced by directedness (the modality is changed to tonality, the Lydian mode into D major) and the piety turns into a corporeal affirmation: it is common knowledge that Beethoven's work on the quartet was interrupted by disease, and that he composed the slow movement when he was recovering. The movement should not be heard as a kind

of anamnesis; the joyful, sometimes wilful quirks are almost like an auditory version of what is called the body image, namely the feeling of the bodily state – here the state when the strength returns after illness. Again, it is the dimension of mobility that makes itself heard; but now aspects of materiality make themselves felt, too, with the playfulness of the structures.

Then the music both turns back and introduces something new in the second coming of the hymn section: again, slowness is established, but the mobility is of a new kind, namely a slowly rocking fundament upon which the hymn moves, this time higher up in the air. Yes, from the score we can conclude that the melody is played one octave higher, but attunementally it is a change of materiality: it is brighter. Furthermore, the slowly rocking mobility of the polyphonic texture is maintained through the whole section, which means that there is no change between the imitative structures and the phrases of the chorale. The melody releases itself from and sinks back into the fundament: this time it is a song, a song reaching out for the sky, touching it in a moment of bliss.

When the dance returns, it is not a direct copy of the earlier appearance, but it is very close to the first version. Only an exact study reveals the differences; it is even hard to recall what happened the first time, but that is an act of reflection at odds with attunement. The same does not account for the last return of the slow section, because the rocking rhythm is now sharper, dotted and breaks loose from the first two instances. Furthermore, this ongoing conversation has become even more melodic and profiled, outgrowing the hymnic elements, a mobility that appears in the middle voices: they emerge from within. Characterized by *Mit innigster Empfindung*, this last return establishes a new kind of interiority, a fuller feeling of life leading to an expansion where the spatiality reaches its climax (four octaves and a fifth, whereas the return started within an octave). This is the most important spatial change in the whole movement. Of course, there is a clear difference between the flexible but integrated spatiality of the contrapuntal texture on the one hand and the open space of dance steps and playful whims on the other; but those two spatialities are sheer contrasts, whereas this is an overwhelming expansion of a closed space to something that is radically open and self-affirming.

Thus, it seems as if the music has undergone an attunemental process, from a state where there was a succession of mobilities – the polarized interplay between an earnest conversation and a chorale augmented to the point of dissolution, succeeded by the dance-like activity – to the calm state which had shown itself to be of the highest potency but in the end absorbed into a introverted song. Here, if anywhere, the purpose is fulfilled according to Hegel's formulation: in the resounding of how the innermost self is moved to the depths of its personality and consciousness. It turns away from the world, but also from heaven, leaving both for its own interiority – its own musical world. There is only silence, but it is a silence that speaks. One provocative and suggestive formulation by Heidegger is that the most powerful *Stimmungen* are the silent ones: 'In this de-termining, humans are touched and called forth by a voice [*Stimme*] that peals all the more

purely the more it silently reverberates through what speaks.'[42] Here, close to the end of the movement, it is inwardness that speaks – inwardness at its purest, inwardness as attunement. At last, it is a silent call.

We can remember that 'world' has many meanings in the context of attunement. One of these is the historical meaning of a horizon, and the question is whether the world of the movement is contemporary or not. Joseph Kerman has suggested that with his last quartets, Beethoven achieved a 'privatization' of this kind of chamber ensemble.[43] His first quartets (op. 18) were intended for the players themselves, then he turned to the concert public (especially op. 59) and finally the audience was primarily himself. This last step into interiority means also, according to Kerman, that these works stand 'outside history'.[44] For once, Kerman resorts into untenable idealism. From an attunemental perspective, the world of the work is strictly historical. Yet, he is right in two ways. Firstly, the thrust of the movement can still be discerned, even if it has also changed our world (Kerman rightly observes that Beethoven's late works have had an 'overriding historical impact'). Secondly, attunementally the music places itself on the threshold of the non-temporal, that which is outside time. But the reason why Kerman can describe the string quartets as being outside history is that they have not become history; instead, they have played an important role in shaping contemporary music. Precisely the trait of being contemporary is pointed out by Kerman in an earlier work of his, namely his study on Beethoven's string quartets: the *Heiliger Dankgesang* 'makes up its own new language' in its 'self-contained, hermetic world', whereas the fast section is characterized as an 'ordinary world'.[45] Accordingly, Beethoven has set up a musical world that has contributed to our world. That is the reason why a kind of otherness can still be recognized, not because the movement belongs to the past world of Romanticism, but because it gives a presentiment of something that still does not exist.

This is what an attunemental elucidation can be like. It is not characterized by identifying the attunement of the music, but by testifying the emerging world of that music. With the help of the questions on temporality, spatiality, mobility and materiality, this emergence can find its way into words. Here, the aspect of historical change cannot be ignored: we should not assume that there are any elements or characteristics placed outside history; instead we must always be prepared to ask ourselves what 'contemporary' and 'historic' mean. Perhaps the

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[42] Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, Stuttgart: Neske 1997 (1956), 8th ed (trans. in Martin Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, trans. Reginald Lilly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991, p. 50).

[43] Joseph Kerman, 'Beethoven Quartet Audiences: Actual, Potential, Ideal', in Robert Winter and Robert Martin (eds), *The Beethoven Quartet Companion*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1994, pp. 7–27, cit. p. 17.

[44] Kerman, op. cit., p. 26.

[45] Joseph Kerman, *The Beethoven Quartets*, London: Oxford University Press 1967, p. 254.

impression of being contemporary is not due to Beethoven's singular treatment of the Lydian mode, perhaps the ordinariness of the dance-like section has in some way grown old. The thrust does not then lie within the material, but in the contrast – that which is between the sections.

This 'between' is a question of attunemental change, and that is one of the matters to be discussed in Chapter 5. But first we must give more attention to the problem of history, both that which is part of the past and that which is present. It is a question of attunement and history, and the answer can be found in attunemental history.

# PART II
# Elucidation

## Investigating Boundaries

Instead of presenting a complex theory of attunement, I have suggested that, in order to deal with the phenomenon, we should come back to an everyday attitude concerning music. With the attunemental mode of listening, we do not listen to music in an extraordinary way; we do what most listeners do. There are indeed other modes of musical listening, and these modes can be described in accordance with attunemental characteristics (we are always attuned, always *gestimmt*), but in the attunemental mode the listener is attuned to the music. Most often, listeners are attuned, even if they just use the music as an auditory background. This does not mean that the act of listening brings about trivialities (even if the result can surely be banal). To some degree, it can be compared with social relations and behaviour. Some people do not seem to interact with others; they lead a life of their own, uninterested in other people, their states of mind, their reactions. Yet other people are extremely aware of the mood of others; they not only seem able to read the minds of people close to them, they also let themselves be penetrated by the states of mind of those around them. It is not by chance that the great phenomenologist of social relations, Alfred Schütz, was able to transmit the relation between people making music together to everyday situations. When we share rhythms and ways of speaking, when we share temporality, we are attuned to each other. That is no triviality.

Even in view of the everyday mode of being together, we also know that we are sometimes out of reach of those close to us, and they do not intuitively understand us. It may even be easier to understand the attunement between people better when we do not attune, when we do not respond in an appropriate way or when there is no social resonance. It is the unexpected movement, the strange voice of the other person that makes us aware of a difference. All these things are valid in music, too. When a piece of music has a strange mobility, the listener cannot follow it; when the sound elements of the music are new, the listener becomes alienated by its materiality. Heidegger describes the strangeness of a work of art as a thrust (*Stoß*): truth happens in the work of art in this way.[1] He speaks about the great works of art here, but his words are relevant for other situations, too: when music in its temporality and mobility, its spatiality and materiality, seems to belong to another world. We can enter into this new world thanks to that thrust, but we may also be forced to stay outside, without being able to respond to it.

The second part of this work will investigate a series of musical works, situations and contexts, all of them elucidating the phenomenon of attunement in music. The observation that we become aware of our mood when our mood is changed or when we enter a room with an atmosphere that is strange to us is also essential in my treatment of attunement. It is the transgression of a boundary that tells us about both the first and the second state. Therefore, boundaries are going

[1] Heidegger, 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', p. 65.

to be of great interest, not only because some of them separate us from that which we cannot know but also because we can transgress others.

These boundaries can thus be seen as complications for attunement, and the following examples are often chosen for their problematic nature. If the attunemental elucidation of Beethoven in Chapter 3 was easy to carry out since the movement is almost exemplary for the production of *Stimmung*, then works of music that are clearly opposed to such a production may have important things to say about an attunement that is assumed to be ever present, albeit in different guises. I have chosen three fields of investigation, namely the historical, the temporal and the cultural.

Instead of trying to find early music that in different ways seems to be close to the modern sensibility, I have tried to find a work – Johann Sebastian Bach's *Goldberg Variations*, and then first of all the introductory Aria – that cannot be easily adapted to a modern aesthetics of mood. Turning to contemporary music, the choice has not been for instance John Tavener's atmospheric music, but a much more radical option, Luigi Nono's string quartet *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*. Since I have introduced the notion of an attunemental history, it must be possible to treat both works in terms of attunement, but not in the same terms as in the case of Beethoven. In this way, both works can say something general about the impact of history on the phenomenon of attunement. If the attunemental mode of listening is an open one, it should be able to encompass different kinds of musical affectivity in a way that elucidates the history of attunement. These are the main topics of Chapter 4.

*Stimmung* has been described in highly contradictory terms throughout history concerning its temporal status, and in Chapter 5 I investigate the temporal prolongation of attunement. This is an investigation of different kinds of apparent paradoxes: mood and *Stimmung* have been described as being both extremely short and greatly protracted in time, and perhaps this opposition can be solved when discussed in attunemental terms. A clue to the solution of that problem is given in the notion of moment, since there is an unexpected ambiguity in that word, which points in the directions both of the momentary and of the momentous. By way of answering this question, the long philosophic discussion in Germany on *Augenblick* shall be touched upon. It has a parallel in music, and in the last section of the chapter different kinds of musical moments or *Augenblicke* are taken into account. In this way, some general characteristics concerning the temporality of attunement are pointed out: its tendency to hide as soon as it has emerged, its resistance to objectification.

The logically last step in an elucidation of musical attunement is the question of cultural distances. In the epilogue, 'Aftersong', we find ourselves on the edge of the musical world, namely where it touches another world. Again, we are short of words. I here ask the opposite question of how anyone not acculturated listens to a foreign culture. One example of this is the story of how Europeans listened to Hindustani music during their first contacts with Indians, and how we in the West today, being part of a global culture, have become attuned to that kind of music. It is the far side of the world, but beyond that world a new one is opened up.

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# Chapter 4
# History

## Steps into Prehistory: Attunement and the Time of J.S. Bach

### *Layers of History*

The essential question about a time that might be incompatible not only with the concept of *Stimmung*, but also with attunement, must pay attention to the fundamental rift that was the Romantic mode of listening, followed by a development of the techniques of composition, which would be of great importance for the character piece, the *Lied*, and the musical drama. The concept of *Stimmung* was put in play in the 1770s, albeit not in musical discourse (apart from Herder), so even if there are reasons not to accept Hoffmann's notion of a development of Romanticism beginning with Haydn, continuing with Mozart and reaching a climax with Beethoven, we should move further back in history to find the boundaries of the concept of attunement, or at least clarify under which circumstances a boundary should be fixed. With reference to Hoffmann, we can assume that the attunemental mode of listening may concern older music too. But the question now is not whether it is possible to get into some kind of mood when listening to music such as Gregorian chant – obviously, that is the case not only in the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, but also in popular productions of groups or musical projects like Enigma of the 1990s – but to find out if there is any consistency in the assumption that since being attuned is a part of human existence, then the music of earlier times must bear some kind of witness to these circumstances.

The touchstone will be the music of Johann Sebastian Bach, already pointed out by Ernst Kurth as being works where *Gefühlsstimmung* is a reductive or irrelevant category. However, like any other kind of music, the works of Bach can be used and listened to in different ways. We do not have to refer to Hoffmann or the early Romantics to see that; it is enough to take a look at contemporary habits of listening. Someone might relax to *Die Kunst der Fuge* on the stereo, putting themself into mental equilibrium, executing mood-management.[1] In this case the music is used like a stimulant, but it is not a wholly non-aesthetic approach. Here we have a modern, common way of being attuned by music, and there is no need to ask whether the musical interpretation is a modernizing one like that made by the Emerson Quartet or a historically informed harpsichord performance by Gustav

[1] For a discussion on 'mood-management' and music, see Jochen Hörisch, 'Sich in Stimmung bringen: Über poetisches und mediales Mood-and-Mind-Management', in Gisbertz (ed.), *Stimmung*, pp. 33–44.

Leonhardt. It works both ways. However, we should not forget that for a long time Johann Nikolaus Forkel's description of the genesis of the *Goldberg Variations*, said to be composed for the purpose of cheering up Count von Keyserlingk in his sleepless nights, was held to be true. The story may not be authentic, but the sheer idea of music listening as mood-management is clearly not a new one.

Another mood-evoking use of Bach's music can be exemplified by Ingmar Bergman's film *Såsom i en spegel* (Through a Glass Darkly) where the beginning of the sarabande from the Second Cello Suite is played four times, heightening the austere mood of the film. In addition, following the argumentation of Gernot Böhme, a harpsichord on a theatre scene, and a musician playing a movement from any of Bach's works for keyboard instrument, results directly in a 'baroque' atmosphere. Here we have Bach as tranquillizer or equalizer, as mood-maker and as source of an atmospheric presence, all of them different modern uses of music. Yet, however inauthentic these uses may be in relation to Bach's times, and that is by no means self-evident, they all let the music resound.

It is impossible to restore the original performance situation (if any such origin exists). We all know that the experiential worlds of the past lie out of reach, mirrored by the change from the labelling 'authentic' to 'historically informed' performances within the early music movement. It is easy to understand that a modern listener – accustomed not only to Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde* but also to the changing atmospheric pressures of Ligeti's *Atmosphères* and the threatening forces of Penderecki's *Threnody* – has a different mindset from a young man or woman of noble heritage enjoying playing the harpsichord in the baroque period. There is no way back, no way to restore the act of listening or the act of playing. We may describe the circumstances thanks to testimonies from the past; we may find proofs of different changes in the listening habits in different social milieux under different times, but the actual experiencing cannot be restored. That is commonplace.

Still, we may also reverse the perspective, namely focusing on the explicit differences between on the one hand music of the baroque era and on the other Romantic, modern or postmodern music. Even when listening is a free act, the music tends to situate the listener in different ways. Just as Gumbrecht said about literary texts, someone who is confronted with a musical work of art can be wrapped in it in some way or another. Gumbrecht even holds that verses written long ago are physical remnants, giving the readers a direct connection to a specific historical moment, just like a historical building: 'What we touch and what touches us *is* a substantial presence of the past – not its signifier.'[2]

Musicological reflection has long problematized different kinds of historicism, with Richard Taruskin's general attack on historical authenticity as one of the most extreme examples.[3] But historicism may also be a reminder of the sensibility for

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[2] Gumbrecht, 'Reading for the Stimmung', p. 219.

[3] Richard Taruskin, 'The Pastness of the Present and the Presence of the Past', in Nicholas Kenyon (ed.), *Authenticity and Early Music*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

history that resides in the philological discipline combined with an acute sense of the materiality of language. That which we are wrapped in can be described in terms of a world. In this I wholly agree with Gumbrecht, but there is definitively a difference between texts and sounding music: the potentiality of a musical text is concretized and therefore delimited in the performance of the work, whereas the reader is him- or herself a performer. When Glenn Gould, in his first studio recording of the *Goldberg Variations*, plays the affectively quite extreme 25th variation, he finds a Romantic potential in the music, well described in his own words when he speaks about the 'languorous atmosphere of an almost Chopinesque mood-piece'.[4] His reading of the piece is powerful, realizing a potential that seems to be at odds with any idea of execution Bach may have had.

We can presume that Gould's version has little to do with any aspect of the interpretations made in Bach's time, but in most other renderings of the piece we can ask ourselves whether or not we are confronted with something that quite clearly is not modern. In a sense, every interpretation is made at a specific point in history, dependent on the ideas of practice of its day; but at the same time the works speak of themselves – they say something about the time past.

There is an easy way to answer the question about the relation between attunement and the music of Johann Sebastian Bach: in the famous C-major prelude in the first book of *Das wohltemperierte Klavier* we have a piece of music that anticipates the mood-making of the Romantics. The technical device of a 'play figure' has a suggestive emotional impact, and, without doubt, Besseler was right when he said that composers like Chopin and Schumann were utilizing this compositional trait. The C-major prelude in Chopin's op. 28 transforms the idea of a joyous arpeggio to a stormy sequence of divided chords, and the G-major prelude in the same opus is a speedy variant of Bach's little piece, supplied with a melody on the top. Therefore, we not only have a structural likeness, but also a reasonably reliable source of influence, since Chopin and many others of his Romantic generation paid their tributes to Bach's work – and especially *Das wohltemperierte Klavier*. However, even if Bach is a precursor and able to influence the mood of the listener in a way the Romantics developed fully, we have only a parallel, not an example where the radical question of attunement in the music of the baroque era (and earlier periods) is posited. We should instead look for something more typical, not as close to that which was to become an essential trait of the music of Romanticism.

That piece of music will be the Aria from 'Aria mit verschiedenen Veränderungen', the *Goldberg Variations*. Being a sarabande, it actualizes the notion of affects inherent in a specific dance – for instance developed by Mattheson around 1740 when he said that the sarabande is a dance that expresses

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1988, pp. 137–210.

[4] Cf. Glenn Gould: *A State of Wonder: The Complete Goldberg Variations 1955 and 1981*, Sony SM3K 87703, 2002. The quotation is taken from the booklet, p. 18.

the affect of ambition – with a high-flown and serious attitude.[5] Some decades earlier (1708), Johann Gottfried Walther underscored the gravity of this dance form.[6] A discussion on attunement should in this context clarify the relation between *Affektenlehre* and *Stimmungsästhetik*. Moreover, in this Aria we find a fundamental bass, closely related to the bass-line in other well-known baroque pieces, among them chaconnes by Handel and Muffat, and a ground by Purcell;[7] and since the variations are built upon this fundamental bass, we may gain an insight into the work in general.

There are circumstances that speak against the choice of the Aria. First of all, doubts have been raised as to whether Johann Sebastian Bach really composed the piece.[8] The style of that sarabande is often described as French (*sarabande tendre*) and, if not a kind of *objet trouvé*, then a concession to the *galant* style. Furthermore, the Aria is linked to a series of variations, and therefore not an independent piece. Yet, these problems are either irrelevant or, as a matter of fact, instructive. The question of authenticity is irrelevant since it does not matter – for our needs, that is – if J.S. Bach composed the Aria or not. The *galant* style is closer to the *Empfindsamer Stil* than is baroque music, but the principal question of the possibility of a 'pre-term phase' of the phenomenon of *Stimmung* has not lost its relevance.

The last objection above, concerning the non-autonomy of the Aria, can be turned into the opposite: namely, if the work is seen as a context and not an organic system – if the piece is to be understood fully – then it must be put in relation to a contextual field, and the most important context is obviously the series of variations. And, it should be added, the piece was written down in the keyboard album begun in 1725 with hand-copied pieces that J.S. Bach's wife Anna Magdalena liked and wanted to play for herself.

### *The World of the Work*

The *Goldberg Variations* are of the *aria variata* type, variations made on a bass-line. From this it follows that the Aria (Example 4.1), too, could be said to be one of the variations. Yet, in the series of 30 variations, which is grouped into ten sections of three pieces each – first a genre-piece (most often a dance), then

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[5] Cf. Johann Mattheson, *Der vollkommene Capellmeister*, Kassel and Basel: Bärenreiter 1954 (1739), p. 230.

[6] Cf. Johann Gottfried Walther, *Praecepta der Musicalischen Composition*, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel 1955 (manuscript 1708), p. 53.

[7] For an overview on this topic, see Peter W. Williams, *Bach: The Goldberg Variations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001, pp. 36–9.

[8] From Arnold Schering, in his preface to Johann Sebastian Bach, *Klavierbüchlein für Anna Magdalena*, Munich: Callwey 1937, to more recent texts such as Frederick Neumann, 'Bach: Progressive or Conservative and the Authorship of the Goldberg Aria', *Musical Quarterly*, vol. 71, no. 3 (1985), pp. 281–94.

a toccata or virtuosic piece and a canon as conclusion – the air is something that is both an integrated part of the work and which maintains a distance from the variations. This relation to the other movements is highlighted in the abrupt change of character between the calm of the Aria and the vigorous first variation. At the end, the sarabande returns in the *aria da capo*, a return that even further underscores that it is an exception within the work. It both belongs and does not belong to the other variations.

Example 4.1 Johann Sebastian Bach, Aria, from 'Aria mit verschiedenen Veränderungen' (BWV 988), bars 1–16



What can be said about these double contrasts? If we move on to some of the more important musical interpretations of the *Goldberg Variations*, then we can conclude that this very Aria has been played in manifestly different ways. Almost emblematic is the difference between Glenn Gould's first and second studio recordings, where the first (made in 1955) conforms to Gould's own description in the liner notes of it as being an 'unassuming' sarabande, whereas the second (from 1981) is decisively more solemn, erasing the character of a dance.[9] Rosalyn Tureck's 1957 recording moves in an even more transcendent direction, again without the characteristic rhythmization of the sarabande, which to some extent indicates that the piece is entitled 'Aria'.[10]

One should not, however, draw the hasty conclusion that in comparison with harpsichord interpretations pianists have generally idealized the score or projected transcendence into the music: when Wilhelm Kempff rendered his version of the

[9] Cf. Glenn Gould, op. cit., booklet p. 15.

[10] Johann Sebastian Bach, *Goldberg-Variationen*, Rosalyn Tureck (piano), *Rosalyn Tureck II*, in *Great Pianists of the 20th Century*, vol. 94, Philips 456 979–2, 1999 (1957).

variations, following the Busoni piano edition, he thought the embellishments too contrived for the harpsichord, but he nevertheless took utmost care to render the dance characteristics.[11] However, the harpsichord interpretations tend to make the listener aware of the sarabande rhythm: versions ranging from Wanda Landowska's recording in 1933 to Gustav Leonhardt's version from 1965, and continuing to a recent rendition such as that of Andreas Staier (2010).[12] But even when the sarabande rhythm is brought to the fore, the tempo differs highly.

Due to this diverse interpretative material – not only including different kinds of instruments, different ideas of the importance of the sarabande character and different choices of tempo, but also different ideas of transcendence in music – it seems necessary either to say that there is no general conclusion to be drawn, or to present a cogent interpretation of one's own. Even if it is tempting to choose the latter possibility, I would suggest that despite the great heterogeneity of the material, there is something to say that is relevant for the piece in general.

The Aria is the entrance to the world of the *Goldberg Variations*, and it is also the exit. In a way, it is the horizon of that world. The idea of a 'Goldberg world' is not foreign to the literature on the set of variations. In his monograph on the work, Peter F. Williams speaks about 'the elusive beauty, an uncanny world not quite like any other'.[13] In the speculative business of esoteric interpretations of Bach's music, David Humphreys has argued that it is possible to find a Ptolemaic cosmology hidden in the work, governed by nine spheres – symbolized by the nine canons of the work, but also present in the musical texture through musical depictions and oratorical devices.[14] Werner Breig offers an analytic perspective, dealing with the cyclic character of the work, when he investigates the main structures building the work into a whole.[15] From the interpretative point of view of a musician, Glenn Gould modelled a 'virile ego' with an 'irrepressible elasticity', 'a fundamental co-ordinating intelligence' to be sensed behind the kaleidoscopic work.[16] My intention is not, though, to suggest another general characterization of the work, but to focus on the Aria, albeit in the context of the work.

What kind of world emerges in the Aria? There is of course a difference between on the one hand a slow, solemn interpretation, perhaps without the dance-steps of a sarabande, and on the other hand a more fluent rendering where the

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[11] Johann Sebastian Bach, *Goldberg-Variationen BWV 988*, Wilhelm Kempff (piano), Deutsche Grammophon DG 439 978–2, 1994 (1970).

[12] Cf. the following recordings of J.S. Bach's *Goldberg Variations*: Wanda Landowska (harpsichord), Naxos 8.110313, 2005 (1933); Gustav Leonhardt (harpsichord), Teldec 2564 69853–2, 2007 (1965); and Andreas Staier (harpsichord), Harmonia mundi HMC 902058, 2010.

[13] Williams, op. cit., p. 92.

[14] David Humphreys, 'More on the Cosmological Allegory in Bach's Goldberg Variations', *Soundings*, no. 12 (1984–85), pp. 25–45.

[15] Werner Breig, 'Bachs Goldberg-Variationen als zyklisches Werk', *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, vol. 32, no. 4 (1975), pp. 243–65.

[16] Gould, op. cit., pp. 17, 18 and 19.

dance type is recognized. We should remember that sarabandes and other kinds of dances in baroque suites were not, in fact, dance music but stylized dances intended to be played for the pure pleasure of the musician and, perhaps, a small audience. Nevertheless, a character is implied: the type of the sarabande is that which has an emphasized second beat of every bar,[17] and this characteristic is highly relevant in an interpretation. Since Bach was using the French *sarabande tendre* as his point of departure, with its slow grandeur clearly differentiated from the Italian and Spanish types, it seems to be reasonable to imagine a steady flow.

Not only for the modern listener, but for the performer of the baroque age as well as the small audience, the court atmosphere was presumably invoked – it is not by chance Mattheson wrote about a serious and high-flown attitude. The original *zarabanda*, danced with an overtly sexual verve, and banned in Spain in 1583 for the same reason, is distant.[18] After the introduction of the sarabande into French court culture, the musical gestures were refined and the pace became accordingly slower – and the Aria has a fine-spun quality that brings it close to the *galant* style. The highly embellished melodic line, indicating the clearly French influences, is central for the unfolding of the piece. The ornaments are an essential part of the upper voice; if they are taken away or reduced – the latter case something that Busoni made in his piano edition and Kempff restored as practice – then the fragile music is put out of equilibrium.

Another important trait concerning mobility is the periodicity: it seems as if the music is structured in four equal parts, four periods of equal size. A closer look confirms the impression, since we find a symmetric structure of the phrases, constituted by 8+8+8+8 bars through the cadences (to the tonic in the first eight bars, then to the dominant, followed by a passage to the relative minor and finally back to the tonic). Combined with the slow harmonic motion derived from the bass-line, this symmetric structure results in a light but firm grip, allowing the melodic line to flourish without losing its contour. It might be that the average listener is focused on the melody, but there is something more to say about the bass-line, since it is related not only to the sarabande of Johann Sebastian's uncle, Johann Christian Bach, and to chaconnes by Handel (HWV 435 and 442), but in its initial four notes it also points back to ground basses of the sixteenth century;[19] and with different expansions it can be said to be more of a type than an original theme. The first half of the sarabande lives up to all the expectations that can be made of a teleological structure. Enmeshed in the musical world of baroque music, the listener may be unaware of the piece's intricacies but is assured by its

[17] Rainer Gstrein differentiates between six types, of which that in question is of the second: 'Durchgehende Betonung des zweiten Taktteiles'. Cf. Rainer Gstrein, *Die Sarabande: Tanzgattung und musikalischer Topos*, Vienna and Lucca: Studien-Verlag/ Libreria Musicale Italiana 1997, pp. 142–4.

[18] Gstrein describes the early history of the sarabande in the chapter 'Die Zarabanda als erotischer Tanz', op. cit., pp. 23–33.

[19] Cf. Williams, op. cit., pp. 36–9.

step-by-step development – it is a whole era's musical logic that speaks, giving the mobility a target-oriented character.

The second part is not modelled on a standard scheme. Repudiating any presumption of an affective unity in Bach's movements, the visit to the relative minor in the third quarter of the Aria gives a perspective of the established, albeit still nameless, attunement. The world of the Aria is closed but transparent; it gleams but is not without a slight tension when the hint of melancholy is introduced. That does not mean that Bach brings about an element of surprise in the harmonic movement; rather, he follows the logic of a sarabande and not that of a chaconne.

There are indeed many reasons to say that the Aria is just the first variation on the bass theme, but musically it seems fair to follow Bach's own separation between it and the 30 numbered variations. The contrast between the Aria and the first variation, a complete change of character and pace, has already been considered, but even more telling is the return of the Aria at the end of the set of variations. Once again, we have many different interpretations among the recordings. Almost always the harpsichordists and pianists take the Aria a little slower than the first time it was played, giving it a more reflective character – sometimes nostalgic, sometimes according it a simplicity wholly at odds with the great architecture of the 30 variations – almost to demonstrate how plain the music had been at the start and how vehement the intellectual development had been. How the difference is made is not so important, whether it occurs through a slower or more flexible tempo; the difference is inevitably there. Even if there are small divergences, the repetition is the great difference. It separates the Aria from all the variations.

It is the very equilibrium which is specific to the short piece, and if a German word for this character should be mentioned, I would suggest *Gelassenheit* (often translated to English with words like 'releasement', 'abandonment' and 'composure'). It is a word that had a specific religious meaning in the Lutheran community of the eighteenth century – the word is found in some of Bach's many church cantatas, then in a sense of trust in God[20] – and its history reaches back to the mystic tradition in Germany: from the medieval Meister Eckhart to the protestant Jakob Böhme, a tradition to which Heidegger adapted his own thinking in his late, esoteric phases.[21]

But there is no mysticism in the Aria; instead something more akin to splendid isolation, a music that does not force itself upon the listener and does not let anyone intrude upon its doings. If a connection should be made to the Christian virtues, then it is to lead life in composure, to be light at heart and to have a charitable disposition – such is the *Gelassenheit* of the piece. A more secular meaning is to be found in Mattheson, who asks himself if *Gelassenheit* really is a 'feeling', but who also declares that a calm heart is free from extraordinary sentiments and is quietly contented within itself. It is hard, according to him, to represent it within a contrapuntal texture, but with means of unison it can be represented nicely and

[20] For instance in *Wer nur den lieben Gott läßt walten* (BWV 93).

[21] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, Pfullingen: Neske 1988 (1959), 8th ed.

naturally.[22] The texture of Bach's Aria is certainly contrapuntal, but if one wishes to try to keep in line with Mattheson, then it is possible to point to the prominence of the melody. Here, we are far away from the religious connotations, with a profane meaning of calmness.

The composure of the Aria is brought about even more clearly when put in relation to the systematic character of the variations. The architectural plan has the character of a compendium of compositional techniques, musical characters and genres. But the relation is not the rationalistic exposure of a melodic theme varied in different ways. Another apprehension of the ordering principle in Bach's cyclical works has been suggested by Martin Geck who, referring to the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, says that the individual pieces of *Das wohltemperierte Klavier* can be seen as Leibnizian monads. Every monad expresses the whole world, but in different ways. Still, all monads are attuned to one another through a world harmony, even if they do not know anything about one another.[23] In the *Goldberg Variations*, the bass-line attunes the different variations to one another, and therefore there are other traits of the monadic character to pay attention to. We may use another notion by Deleuze, characterizing the whole baroque era, namely the 'fold' (*pli*).[24] The variations are unfolded one after another, and even if they are individual pieces, they are only different folds within one of the same series.

The different folds are attuned to one another. There is a fundamental harmony connecting them. Obviously, we have the fundamental bass-line, but that is not that to which I refer. I would suggest that this fundamental attunement is *Gelassenheit*, but this time understood precisely as a *fundamental* attunement, less perceivable than sheer attunement. The attunement of the sarabande is *Gelassenheit*, but when it returns at the end the *Gelassenheit* reaches a deeper stratum, which is a testimony of a fundamental attunement. This fundamental *Gelassenheit* is the playful acceptance of the rationalized world, the universalizing tendencies conspicuous for the baroque era, and indeed the mathematical conception of reality.

On the one hand, the whole work can be described as a rationalization of the Aria, where a fundamental structure is extracted from a simple piece of dance music, only to be exploited in a highly systematized way. On the other hand, this is done in a playful manner, affirming the potentialities of a musical material, letting it be what it is without forcing something upon it. We are herewith close to the *Gelassenheit* in Heidegger, where it stands for a mode of existence that makes it possible to endure in the world of technology without getting threatened by it, accepting and letting things be as they are.[25] The main target of Heidegger's argumentation is the 'calculative thinking' that is said to dominate the modern

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[22] Cf. Mattheson, op. cit., p. 19. He thinks that the composer must rank it quite highly, since its proper place is at the end of a piece of music.

[23] Martin Geck, *Johann Sebastian Bach: Leben und Werk*, Reinbek: Rowohlt 2000, p. 595.

[24] Cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque*, Paris: Minuit 1988.

[25] Cf. Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*.

era, and it is opposed to the 'meditative thinking' of Heidegger's own. In many ways, the Lutheran-baroque view on music presented by the Bach scholar Walter Blankenburg[26] demonstrates what Heidegger means by calculative thinking: it is founded on a mathematical conception of not only music but also the world, implicated by the concept of harmony; it thus combines metaphysical and theological arguments in a way which answers to the onto-theology from which Heidegger distances himself.

### *The Affective Sphere:* Affekt–Stimmung *and Affect–Attunement*

I have described the character of the Aria in a manner that is intended to elucidate the attunement of the piece. The name of the attunement has been suggested to be composure, *Gelassenheit*. This state cannot be an affect – it is assumed to be an attunement – but hitherto we have not questioned the relation between affect and attunement. It can be argued that the *affect* composure can be found in the Aria, too (at least if we follow Mattheson, commenting on the sarabande). Thus we must consider the difference between the *affect* of composure and the *attunement* of composure. Are they the same or are they different, despite the name that is common to them? If this question can be answered, we may be in a position to say something about the relation between affect and attunement, of *Affekt* and *Stimmung*, in general.

Let us start with what we know from history. There is not much to find in J.S. Bach's writings – the letters and the documents left behind – about his attitude towards the representation or arousal of affects in music. A hint may be the application for a position as a church organist by Bach's student Johann Gotthilf Ziegler, where he referred to his master's suggestion that the organ chorales should be played according to the affects of the words of the actual chorale.[27] Perhaps this only meant changes of register; perhaps the scope was wider (the musical imagery in Bach's settings of texts have parallels in instrumental music related to religious functions, like the chorales).

The notion of affects being depicted in music or symbolized by conventional musical figures was, as is well known, common in the baroque era, as was the slightly different perspective of an arousal of an affect through music by some kind of rhetorical means.[28] In general, the aesthetics of baroque music forwarded a view which implied that a movement or piece of music should only deal with one affect (perhaps with a contrasting section), whereas the *galant* and the pre-classical style began to allow swift changes of affects or ways of feeling.

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[26] Walter Blankenburg, 'Der Harmonie-Begriff in der lutherisch-barocken Musikanschauung', *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, vol. 16, no. 1/2 (1959), pp. 44–56.

[27] Werner Neumann and Hans-Joachim Schulze (eds), *Bach-Dokumente*, vol. 2, Kassel: Bärenreiter 1969, p. 423.

[28] On the relation between music and rhetoric in the eighteenth century, see Mark Evan Bonds, *Wordless Rhetoric*.

Much has been written about the theoretical problems and possibilities of musical representation and arousal of affects,[29] indeed also about the idea of a coherent *Affektenlehre*,[30] but these huge debates can be left aside for the moment if we focus on the conceptual perspective of the problem. Of principal importance is the difference between the notion of an *Affekt* depicted in music and the notion of *Stimmung* in music. In the French discourse on imitation, Charles Batteux went so far as to say that all music must have a signification, grounded on resemblance.[31] Music may imitate sounds and noises from the outer world (like landscape painting) or it may imitate the world of feelings (corresponding to portraits). In the *Stimmung* nothing is depicted or imitated; even if musical codes are used, only the phenomenon of tuning is relevant, not the sign. Thus, tuning and arousal are certainly different musical notions; but at the same time a conventional way of treating *Stimmung* would be to say that the musical object influences the subject emotionally – it arouses a feeling or a mood. Now, this conventional way of treating the phenomenon is at odds with the mode put forward here, where *Stimmung* (or attunement) is said to resist any polarization between subject and object. However, we are on the way to investigating the relations between subject and object concerning affects, and we need to pursue that inquiry.

In the period 1700–50, the late phase of the baroque, the affective term *Stimmung*, as we know, had not been introduced into musical discourse. As has been pointed out in reference to Spitzer's investigation of the historical semantics of that concept, the notion *Harmonie* (with its background in the ancient Greek *harmonía* and the Latin *harmonia*) was in play and answers to important aspects of what was to be called *Stimmung* from the 1780s onwards. With the combined meaning of *Zusammenklang* (concord), *Zusammenstimmen* (accord), *Gesetzmäßigkeit* (conformity to law) and *Ordnung* (order), it had a central role as a universal concept of the baroque in the German sphere, connecting the theological, philosophical, ethical and scientific fields to each other.[32] Even if *harmonia* is part of the prehistory of *Stimmung*, there are definitely major differences between the concepts. First of all, in the baroque *harmonia* had a systematic character, where the heavenly order corresponded to its worldly counterpart. With mathematics as matrix, music and eternity, mind and matter were accordingly ordered. All of this

[29] A list of works dealing with this issue would be extensive, even if it just included the most substantial ones. There are many relevant authors in the vein of analytical philosophy (for instance Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies), New Musicology (for instance Susan McClary and Lawrence Kramer) and historically inclined studies (George J. Buelow and John Neubauer).

[30] George J. Buelow's severe criticism of the notion of an established *Affektenlehre* can serve as an example: 'Johann Mattheson and the Invention of the *Affektenlehre*', in George J. Buelow and Hans Joachim Marx (eds), *New Mattheson Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983, pp. 393–407.

[31] Charles Batteux, *Les Beaux arts réduits à un même principe*, Paris: Durand 1743, p. 267.

[32] Cf. Blankenburg, op. cit.

is heavily criticized by Mattheson, who from *Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre* (1713) to his main work, *Der vollkommene Capellmeister* (1739), attacks the idea of putting mathematics at the centre of musical understanding. The changes can be described in the following way: whereas the affects had been the subject in the baroque, the composer turned into the subject;[33] the music had been expressive, but now the composers or musicians expressed themselves in the music.[34]

Is the suggested mode of listening then, perhaps, just a modern projection? We could follow Manfred Bukofzer's sceptical attitude concerning an emotional response of a modern kind to an older repertory like Bach's works, saying that we cannot interpret these musical affects as dynamic emotions since they are musical representations of typified and static attitudes of mind.[35] This response can be linked to the historically informed interpretations of late, and of course to the immense discussion of the authenticity of performances. Yet, the attunemental mode of listening is not intended to be some kind of archaeological activity, but is concerned with an attunement that is still perceivable or holding its sway: if it has been silenced, it can be awakened in the act of listening and playing; but if it is dead, nothing can breathe life into it again.

We may dispute the impact of philosophical affective theories on baroque composers, especially in the case of Bach. We may also dispute the relevance of these theories for the different modes of listening practised in the musical milieux of that period. Still, even if the descriptions of the arousal of affects were only theoretical constructions, they must have been grounded in some mode of listening. Some interest has been shown in a short passage in Mattheson where he describes his reaction when he listens to an instrumental ensemble in church: a sense of reverential awe falls over him when he listens to a solemn symphony, an elevated sense of wonder is brought about if an instrumental chorus joins in.[36] Matthew Riley follows Mark Evan Bonds in his comments on the difference between Mattheson and Wackenroder, but he focuses on the question of attention, since Wackenroder is not only more active than Mattheson but more attentive, too. For Mattheson, there seems to be an almost mechanical relation between sound event and affect: the listener is affected by the musical passage and an affect is aroused.[37]

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[33] Cf. Rolf Dammann, *Der Musikbegriff im deutschen Barock*, Cologne: Arno Volk 1967, p. 483.

[34] Cf. Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, 'Das Ausdrucks-Prinzip im musikalischen Sturm und Drang', in *Musikalisches Denken: Aufsätze zur Theorie und Ästhetik der Musik*, Wilhelmshaven: Noetzel 1977 (1955), p. 81.

[35] Cf. Manfred Bukofzer, 'Allegory in Baroque Music', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, no. 3 (1930–40), p. 12. See also David Schulenberg, 'Expression and Authenticity in the Harpsichord Music of J.S. Bach', *The Journal of Musicology*, vol. 8, no. 4 (1990), pp. 449–76.

[36] Mattheson, op. cit., pp. 208–9.

[37] Matthew Riley, *Listening in the German Enlightenment*, pp. 21–2. This mechanistic aspect of affectivity in the baroque is underscored by Enrico Fubini in *L'estetica musicale*

We can find another view of how the listener was situated in music when reading Rolf Dammann, who investigates the affective state of the listener in the baroque age: the listener is non-reflective and passively aroused by the represented affect, there is no aesthetic attitude involved; instead the listener reacts spontaneously and sensitively.[38] It seems as if Dammann is quite close to Besseler's notion of Romantic listening, since both Dammann's baroque listener and Besseler's Romantic listener are overwhelmed by the affectivity of the music, but Dammann locates an important difference: 'The ways of representing human passions typical for baroque music are directed at a goal in contrast to for instance Romanticism, where the expression of guiding moods [*Leitstimmungen*] become without goal, detached from goals.'[39] Thus we are coming close to the usual distinction made between *Affekt* and *Stimmung* where the former is well defined and 'objective', whereas the latter is amorphous and subject-dissolving.

Now, Dammann may quote Mattheson to lend support to his description of the mode of listening in the baroque; but Mattheson's writings are also signs of the disintegration of the same mode, indeed of the baroque era in music. Mattheson's theoretical approach is, as stated, non-mathematical, since he leaves behind mathematical explanations – but the mechanism in itself is not put into question. His is not the doctrine of Andreas Werckmeister, who founded his musical view on a doctrine of proportion and numbers, holding that God ordered everything according to measure and number since he is a god of order. The outcome is nevertheless the same: the relation between musical structure and affective response can be described in terms of cause and effect. Here we have a cornerstone of systematization of affects and sub-affects.[40]

In the Romantic aesthetics of *Stimmung* this causality is put out of play. Untouched, though, is the notion of attunement between music and listener: there is no valid parlance of the musical language, but the music tunes the listener. There are huge theoretical differences in the explanations of the musical understanding of the baroque, grounded in proportions, mathematics, bodily reactions and mental patterns, but it is possible to gather that we have been regarding a phenomenon of attunement. Here, the notion of attunement calls for other kinds of differentiation: namely the question of how well defined the attunemental phenomenon is; the question of translatability into language; the question of the configuration of the relation between subject and object; and the question of how deep the attunement reaches.

With the point of departure in Coriando's discussion about *Affekten* and *Stimmungen*, we can differentiate between the two concepts in the following way,

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*dal Settecento a oggi*, p. 9.

[38] Dammann, op. cit., p. 224.

[39] Dammann, op. cit., p. 230.

[40] Cf. Andreas Hartmann, 'Affektdarstellung und Naturbeherrschung in der Musik des Barock', *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1980), pp. 25–44.

at first outside the musical sphere, or, to be more precise, in a general sphere that includes music but does not accord to specific musical circumstances. *Affekt* is bound to an object (for instance the happiness of meeting an old friend after a long separation); it is punctual (it arises as soon as one recognizes that old friend); and it is a reaction upon a specific situation (something happens to the experiencing subject).

*Stimmung* is without object (for instance the joy of existence when waking up in the morning); it does not begin and end at specific points in time (one becomes aware of the joy without knowing when it started, and it passes by without our taking notice of it); and it is not a reaction upon something that happens to us (we cannot say why the joy appears).[41] Furthermore, an *Affekt* is well defined, being a parallel to the main passions described by Descartes, whereas the *Stimmung* is vague and hard to grasp.

It seems as if we could transfer these characteristics to music, saying that the affect in baroque music is represented in order to be aroused or understood (in and by the listener), being made into a musical object, whereas the *Stimmung* discloses a world (for the listener). However, and this is of the utmost importance, Coriando points out that every *Affekt* is put in relation to a world, no less than every *Stimmung* is put in relation to an object.[42] A *Stimmung* is essentially a 'disposing unlimiting' (*disponierende Entgrenzung*), but even if an *Affekt* is intentional and delimited, it presupposes always a whole, a world.[43]

From what has been said, we can conclude that *Affekt* and *Stimmung* are intertwined with each other; they are opposed to each other in terms of the subject–object and object–world relations, but they are still inscribed in the same sphere, affectivity. Nevertheless, if Heidegger's presumption that Dasein is always *gestimmt* is accepted, then the *Affekt* must be inserted within the coordinates of *Stimmung*. *Stimmung* seems to be operating on two different levels at the same time, but this is just a consequence of the ambiguity of the concept, an ambiguity that can be avoided in English, where we can differentiate between mood and attunement. *Stimmung* in the first sense is the opposite of *Affekt*, but *Stimmung* in the second sense regulates *Affekt*. Accordingly, mood is opposite to affect, whereas attunement regulates affect. When we historically associate *Affekt* with a specific period of musical aesthetics, namely first of all the German baroque, we also see how it is followed by other modes of affectivity: the aesthetics of *Empfindlichkeit*, of *Gefühl* and of *Stimmung*. They can all be inscribed in something that can be called the attunemental history, each time with a new constellation between subject and object, between object and world, even in a mode where subject and object disappear and where the separation between object and world cannot be made (answering to the mood-making in the music of late Romanticism and impressionism).

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41 Here, I elaborate the differentiation made by Coriando in *Affektenlehre*, p. 130.

42 Cf. Coriando, op. cit., p. 131.

43 Coriando, op. cit., pp. 261–2, cit. p. 261.

This attunemental history responds to Heidegger's history of Being, engendered by it but also taking a stance against the antagonistic relation between Being and beings in Heidegger's work at the time. The attunemental history opens itself up to plurality instead of searching for authenticity, as Heidegger tends to do in one way or another. Attunement is not equated with any specific relation between subject and object, or object and world; instead, it is that which precedes this differentiation and that which makes the differentiation possible in the first place.

A world also worlds in a piece composed in relation to an affect. We can ask for that affect hermeneutically – we can give different historically grounded suggestions of what kind of affect we are dealing with; and in this way follows the musical discourse of affects. An attunemental mode of listening or understanding gives other answers, but it does not break with historical awareness. Obviously, the world of a piece of music composed in a period when affect was supposed to be the prime affective phenomenon is structured in a different way from a piece composed within the aesthetics of moods, but nevertheless there is an attunement to be asked for, to be listened to in both cases. Asking for temporality, spatiality, mobility and materiality is not to ask for something outside time, outside history (materiality, however, being both brought forth in the historical world and withdrawn from it). The attunemental mode of listening makes it possible to auscultate how something is given (not what is given) musically in history and tells us about that moment in history, at least if the attunement at play in the piece can be awoken.

Here, baroque music has been discussed, but following the way of asking advanced here, we could go even further back in the history of music. There is no boundary to fix; the only boundaries are those of resonances. Is there a swaying resonance, or is it lost?

## The Afterworld of Luigi Nono's *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*

At first sight, Luigi Nono's quartet *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima* (1980) does not seem to be an obstacle for questions concerning attunement, at least when attunement is understood as part of the affectivity of music. No one has really questioned the expressivity of Nono's music, neither concerning the phase when he was one of the main figures in Darmstadt of the 1950s nor when he composed overtly politically engaged music from the 1960s into the 1970s – and certainly not from the middle of the 1970s until his death 1990 when he oriented himself towards more introvert music.

The string quartet has often been called a turning point, the work with which Nono's late production begins: in Italian this turn is called *la svolta*, but the German expression *Wende* is even more telling since it predicts the political change of a country that has begun to treat him almost as a native composer. This political parallel is no whimsical association; the story of the political composer Luigi

Nono is also the story of the European left-wing intellectual.[44] With his quartet the politically engaged Nono was said to have – or was actually accused of having – turned inwards, being a musical counterpart to the literary 'new subjectivity' in West Germany (*die neue Innerlichkeit* that included prose and drama from the 1970s by authors such as Botho Strauß, Peter Handke and Martin Walser), leaving the political sphere for privacy, turning activity into a kind of quietism. Even different notions with *Stimmung* as an etymological root – *Gestimmtheit* and the verb *einstimmen* – have been actualized regarding quite specific perspectives on the quartet.[45]

Yet, it will be made clear that the late work and aesthetics of Nono challenge the boundaries of attunement in so many ways that the issue of delimitation will be highlighted. He has nothing to do with the movements or styles which blend perfectly into the picture of a new kind of music of moods, established in the 1970s and the 1980s: the holy minimalism represented by composers like Arvo Pärt, John Tavener and Henryk Górecki; the New Romanticism to be found in Europe with Krzysztof Penderecki as a key figure, and John Corigliano in the same position in the USA. However, these examples only have a trivial concept of mood in common; they do not promote a radicalized idea of what the phenomenon of attunement is. Nono's quartet pinpoints this concept; it questions the presumptions underlying my argument; and it even intrinsically demands a kind of listening which is at odds with the attunemental mode of listening. Therefore, this is an appropriate work to turn to when investigating the boundaries of attunement.

In the following pages, I shall firstly examine whether the radical fragmentation in this quartet can be grasped attunementally. Secondly, I intend to clarify the status of the Hölderlin citations which Nono worked with in the score. The following elucidation provides possible attunemental characteristics of the quartet. Lastly, I deal with the seemingly irreconcilable opposition between the passivity of the attunemental mode of listening and the activity of the mode of listening that has been developed by Nono (in a dialogue with the philosopher Massimo Cacciari). If the last antagonism can be dealt with, we may draw on both investigations in this chapter – of Bach's and Nono's works – in the conception of guidelines for an

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[44] On Nono's changing views on politics, see Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, 'Nonos Arbeitsweise. Und: Die Frage nach der Einheit seiner Musik', *Musik & Ästhetik*, vol. 10, no. 40 (2006), pp. 51–62; Christine Mast, *Luigi Nono 'Io, Prometeo': Zum Entwurf konkreter Subjektivität in Luigi Nonos 'Tragedia dell'ascolto'* Prometeo, Frankfurt: Stroemfeld 2008, pp. 163–7; and Marinella Ramazotti, *Luigi Nono*, Palermo: Epos 2007, pp. 15–66.

[45] Ingrid Allwardt proposes the concept *Gestimmtheit* for the 'present absence' of Diotima's voice, *Stimme*, in the quartet. Cf. Ingrid Allwardt, *Die Stimme der Diotima: Friedrich Hölderlin und Luigi Nono*, Berlin: Kadmos 2004. Further, Dietrich E. Sattler suggests that the musicians should be attuned to the poetry of Hölderlin when they interpret the music, however, without elaborating his idea. Cf. Dietrich E. Sattler, '"Geheimere Welt": Zu Luigi Nonos Streichquartett *Fragmente – Stille, an Diotima*', *Musik & Ästhetik*, vol. 14, no. 55 (2010), p. 78.

approach to history in attunemental terms. Such a history cannot be written here and now, but this is a test of whether or not there can be any hope of writing it.

*The Problematics of Fragments*

As already mentioned, the problems with Nono's *oeuvre* do not start with the question of affectivity. Any preconceived notion about serial music – critical or indeed affirmative – saying that it has entered an objective realm where questions of subjectivity and affective aspects are left behind is definitely put out of play with Nono's music. First of all, the pieces by Nono where serial techniques are used most consequentially – *Incontri* (1955) and *Varianti* (1957) – show that these compositional techniques can result in both highly expressive and intimate music. That not only says something about the possibilities of these techniques, but also gives a new dimension and a telling contrast to works like Boulez's *Structures 1a* or Stockhausen's *Kreuzspiel*. The sought-after objectivity there does not rule out any discussion of attunement, since it can be seen as an attainable position within the attunemental field.

The strict and consequent permutations, the huge amount of pre-compositional work, the automation of the compositional process and the obliteration of the compositional subject are all factors that bring about a totally rationalized music. That does not mean that the music is alien to the attunemental sphere: we can remember that even the pallid state of being in no particular mood at all is a mood, and the opposites 'startled dismay' and 'certainty', characterizing the modern era according to Heidegger, are at least intuitively not foreign elements in the understanding of serial music. However, an attunemental elucidation of works such as those mentioned reaches a limit where we can only point out that they are characterized by startled dismay or paleness (for instance); but such an investigation does not do them any justice, even if it may say something useful for cultural criticism. Yet, Nono showed with great determination that the range of attunements could be much wider in serial compositions.

It is well known that Nono together with Bruno Maderna went back to the old contrapuntal writing of the Franco-Flemish school. This kind of constructional thinking gave the two Italian modernists an alternative to the dramatic break with tradition within the more orthodox serialism. The string quartet by Nono is a part of this tendency, not only since the composer cites Ockeghem's 'Malor me bat' (which he had been studying with Maderna, who also arranged it for three violas), but also in the compositional attitude. Despite some of the first major responses to Nono's quartet, declaring that the composer had left his serial techniques behind,[46] musical analysis on Nono's late music has made it clear that in this period he still

[46] Cf. Hubert Stuppner's 'Luigi Nono, oder: die Manifestation des Absoluten als Reaktion eines gesellschaftlich betroffenen Ichs' and Heinz-Klaus Metzger's 'Wendepunkt Quartett?', *Musik-Konzepte*, no. 20 (1981), pp. 82–92 and pp. 93–112 respectively.

used pre-compositional work; that he still thought in terms of musical architecture; and that he was still structuring his music (albeit in a new way).[47]

The point of departure for the quartet is not the 12-note row, but the enigmatic scale used by Verdi in the 'Ave Maria' of *Quattro pezzi sacri* with the characteristic four tritones taken from the deviating ascending and descending scale versions.[48] Nono invents a scale of fermatas, but this scale is not used in a serial manner; instead he builds different kinds of symmetries with it. That also accounts for the extremely differentiated dynamics, going from *pppp* to *ffff*, as well as for the accents. What we find is a musical world filled with mirror effects, with imitation as a fundamental feature.[49]

That which can be called the analytic mode of listening (or structural listening) is sensitive to symmetries and imitations concerning pitch and rhythm; but since dynamics and accents are contextually related and lacking fixed gradation, it is unlikely that a listener who is capable of perceiving these patterns in such a complex texture as that of the quartet could be found. What makes things even harder to hear, but less so to see, is that the fermatas are used in a way that hides the structural traits. We therefore have to deal with ambiguous material: there are constructive elements like the use of serial or imitative techniques, but these elements are broken down and fragmented; much of the construction can be found in the score, but Nono uses devices to conceal it from the listener.

When composer and critic Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf went to the Nono archives in Venice to study the manuscripts and sketches, he concluded that Nono was literarily free, a vagabond of a composer: 'Serial thinking in parameters is a constant in his work, in any case until the so-called turn, thereafter as background grammar, which is no longer a system, and certainly no method.'[50] But perhaps Mahnkopf did not take notice of some of the notes Nono wrote at the beginning of the compositional process, notes commented on by Carola Nielinger-Vakil. She has found the basic structural idea in a graphic form and a preliminary scheme of the distribution of the material. Nevertheless, even if there is a scheme, Nielinger-Vakil also holds that Nono tended to break his own rules.[51] Therefore, Nono seems to be systematic in an unsystematic way, and unsystematic in a systematic way.

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[47] Cf. Hermann Spree, *'Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima': Ein analytischer Versuch zu Luigi Nono Streichquartett*, Saarbrücken: Pfau 2004 (1992), 2nd ed., and Stefan Drees, *Architektur und Fragment: Studien zu späten Kompositionen Luigi Nonos*, Saarbrücken: Pfau 1998.

[48] The scale is upwards as follows: C–D♭–E–F♯–G♯–A♯–B–C and downwards with F instead of F♯. On the *scala enigmatica* and the quartet, see Spree, op. cit., pp. 28–32.

[49] Spree says that the constitutive technique is of mirroring, that is, of retrograde and inversion, and palindromes, leading to a kind of 'house of mirrors'. Spree, op. cit., pp. 35–6.

[50] Mahnkopf, op. cit., p. 56.

[51] Carola Nielinger-Vakil, '*Fragmente – Stille, an Diotima*: World of Greater Compositional Secrets', *Acta Musicologica*, vol. 82, no. 1 (2010), pp. 105–47.

Perhaps the broken-down system is an even greater problem for attunemental listening. Fragments are at work in the quartet. That is without doubt true, but what kind of fragments? The question is important, since the concept of attunement is directed at wholes – of a piece, of a part, of an episode. World and attunement are interconnected. When the work is fractured, when nothing at all is stabilized, then the attunement seems to be at risk of never appearing. The world never worlds.

With the score in our hands, the first part of the answer is immediately evident: it contains short fragments from a number of Hölderlin poems, written almost as expression marks above the staves. Nono did not intend them to be read to the audience, and absolutely not to be taken as a programme for the work.[52] The fragments are there for the musicians: 'The players should "sing" them inwardly.'[53] The score is also numbered in a way that has often been taken by commentators as representing a numbering of the different musical fragments. But the poetic fragments do not answer directly to the musical enumeration, and not only by listening to a performance but also by reading the score one begins to question if it is in fact possible to find those pauses, breaks or caesuras between the short sections necessary to call them fragments.

The word *Fragmente* in the title of the quartet has caused a lot of speculation. In the early reception of the work it was thought to be a sign of change in Nono's musical aesthetics. The presumed change concerns many levels, as has already been indicated: from the overall form to the compositional details, from the question of political engagement to the question of expressivity. Nono hinted at one of the most sublime moments of nineteenth-century music when he re-used Beethoven's *Mit innigster Empfindung* from the 'Heiliger Dankgesang' of the String Quartet op. 132. It was composed in the period when Beethoven's works dealt with harsh inner conflicts, so the possibility that the Romantic concept of fragments could be re-actualized by Nono seems close at hand. Perhaps no other definition is as well known as Friedrich Schlegel's in his 206th *Athenäums-Fragment*: 'A fragment, like a miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a porcupine.'[54] Yet, this formulation is very close to another literary genre, the aphorism, but many of Schlegel's other formulations go in another direction, namely to the openness regarding the totality: something finite cannot represent the infinite, but the open fragment can point at it.

Martin Zenck has argued that in Schlegel's thinking the fragment appears 'from the background of a vast totality', whereas this is not the case with the

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[52] Luigi Nono, *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*, Milan: Ricordi 1980, unnumbered page (at the beginning of the score).

[53] Nono, op. cit., unp.

[54] Friedrich Schlegel, *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, vol. 2, part 1, Paderborn: Schöningh 1967, p. 197 (trans. in Friedrich Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Peter Firchow, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1991, p. 45).

quartet.[55] However, such totality has been the working hypothesis of Stefan Drees concerning Nono's late works,[56] and Hermann Spree has investigated the splintered background in his groundbreaking study of the quartet. Therefore, Schlegel's dictum that it is disastrous for the mind to have a system, but also to not have one, leading to an interplay between the systematic and the unsystematic, seems to be a good way of describing Nono's position. And, indeed, Drees says that Nono evokes the literary-philosophic tradition of fragments using *Fragmente* in the title of the quartet, and then especially the Romantic conception to be found in Schlegel and Novalis, where the self-reflective movement leads to an infinitely expanding structure.

Yet, too much focus on Romantic thinking leads to a neglect of the co-operation between Nono and the Italian philosopher Massimo Cacciari. Another way of dealing with fragments can be seen in Cacciari's proposals for the opera *Prometeo*, the main work in Nono's last phase – namely the idea of shaping the different parts of the work as islands (*isole*). It was not Nono's idea from the start; instead Cacciari used it as a means of discontinuity in his text for *Prometeo*, a collage of citations into which Nono was asked to find his own way[57] without a specific route (almost like Odysseus going through the Mediterranean Sea, not always with the intention of getting back home to Ithaca). They had agreed on a form that omitted any dramatic convention, turning instead to a singular drama where all sounds, colours, signs and words must be released from every causal, deterministic and extrinsic bond: 'Only Singulars constituted in this way can have a relationship – *polyphony*.'[58]

These singulars would render possible a listening that was undisturbed, focused and intense. But the notion of islands was more than that. In *Prometeo*, the whole history of the Western sphere was told, and the prospective was a historical one. Cacciari went on to elaborate the notion in his own philosophical work, and it was central to him when he discussed the idea of Europe in the 1990s. Here we find a more elaborate version of *isole*, now concerning the different parts of Europe: they have all different *logoí*, but at the same time there is the notion of a *logos* for all, a journey 'towards this unity that the multiplicity demonstrates, yes, but as lost; disclosing, yes, but in its absence'.[59] The relation between the islands is essential. It is described in terms of harmonizing, but then without any violent reduction of the multiplicity to a unity.[60] It is not hierarchical; no island can be the centre:

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[55] Martin Zenck, 'Dal niente: Vom Verlöschen der Musik', *Musik-Texte*, no. 55 (1994), p. 21.

[56] Drees, op. cit.

[57] Cf. Klaus Kropfinger's interview with Nono in ' … kein Anfang – kein Ende … Aus Gesprächen mit Luigi Nono, *Musica*, no. 41 (1988), p. 166.

[58] Massimo Cacciari, 'Verso Prometeo, tragedia dell'ascolto', in Massimo Cacciari (ed.), *Luigi Nono: Verso Prometeo*, Milan: Ricordi 1984, p. 20.

[59] Massimo Cacciari, *L'Arcipelago*, Milan: Adelphi 2005 (1997), 2nd ed., p. 19.

[60] Cacciari, op. cit., p. 20.

> In the mobile and changing space of co-ordination and co-habitation – which is also the meaning of *pólemos*! – the singularities of the Archipelago belong one to the other because none of them disposes in itself the Centre proper, because the Centre is nothing other than this impetus that obligates each of them to 'transcend', navigating towards the other and all of them towards the absent homeland.[61]

A work of art is not a continent, of course, but the metaphor of an archipelago is here elaborated by Cacciari in a manner that can help us better understand how the relation between the islands was constituted in *Prometeo*, and furthermore how the intricate system of what are apparently fragments coheres in something that is much more than mere atomized parts. It is not too daring an assumption to say that this fractured complex can be found in the quartet. The metaphorics of islands has, in fact, followed the quartet in comments from early in its reception history.[62] There is a unity, but the unity is absent. There is no proper centre, but a web of relations, a co-ordination, a co-habitation, a co-existence between different singularities – insularities.

### *A Call for Interpretations*

Paradoxically, the extremely detailed instructions in the score of *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima* are combined with an attitude that leaves much interpretation open to the musicians. For instance, every fermata should 'always sound different from the others, with free fancy',[63] which is wholly at odds with the exactitude of the fermata series. The recordings of the quartet clearly show that this has also been the consequence, ranging from the LaSalle Quartet's premiere recording (1983), which is 38 minutes long, to the Moscow String Quartet's recorded live (1989), which is more than ten minutes shorter.[64] The apparent variation concerning duration is only one of the dimensions where the interpretations differ. The rhythmic articulation, as well as the grade of consonance and dissonance in the chords, is open to different readings.

The choice of how to balance the voices (the citation of 'Malor me bat' can be made easy to recognize or, conversely, can be concealed) is another dimension.

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61 Cacciari, op. cit., pp. 20–21.

62 Cf. Jürg Stenzl, liner notes for Luigi Nono, *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*, LaSalle Quartet, Deutsche Grammophon DG 415 513–2, 1986; Wolfgang Rathert, 'Zeit als Motiv in der Musik des zwanstigsten Jahrhunderts: Mit einem Ausblick auf Feldman und Nono', in Klein et al., *Musik in der Zeit*, pp. 287–312; Spree, op. cit., p. 72; and Allwardt, op. cit., p. 41.

63 Nono, op. cit., unp.

64 The recordings referred to in this section are Luigi Nono, *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*, LaSalle Quartet, Deutsche Grammophon DG 415 513–2, 1986 (1983); Luigi Nono, *Orchestral Works and Chamber Music*, Moscow String Quartet, Col legno WWE 20505, 2000 (1989); and Luigi Nono, *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*, *'Hay que caminar' Sognando*, Arditti Quartet, Montaigne 789 005 (1991).

Such interpretative issues are relevant for most music, but in this quartet the choices have an extraordinary impact on the concretization of the work. Then there is a technical aspect, too, since it seems to be almost impossible to differentiate between the dynamics of the work (most of the quartet lies within the range of *pppp* and *mp*). The great problem of how 'Fragment' in the title is to be understood also produces highly different alternatives, mirrored in the attitude concerning individual elements in the work and the relation between the episodes. The Moscow Quartet tends to give priority to the musical flow, not to breaks and stops, and the interpretation is the most organic of them all. Both the Arditti and the LaSalle Quartet are closer to the instructions of the score, but the latter quartet is more focused on continuity and pedagogical clarity.

In his foreword to the score, Nono warned against taking the splinters of Hölderlin's poems too firmly. It seems to have been with some considerable foresight that he did that. His concerns then were about the concert, the preparation of the musicians and the prohibition of having the texts read aloud. Perhaps it would have been wise of him to also warn literary or philosophically minded musicologists not to step too deeply into Hölderlin's poetic universe, especially into the immense world of commentaries. There is, admittedly, much to be found there. We have already seen that Heidegger made Hölderlin into his forebear when he himself starting to brood over the 'second beginning' of Western thinking. Hölderlin has become an undisputable reference in literary theory and philosophy since the 1960s, calling for comments from Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Peter Szondi, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and many, many others. Yet, Nono was only interested in the performances, not in the intellectual reception. In an informal conversation he apparently told the musicologist Friedrich Spangemacher that he had put the citations in the score after the composition of the work.[65] Studies made on the sketches strengthen this statement.[66] If this is a fact, then much changes in the reflection on the quartet – not everything, however.

Luigi Nono studied Hölderlin intensively. There are many witnesses to his interest in the famous *Frankfurter Ausgabe* of Hölderlin's works, where different versions of the text are published along with the manuscripts with Hölderlin's handwriting – the mere idea of small changes in the text, new nuances coming forth, changes of atmosphere made Nono himself aware of new ways of thinking about the work of art and the process of composing.[67] Another path to trace is the importance of Hölderlin's ideological aspects to Nono: the latter had read Pierre Bertaux's politically engaged biography about the poet,[68] and it is no sheer

[65] At least this is the interpretation made by Döpke in her essay on the quartet. She was allowed to read Spangemacher's notes from the conversation. Cf. Doris Döpke, '"Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima": Fragmentarische Gedanken zur musikalischen Poetik von Luigi Nonos Streichquartett', *Zeitschrift für Musikpädagogik*, vol. 11, no. 36 (1986), p. 14.

[66] Cf. Nielinger-Vakil, op. cit., p. 121.

[67] Cf. Döpke, op. cit., p. 14.

[68] Pierre Bertaux, *Friedrich Hölderlin*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1978.

coincidence that Peter Weiss wrote his play on the 'Jacobean' Hölderlin in close connection with a collaboration with Nono. However, even if there are political aspects to Nono's String Quartet, they cannot be reconciled with any revolutionary ideals. They are part of his utopian aesthetics. I will touch upon some of these themes, but only when motivated by the act of listening.

It is necessary to clarify the role of the textual fragments. It is not possible to leave them out of the account and focus on the notes in the score, since they are parts of the work of art. A starting point is the foreword in the score, a text I have already cited. Here, we should make use of the Italian text, printed first in the score and followed by translations into English (shown below) and German:

> I frammenti, tutti da poesie di F. Hölderlin, inscritti nella partitura:
>
> – in nessun caso da esser detti durante l'esecuzione
> – in nessun caso indicazione naturalistica programmatica per l'esecuzione
>
> ma molteplici attimi pensieri silenzi 'canti'
> di altri spazi di altri cieli
> per riscoprire altrimenti il possibile non 'dire addio alla speranza'
>
> Gli esecutori lì 'cantino' internamente nella loro autonomia
> Nell'autonomia dei suoni tesi a un' 'armonia delicata della vita interiore'
>
> – forse anche altro ripensamento a Lili Brik e a Vladmimir Majakowskij.
>
> [The fragments written into the score, all from poems by F. Hölderlin, are: // – never to be spoken aloud during the performance / – under no circumstances to be taken as programmatic performance indications // but many moments, thoughts, silences, 'songs' of other spaces, other skies / to otherwise rediscover the possible, do not 'say farewell to hope' // The players should 'sing' them inwardly, in their autonomy / in the autonomy of sounds striving for a 'delicate harmony of inner life' // – Perhaps, also, another reminder of Lili Brik and Vladimir Maiakovsky.][69]

From the first three lines we can see that Nono was not breaking his own rules when he asked for the inclusion of the fragments in a programme booklet; nor was the reproduction of the score with one fragment on another occasion against his principles: they should not be read out loud, but they could be read silently. The musicians were not to make the quartet into some kind of cheap programme music (indeed, neither Richard Strauss nor the young Mahler wanted that), and this should have been expected for the audience too, even if they had the fragments to read.

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[69] Nono, op. cit., unp (trans. in Nono, op. cit., unp.)

Then the problems begin. First, the verb is missing when the instructions continue, yet it seems logical to understand that the fragments are moments, thoughts and silent songs. The expression 'songs' for the poems is wholly in line with Hölderlin's own understanding of his poetry, often said to be *Gesänge* – of course almost a standard description in poetry, reminiscent of poets being followers of bards, minstrels and rhapsodes. In a move which seems to be Romantic, these thoughts and songs are said to come from 'other spaces, other skies', but here we should be aware of the literal meaning of utopia – that which is to be found in no place, *u-topia*. No, instead the musician is asked to rediscover the possible, that which is not a reality but may come; he or she must not, like Hölderlin in a letter to his beloved Susette Gontard, 'say farewell to hope'. In an ambiguous way Nono introduces the oscillation between love and politics, since he seems to be speaking about the love between Hölderlin and the wife in a family where he worked as tutor, impossible since society could not accept this kind of relationship (just as impossible as the love between Lili Brik and Mayakovsky, mentioned in the last line of the extract).

In the next step, Nono gives instructions as to how the musicians are to handle the fragments, but in a manner reminiscent of Hölderlin's poetic technique, it is not at all clear what the words refer to: 'The players should "sing" them inwardly, in their autonomy.' Which autonomy does Nono mean? Should the interpreters 'sing' in their autonomy, or should the textual fragments be sung according to their autonomy? And if it really is the autonomy of the fragmentary words, are they suddenly transfigured to sheer musical sounds (albeit silent)? Here, it is obvious that Nono does not try to give precise instructions, but to open up the musicians to something that is not uttered. In other words, he seems to be precise but he is in fact bewildering; and that is only the beginning of the situation for the musician who will soon enter a score that is extremely detailed yet wide open to different readings, different interpretations, different bodies of sound.

The last line in the quotation to be commented on reminds us of a restorative attitude. Once again Nono cites a letter by Hölderlin, now speaking about 'die zarten Töne [Nono writes 'Tönen'] des innersten Lebens'. The sounds should strive for a 'delicate harmony of inner life', which is another version of the idea of *Stimmung* being the tuning of the soul. Just as later in the score he uses Beethoven's formula *Mit innigster Empfindung*, Nono here seems to invoke a Romantic conception of the subject. We recognize it from the early Romantic era of the history of the concept of *Stimmung*, and it is still keeping intact the separation between inside and outside. It reminds us of the attunemental historicity, not only in the sense that *Stimmung* has been conceived of in different ways in theoretical writings in both philosophy and musical aesthetics, but also, more radically, that attunement is not fixed in a specific relation between subject and object – instead it is that which regulates the relation, and at times makes it disappear.[70]

[70] However, Nono discussed the quartet in another sense at the end of the 1980s, saying that the *Verinnerlichung* or internalization at work in the quartet cancels the

These are only general comments on a foreword to the work of art, comments that, nevertheless, are rules for that work and, accordingly, a part of it. We should now take a look at these poetic fragments: their character, their presence in the work, for they are present in the work, even if they are never heard. They are to be made present, and in a way which says something about attunement.

The fragments can be grouped in different ways. One group has to do with what is withheld and kept in silence ('more secrete world', 'in the deepest heart', 'when in abundant calm', 'in silent eternal clarity' and 'in quiet delight').[71] Of greatest interest is the fragment 'that you do not know', which has been used as a key to Nono's general strategy when he withholds the poetic fragments from the audience,[72] but which should be read in the context of the poem where it has the positive meaning of saying that the feminine 'thou' of the poem cannot know if she is really alone.

Another group has to do with the very question of solitude: 'alone' and 'lonely … estranged, she, the Athenian'; but, given its context, 'that you do not know', too. In addition, some of the fragments speak of intimate relations or something that one might have in common with others – again, 'that you do not know' – but also the context of 'more secrete world', since it speaks of the secret world of two lovers: 'dwell there among you' and 'bound together in freedom'.

Yet another group has to do with openness: 'when from afar', 'out of the ether', 'out of here into air and light', 'flying into the vastness'. New constellations are to be found in fragments speaking about a relation to another world or another space. Again there is reason to include 'when from afar' and 'out of the ether'; but even more clear are 'each of you … a world', 'how gladly I would' and 'you, glorious ones!'

Also important is the theme of home, of *Heimat*: 'in the waters of homeland' and 'On Neckar's shores of peace and beauty'. The fragments are in other words open-ended. They point in different directions. They can concurrently hold different meanings. My intention is not to declare what they say, not even what they say to me; instead I want to show that any interpreter affronts a non-specified meaning and is forced to choose a passage through them, all the time aware of the fact that there are always other possibilities.

It is true that some of the citations chosen by Nono are taken from a poem that has a political theme, namely Hölderlin's 'Emilie vor ihrem Brauttag', where references are made to a Corsican uprising at the beginning of the eighteenth century. But if we take a closer look at the words and their context in the poem, we cannot find anything political in them – it is actually the other way around. There

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difference between 'inside' and 'outside'. It indicates a reinterpretation of his own work. Cf. Kropfinger, op. cit., p. 167.

[71] Nono, op. cit., unp. When possible, I have consulted Nick Hoff's translations in Friedrich Hölderlin, *Odes and Elegies*, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press 2008.

[72] Cf. Juliana Hodkinson, 'Presenting Absence: Constitutive Silences in Music and Sound Art since the 1950s', PhD thesis, University of Copenhagen 2007, pp. 120–25.

are two passages from this poem, the longest in Hölderlin's whole production, which Nono uses when he picks the words (with the chosen words underlined). The first one is the following:

> Das hast du oft
> Mir vorgeworfen, daß ich immerhin
> Abwesend bin mit meinem Sinne, hast
> Mir's oft gesagt, ich habe bei den Menschen
> Kein friedlich Bleiben nicht, <u>verschwende</u>
> <u>Die Seele</u> <u>an die Lüfte</u>, lieblos sei
> Ich öfters bei den Meinen. Gott! Ich lieblos?[73]
>
> [Blamed me / You often had for being absentminded, / Not seldom you have said that I don't have / A peaceful way of keeping company, / <u>As if the soul had flown into the air</u>, / And with no love for people who are close / To me. My God, a loveless person, me!]

It is almost as if we find an anticipation of the criticism directed against the quartet. Emilie tries to defend herself against the words of her friend Klara; the solitude, the absentmindedness should not be seen as a lack of love to those close to her or to her people. But when Nono quotes them, the attitude is changed; on their own, they seem to have a lightness close to the lightness of the actual music. In the next passage, whence Nono takes some words, Emilie writes about a journey she and her father made, which starts with a visit to Klara's neighbourhood:

> An deines Neckars friedlichschönen Ufern.
> Da dämmert' eine stille Freude mir
> Zum ersten Male wieder auf.[74]
>
> [On your Neckar's shores of peace and beauty. / A gentle joy begins to dawn in me,/ – it happens finally again.]

Here, Nono excludes the possessive pronoun saying that it is Klara's countryside; he only chooses the strands of the river Neckar.

Any attempt to establish a definite meaning, to distil a whole, is bound to fail. Just as useless is any effort to systemize the fragments and to give them a fixed relation to something that seems to be specific musical segments. The fragments are not inscribed to be keys to what is sounding; the different segments of the music do not give auditory illustration to the words (even if one might find

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[73] Cf. Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*, vol. 2, Berlin: Aufbau 1995 (1970), 2nd ed., p. 295. I thank Hannah Hintz for our discussions about the translation of this and next Hölderlin citation.

[74] Hölderlin, op. cit., p. 300.

examples of that which seems to be an embodiment of what can be read). Instead they are hints of how to get into the work; they are entrances to the world of the musical work. The reader who remembers the description of how composers of so-called programme music handed over texts to help the audience understand what otherwise might be hard to grasp could here be tempted to think that Nono tries to do the same for the musicians. The fragments would thus be used instrumentally. I do not think so. The fragments are integrated parts of a work of art that makes attunements come alive. If anyone who deals with the quartet repeats the working process of the LaSalle Quartet when rehearsing it together with the composer – namely through reading all Hölderlin's poems[75] – then the meaning of the quartet will not be elucidated. Instead sensitivity to attunement will be greater, calibration of the tuning more specific. There is no concealed meaning to find; instead it is a way of opening up the mind, the ear, the sensitivity.

*Diotima's World*

There is a shortcut to the world of *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*: it can be characterized as being fragmentary. Is it then a world, really? In Heidegger's conception a world is a whole of meaning, where the relations necessary for meaning can be investigated. Anyone who reads the score will soon be convinced that such a wholeness cannot be grasped, since the structures that can be found evaporate through the excessive use of fermata, changes of tempo, pauses. There are different kinds of scales to be found: scales of tones, scales of nuances, scales of pauses, scales of metres. We can even find that the enigmatic scale is mirrored in the scale of fermatas. But only fragments of the scales are taken into account, staggering the fractured character. The whole seems to be dispersed.

Nevertheless, listening to the music without restraint we hear that this is not the case. We do not find processes leading from one point to another; there is no general logic governing the move from one segment to another; no web of motif relations is unfolded. Still, there are different kinds of relations. Here, the principle of the present and future temporalizing themselves out of having-been is an ever-working principle where the move backwards is not a reflexive one but a play between sameness and difference. The specific temporality of the quartet is characterized by this foundation in the past. Whereas the mobility changes between resting chords, sudden gestures of expression and absence of any movement, the temporality is cumulative, always related to what has already happened. Whereas the spatiality goes through a whole series of transformations – from a glowing line in just one dimension to a vague atmosphere without any boundaries – the foundation in the past says that these spatialities are bound to each other; they are not unfamiliar. There are seldom exact repetitions of what has been; instead we find new constellations of materials and principles. What is the same is also different. Reflection might say what is combined. However, the ear

[75] Cf. Allwardt, op. cit., p. 68.

finds new ways through an already known terrain. Musical material is presented from different perspectives; but, putting the words in another way, the materiality of the music comes forth: different kinds of materiality, sometimes as if without form – a naked materiality that is at once concealed again.

I used the term 'terrain', but is it the best expression? The metaphor used by Nono and Cacciari in their collaboration is poignant – archipelago. The listener moves from one island to another; is exposed to the sameness and the difference between them; rests on the open space of the sea and meets a new shore. Still, if we take *Prometeo* as the paradigm for an aesthetics of islands, then the conclusion must be that in the quartet there is no equivalent of the movement-like islands in the opera. We find short phrases, different kinds of material shaped in new ways, long pauses full of awaiting and stillness, yes. But if the metaphor of islands is to be used (and I intend to do so), then it must be focused in a way that in visual terms leaves the well-defined shores of the island and instead opens the view over an archipelago filled with small islets, skerries and reefs, and where mirages confuse the sight and the haze dissolves the contours. Or, to change the sense paradigm from sight to hearing, where the listener opens themself up to a series of interconnected sound events that are combined, superimposed, affected by each other.

This means that the sameness transgresses the individual segment. From the beginning (Example 4.2), the movements in the first violin are only punctuated by the other instruments, and it is possible to perceive a section consisting of no fewer than seven cues (with a duration of about 5′30). It would be too much to say that there is only one temporality dominating here. Instead different temporalities seem to emerge out of the silence, different tendencies move; but as soon as a movement can be apprehended, it is gone. A space is opened up, but it is a space where stillness is as important as sound events. Then there follows a section (from cue #8) where fast-moving figurations played with aperiodic tremolo start to dominate the textures – a figuration that has been introduced in the second bar after cue #5. Another general change comes with cue #18 (actually, the third bar), where the extended tones that have occasionally been emerging are played *gettato*. The staccato technique is varied with *battuto* on chordal movements earlier played *normale*, and thereby yet another kind of continuity emerges. When these two sections have ended (cue #24), the music moves up in the sky – anticipating the ending of the quartet. The interconnections between the temporalities grow more and more complex, and the later sections are not so clear-cut; but most of the first half is already past when this happens. The segment after cue #25 is a harbinger of this change, echoing past musical events and pointing at future ones.

Analytically simple but attunementally weighty are the appearances of easily identifiable (relative) consonances at junctures in the quartet. A first 'consonance', dominated by the minor third G+B♭ and indicating G minor, is hinted at by the cello one bar before cue #26 but disturbed by an A in the viola. The G-minor chord emerges slowly after cue #28 with a third, now B♭+D, and soon with a G established below – but, again, the consonance is disturbed. Then the minor third

Example 4.2 Luigi Nono, *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*, opening






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in the cello reappears between cues #40 and #41, followed by G+D or D+G in all instruments (cue #41), a consonance re-attuned to a G-minor chord three bars later. This interplay of consonant intervals is in the end changed to a constellation where D+F♯+G+A (played as harmonics) is followed by D+G+A, then D+G and finally D. This trajectory of junctures can be described as a slow but steady change of attunement, carrying on from the deepest of grief to the presage of hope.

The latter half of the quartet is more fragmented than the first. With the exception of the Ockeghem citation after cue #48 – lasting around two and a half minutes, and much less dominated by the historical citation than by a specific texture (the viola fronted as a solo part the whole time) – no overarching characteristics or principles make it possible for a grouping; thus it is set in contrast to the first half. Perhaps the postludial character of the last three minutes, dominated by long withheld tones, suggests that it should be counted among the overarching sections. Yet, the impression is not truly fragmented, since almost everything that happens has been touched upon earlier. The combinations may be new, the constellations built in new ways, but nevertheless the dimension of having-been works in an obvious way. Only the 'Malor me bat' comes as a surprise, however estranged it may appear through the rhythmical changes.

The reference to what has been is, though, not always clearly specified, since there is no original thematic motif to be remembered. The musicians playing the quartet have surely been steeped deeply in the work, recognizing the different connections between the segments. But the listener – who has not studied the score, not read any commentaries of the work and not made any auditory analyses – does not do that; he or she is situated in something that is both recognizable and changed.

If the temporal dimension of having-been is central for listening to the work, then the forecast of understanding is almost put out of play. The logic at work is almost always extremely local. For a moment one can guess what will happen – in the next moment, in the coming seconds – but the future horizon is very close to the plain present. Guessing is reflective, but other examples show that there is an unreflective presentiment, too. The most important of these are the pauses: when the musicians stay silent for 10 or 15 seconds, this will seem to be the given way to continue. Closely acquainted with the pauses are the withheld tones with fermata, at times held for almost half a minute. Here we should remember that *Stille* means not just the absence of sound, but also 'calmness' and 'motionlessness'. At both times, the musicians are asked to open themselves to 'dreaming spaces', 'sudden ecstasies', 'unutterable thoughts', 'tranquil breaths' and 'silences "intemporally" "sung"'.[76] The negation is not simple. Silence is not the opposite of sound, at least not in this case. The music may be kept still, but that does not mean that the movements disappear. Instead, the movements are to be found on another level, among the players or indeed listeners.

Ambitions are also part of this world. These ambitions are at work in the music. Despite its seemingly introspective character – Nono has taken the notion

[76] Nono, op. cit., unp.

*Mit innigster Empfindung* from perhaps one of the most central movements in Beethoven's late quartets and has even chosen his own mode, *la scala enigmatica*, as a counterpart to the Lydian mode of the Beethoven movement – the quartet is placed at the centre of society: surely a centre that is not generally acknowledged, but a centre which is a free space, where things can shine through. It opens itself to a light that is not possible to see, to sounds that are impossible to hear under ordinary circumstances, and it points at something that is impossible to say, impossible to express, impossible to know. That is the other space, the non-space, the utopia of the quartet. The quartet does not say farewell to hope; it attunes to a withheld hope.

*Listening for the Possible and Listening for the Attunement*

The slow transposition from grief to (withheld) hope seems to be a perfect illustration of an attunemental change. When the listener is attuned to the unfolding music, he or she is also transposed – it is not an active listening, it is passive. In a way, someone who listens to Nono's quartet is also attuned to a utopia, something that does not exist but could possibly exist. However, I have also stressed the activity necessary for any understanding of the work. It is not enough to just let oneself be attuned. There are too many possibilities, too many ways to understand, too many options. The work demands an active listening that seems to be at odds with the passivity of attunement. But the scope is even wider. Nono's utopian listening, elaborated in a continuous dialogue with Cacciari in the 1980s, outgrows any earlier attempt at formulating the emancipated role of the listener.

Again and again in his comments and reflections on his late works, Nono comes back to the notions *il possibile* and *la possibilitá*, 'the possible' and 'the possibility'. In this, he is inspired by Robert Musil,[77] who described his character Ulrich in *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* as 'the quintessence of his possibilities, potential man'.[78] Another key to Nono's aesthetical thinking is the Frankfurt edition of Hölderlin's works (started in 1975 but completed only in 2008), where not only are different versions of the poems to be found, but also reprints of the original manuscripts and detailed accounts of small changes to the words and their order. Here, Nono could follow the creative process in Hölderlin, where the slightest changes of nuances were attainable, the writing seemed to be not linear but multidimensional and the idea of a completion was put into question.

We can make a comparison with one of the most influential normative descriptions of how the act of listening should be constituted to New Music,

[77] Carola Nielinger-Vakil focuses the Musil influences on Nono's quartet in the article 'Quiet Revolutions: Hölderlin Fragments by Luigi Nono and Wolfgang Rihm', *Music & Letters*, vol. 81. no. 2 (2000), pp. 245–74 (esp. pp. 255–8).

[78] Robert Musil, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, vol. 1, Reinbek: Rowohlt 1978, p. 251 (trans. in Robert Musil, *The Man without Qualities*, trans. Burton Pike, New York: Knopf 1995, vol. 1, p. 270).

namely Adorno's 'adequate listener'. Adorno says that any competent listening is to be distinguished by the ability to perceive the inner logic of a work; but when the music is characterized by that inner conflict, *Zerrissenheit*, which is emblematic of the second Vienna School, then a 'speculative ear' is needed. The complex combinations of notes must be heard as chords; the melodies must be heard as melodies, even if there are many leaps over wide intervals and even if the different phases are interrupted by pauses; the architecture of the piece must be heard despite its fragmentation. The way of listening must correspond to the way of composing; what the composer brings together with great effort must also be synthesized by the listener. Here in 'Anweisungen zum Hören neuer Musik', his most concrete treatment of the relation between adequate listening and the New Music, Adorno uses almost exclusively examples from the second Viennese School.[79] His model is an answer to the problems that arise when this kind of music is approached. Thus it follows that two different fields are combined: it was a musical development that demanded a new way of listening adequately, and this kind of listening was then applied to other kinds of music, too.

Now, as stated already, the quartet *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima* has no inner logic, just like many of the other pieces from this period in Nono's production. In Nono's and Cacciari's elaboration of a new mode of listening, they do not adhere to any preconceived notion; instead they draw on a series of literary works by Musil and Edmond Jabès[80] on the critical theory of Benjamin and Adorno, and on a theological thinking reaching from the Jewish tradition in general to Gershom Scholem specifically, as well as on Christian speculation. Their kind of listening is not a passive one: it involves a choice of which path to follow through the music; or, better, a choice of which route to take in the archipelago. It is productive; it brings something into the musical artwork that was not there from the start. The highly differentiated pitches, loudness and timbre call for an act of listening that leaves behind ordinary patterns of cognition.

This new listening, sensible and sensitive, enables the listening subject to find new possibilities. It takes part in societal change; it is open to the unknown and the foreign; it is always concerned with relations between individuals. The consciousness must be open to combinations of feelings and not only one state of mind at a time. Yet, this kind of listening has to be developed, since dominating cognitive patterns make open listening impossible, and the act of listening is too often dominated by sight and ideology. To listen is to be open.[81]

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[79] Theodor W. Adorno, 'Anweisungen zum Hören neuer Musik', GS, vol. 15, pp. 188–248, ref. p. 243.

[80] A small volume of texts documenting the collaboration between Jabès, Cacciari and Nono has been edited by Nils Röller: *Migranten: Edmond Jabès, Luigi Nono, Massimo Cacciari*, Berlin: Merve 1995.

[81] This mode of listening is elaborated in a series of interviews and discussions with Nono from the 1980s, many of them printed in Luigi Nono, *Scritti e colloqui*, Lucca: Ricordi 2001 and Cacciari, *Luigi Nono: Verso Prometeo*.

There is a radical break with systematic composition when Nono annihilates his own systems: his criticism of the schematic modernistic way of composing does not lead to a renewal of tonality, but a breakdown of structures. Freedom lies in this possibility. But Nono also puts the standardized perception into question: micro-tonality derides traditional pitches; the extremely differentiated timbre deviates from the ordinary use of the instruments; and the insularity of the form makes the work impossible to perceive as a whole. In his late music, Nono goes outside the cognitive patterns with their groupings and thresholds for the musical material and pitches. This tendency can still be interpreted in terms of political convictions: instead of being satisfied with what is given, there is a reaching out for the non-existent, the utopian. When the musicians sing about other spaces, other heavens, a new space is opened up for the listener to dwell in.

In *Fragmente – Stille, An Diotima*, attunement is in play not only as a condition for all human activity and existence; it is also interwoven with the aesthetic principles of the piece. The musicians are supposed to attune themselves to the poems, not only to read the short fragments, but also to search for them in their original context; and thus attuned to them they are to interpret the music. Without any idolatrized sense, the listener is put into a sounding world that, if the reading has been successful and the act of listening is opened up, is attuned to the same attunement that has attuned the textual fragments. In a way, the interpretation of the musicians – being asked to dream about other spaces and heavens, to sing and to think – can be seen as a parallel to the act of elucidating the piece in the attunemental mode of listening. Both kinds of interpreter, the musicians and the writer, should put themselves under the spell of the work, and, attuned to it, let something of the attunement be known.

But the act of listening in Nono and Cacciari's mode, listening for the possible, is said to be both reflective and productive. It depends on a highly active subject, choosing its way through the archipelago of Nono's late music. That is clearly not an attunemental mode of listening. However, the listener has already been thrown into the archipelago before he or she can even begin to navigate between the islets, skerries and reefs. This listening for the possible is made possible by the attunement. Here, we find a boundary for the concept of attunement, since it does not account for the act of listening demanded and described by Nono and Cacciari; but at the same time it shows that which conditions the mode of possibilities. It is the primordial disposition of that mode which, however, seems to call for an emancipated subject that still has not been seen. Perhaps it has been heard of.

## Remarks on the Attunemental History of Listening

Nono's and Cacciari's mode of listening is yet another manifestation of ways of hearing in the history of attunement. Up to this point, a series of modes have been discerned: the baroque listener, the Romantic modes described by Wackenroder and Hoffmann, the speculative listener by Adorno, and then Nono and Cacciari's

mode of possibilities. The list of modes could easily be expanded. There is much potential for reaching further back in time, to the Renaissance and beyond, as well as auscultating contemporary modes and listening habits. But that would be a different kind of investigation, a different work, from the present one. What I have presented here as an attunemental mode of listening is not merely another mode, because it is conceived in order to auscultate all of these modes, to show how the world can be expected to world in different ways. At the same time, the mode cannot escape history. It cannot proclaim to breathe any life into that which is dead, and it does not reconstruct the past. However, it offers a living relation to history. The relation between attunement and history can therefore be said to be an attunemental history.

Accordingly, attunemental history is not a perspective on history, since a perspective is a visual field where the object of interest is more or less distant; instead, it is a way of listening to history, to not stand out in a past but to let that which has been stand into our being. It rests upon some suppositions that may not be self-evident. To start with, it is assumed that music is capable of a primordial world disclosure, not only of temporality but also of mobility, spatiality and materiality. All music has to do with attunement, but not all music discloses its world in an equally primordial way. Some musical works institute a world so thoroughly, so completely, that they tune our relation to the surrounding world in a new manner. But the listeners can also attune themselves to ways of listening, and therefore also to ways of relating to the world that come from the past but are still resonant. There is a diachronic difference, a different tuning, between us today and all past epochs, but since these past epochs are equally our past, we are put into a relation with them. We are what we have been born into – if there is no resonance, then it is not our past.

Another important trait of the notion of attunemental history put forward here is that we can give a testimony of the primordial world disclosure through music. That testimony bears witness to our way of being brought into a disposition. Attuned, we find ourselves – and therefore the self and its relation to the world. This self is not a stable construction that remains unchanged; on the contrary, disposition is how the listener finds his or her self. These dispositions have a historical character: the baroque listener takes part in the arousal of an affect, which is the subject of the music, whereas the subject of the Romantic listener is dissolved when listening for the moods of music. Consequently, the presumption is that there are different modes of listening adapted for different kinds of music. Nevertheless, a specific mode of listening can be active even if the music is partly resistant to that mode. The act of listening is characterized by an attunemental difference which can be diachronic when it concerns music of the past and synchronic when it concerns different contemporary musical cultures. This state of being out of tune to a greater or lesser degree is unavoidable. Since we have already discussed changing concretizations of one and the same work of music in this chapter, ranging from Wanda Landowska to Andreas Staier, we can also discern how different musical interpretations are dependent on different ways of listening to music.

How, then, is this approach related to other attempts to understand the history of listening? It is akin to Heinrich Besseler's historical investigation where different modes of listening (his term is *Zugangsweisen*, literally 'access ways') are related to historically conceived compositional traits and philosophical positions contemporaneous with the actual musical works. However, Besseler does not ground his observations in changing world disclosures – the notion of the artwork opening up a world is actually absent in his texts. His 'Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit' is instead a description of the history of listening from early modernity to the end of the nineteenth century, when Hugo Riemann's active listening was put in doubt.

There are more demarcated investigations, too. First of all, James H. Johnson's rich study of changing habits of listening in Paris investigates something that can be described as an epochal change of world disclosure, with the French Revolution being the divide between the ancient and modern regime. But, interestingly, he is able to show that the revolution was not the reason for the change, in which the musical milieu shifted from a spectatorship dominated by a nobility uninterested in operatic music to an individualized audience of the bourgeoisie captivated by absolute music. Instead, the revolution only accelerated a change that was preceded by a new sensibility to be discerned in thinking as well as in audiences and in works of art. This sensibility can be understood as a changed world disclosure. A thoroughly accomplished attunemental history should do justice to the rich material such as that which Johnson affords the reader, but instead of writing the history of a changing musical milieu, it is concerned with the possibility of resonance and the emergence of sensibilities. Being a historian, Johnson investigates the historical reasons why the audience grew silent. Inventive studies such as Matthew Riley's enquiry into attentive listening in the later decades of the eighteenth century, Lawrence Kramer's investigations on the experience of the inner self in music, and Mark Evan Bonds's work on German idealism all throw light upon the same shift that has been the major historical event in this study – manifested by the birth and dissemination of the concept of *Stimmung* in the last decades of the eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth.

In contrast to all these attempts, however, I try to reach beyond the historical investigation, not by leaving history behind but by auscultating the conditions of possibility of the different modes of listening. The shift during which *Stimmung* understood as mood emerged is only one of the major turns in attunemental history. What took place when Luther made his parish experience music as a gift from God? How could the listener turn into a maker in the era of digitalization? There are many events in the attunemental history calling for elucidation.

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# Chapter 5
# Duration

## Mind the Moment

Duration is, of course, concerned with time; but in relation to the world of the musical work, it has to do with more dimensions than just temporality. The mobility of music is something that has duration, too; it takes time to move. The same is true for spatiality and materiality, which also have certain durations in a piece of music. Thus we can see immediately that an element of measurement seems to have been introduced into the discussion: if these musical phenomena have durations, we should be able to measure them in clock-time. The following chapter on attunemental duration will show, among other things, why such a conclusion does not hold.

Let us recall that *Stimmung* was never thought of as a clear-cut phenomenon. On the one hand, Hegel spoke about the momentary and most fleeting *Stimmung*. On the other hand, Heidegger, with his re-conceptualization, said that the *Grundstimmung* never showed its impact – its disclosure of truth – at a stroke. At the time, in the 1930s, Heidegger even proposed that a great deed and a great work of art could only emerge from a *Grundstimmung*. We seem to be dealing with two totally separate concepts, and that cannot be explained away with the German prefix *Grund-*. Concerning music, Hanslick and Hoffmann contrasted instantaneousness with endurance in their discussions on *Stimmung*. Is it really possible for a concept like attunement to harbour both meanings, or even to throw light upon the interconnection between them or, to use a wording less impregnated by the visual, to describe them as two modes of the same phenomenon? If the answer is yes, then we should also be aware of the risk of having an all-embracing concept, which would therefore be quite useless.

Heinrich Besseler combined the two spheres of musical and philosophical problems when he complained about the misunderstanding of *Stimmung* in late Romanticism and impressionism. Against the play with stimuli there he set the authentic *Gestimmtsein*, a fundamental phenomenon of our being. Not intending to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic attunements, I shall try to embrace the whole time span of the phenomenon. The attunement can be superficial, but it may also be a mould for our state of mind; it may only be of individual relevance, but also held to be a musical matrix of a culture. Duration is decisive here.

We shall go to the extremes, sometimes just to see how they meet. Starting with the smallest possible element, I will elucidate the relation between simple musical material and short duration, at times corresponding to, at times deviating from each other. Minimalistic music and the minimal music of miniatures – the former represented by La Monte Young and Terry Riley, the latter by Anton Webern and György Kurtág – seem to be total contrasts;

but as regards attunement they can be different instances of 'monotony' in the sense of music emerging in one 'tone'. However, the extremely short pieces by Webern and Kurtág are parts of works where plurality reigns: cycles and multi-movement works are accordingly characterized by plurality, even if the work is unified in different ways. A major question of how to deal with these kinds of pluralities concerns the foundation of attunement, since it seems reasonable to suppose that different movements or different parts of a cyclical work are evocative of different attunements. Does one and the same attunement endure, or is an attunemental change at work?

The question of the tuning of attunement is latent in all these issues: it can be a direct tuning or a gradual one; it can take place at the beginning of a piece or once the work is underway; and if it happens while underway, it can turn back into what has been before or it can go on to become something new. I have in this section of the chapter chosen a vast number of musical examples, with the primary intention not of saying something substantial about the works of art, but instead of letting the works say something essential about attunemental duration.

The attunement emerges, accordingly, in a given moment. But what is a moment? What is a *musical* moment? The second section of this chapter on attunemental duration consists of an auscultation of exemplary musical moments, salient events in the temporal structure of a certain piece. The moments chosen are those of climax (here the final culmination of the first movement in Bruckner's Eighth Symphony), followed by 'breakthrough' or *Durchbruch* (which Adorno discussed in his monograph on Mahler), and finally the sublime moment (exemplified by Haydn). These examples are intended to highlight the temporal particularities of attunemental changes, answering the question of how an attunement is temporalized, but this in relation to the other attunemental themes, to the worldliness of music in its four dimensions.

## Monotony, Plurality and Tuning

### *Minimalism and Monotony*

One of my theses is that no specific element of a musical work can be pointed out as the origin of an attunement, even if such a detail can draw the attention to that same musical phenomenon. But what about a piece like *Composition 1960 No. 7* by La Monte Young? It consists of just one element: an open fifth, B+F♯, which is 'to be held for a long time'.[1] The choice of instrument (or instruments) is free. Nothing but the two pitches is specified. The open fifth is an open fifth – nothing more, nothing less. However, since the whole work is just a fifth, and the

[1] A reproduction of the 'score' can be found in Wim Mertens, *American Minimal Music: La Monte Young, Terry Riley, Steve Reich, Philip Glass*, trans. J. Hautekiet, New York: Broude 1983 (orig. title *Amerikananse repetitieve muziek*, 1980), p. 26.

assumption made is that attunement cannot originate in an individual detail like an interval, I seem to run immediately into an impasse.

We need to take a brief overview of Young's *oeuvre*. In 1960 he produced a series of works that have been labelled conceptual art, being formative for the Fluxus events that would appear a couple of years later, and the composition we have in focus is the seventh one in the series called *Compositions 1960*. However, there is definitely a difference between on the one hand no. 15, consisting of just the declaration 'This piece is little whirlpools in the middle of the ocean', and on the other hand the sounding fifth of no. 7.

Another tendency at this early stage of Young's development was the introduction of electronics into his music: with drones from at first frequency generators and later a Moog synthesizer, he enabled an indefinitely outstretched production of static sounds, often using just intonation. With the 'Dream Houses', he created spaces for the production or performance of his enduring works, where drones are the fundament upon which an improvisation is executed on long-held pitches and combined with light shows (by his wife Marian Zazeela).[2] The relation between time, space and life is put into focus. These 'Dream Houses' are early examples of what are now called installations; leaving the sphere of instrumental music, they lie outside the scope of my work. Still, that open fifth which is *Composition 1960 No. 7* must be dealt with in one way or another. It can be put in relation to later works by Young, his experimentation with drones, but an open fifth is not a 'Dream House'. Perhaps, then, it is nothing but a conceptual work.

The circle must be widened, however; the world of minimalistic music must be rudimentarily sketched. The minimalistic music of the 1960s and 1970s has, generally speaking, not only to do with the extreme reduction of the musical material to the most basic elements, but also with a changed relation to the music, namely a meditative or trance-like mode of listening. Robert Fink has a point when he introduces the concept of 'mood-regulating' in the context of minimalistic music, referring to an early review by the great minimalist champion Tom Johnson, who said that Philip Glass's *Music in Twelve Parts* 'conveys a mood which is overwhelmingly joyous'.[3] There is clearly a potential for non-structural and non-focused listening here, or better, in Fink's own words: 'some kinds of minimalist repetition might promise escape, not through narcissistic regression, but through co-optation. Music can drown out the omnipresent barrage of commodity culture with a barrage of its own.'[4] With no doubt, minimalist music was an alternative scene, a counter-culture, from the start.

Terry Riley's *In C* (1964), with its 53 modules, is another playful investigation of constricted material leading to a joyful experience. It can accordingly be

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[2] Cf. Mertens, op. cit., p. 27.

[3] Robert Fink, *Repeating Ourselves: American Minimal Music as Cultural Practice*, Berkeley: University of California Press 2005, p. 204. The article cited is Tom Johnson's 'Philip Glass's New Parts', *Village Voice*, 6 Apr. 1972.

[4] Fink, op. cit., p. 205.

given an emotional label, with its overall hasty temporalities and joyful play and interplay. However, from an attunemental point of view, Tom Johnson was right when hesitating to give the new musical movement the name 'minimal music', thinking of 'hypnotic music' as an alternative – the hypnotic quality arises when the listener learns to 'tune into the many subtle variations which go on underneath the sameness of the surface'.[5] In Glass's and Riley's pieces, the attunement is not first of all to be found in the joyfulness, which after a while becomes quite static, but with the trance of a successful performance. Trance is then the attunement of *In C*, a trance that never turns Dionysian or is situated in the Apollonian sphere. *In C* sends the listener into a trance; it takes hold of the listener, holds him or her in a grip that is eased and tightened, that allows different temporalities to appear, different materialities. But nevertheless it is a continuous trance – and it empties the listener's subjectivity. In this, *In C* is paradigmatic for minimalism.

Now, joy is of course not an option concerning Young's piece, and the notion of a trance-like state is also irrelevant. La Monte Young is heading towards something other than emotional content, and in his most elaborate works this tendency is obvious. It seems as if he tries to invoke an eternal musical sound, his own perspective of the harmony of the spheres. One of his texts on the 'Dream Houses' shows how he reflects on this matter:

> And in the life of the Tortoise the drone is the first sound. It lasts forever and cannot have begun but is taken up again from time to time until it lasts forever as continuous sound in Dream Houses where many musicians and students will live and execute a musical work. Dream Houses will allow music which, after a year, ten years, a hundred years of constant sound, would not only be a real living organism with a life and tradition of its own, but one with a capacity to propel itself by its own momentum.[6]

The musicians and students live in the world of a 'Dream House', but no world seems to emerge in *Composition 1960 No. 7*, or perhaps better: the world of a fifth is opened up, but that world is certainly barren. However, the musicologist Keith Potter has suggested that the piece 'opens up the world of psycho-acoustic events behind a simple acoustic phenomenon: combination tones, for instance, and the possibility of hearing the balance of partials within each note of the interval quite differently in different parts of the room'.[7] Therefore, it is not only a conceptual work, but also a perceptual work. This stance is also taken by the media theorist

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[5] Johnson, op. cit.

[6] La Monte Young, 'Notes on The Theatre of Eternal Music and *The Tortoise, His Dreams and Journeys*', http://www.melafoundation.org/theatre.pdf (accessed 18 Apr. 2011), p. 13.

[7] Keith Potter, *Four Musical Minimalists: La Monte Young, Terry Riley, Steve Reich, Philip Glass*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, p. 52.

Douglas Kahn, discussing *Composition 1960 No. 7* and *X for Harry Flynt*, and then turning forwards: '*a sound* is in fact *many sounds*', he writes, 'arising from both acoustical and psychoacoustical vicissitudes, creating their own variations and modulations of time, and, given time, evolving their own organization often richer than any given musical structures through which they might be directed'.[8] In Potter's and Kahn's poignant comments, the simple sound is much richer than its mere combination of two vibrating notes; that is obvious. But even if we have left the acoustical world, we have merely entered a psychoacoustical one.

With regard to attunement, what is called for in Young's piece is the meditative state, and in this state a certain relation to the sound event is managed. There is no emotionality inherent in the fifth (let us say the arousal of purity); nor is the starting point any contemplation of the musical object. Instead, the open fifth tunes the listener to the meditative state in which the two notes become an auditory event, stable but at the same time ever changing since no repetition or continuity is exact. That is, in Young's simple musical event, the attunement of meditation emerges, and in this attunement the fifth becomes an event that takes hold of the listener. The attunement is primordial, it manages a relation to the event which may drift between objectification and a restless submission, but which in the long run is likely to end up in that loss of subject to found in Riley's *In C*.

Therefore, an open fifth as an autonomous element cannot be said to be attunemental by and in itself, but being an artwork belonging to minimalism, that counter-cultural movement, *Composition 1960 No. 7* turns into a meditative attunement. The fifth is not an element, but an event with an unspecified duration. It would not be too adventurous an assumption to say that this meditative state, this mould, was significant in a certain phase of the years to come in the culture of the United States and other parts of the West.

*Miniatures and Intonation*

The transition from the elementary material of minimalism to the extremely complex miniatures of modernism is surprisingly short. One of the major influences on Young's investigations of static sound was Webern's practice of keeping pitches at the same octave in his serial permutations, like in Symphony op. 21 and Variations for orchestra op. 30.[9] Young found stasis even in the Bagatelles for string quartet op. 9, where he heard 'little static sections, like a chime, or a music box, or time ticking off'.[10] In his Trio for Strings (1958), Young combined compositional techniques derived from Webern with extended duration.

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[8] Douglas Kahn, *Noise, Water, Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999, p. 232.

[9] Cf. Potter, op. cit., p. 29.

[10] Edward Strickland interviewing the composer in 'La Monte Young', in *American Composers: Dialogues on Contemporary Music*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991, pp. 51–70, cit. p. 59.

The art of writing extremely short pieces does not start with Webern's (or Schoenberg's) miniatures. However, the miniatures of the piano repertory of the nineteenth century, of eighteenth-century harpsichord music and of lute music before that usually show their character at once and often keep to the same state – they are coherent in their way of tuning. Something new happens with the miniatures of the Second Viennese School, a series of works composed in the period 1909–14. Webern orientated himself towards this aesthetics of extreme reduction with his Five Movements for string quartet op. 5 (1909) and Six Pieces for orchestra op. 6 (1909), but it was only with Four Pieces for violin and piano op. 7 (1910) that he consequently used the miniature for all movements of a work. Schoenberg had responded with his Six Little Pieces for piano (1911, op. 19), but he did not follow Webern further, who continued with chamber pieces (opp. 9 and 11) and Five Pieces for orchestra (op. 10).

The concentration of the musical material, the renunciation of tonality, the lack of motivic development and the complexity all change the conditions for attunement. We are not, however, re-entering the problem of fragments dealt with in the chapter on Nono's string quartet. These miniatures are not fragmentary; instead, they are aphoristic. In the words of Massimo Cacciari on the Bagatelles: 'The aphoristic writing aims at definition, circumscribing microcosms, in whose interior the different parts are strictly, organically connected.'[11] Being microcosms, they certainly let worlds emerge, but these worlds evaporate or implode as soon as they have been made present.

Young found, as we saw, little static sections in the Bagatelles, but these sections are only momentary, with durations of one or two bars. Thereafter, something new happens. In one of Webern's shortest pieces, the third Bagatelle in op. 9 (Example 5.1), we can follow what Adorno calls the gesture (*Gestus*) of the piece: 'one-bar recitative, accompaniment system, erupting upswing of the leading voice in the fourth and fifth bar, rhythmic central complex up to the peak in bar 6, and then fade-out, back to rustling'.[12] Dividing this piece analytically in different tiny but interconnected sections, Adorno establishes a highly reflective perspective that is incongruent with the attunemental mode. He even underscores that Webern's 'Moments musicaux' have nothing to do with 'Stimmungs- oder Genremusik'.[13]

However, that is not true even in the narrower sense of *Stimmung*: it was a living notion in the discussion within the Second Viennese School on central issues of their aesthetics. Concerning the Bagatelles, Webern wrote a letter to Schoenberg where he says that the '*Stimmung*' of one of them is derived from the radiance of an angel: 'The angels in heaven. The incomprehensible state

[11] Massimo Cacciari, *Dallo Steinhof: Prospettive viennesi del primo Novecento*, Milan: Adelphi 2005 (1980), 2nd ed., p. 71.

[12] Theodor W. Adorno, *Der getreue Korrepetitor*, GS, vol. 15, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1998, p. 291.

[13] Adorno, op. cit., p. 278.

Example 5.1 Anton Webern, *Sechs Bagatellen für Streichquartett*, op. 9, III (complete)




after death.'[14] This is nothing exceptional in Webern's comments on his own music. The word *Stimmung* is, however, put within quotation marks here, and this circumstance brings the phenomenon into the same position as the sediments of traditional forms that can be found the aphoristic pieces composed by him during these years: the inner conflict that Adorno finds in them, 'that which constitutes the spirit of the sonata form',[15] has its counterpart in the *Stimmung*. But that brings only the latent Romanticism of Webern's music into the picture.

[14] Webern's letter to Schoenberg (24 Nov. 1913) is cited from Hans and Rosaleen Moldenhauer, *Anton von Webern: A Chronicle of his Life and Works*, New York: Knopf 1978, p. 192.

[15] Adorno, op. cit., p. 278.

The gesture says something more than that. There is a tone in this short piece, but this tone is wholly unstable: from the start it is merely a presentiment of unease in an intonation that gives space to a pulsating rhythm, forced into an outburst, which is tuned out directly. In this microcosm, a simple order appears, an order that cannot hold back an underlying frenzy. But as soon as the conflict, the actual tone of the piece, is brought into the foreground, it disappears. Within the span of 23 seconds, the bipolarity Mahler had been investigating in large symphonic dimensions is here put forward in an energetic aphorism; forms emerge and are annihilated, or liquidated in Adorno's terminology.

When György Kurtág turns back to the Viennese aesthetics, reflecting on it, sometimes in a nostalgic way, he even radicalizes the brevity of Webern. At the same time, he quite often changes the way that reduction is executed, presenting a simple or even basic musical idea and then leaving it. One can say that the fourth of the 12 Microludes in *Hommage à András Mihály* for string quartet (1977/78, op. 13) repeats the gesture of Webern's Bagatelle. It starts with a texture sometimes used by the Second Viennese School, a series of chords broken into garlands of fast-moving notes (a slower version of this texture can be found for instance in the introduction to the final movement of Schoenberg's Second Quartet) leads to a climax that comes with a surprising suddenness, only to be resolved (Example 5.2). The gesture: an inviting start that turns violent and disappears.

In attunemental terms, the piece begins with a moment of attuning, and it turns then to a climax that is already hinted at but is managed in an unexpectedly vehement way, with the ending still unstable after the blow. There are only hints: the spider-web with a mobility that circles in a slightly nervous way; the crude force that presents itself with a distorting glissando; and the end mirroring the start, confirming that it was only the most transitory of moments. All this happens in only 13 seconds and, compared with the complexity of Webern's Bagatelle, the gesture is much simpler. The other difference concerns the temporalities: whereas Webern's piece seems to be crystallized, Kurtág makes the fugitive present. This needs further comment.

Kurtág's 12 Microludes of *Hommage à András Mihály* have their pianistic counterparts in three 12-piece series of Microludes in his *Játékok* books, all of them arranged according to the principle of a central tone rising one semitone from piece to piece. *Játékok* ('Games') started as a work for children,[16] almost like Bartók's *Mikrokosmos*, but became something of a diary or notebook,[17] reflected in the subtitle 'Diary Entries and Personal Messages' of the later volumes. Here, musical ideas are written down and published without the severe self-criticism that is associated with the composer. It seems as if we have to do with compositional ideas that are brought direct to the paper, a playful and associative way of thinking music. Like the

[16] Cf. Stephen Walsh 'György Kurtág: An Outline Study', *Tempo*, new series, no. 140 (1982), pp. 11–21 and no. 142 (1982), pp. 10–19.

[17] Cf. Friedrich Spangemacher, *'What is the Music?': Kompositionswerkstatt: György Kurtág*, Saarbrücken: Pfau 1996, p. 13.

Example 5.2 György Kurtág, *Hommage à András Mihály* for string quartet, op. 13:4 (complete)




Microlude discussed above, they can touch upon a historical texture and imitate a gesture, echoing the past, or they can be personal messages, sent to friends, dead or alive, echoing their musical works or paying homage.

If Webern distils, then Kurtág catches what is evanescent. He executes exactly that which Hegel meant by the artwork giving permanence to the momentary appearance of a mood or a feeling. It is something that exists some short seconds, and then it is gone. The work, being repeatable, albeit always in new guises, achieves a kind of durability from that which does not endure. Webern appears to do the same thing, using a gesture that almost seems to be the model for what Kurtág does. Webern's world vanishes almost as quickly as Kurtág's – it is just a question of seconds; but what I described as the tone of the Bagatelle is much more penetrating. For a moment it lets the opposition between world and eternity resound, not as a consonance, but in its full disparity. Here, what endures shows itself in the moment. What in Webern seemed to be incompatible with attunement,

its quickly changing material, turns out to be an intonation and therefore a tuning-in. We are close to a boundary, but we have not passed it.

*Plurality and the Question of Foundation*

With Webern's Bagatelles and Kurtág's Microludes, we have entered another sphere of questions concerning duration and attunement, that of the multi-movement work and of plurality. Here, the specific problems concerning Kurtág's sets seem to be most acute. On the one hand, the Microludes in *Hommage à András Mihály* can be said to be self-contained miniatures, just like most of the pieces in *Játékok*. They can be taken out of their context and put into new constellations, which can be illustrated by Kurtág's 'composed programmes', such as the portrait concert 1993 at the Salzburger Festspiele,[18] where he puts together a whole series of pieces and parts of multi-movement works.

On the other hand, all Kurtág's sets of Microludes are arranged like Bach's *Das wohltemperierte Klavier*, with a semitone taken upwards from piece to piece; but in the series for string quartet, the aphorisms are interrelated in many other, subtler ways. Whereas the primary structure of the piano Microludes in *Játékok* is exactly the rising semitone arrangement, the set for string quartet is more ambitious. Here we find an example of Kurtág's intriguing cycles, where highly divergent materials are juxtaposed and set into an interplay that at times seems to be without any possible rest. In an early discussion about the Microlude sets by Kurtág, Margaret McLay says that 'by providing links between the shorter movements, by including some more extended pieces, and by recalling the mood of previous movements as the work progresses, Kurtág does achieve the stability lacking in the Microludes from *Games*'.[19] In other words, she suggests that the mood of one piece may be akin to that of earlier pieces, and thereby the work is stabilized. A more far-reaching idea of the set is found in Philipp Brüllmann's detailed investigation of the work, where he also gives it a suggestive characterization: it is a cyclic labyrinth. Different ways of reading the work are opened up, sometimes in conflict with each other; at the same time it is impossible to find a harmonized whole.[20]

This brings Kurtág close to one of the intriguing questions of form in Romanticism, namely that of cycles – highlighted in some important musicological works of

[18] At the concert, covering works from 1961 to 1992, Kurtág had chosen no fewer than 16 works, of which parts or the whole were performed. Op. 13 was represented by four Microludes, nos 4, 6, 10 and 5. Cf. György Kurtág, *Portraitkonzert Salzburg 10.8.1993*, Col legno WWE 2CD 31870 (1994).

[19] Margaret McLay, 'György Kurtág's Microludes', *Tempo*, new series, no. 151 (1984), pp. 17–23, cit. p. 19.

[20] Philipp Brüllmann, *György Kurtág: 'Hommage à Mihály András' 12 Mikroludien für Streichquartett op. 13 (1977/78)*, Saarbrücken: Pfau 2010, p. 29.

late.[21] The cycle is polarized between two tendencies: one directed to plurality, one directed to the unity of the cycle. If one of these inherent tendencies is lost, the cyclic character disappears. In an analytic approach to the cycles, one can differentiate between fragmentizing and unifying strategies, sometimes misleadingly termed progressive and conservative respectively. This ideologically tainted discussion has also found its way into judgements concerning Kurtág's relation to modernism, since in a work like *Officium breve* he combines diatonic material and serial techniques, citing Webern and Endre Szervánszky alongside his own compositions.[22]

What kind of strategies can, then, combine vastly different materials without falling out of the frame of a cycle? And if such strategies can be found, are they of any attunemental relevance? As we saw in Chapter 1, this was a central issue for Schumann. He raised concerns not only with *Carnaval*, but with *Papillons* and *Davidsbündlertänze*, too. John Daverio had, as we know, identified the problem with 'the continual fluctuation of musical moods', but through introducing the concept of Romantic *Witz* he wanted to take into account an 'intuitive logic' that may be sensed in an 'undeniably fragmentary' form such as Schumann's cycles.[23] The work is therefore both fragmentary and heterogeneous, but 'the listener becomes a producer by wittingly linking together what may be non-contiguous utterances, thus creating fragment complexes, associative chains of discontinuous musical ideas'.[24] This could be a solution to the problem in Kurtág's work, too, if one can picture a late modern version of wit: it is a question of the capabilities of the listener, a kind of musical fitness and acrobatics. Now, Daverio describes a highly active listening subject who is able to find likeness where difference reigns,[25] in a flash of lightning through fantasy.[26] This description comes close to the mode of listening introduced by Nono and Cacciari, and we are, again, outside the attunemental mode of listening.

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[21] Here I am thinking not only of the groundbreaking chapter on *Witz* (wit) in John Daverio, *Nineteenth-Century Music and the German Romantic Ideology*, New York: Shirmer 1993 and parts of his biography, *Robert Schumann*, but also of Charles Rosen's *The Romantic Generation*. See also David Ferris, *Schumann's Eichendorff 'Liederkreis' and the Genre of Romantic Cycle*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000 and Beate Julia Perrey, *Schumann's 'Dichterliebe' and Early Romantic Poetics: Fragmentation of Desire*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.

[22] Cf. Tobias Bleek, *Musikalische Intertextualität als Schaffensprinzip: Eine Studie zu György Kurtágs Streichquartett Officium breve op. 28*, Saarbrücken: Pfau 2010 and Alan E. Williams, 'Kurtág, Modernity, Modernisms', *Contemporary Music Review*, vol. 20, no. 2/3 (2001), pp. 51–69.

[23] Daverio, 'Schumann's Systems of Musical Fragments and *Witz*', in *Nineteenth-Century Music*, p. 71.

[24] Daverio, op. cit., p. 87.

[25] Jean Paul defines *Witz* as that which finds likeness hidden behind difference. Cf. Jean Paul Richter, *Vorschule der Ästhetik*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, part 1, vol. 5, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2000 (1804), p. 171.

[26] Manfred Frank discusses Friedrich Schlegel's metaphor of lightning and *Witz* in *Einführung in die frühromantische Ästhetik*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1989, p. 295.

We have reached a boundary that seems to stop us from gaining an attunemental elucidation. In other words, we need to make another attempt.

Perhaps a less complicated case of plurality might put us back on track so that we can turn again to Kurtág's work. It seems likely that a much more thematically or harmonically consistent form like the theme and variations comes closer to the notion of attunement. The theme sets a character, and if the deviations from the theme in the variations are not too extensive, then the whole work or movement seems to circle around an attunemental centre. Yet, even a straightforward work like Mozart's variations on 'Ah, vous dirai-je, maman' (KV 265) wanders from one mood to another, and not only when the single minor variation clearly deviates from the pattern. Variations vary. Thematic or motivic identity is not tantamount to attunemental identity. When the variations clearly deviate from the original theme, the listener is not confronting sameness but difference.

Still, an assembly of different materials might also be a concord of opposed inclinations. When Schumann was discussed earlier on, Heidegger's contribution to the philosophy of *Stimmung* had not been taken into account. The lexical inventiveness of Heidegger can be of help: the *Grundstimmung* may be an accord (or, indeed, discord) between a *Stimmung* and a *Gegenstimmung*; a *Stimmung* may appear as a *Leitstimmung*. So, concerning attunements, there is reason to introduce a possible accord between an attunement and its 'counter-attunement', resulting in a 'fundamental attunement', just as the 'guiding attunement' may be combined with other attunements without losing its grip. This could give us the key to why an attunement of a piece of music is not always merely replaced by another one, instead, the contrast may give a greater significance to the preceding one, or they might accord into a more fundamental attunement.

Concerning the elaborate and complex interplay between the miniatures in Kurtág's *Hommage à András Mihály*, then, the suggested kind of attunemental auscultation seems to be more convenient than McLay's strategy of finding likeness between the moods of the pieces. Here we have no direct solution to the problem of active *Witz*, but we are closer than expected. *Witz*, just like Nono's 'mode of possibility', is not only activity; it has become activated by the specific musical event, and therefore it has passively been attuned by it in the first place. In cases where the elucidation ends in an impenetrable complex of attunements, there is reason to ask oneself if there may be a guiding or fundamental attunement in play. In the witty, ironic and iconoclastic phase of early Romanticism, this is an option, and so it is in later parallels like heterogeneous periods such as the kaleidoscopic modernism in 1920s Paris or the postmodernism of the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, Mahler's ironic use of dated materials and forms enabled him to make them expressive once again, just as Adorno maintained in his discussion on Mahler's 'tone' and the potpourri as form.[27] Kurtág pursues this relation to given materials even further, including the Second Viennese School and Bartók

[27] Adorno, *Mahler*, pp. 168 and 184.

alongside Beethoven and Schumann.[28] Kaleidoscopic worlds emerge and are dissolved. The attunement of playfulness appears in different historical guises.

*The Tuning of Attunement*

But how does music attune? Of course there is no simple answer, since we are looking for something that does not make itself known, but it nevertheless makes itself heard. We cannot even search for it, at least if we follow the discussions of Heidegger and Gumbrecht. The attunement comes over the listener; it may arrest him or her but it may also emerge imperceptibly (according to Heidegger the most efficient way of becoming attuned). The listener finds him- or herself wrapped up in something. This attunement to the music can happen in different ways. It seems to be reasonable to distinguish two main types, namely a direct tuning and a gradual tuning. Both kinds can, if we continue to speak in general terms, take place at the beginning of a piece or once it is underway. Further, if it happens once the piece is underway, it can turn back into what has been before (like the recapitulation in sonata form) or go into something new (like the introduction of a new theme or a move to a new section).

Let us start with *direct tuning*. Some musical works seem to establish attunement immediately. When Schumann lets his *Fantasie* in C major (op. 17) take off, it is a beginning that captures the listener right away. The melodic phrase has not ended before the music subsides; still Schumann has set a frame of the musical mind, which can be filled with highly diverging episodes. Schumann famously wrote to Clara about his almost unstoppable outcry of longing for her, to be discerned in this movement.[29] However, we do not have to look at the biographical situation – the fantasy was composed when Clara had been away for a long time, some years before their wedding – to be able to find the name of the attunement, longing.

If, going against the premises for the investigation, we try to find a detail pointing to the unsatisfied desire, it would surely be the fact that the movement starts with a D-minor chord over a dominant pedal with the C-major tonality far from being possible to identify[30] – the listener will in fact have to wait almost 300 bars before the tonality is assured with a perfect cadence in the tonic.[31] But that is more of a structural idiosyncrasy: the question of tonality is in fact secondary, whereas that specific undirected mobility in a fast pace has much to tell about the musical world that is opened up. It is an attunement at its most flexible, being able to house the outbreak of a ballad-like episode (*Im Legendenton*) without becoming unclear.

If we turn away from Schumann, we do not have to wait for the identification of the funeral march rhythm, a reflective act of the listener, to become absorbed by

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28 Cf. Bleek, op. cit., p. 283 and Williams, op. cit., p. 59.

29 Clara and Robert Schumann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 1, p. 126.

30 Cf. Rosen, op. cit., p. 104.

31 Cf. Nicholas Marston, *Schumann: Fantasie, Op. 17*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992, p. 50.

the morbidity of Liszt's *Funerailles*; the dark sonorities immediately transport the listener into the shadows. That example is also taken from high Romanticism, but the same immediate grip can be found in other periods, too. Take John Dowland's *Lachrimae*, for instance; the melancholy is there, at once. If we go in the opposite direction, we find the same directness in the start of Penderecki's *Tren*, where the extreme attack of dissonances attunes the listener immediately. Attunements are at work, indeed.

The question is for how long this tuning lasts. In all the cases mentioned, the initial setting is followed by passages, or even sections, where the music is attuned in a new way. This holds true not only for Schumann's *Fantasie*, but even for Dowland's lute piece: it seems as if the music in the second section of that piece gains some momentum before it sinks back to its initial state. However, the initial tuning takes place in a specific moment in all these works, and despite the different deviations as the works unfold, the first moment is decisive.

Phenomenologically, the musical world has dimensions so clearly conceived that they force themselves upon the listener. This violence can be overt, like in *Funerailles* and in *Tren*; the influence can make itself manifest, like in Schumann's *Fantasie*; but even in Dowland's piece, in all its gentle melancholy, the music takes hold of the listener, like sweet violence. Admittedly, the works mentioned do not behave as music usually does, that is, they are extraordinary in terms of their capacity of immediate tuning. They are even emblematic of their times: Schumann's *Fantasie* in its Romantic longing; Liszt's piece in its no-less-Romantic morbidity; Dowland's piece which is famous for evoking the Elizabethan melancholy; and Penderecki's *Tren* witnessing the anguish of the Cold War (in the light of Hiroshima). A contemporary listener hears the past through these works, both in a way of constructing that past and giving a sense of the world of past times. That is a consequence of the attunemental history. But, like the following examples, they show how a particular emergence of attunement is carried out.

The *gradual tuning* is characterized by not establishing the attunement at once, but instead letting it expand step by step. Again, we should look at the beginning of some specific works. Paradigmatic of the symphonic literature from the nineteenth century onwards, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony starts with an open fifth that seems to be totally undefined, an 'undifferentiated state'.[32] In an expansion of the musical space, a growing mobility and a developing thematic lucidity, the first *fortissimo* (bar 17) is a declaration of a musical identity. Thomas Clifton has described this introductive section as an initial opening followed by a gradual growth of space and intensity directed at the *beginning* of the symphony in bar 17. That is, the symphony does not begin in bar 1; it begins 16 bars later. Even more disconcerting is the relapse into the primary state from bar 35, where Clifton says that the symphony begins a second time (or, being more true to his description than he is, 'opens' again).[33]

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[32] Susan McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1991, p. 128.

[33] Clifton, *Music as Heard*, pp. 83–8. I only comment on his first reflections.

The first 16 bars can thus be described as a passage from nothingness to an identifiable world, a world that has been foreboded before becoming established. The world is not present from the start, and it emerges in different dimensions. A falling movement is repeated, and turns from being a mere motion to a theme – the materiality is changed from a primordial state to an elucidated theme. At the same time, this development also means that the mobility is changed: a slow movement downwards becomes more vigorous and is expanded (in the first violins). The temporality also undergoes a change, accelerating from a standstill to a rush. Then, at last, the spatiality is opened up from the fifth in positions which are extended from two and a half octaves to six as the maximum. Clifton's observation that the symphony only begins 16 bars after its opening reveals not only an aspect of what he calls 'time in motion', but also the attunemental event.

This gradual opening up of a musical world, with its dimensions slowly emerging, can be found in the first movements of some of Bruckner's symphonies (Nos. 3, 4, 8 and 9) as well as some of Mahler's (Nos. 1 and 9). Turning to the twentieth century, I should at least mention Stockhausen's vocal *Stimmung* whose introductory section consists of the gradual intonation of the fundamental note B♭ and its second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh partials.[34] Even more radically, pieces such as Giacinto Scelsi's *Quattro Pezzi per Orchestra (ciascuno su una nota sola*) never begin. They are pieces of becoming, not of being. They open up spaces that never reach the status of world-hood; they never leave the phase of tuning-in since they never reach into anything, always standing on the threshold of something that is never made present.

The gradual tuning can also take place once a piece of music is *underway*. We find an excellent example of this in the slow return into the initial material in Mahler's Adagietto of the Fifth Symphony (Example 5.3). The lyric, tender, gently caressing melody – indeed a 'song without words'[35] – and its elaboration have been broken off by a surging and passionate gesture; the dissolved temporality of the beginning, where the harp's broken chords with their unstable rhythmic pattern play an important role, has been changed into a flow directed forward (*Fliessend*). Major has turned into minor. Soon, a new key will be established, followed by another two fast changes, undermining the tonal orientation. Shortened phrases, ever-changing nuances and sudden emphases exalt an unsatisfied urge. Then, marked with *zurückhaldend*, a slow downward movement in the cellos and basses seems to be directed at a unfulfilled cadence establishing D major as temporary tonic. The goal-oriented mobility is dissolved through an augmentation of its constituent elements at the same time as the first violins are reaching for a D. This D, however, collapses with a two-octave *glissando*, taking the music back to the F-major start in a reinterpretation of the harmonic material. In attunemental terms,

[34] Since linguistic material is important in Stockhausen's *Stimmung*, it will suffice mentioning the work.

[35] Adorno's characterization is apt, also because it points out the relation to the song 'Ich bin der Welt abhanden gekommen', composed at the time he worked on this movement. Cf. Adorno, *Mahler*, p. 170.

Example 5.3 Gustav Mahler, Fifth Symphony (revised version), fourth movement: Adagietto, bars 64–75




the urgent desire goes through a slow transformation – where the mobility is held back, the temporality changes into timelessness, the materiality changes in terms of light and structure – and falls back into the contemplation out of which it arose. This does not happen as a sudden change, but as a slow process where the goal is not known until the initial state has been reinstalled.

Several important questions arise concerning the tuning-into or tuning-back-into the initial attunement. First of all, one has to maintain that it is within the scope of attunemental listening to discern the return to the main key even without the active understanding of the futural aspects. Secondly, the great variation of tempo in the existing recordings – ranging from the versions of the Mahler-acquainted Willem Mengelberg (1926) to almost double that in Hermann Scherchen's (1965)

recording – does not influence the kind of attunemental change we are dealing with, even if the attunement of the first part differs between the stasis in Scherchen and the languishing desire of Mengelberg.[36] Thirdly, there is the work context that cannot be bracketed. Even if the thematic bonds between the Adagietto and the funeral march in the first movement cannot be accounted for in this mode of listening, the contour of the melody can: the world of the first movement is acquainted with the world of the Adagietto, the kind of mobility. Here, retrieval is in play, and the thematic interplay is one way of giving the symphony a greater material lucidity.

We have already met the phenomenon of attunemental change in music in the discussion of Schumann. Daverio highlights Schumann's strategy of manipulating musical moods, and he refers to Hölderlin's theoretical discussions of a 'Wechsel der Töne' to understand the composer better. He points out a prominent example of this kind of change in the six-bar link between the slow movement and the finale of Schumann's Piano Concerto, where a motif from the first movement reappears:

> The motive, supported by horn fifths, wavers between the minor mode of the first movement and the major mode of the last. The dance-like opening gesture of the finale in turn retains the horn fifths but inverts the direction of the motive.

Here, the transfer of tones takes place when 'Schumann redirects the reflectivity of the first movement and the naïveté of the second toward the heroism of the finale'.[37] Daverio captures very well the attunemental change, but he could have pointed out that this change comprises not only the six-bar link but also a slower tuning-over starting 17 bars earlier, where the 'naïveté' grows more 'reflective', and the final jump into 'heroism' is a much quicker change, with a duration of just one measure. There seems to be reason not only to differentiate between the direct tuning and the gradual tuning but also to introduce something in between.

Having reached this point, it is worth paying attention to how Wolfgang Rihm staggers this manipulation in his musical 'essays' for piano trio, *Fremde Szenen I–III* (1982–84). He not only follows Schumann in a continual (in Rihm's case even frenetic) fluctuation of moods; he also plays with the historical distance from his predecessor. The pieces are conceived in terms of deserted rooms where forbidden acts can take place,[38] as if Rihm has entered chambers of the past where an assault is acted out. In the three piano trios – actually three different pieces but often performed and recorded together – Rihm does not cite Schumann; instead he investigates and imitates Schumann's intonation or tone. He goes further, however: he blends the Romantic gestures and textures with modernistic strategies

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[36] Cf. Willem Mengelberg/Amsterdam Concertgebouw Orchestra, Naxos 8.110855 (1926) [7′09] and Hermann Scherchen/Orchestre National ORTF, Harmonia Mundi 1905179 (1965) [13′07].

[37] Daverio, *Robert Schumann*, pp. 314–15 (both quotations).

[38] Cf. Wolfgang Rihm in his programme notes for *Fremde Szenen*, printed in *Ausgesprochen: Schriften und Gespräche*, Mainz: Amadeus 1997, vol. 2, p. 333.

and sounds, moving quickly back and forth between the two. Alistair Williams has written a penetrating article on the pieces, focusing on the second, and there the question of subjectivity plays a central role: Williams says that in inhabiting and transforming Schumann, Rihm 'connects with the subjectivity of the material, yet reconfigures its meaning by working with sound objects'.[39] One of the elements of musical subjectivity is the 'intonation', the specific tone of the music, which is Schumann's most explicit presence in Rihm's pieces since the latter does not quote (for instance) any of the three piano trios by Schumann. This is a relation to tradition that Rihm had already developed, for example in *Dis-Kontur* (composed 1974), where the composer himself said that he filters and assimilates music from the past but that he does not quote anything literally: the foreign tone passes through his own system, his own voice.[40] In the case of Schumann, however, we are dealing with an unstable subjectivity, passing from one state to another. Its continuity is not granted; instead, it is undermined again and again.

*Fremde Szene III* opens in almost total stillness, where the chords are ethereal objects shifting their positions. It starts in *ppp* with the fourth E+A played as harmonics on the string instruments, and the piano entering with a C in octaves followed by a searching E♭. Then, the strings take a semitone step up, whereas the piano goes down to an F after a hushed emphasis, now tending to consonance in the major mode. However, violent attacks disturb the stillness, but they do not establish a new state: the initial tuning-in proceeds. This disturbed homogeneity is followed by a strange mixture of Romantic sound objects. There is a march, dressed in funereal clothes (bars 55–60, see Example 5.4), which seems to echo the slow movement in Schumann's Piano Quintet. There are overtly Romantic piano textures – broken or treading chords – and soaring melodies for the two string instruments that suddenly take off on wholly unexpected trajectories, stacked in repetition, distorted, fragmented.

The tuning is immediate in these cases; what seemed to be the living presence of a Romantic voice is cancelled and what is left is only a mask with a hole for its mouth. Rihm imagines a non-existing work – 'Schumann's plan: a piano trio "Scena"'[41] – and then he reinterprets the material, making it contemporary. In a way, one can say that for a moment he gives rebirth to that Romantic mode of *Stimmung* derided by Besseler, the loss of oneself in the flow of music, only to tune over to another attunemental adjustment, where the components fall apart and the flow is immediately frozen.

Rihm demonstrates how a whole series of attunemental strategies can be used in one and the same piece: the gradual tuning-into, the direct and augmented

[39] Alistair Williams, 'Swaying with Schumann: Subjectivity and Tradition in Wolfgang Rihm's "Fremde Szenen" I–III and Related Scores', *Music & Letters*, vol. 87, no. 3 (2006), pp. 379–97, cit. p. 395.

[40] Wolfgang Rihm, 'Über *Dis-Kontur*: Notizen zu einen Vortrag' (1976/97), in op. cit., pp. 291–6, cit. 293. Cf. Williams, op. cit., p. 381.

[41] Rihm in the programme notes, op. cit., p. 333.

Example 5.4 Wolfgang Rihm, *Fremde Szenen: Versuche für Klaviertrio*, III, bars 59–61




tuning-over-to, the unmediated tuning that happens instantly. Thus, the work also puts pressure on the differentiation between the types of attuning: it is by no means evident how to categorize the musical examples. Schumann's six-bar link forced me to suggest an intermediary type, and Rihm's piece asks for even greater differentiation. Perhaps the whole idea of speaking about different categories of tuning may prove to be a failure. Or perhaps this ambiguity says something essential about the temporality of attunement.

### *Approaching the Moment*

There is a hidden theme behind the considerations in this chapter so far – that of the moment in which the attunement takes place. In the composition by Young, everything seemed to be present from the first moment on, but when we took a roundabout way, bringing in not only Young's musical aesthetics in general but also the minimalistic movement, we saw that this was not the case: the fifth is not an element; it is an event.

The momentary events in the pieces by Webern and Kurtág, lasting less than half a minute, showed how different musical moments could be, even if there is a close connection between them – both that which seems to escape and that which seems to endure are made present in the musical moment. In simple terms, the tuning of attunement happens in a moment. But this moment turns out to be flexible: if the attunement is tuning in, or if it tunes over to another attunement, the change evidently takes place in a temporal process. However, an unsolved problem is the attunement that is established from the start, like in Schumann's Fantasy and Liszt's *Funerailles*. It may be the case that the open fifth of Young's *Composition 1960 No. 7* does not show itself until it has lasted a while, but the other examples are said to be present at once. How can this be, if the moment of attunement cannot be manifested as a point in time?

Perhaps we should be cautious with the wording. These are not instantaneous events; they happen in a moment. There is an ambiguity in the temporality of moment: the event can be momentary, but it can also be momentous. There is something odd about this temporal category called moment. The next section of this chapter will dwell upon this oddity.

## Moments

### *Augenblick and the Ear*

We need to remind ourselves what a moment really is. In ordinary life, it stands for something quite paradoxical. On the one hand it is small amount of time, something that really does not count. We say 'Just a moment, please'. However, when we hear that phrase – waiting for information about a delayed flight at the airport – we know that this moment can be long, very long; in any case, it is almost always just a waste of time. On the other hand, the moment can be of greatest importance and of emotional complexity. A nostalgic person can say 'It was the greatest moment of my life.' In German, a word for moment – not only in philosophy and aesthetics but also in everyday language – is *Augenblick*. This word literally means 'glance of an eye' but has its English counterpart in an expression with slightly different characteristics, 'in the blink of an eye'. A blink is, of course, a very fast movement or a shining light (however, 'to blink' can also be 'to deceive'), but the examples above suggest that the duration of a moment is

indefinite. It can be just half a second, a couple of minutes or half an hour; but it is in any case something unbroken – you cannot split a blink or a glance.

Obviously, this German term is taken from the visual sphere, and this has had consequences for the development of the concept within philosophy. *Augenblick* is directed forwards; it has to do with insight and making decisions.[42] This visuality can also be discerned when the question of the status of the moment is posed. Is it a point in time? Husserl says that it is, even if it is a point in time with both a retention of the past (visualized by Husserl both as comet tail and in diagrams) and a protention directed into the future.[43] As a literary category, it blossomed in the decades when Husserl made his investigations (in the works of Hofmannsthal, Joyce and Jünger),[44] but the history of the moment in literature goes back a long way, at least to early Romanticism. Here, the moment breaks into the ordinary time-flow, or can actually be placed outside time: it is where time is not. In the moment of revelation, the subject is brought out of time, not into another time, but it is placed outside time.

The question of moment and *Augenblick* has received some attention in musicology in the last 20 years, especially in the discussion on the specific modalities 'breakthrough' (*Durchbruch*) and the sublime moment.[45] Despite the fact that *Augenblick* is taken from the visual sphere, it is highly relevant in music, too. The musical practice is one where the visual is of greatest communicative importance, from the role of the conductor to the wordless communication between members of a chamber music ensemble. If the state of being attuned to each other in a performance is to be achieved, the bodily dance in making music together may be necessary. The moment form – with its independent sections constituting a plurality of moments, developed especially by Stockhausen in the late 1950s – is a telling example of interest in the question of the musical moment. And speaking of Adorno, we must of course include his *Moments musicaux*, with their title taken from the French subgenre of the character piece, used by Schubert, Rachmaninoff and Paderewski.

The simplest answer to the question about the musical moment might be that since music happens in the flow of time, the moment is that which is at odds with the flow. This incompatibility provides a clue to the problem of the beginning of an attunement. It happens 'in a given moment'. Some caution is necessary here:

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[42] For a general discussion on *Augenblick* (and Kierkegaard's *Øieblik*) in the tradition Kierkegaard–Nietzsche–Jaspers–Heidegger, see Ward, *Augenblick*.

[43] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*, in *Husserliana*, vol. 10, The Hague: Nijhoff 1966, p. 28 (diagrams) and p. 30 (comet tail). For a discussion in a musical context, see Clifton, *Music as Heard*, pp. 56–62.

[44] Cf. Karl Heinz Bohrer, *Plötzlichkeit: Zum Augenblick des ästhetischen Seins*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1998 (1981), 3rd ed., p. 63.

[45] Cf. Berthold Hoeckner, *Programming the Absolute: Nineteenth-Century German Music and the Hermeneutics of the Moment*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002. Much earlier, Wolf Frobenius wrote a detailed article on *Augenblick* in Adorno, 'Über das Zeitmaß Augenblick in Adornos Kunsttheorie', *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, vol. 36, no. 4 (1979), pp. 279–304.

this moment is not a point in time; it cannot be pointed at, given an exact timing. The musical moment has a kind of unspecified duration, where the approximate starting point can be found, but only when the moment has passed. The beginning of the attunement is immediate, that is: unmediated. But we acknowledge the beginning of the moment only when the moment is gone, and to get back to that moment we need to recollect it, that is to reach it through mediation. Recollecting it, we are outside the attunement, even if this does not mean that we are outside the music – in musical listening the act of recollecting is sometimes extremely important, but this kind of listening is reflective and therefore transgresses the attunemental listening. Even if, using our reflective powers, we can specify where we begin to become attuned to the new attunement, pointing it out in a score or as an exact second in a recording, it is impossible to say when it became clear. If it starts with a chord, only the next chord shows what the first chord meant, and the musical meaning is evident only when we reflect upon it, leaving the musical flow and therefore the attunemental changes. If it starts with a rhythm, this rhythm is only attainable when the rhythmic gesture has ended, and the musical meaning of this gesture is apparent only through the same kind of reflection. The attunement is, therefore, immediate but only attainable through mediation.

Another way to understand the attunemental beginning or reversal is to have in mind the temporality of *Stimmung*, accounted for by Heidegger. All *Stimmungen* are founded in a having-been, he argued – even those that seem to be directed into the future, such as hope. The one who hopes has gained him- or herself, moving towards that for which he or she hopes.[46] Turning to music, we can draw attention to the following: the listener's attunement is always something that is founded in the past. This past is not the past that has to be recalled, like the recapitulation of the sonata form where the main theme is followed by the second theme, now both in the same key, but the retrieval of the moment, which can be specified when that moment has been recalled.

*Augenblick* is also an important word in Heidegger's thinking, so we should ask ourselves how that concept is related to *Stimmung*. First of all, there is no direct parallel between Heidegger's *Augenblick* and music: the major discussion is to be found in *Sein und Zeit*, where it stands for Dasein's authentic relation to the present, directed at the future, open to the past, aware of the situation in which it finds itself, and taking a decision.[47] However, as we saw in the discussion on the temporal aspects of *Stimmung* in *Sein und Zeit*, the different modes of disposition have a temporality of their own. In the case of anxiety, Dasein is brought back to its 'thrownness' in a way that makes a decision possible: it is not the decision, but a fundament for the decision. This means that there is a change in the state of mind, from passivity to activity. As we saw in *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, boredom can be the mood that precedes the moment of decision. Therefore, it seems as if *Augenblick* is an

[46] Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 345. The reference is discussed in Chapter 2.

[47] Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 338. Hans Ruin discusses the concept in *Enigmatic Origins*, pp. 176–209.

attunemental change of sorts, where passivity turns to activity, backwardness turns to forwardness. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that understanding, which is an important element of *Augenblick* in Heidegger, is always disposed in one way or another.

Adorno is sometimes surprisingly close to Heidegger when using the concept *Augenblick*, but whereas Heidegger deals with Dasein situated in a world, Adorno is focused on the work of art, not infrequently the musical one. If Adorno's structural listener could be said to be the authentic listener, then the following passage grasps the ecstatic temporalities in which Dasein is confronted with *Augenblick*: 'Spontaneously following the course of music, even complicated music, he hears the sequence, hears past, present, and future moments together so that they crystallize into a meaningful context.'[48] That has not just to do with the underlying critique of an atomistic understanding of the musical temporality, but also with the authentic relation to time itself. We find in Adorno a special relation to music, of course, expressed in its relation to the absolute, which language can only grasp through mediation: 'Music finds the absolute immediately, but at the moment of discovery it becomes obscured, just as too powerful a light dazzles the eyes, preventing them from seeing things which are perfectly visible.'[49] Here, the moment is extremely short, so short that it seems to be folded into itself. But the moment can be prolonged in time, embracing a whole work of art: 'Every artwork is an instant; every successful work is a cessation, a suspended moment of the process, as which it reveals itself to the unwavering eye.'[50] It would, however, be wrong to say that Adorno here intends that the appreciation of a piece of music (or the reading of a novel or a visit to a theatre) has the duration of an *Augenblick*; no, it answers to what he calls the radiograph of the work in the proper way of understanding it.[51]

Adorno's metaphor tells us a lot about his view on the musical work of art. It is not something that is primarily developed in time, but a construct with a temporality that can be surveyed in an instant. According to stances taken earlier in this chapter, here the usage of moment has not only to do with the fact that it is one of the possible translations of the German word, but also with what is implicit in it: it comes from *momentum* in Latin, with its meanings of a force setting something in motion, the movement itself (in time and also in space) and importance. In the musical moment, a temporality emerges, and in the following discussion different kinds of temporalities will be investigated.

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[48] Theodor W. Adorno, *Einleitung in der Musiksoziologie*, GS, vol. 14, p. 182 (trans. in Theodor W. Adorno, *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, trans. E.B. Ashton, New York: Continuum 1989, p. 4).

[49] Theodor W. Adorno, 'Fragment über Musik und Sprache', *Quasi una fantasia*, GS, vol. 16, pp. 251–6, cit. p. 254 (trans. in Theodor W. Adorno, *Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music*, trans. Rodney Livingstone, London and New York: Verso 1992, p. 4).

[50] Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, p. 17 (trans. Hullot-Kentor, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 6).

[51] Theodor W. Adorno, *Zu einer Theorie der musikalischen Reproduktion*, in *Nachgelassene Schriften*, part 1, vol. 2, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2001, p. 9.

*The Climax*

Bruckner's Eighth Symphony was referred to earlier, invoked for its way of establishing a musical world. At that stage we considered the Adagio. However, now that I wish to give voice to the moment, it is the first movement which we should reference. Why is this? The contemporary, stereotyped view of Bruckner is that his symphonies are monumental, architectonical, almost like Gothic cathedrals. Timelessness seems to characterize Bruckner's music. That is not only the impression given by commentators on his symphonies, but also by several generations of interpreters who, starting with Karajan, turned away from the elastic and vivid interpretations of Siegmund von Hausegger, Wilhelm Furtwängler, Eugen Jochum and Hans Knappertsbusch.[52] It was clearly a matter of time, considering that Ernst Kurth had established a highly dynamic picture of Bruckner in his two-volume study from 1925, dominated by waves and forces, *Kräftespiele*. Something has obviously happened, as the concept of *plateaux d'intensités* has lately been taken from Deleuze and Guattari to characterize Bruckner's type of accumulative but not always culminating sections.[53]

In attunemental terms, the interplay between clear-cut episodes, juxtaposed to present the utmost contrasts, gives telling examples of how a fundamental attunement can be held onto for a large amount of time through a complex of attunements and counter-attunements: the *Feierlichkeit* of the Adagio comes forth through the counter-attunements of dejection and elevation, making room for the sacred. Yet, among the temporalities of his symphonic movements, the category moment is also to be found, being something that gives momentum and in itself has a certain way of moving.

The last climax of the first movement of the Eighth Symphony is exceptional, and this exceptionality does not only lie in the forces and orchestral volumes used by the composer. It is also ecstatic, since it stands out in another temporal sphere. This moment is situated in the recapitulation of the third theme, now starting a third lower than in the exposition; and instead of turning to the jubilant relative key of C minor, an E♭ major chord in the fanfare of the trumpets (bars 125–8), which is the climax in the exposition, it breaks away following the negative tendencies in the material. From the start it establishes a forward-directed, ominous mobility through the interplay between a rising motif in the horns answered by oboes and clarinets and the triplets in the strings. Triplets are then put into the foreground in a sharp scalar motion, repeated several times and moving downwards, cutting through the auditory world but keeping the question–answer structure intact in the interplay between high and low strings.

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[52] Benjamin Korstvedt comments on this change in *Bruckner: Symphony No. 8*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, pp. 98–103, cit. p. 103.

[53] Derek B. Scott, 'Lux in Tenebris: Bruckner and the Dialectic of Darkness and Light', in *From the Erotic to the Demonic: On Critical Musicology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, pp. 103–27.

The circling chords, which in the exposition lead to the major chord, now turn in another direction, namely that of fulfilling the ominous expectations of the opening: it turns out to be a disastrous, overwhelming wandering between dissonance and resolution, an almost apocalyptic scenery; as the veils fall away the sheer violence is left bare (Example 5.5). When the tension is almost released, the C-minor chord can be heard both as a tonic with the timpani on the low C and as a 6/4 chord, leading to the tonic through reduction. The harmonic change is also a cleansing, an opening to the annunciation of disaster.

We seem to have a problem here. The main event, a confirmation of what had been ominously foreshadowed at the beginning of the section, seems to be dependent on the change to the other direction in the exposition. In other words, to be able to follow the music into the ecstatic moment of tragic affirmation, the listener may have to reflect on the difference between the two moments of the movement: the climactic resolution in the exposition and the climax in the last measures of the recapitulation. Since attunement is said to be non-reflective, this change of direction should be inaccessible to us. Only in reference to the jubilant chord can the ecstatic tragedy be discerned. But there is no need to take reflection and recollection into account here. The movement has established a world in which the listener finds him- or herself, and the new direction discloses yet another dimension of that world. An installed form becomes ecstatic through the breakaway from that which has been, but still has an impact. It is still in sway; it is not past.

Another critical question concerns the supposition that the attunement cannot be founded in a detail. Is not the harmonic shift to the tonic (or, according to the other interpretation, to the 6/4 chord) exactly the point in time where the attunement changes? This change can be called different things: it can be said to turn from conflict to tragedy, from anxious questioning to acceptance of fate, from strident dissonance to overwhelming consonance. But even granted the different labels, the point in time seems to be easily discerned. This point in time can be called a moment, but is it also a moment in the emphatic sense? All these questions can be answered when we try to see how this musical moment is temporally constituted.

Harmonically, the music has strived for release in an acute way for at least 14 bars, but that which has been called an ominous mobility had started 42 bars earlier. In both cases, the unsounding tonic is in sway. Rhythmically, there is continuity from bar 369 to 389 through the rhythm of the first theme, presented already in the first bars of the symphony (it actually lasts from bar 369 until the end). This continuity is *rhythmic*, however, and in terms of mobility many things happen in this dramatic part of the recapitulation. In the conflict between dissonance and temporary resolution, the flow seems to stop in an upheaval; then, the opposed elements of resistance and striving almost evaporate (but only almost, since we have to do with an unclear tonic followed by the C in horn and trumpets, and in the coda there is a strange urge to continue, even if the music is lead to a traditional ending – here, a higher-level rhythm is at work, where the silent ending seems to ask for the continuity granted by the next movement).

Example 5.5 Anton Bruckner, Eighth Symphony in C minor, first movement: Allegro moderato, bars 381–92




In other words, the situation is not simple enough to be reduced to a preparation of the change and its dying away. The attunemental change does not take place at the point in time where the tonic is established, but *in the moment in the emphatic sense*. This moment breaks loose not only from clock-time, but also from the temporality of what has been in the music. It is an ecstatic moment opening up a hitherto unknown temporal dimension – an untimeliness, taken literally as time undone. It is only in the act of recollection that one understands what has been the event. The chord is reduced to a C, only horns (six turns into only three), trumpets and timpani are left, and at the last the timpani are on their own. The coda is only the aftermath of the battle, an aftermath that still has uneasiness as a component.

The tuning of the attunement cannot be grasped. It is a beginning that shows itself only when it has begun. In a way, we could speak about a presence of the attunement – through music the attunement makes itself present in the act of listening – but it is impossible to define. As soon as we try to define it, it shows itself as being absent. In the dissonance reaching for the resolution in a C-minor chord, the expected endpoint would be a fully fledged tonic, with C as root and all notes in the triad played in sustained values. But when this point in time is reached, the horns and the trumpets are left on their C. This is a sudden change, but not the change expected, so the presence is also an absence. In this new context, there is a premonition of another endpoint, this time a sustained C in the remaining

brass instruments and the timpani; but brass and timpani fall out of phase, and the endpoint is never reached. Instead, there is silence. But not even this silence prevails; instead the timpani lead on in *pianissimo* – and we are in the coda where the rhythm from the first theme, highlighted in the recent climax, returns. The moment is mobile.

*Durchbruch*

What I call moment is akin to what Adorno, and before him Paul Bekker, called 'breakthrough', *Durchbruch*.[54] We are then dealing with a musical phenomenon that is enmeshed in the aesthetics of the nineteenth century, reaching from Beethoven to Mendelssohn and Schumann, and to Bruckner and Mahler, with whom it peaks.[55] The term breakthrough has from Adorno on to do with musical form; more specifically with sonata form. This is captured well in James Hepokoski's definition: 'a seemingly new (although normally motivically related) event in or at the close of the "developmental space" radically redefines the character and course of the movement and typically renders a normative, largely symmetrical recapitulation invalid'. According to Hepokoski, a composer includes a breakthrough for a simple reason – it is a question of striving for unpredictability: 'The breakthrough principle is a notable member in a set of strategies that seek to avoid a potentially redundant recapitulation.'[56] This approach misses the point of the term because there is a utopian tendency in Adorno's concept, hinting at other possibilities for the course of the world, not only for the musical movement. When Adorno discusses the term in the context of Mahler's symphonies, it is used in opposition to the state of things, and characteristically for Adorno the utopian element is both stressed and withheld: 'The idea of a breakthrough, which never left him [Mahler], became sublimated into the memory of a past life as of a utopia that had never existed.'[57]

In some of the elaborations of the term following on from Adorno, the political element is kept intact, such as when James Buhler underscores the antagonistic relation between the artwork and the society in which it has been created,[58] or in Bernd Sponheuer's calling to attention the critical impulse, having first grounded

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[54] In *Mahler* Adorno differentiates between three new formal devices in Mahler's symphonies: breakthrough, suspension and fulfilment (*Durchbruch*, *Suspension*, and *Erfüllung*). Cf. Adorno, *Mahler*, pp. 190–95.

[55] The discussion on *Durchbruch* has been intense in the last 20 years. In what follows I shall refer to the most relevant texts.

[56] Hepokoski, *Sibelius: Symphony No. 5*, both cit. p. 6.

[57] Adorno, 'Mahler', in *Quasi una fantasia*, p. 332 (trans. Livingstone, op. cit., p. 91).

[58] James Buhler, '"Breakthrough" as Critique of Form: The Finale of Mahler's First Symphony', *19th-Century Music*, vol. 20, no. 2 (1996), pp. 125–43, ref. p. 129.

Adorno's concept in musical analysis.[59] However, when other musicologists widen the scope of the concept in discussions concerning composers treated negatively by Adorno, like Richard Strauss and Jean Sibelius, the political aspect is downplayed if it is present at all; the critical aspect concerns only handed-down form. To Adorno, formal problems always have a societal relevance: 'The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form.'[60] When the form breaks down, because of the antimonies inherent in it, something can break through from the outside that is not determined by the form. This breakdown is not always a breakthrough: the latter term can be said to be the opposite of the tragic *peripeteia*, not only because of the tragic event taking place instead of an uplifting moment, but also structurally since it is most often only the tragic hero who is blind to the catastrophe, whereas *Durchbruch* is totally unexpected.

Following Adorno, an example of *Durchbruch* can be found in the first movement of Mahler's First Symphony, just before the recapitulation (in bars 352–7). The overwhelming fanfare on the dominant seventh chord, scored for trumpets, horns and high woodwinds, takes on a proportion that exceeds any event before it. Adorno writes:

> The rupture originates from beyond the music's intrinsic movement, intervening from outside. For a few moments the symphony imagines that something has become reality that for a lifetime the gaze from the earth has fearfully yearned for in the sky.[61]

This excess is not only something that breaks in and then disappears. It also deforms the ordinary sonata scheme, since the 'recapitulation' does not start, as would be expected, with the main theme (taken from the second song in *Lieder eines fahrenden Gesellen*) but with a horn theme introduced in the second section of the development. Even if the main theme follows, it is not to its full extent. Not having the characteristics of a true recapitulation, this last section is more of a coda, so Adorno writes: 'It shrinks to a hasty epilogue.'[62]

As is already clear, breakthrough is treated in terms of form. Adorno does so in his comments on expectations on the sonata form, and Sponheuer, Buhler and Hepokoski follow his lead. The last of these has even proposed that it is a compositional technique and has found its specific space: it disturbs the sonata form through an unexpected event normally in the development section, making a

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[59] Bernd Sponheuer, 'Der Durchbruch als primäre Formkategorie Gustav Mahlers: Eine Untersuchung zum Finalproblem der Ersten Symphonie', in Klaus Hinrich Stahmer (ed.), *Form und Idee in Gustav Mahlers Instrumentalmusik*, Wilhelmshaven: Heinrichshofen 1980, pp. 117–64, ref. p. 160.

[60] Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, p. 16 (trans. Hullot-Kentor, op. cit., p. 6).

[61] Adorno, *Mahler*, p. 153 (trans. in Theodor W. Adorno, *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1992, p. 5).

[62] Adorno, op. cit., p. 154 (trans. Jephcott, op. cit., p. 6).

recapitulation irrelevant. This kind of change or 'deformation' is out of reach of the attunemental mode of listening, since it demands a reflective awareness of how a sonata form normally behaves and how the actual music diverges from that scheme.

However, if we take a closer look at Mahler's movement, there are already many things happening there outside the standard sonata form. The slow tuning-in of the musical world can be found from the start of the movement, just like in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony and a series of central symphonic works (as we saw). But the opening of the world in Mahler's First Symphony is in itself hard to put in accord with these solutions: if Beethoven used 16 bars to set up a world and begin the symphony, Mahler's process spans 62 bars with a duration answering to more than one quarter of the movement. The music relapses to this state of opening-up later on (it is a kind of state of nature, with Mahler's characterization of it as *Naturlaut*, the cuckoo in the clarinet and the conventional music of the woods in the horns), the first time only for a short while around the reprise of the exposition, then at the start of the development section. This wandering back and forth to the primordial state is itself hard to harmonize with sonata form. In fact, Sponheuer even says that the first movement lacks the sharpened problematics that could have made a breakthrough possible.[63] The movement is too vague.

There is a breakthrough nevertheless, but perhaps not behaving as it should according to formal criteria. The reason may be that it does not have to do with form, at least not primarily. It is an event outside form, and cannot be grasped in formal terms. Its sheer volume and suddenness makes it an attunemental moment. Is it then possible to point out the instant when it happens? Just as Adorno says, this breakthrough has to do with proportions. The orchestral forces are overwhelming, and there is indeed a starting point: the arrival of the seventh chord *fortissimo* (bar 352). It seems then to be just a question of a physiological response. But this climax, in its turn, can only be grasped if it is put in relation to the attunemental change that starts more than 50 bars earlier (bar 305), following upon a section where the theme from *Lieder eines fahrenden Gesellen* has been elaborated, and that turns into a passage fraught with ever-rising conflicts. The idyllic atmosphere is transformed into anxiety and despair, and the seventh chord is only the passage into release. In itself, the seventh chord asks for that release, which comes with the tonic D-major chord (bar 358). Being thus not a point in time but an event, the breakthrough, with its fanfare taking off in bar 352, is not defined until its release, by which time the music has already moved on. It is not the tonic, but the event leading to the tonic. When the tonic has arrived, we can only reach the breakthrough through a recall – even if it is still present in the retrieval.

[63] Sponheuer, op. cit., p. 139.

*The Sublime*

Another pronounced musical moment is the sublime moment.[64] In Kant and in post-Kantian thinking, *Stimmung* belonged to the discussion on music and the sublime. However, Kant, just like Burke, had excluded instrumental music when he wrote about the sublime in his third Critique, allowing it to reach the sublime only in combination with language.[65] In other words, instrumental music had, according to Kant, not only a remarkably uneasy relation to beauty since he says that it does not leave anything over for reflection; it was also unable to attain the sublime.

Nevertheless, his follower Christian Friedrich Michaelis did see the sublime as possible in music: 'Namely, when the dominating tone suddenly changes unexpectedly, then emerges amazement and astonishment, a mood that moves the spirit thoroughly, and sublime ideas are awoken or maintained in it.'[66] Here, the mood of astonishment gives birth to sublime ideas. The irregular, irrational character is underscored by Michaelis – 'That which is sublime is sublime only when it is *opposed* and *superior* to imagination and understanding'[67] – and therefore Kant's interplay between the faculties is put out of play. Michaelis is surprisingly concrete in his detailed discussion on how a composer can arouse the sublime in the listener, but it seems clear that he thought the effect was not just something instantaneous but something that persists. Music, according to Michaelis, can either arouse the sublime through an inner structure or portray the state of mind when the sublime holds it in its grip.[68]

Whereas Michaelis looks for the unfathomable, Sulzer insists that it is necessary to be able to grasp and compare. In his aesthetic theory, Sulzer writes that the sublime works like a hammer-blow but endures,[69] and his example is the biblical words 'Let there be light': we cannot grasp that God had created the world out of nothing, but thanks to Moses' words we can have some kind of notion of the creation.

This quotation from the Bible has been set to music in one of the most famous moments in Western music, namely in Haydn's *Die Schöpfung* (*The Creation*).

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[64] For an overview of the discussion in the 1990s, see Wye J. Allanbrook, 'Is the Sublime a Musical Topos?', *Eighteenth-Century Music*, no. 7 (2010), pp. 263–79.

[65] Cf. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p. 428 (§52). Even if both Kant and Burke emphasized language in their discussion on the sublime in a musical context, they contributed to the understanding of the musical sublime, a fact pointed out by Michela Garda, *Musica sublime: Metamorfosi di un'idea nel Settecento musicale*, Lucca: Ricordi 1995, pp. 104–13 (Kant) and 65–76 (Burke especially through sublime sounds).

[66] Christian Friedrich Michaelis, 'Einige Bemerkungen über das Erhabene der Musik' (1805), in *Ueber den Geist der Tonkunst*, Chemnitz: Schröder 1997, pp. 242–4, cit. p. 244.

[67] Christian Friedrich Michaelis, 'Ueber das Erhabene in der Musik', in op. cit., pp. 168–74, p. 171.

[68] Michaelis, 'Einige Bemerkungen', p. 243.

[69] Cf. Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, vol. 1, p. 341.

In this early aspiration of representing the unrepresentable, Haydn lets there be light from the thunderbolt of which Longinus spoke in his treatise *On the Sublime*. The C-major chord contrasting with the depiction of chaos in Haydn's oratorio is an overwhelming event. If we turn to a more recent discussion on the sublime, James Webster is observant of the centrality of temporality: 'In particular, the musical sublime can arise even through the effects of a single moment: such a moment can "reverberate" long afterwards, on different musical and hermeneutic planes.'[70] Here we find both the instantaneous character of which Michaelis and Sulzer spoke (effects of a single moment) and the duration that was important to Sulzer (the reverberation of that moment). These characteristics are essential to my discussion of the musical moment: a multi-layered temporality, just like Webster says.

The overwhelming attunemental change on 'Licht' in 'Und es ward Licht' lies beyond my self-imposed restrictions, yet it might be rewarding to see what kind of primary means of invoking the sublime Webster lists in Haydn's late sacred vocal music. He mentions contrasts between 'musical topics, performing forces, gesture and rhythm, harmony', but these contrasts do not create the sublime in their own right; instead 'they must either occur in an unusual and exposed context, or many of them must appear together in unusual or "pointed" combination'.[71] This quotation is important in two ways. Firstly, it underscores that the sublime is contextual and dependent not on one specific element but on the interaction between elements. Secondly, it describes the musical means with which the sublime is evoked. The latter observation means that there is reason to say that the musical sublime in vocal music should be sublime in instrumental music, too. In fact, Webster himself has demonstrated exactly that in Haydn's last symphonies.[72]

If the enormous C-major chord is an archetype of the grand and majestic sublime by Longinus, then the preceding bare C in five octaves and its consequences in the overture or 'Die Vorstellung des Chaos' can be said to have the same status concerning the negative mode of the sublime, and it can be seen as an anticipation of the programme music of the nineteenth century, if considered in itself. Here, we have an example of instrumental music, even if it is part of an oratorio, so we shall turn to this overture.

What we hear is a series of local orders in the overture. Since the musical texture and structure are ever changing, there is no exact point where the sublime appears – only different moments within a moment. The fundamental ground is absent. At least, that is the case within the attunemental mode of listening. However, there have been several attempts to disqualify the chaos in the depiction, indeed

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[70] James Webster, '*The Creation*, Haydn's Late Vocal Music, and the Musical Sublime', in Elaine Sisman (ed.), *Haydn and His World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997, pp. 57–102, cit. p. 64.

[71] Cf. Webster, op. cit., p. 64.

[72] Cf. James Webster, *Haydn's 'Farewell' Symphony and the Idea of Classical Style*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, pp. 230–31 and 248.

quite successful ones. Most important among them is, I would say, Schenker's analysis in *Meisterwerke der Musik*, where he holds that music can express chaos only with severe means, and therefore we find Haydn's main principles even in the depiction of chaos.[73]

Charles Rosen argues along the same lines in *The Classical Style* when he asks: 'how can Haydn's musical language express this and still remain language?'[74] That is really the general question about the sublime after Kant. Rosen's solution is to say that Haydn does what he always does in a sonata form in a slow tempo: there is a first theme in the tonic C minor followed by a second in the relative major, and the recapitulation could not be more easily identifiable. Accordingly, some major characteristics of the sonata form are present, and the sublime is only superficial. Even if his observations are relevant, they do not give an answer as to how we listen if we do not try to find out if there is something like a sonata form in a piece of music. Certainly, Rosen says that the themes are 'reduced to very small fragments' and that there is an 'absence of clear articulation in the large phrase-groups',[75] but then it might be better to say that the form is almost empty or shapeless. That is something totally different.

Schenker, too, looks of course for fundamental structures under the chaotic surface, but he is forced to distort his *Ursatz* with the descent of the fundamental line completed after only two-thirds of the piece (bar 40).[76] This leads to the general question about what deep structures have to do with the attunemental mode of listening. Yes, the shapeless shape is relevant and the outstretched trajectories of harmony can indeed be discerned attunementally if the listener is extremely attuned to the main structures of not only Western art music in general but the characteristics of a specific style too. But these traits say nothing about *the sublime* in this introduction.

Instead, we can elucidate how the emptiness of the initial C in five octaves lets a specific spatiality come forth. It is an empty space, waiting to be filled. The minor third in bar 2 (Va and Vc.) could of course be said to indicate the tonality C minor, but attunementally it tunes the music into an austere state, readjusted by the added A♭ (Vl. II). The instability is prolonged through the first tendency towards a motivic element in bars 3 and 4 (Vl. I). Then, the orchestral C returns in bar 5, but now enhanced with E♭ and A♭, being the first sign of an emerging but still premature order. What follows are fractured themes and broken chords, up-rushing wind scales, almost surrealistic syncopated chords where the strings anticipate the beats

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[73] Heinrich Schenker, *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik: Ein Jahrbuch*, vol. 2, Hildesheim: Olm 1974 (1925–30), p. 161.

[74] Charles Rosen discusses the opening of *Die Schöpfung* in *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven*, New York: Norton 1972, pp. 370–72, cit. p. 372.

[75] Rosen, op. cit., cit. p. 370 and p. 372.

[76] Schenker, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 168 and Appendix XIII. See also Lawrence Kramer's comment in 'Haydn's Chaos, Schenker's Order; Or, Hermeneutics and Musical Analysis: Can They Mix?, *19th-Century Music*, vol. 16, no. 1 (1992), pp. 3–17, cit. p. 6.

by one semiquaver, and the constantly delayed cadences. All this speaks of chaos, with competing forces, and attunes the spatiality in an arcane way, transgressing not only the classical style but even the sublime slow introductions in Haydn's symphonies composed just a couple of years before the oratorio.

Later, we can find order, even *hear* order (I do not wish to argue that Schenker and Rosen did not use their ears). But let us also find out how a listener contemporary with Haydn – someone who could thus be expected to be able to judge it appropriately – commented on this overture. This listener is Charles Burney, who in a letter describes his reaction:

> It struck me as the most sublime Idea in Haydn's work, his describing the birth of order by dissonance & broken phrases! – a whisper here – an effort there – a groan – an agonizing cry – personifying Nature – & supposing her in labour, how admirably has he expressed her throes! Not by pure harmony & graceful melody, but by appropriate murmurs … When dissonance is tuned, when order arises, & chaos is no more, what pleasing ingenious and graceful melody & harmony ensue![77]

We can see repercussions of the sublime event in the letter, not only in the description but also in the disrupted, fragmentary style. We can follow Burney's recollection of the music, pointing to a series of events that cannot be ordered properly. The dissonance and brokenness are pointed out, but the experience has been so overwhelming that language breaks down, ordinary syntax is inapt and the chaotic state is present in the very writing. Here, we can follow a testimony witnessing a strange temporality and mobility to which it is impossible to lend any coherence. Unity emerges in the tuning-in of order, and the tone of the words sings the melody he heard. It is a letter attuned to the sublime moment.

## Transition

We have seen that, in terms of duration, attunement can be extremely momentary in music (with Kurtág contributing examples in his miniatures), but that is also has a significance for much longer amounts of time (as in Young's composition). Instead of theorizing, I have auscultated a whole series of works, trying to elucidate the temporality of specific moments. Music can, without doubt, be measured in terms of duration. We can point out harmonic progressions, particularities in voice-leading, thematic congruence, all of them giving the music character; but we do not find the attunemental moment in doing so. Without trying to systemize how music attunes, I suggested some general forms of tuning: direct or gradual, taking place at the beginning of a piece or once it is underway, going back to what has

[77] This is written by Burney in a undated letter to John A. Latrobe quoted by David P. Schroeder in *Haydn and the Enlightenment: The Late Symphonies and Their Audience*, Oxford: Clarendon 1990, p. 126.

been or turning in a new direction; but when it was asked how this moment was constituted, it vanished.

Then three salient moments were chosen, since they are almost emblematic in the history of Western music, moreover being examples of three different kinds of moments: the climactic moment (in the first movement of Bruckner's Eighth Symphony), the breakthrough (in the first movement of Mahler's First Symphony) and the sublime moment (the whole introduction to Haydn's *Die Schöpfung*). All of these have a specific point in time where it seems to be reasonable to say that an attunement is established, but when the moment was elucidated, it was made clear that it was fugitive once again. It is not a now that can be defined, but something that appears in relation to preceding attunemental events, and to an open but implied future. These temporal dimensions answer to that which Heidegger calls 'ecstasies', where present and future temporalize themselves out of having-been. These characteristics would not come as a surprise to those who have suggested that attunement (or *Stimmung*) is not possible to point out in detail or to analyse. It is better to try to give a testimony of it, thereby trying to keep something from the primordial attunement intact.

There is, however, one dimension of duration that has only been hinted at, namely the most vulnerable one: that of an era and of a culture. There we touch upon something that is not only a boundary, but also the edge of our world. That is an appropriate theme for an aftersong.

# Aftersong:
# On the Edge of the World

**Stimmung,** ***Attunement, Culture***

The principal theme of the second part of this work has been the disclosure of attunemental boundaries. Along the way, aspects of the phenomenon (that which shows itself from itself) have been elucidated: attunement is at work both in such music where mood is not a relevant aesthetic category and in acts of listening which at first seem to be incompatible with an attunemental approach. Now, at the end, we will strive to reach another boundary, but this time a conditioning one: we shall find ourselves standing on the edge of the musical world, at a limit concerning music cultures. Hardly anything can be said beyond that boundary, so we can only touch it. Such is this aftersong: close to silence, close to speechlessness.

It is once again the world of the musical work that concerns us, and we must remember that this world is not only understood as that which emerges when we listen to a piece of music, but also as the world belonging to the work. The world of the temple in ancient Greece was not just the space within the erected stones, but also all that which made up the world of the people living around the temple. Heidegger assumed that when the world in this latter meaning is gone, the work of art becomes something for historians and those who take aesthetic pleasure in it. We seem to have one world constituted by the cultural context of the artwork, and then another world worlding in the same work of art. But they cannot be separated: when the world belonging to the work is gone, the world worlding in the work is radically changed or even abolished. The attunement is therefore changed, too, and a phenomenon appears that can be called ‘distunement’. We have lost our entrance to that world; it has become foreign to us.

How can the difference between attunement and distunement be auscultated? Earlier in this study I tried to find different testimonies of attunement, but is it also possible to find someone who testifies about distunement? Heidegger’s example of the lost world of the temple is historically determined: the world belonging to it is passed and therefore lost forever. I want to approach the question in a different way, namely to auscultate how distunement can be a beginning and how a gradual attunement may follow. Described in other terms, it is a process starting in

alienness and leading to acceptance or recognition. This change can be described as a 'foreign world' becoming part of the 'home world'.[1]

Referring to the German philosopher Bernhard Waldenfels's phenomenology of the alien, I shall pay attention to traces of how elements of foreign cultures have been perceived: when something alien appears that has no given meaning, the reaction does not necessarily have to be one of dismissal; we may also be struck (*getroffen*) by it, a reaction followed by a response where meaning is produced. We are affected by these events, surprised, sometimes astonished. Waldenfels calls this event *Pathos*, and he uses the word in its meaning of 'being affected' or 'being hurt', keeping the ancient Greek concept in mind.[2] Even before the alien is perceived as alien, it may give rise to an affective colouring or tone (*affektive Tönung*).[3] Another important phenomenological contribution comes from Klaus Held, who has elaborated Husserl's discussion on the relation between the cultural home world and foreign world.

The contrast between these two worlds is conceived of in terms of a lack of *Einstimmigkeit*,[4] a lack which I shall call distunement. The unknown world is alien because of the foreign context of apperception through which those who live in it understand themselves, the nature around them, the things belonging to their everyday life – that is, everything that makes up their everyday world.[5] Music could and should be included here. However, this state of opposition is not stable. There is always the possibility of territorialization – the unknown territory can be conquered and taken over; but a more peaceful version is the emergence of a common territory.[6]

Held has also brought *Stimmung* into the field of intercultural understanding. In Chapter 2, I introduced his thinking on the role *Grundstimmungen* may have in the relation between the different cultures of the world today: they have great repercussions on the divide between the cultural spheres of the world, in Held's view a contrast between the individually oriented West and the family-oriented East. Even if this contrast is not particularly convincing, and the dualism

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[1] A starting point for reflection is the fifth Cartesian meditation by Edmund Husserl in *Cartesianische Meditationen*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, Hamburg: Meiner 1992, pp. 91–155. He continued the elaboration of intersubjetivity in the extensive investigations published as *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, part 3: 1929–35, in *Husserliana*, vol. 15, The Hague: Nijhoff 1973.

[2] Bernhard Waldenfels, *Grundmotive einer Phänomenologie des Fremden*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2006, pp. 72–3.

[3] Waldenfels, op. cit., p. 125.

[4] Husserl also discusses *Einstimmigkeit* and *Unstimmigkeit* in *Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–37)*, in *Husserliana*, vol. 39, Dordrecht: Springer 2008, pp. 673–6.

[5] Cf. Klaus Held, 'Heimwelt, Fremdwelt, die eine Welt', in Ernst Wolfgang Orth (ed.), *Perspektiven und Probleme der Husserlschen Phänomenologie: Beiträge zur neueren Husserl-Forschung*, Freiburg and Munich: Alber 1991, pp. 305–37, ref. p. 309.

[6] Held discusses territorialization in the later parts of the article, op. cit., pp. 318–36.

between West and East is extremely simplifying, his observations about the impact of *Grundstimmungen* on ordinary life should be paid attention. Traces of *Grundstimmungen* can be found at all levels of human existence and co-existence, from how we move and perceive our bodies to how our language is structured and used. They are decisive for the manners and customs of a society – the *ethos* in the sense Aristotle gave the word.[7] The *Grundstimmungen* of different cultures make them alien to each other, according to Held:

> The fundamental attunements call forth not only the most intensive feeling of belonging together, but they also have the characteristic of 'rendering us speechless'; in this way coming to an understanding can be impeded or even prevented. Our everyday practices do not normally allow the possible disruptions by the fundamental attunements to surface. However, this does not mean that these attunements simply vanish, and therefore the danger constantly exists that an abyssal divide erupts between cultural worlds due to their basic customs or habits, which are rooted in the fundamental attunements.[8]

This negative estimation of the possibilities of an intercultural understanding is slightly nuanced with Held's observation that we find proof of understanding with respect to the fields of economics, politics and science in the era of globalization.[9] This understanding is not an understanding between cultures, however, since the result is a monoculture characterized by technical and economical rationality.[10] Held therefore seems to presume that the continuity and identity of different cultures are conserved in a way that makes them out of reach of each other – only the Greek notion of *kosmos*, the single transcending world which is common for all people, can be set up against that discord. If not, one world will always be stronger than the other; it will force the other to adapt; it will conquer it (and what this means in reality we know from warfare and colonization).

However, the static relation described by Held can be put in doubt, to say the least. From history we know that cultures have transformational influences on one another; they are not inconvertible. Their elements can be mixed, resulting in new constellations and forms. Here, Bernhard Waldenfels's phenomenology of the alien gives other suggestions of how different cultures communicate. Instead of polarizing that which is known and that which is alien, Waldenfels observes that there is an entanglement between them: 'In the beginning, there is not just difference, but also a *mixture*, that reveals every familiar, national, racial, or

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7 Cf. Klaus Held, 'Möglichkeiten und Grenzen', p. 8.

8 Held, op. cit., p. 8 (trans. Thompson, op. cit., p. 6). Trans. slightly revised.

9 Cf. Held, op. cit., p. 5.

10 Cf. Klaus Held, 'Europa und die interkulturelle Verständigung', in Hans-Helmuth Gander (ed.), *Europa und die Philosophie*, Frankfurt: Klostermann 1993, p. 88.

cultural idea of purity to be a mere phantasm.'[11] In terms of music, he has pointed out that even within a tradition we have an interplay between that which is one's own and that which is alien, and the relation to foreign musical cultures is mapped out by this circumstance. With a poignant formulation, he writes: 'Now when the alienness of alien cultures encounters alienness in one's own culture, then connection points ensue. Alien is not simply alien.'[12]

Instead of disqualifying affectivity as an element of understanding, Waldenfels has proposed that the bodily components of our sense-experience are a starting point for a meeting with that which is alien.[13] I would even say that music offers a medium for such an entanglement before language, operating in a sphere primordial to linguistic meaning. Another German philosopher dealing with questions of intercultural philosophy, Georg Stanger, has suggested that the close affinity between music and attunement leads to an openness between the cultures: 'every culture has its own music in which it feels at home and through which it is discernible to others, even though not with the same attunemental density'.[14] Here, we do not find the untenable presumption that music is a universal language, only that a partial resonance is possible. This is why the speechlessness of fundamental attunements by Held should not lead to the despair tainted by cultural solipsism: human relations are not bound to the natural languages.

The first meeting or confrontation between cultures can be expected to be characterized by estrangement or even alienation. How does that which is alien present itself? It is something that does not attune to the order maintained by the perceiving subject, something that does not make sense, something that cannot be grasped by existing concepts. One response might be to put the strange thing into the existing order even if it does not fit, to give it sense without understanding what it says, to use concepts in a way that distorts that which should be grasped. Herewith, a world emerges, but it has little to do with the alien world. Musically, we can have some kind of notion of the strange sound that surrounds us; a world may emerge, but a biased one. Even this is a starting point, where a process begins, but only when the order is established in a new way is the answer characterized by answerability.

Looking for a musical field characterized by such tensions and interferences, we find rich material for auscultation in the intricate and highly varied relation between the Western and the Hindustani musical cultures, an exemplary field as there are testimonies dating from the end of the eighteenth century to our own times when North Indian music has become part of the global musical culture.

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[11] Waldenfels, *Grundmotive*, p. 118 (trans. in Bernhard Waldenfels, *Phenomenology of the Alien: Basic Concepts*, trans. Alexander Kozin and Tanja Stähler, Evanston: Northwestern University Press 2011, p. 76).

[12] Bernhard Waldenfels, *Sinne und Künste im Wechselspiel: Modi ästhetischer Erfahrung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2010, p. 177.

[13] Waldenfels, *Grundmotive*, p. 72.

[14] Georg Stanger, *Philosophie der Interkulturalität: Erfahrung und Welten: Eine phänomenologische Studie*, Freiburg and Munich: Alber 2006, p. 303.

There has perhaps been a more intense circulation between the West and China, Japan or South East Asia within contemporary art music, but the choice of India is due to the long history of intercultural relations in the field of music.

Indian music, especially from Hindustan, has left marks and traces not only on the classical tradition and on contemporary music of the West, but also on the popular sphere. It has been thoroughly investigated in the discourses of comparative musicology and ethnomusicology; and since the middle of the twentieth century it has also been performed in its own right, being part of the global musical scene and the recording industry. The solo genres of the sitar and the sarod were decisive for the breakthrough in both contemporary and popular music, with Ali Akbar Khan and Ravi Shankar as the main figures. In jazz, the experiments with modes in the 1950s led to an exploration of Indian tone systems. Hindustani music (but also, admittedly, the Carnatic tradition to some extent) influenced American minimalism from the 1960s onwards. Shankar was the main figure in the 'sitar explosion' in popular music, and for a moment Indian music not only served as something foreign to the different traditions of Western music, but was also involved in a general shift in the music of the USA and of Europe. We are still living within this transformation.

Another reason for choosing Hindustani music is a linguistic one. Leo Spitzer has suggested that Sanskrit is the language with the closest equivalent to *Stimmung*. In fact, he even finds two counterparts. Firstly, *rasa* is a central concept in the Indian aesthetics of drama, where it stands for the aesthetic appreciation of an emotional essence (like the heroic or the erotic), and it is well established in the musical sphere, too.[15] The second concept is *dhvani*, referring to the suggested or unsaid meaning of a poem, as opposed to linguistic substance.[16] Furthermore, uncommented on by Spitzer, the central concept *rāga* means 'that which colours the mind'.[17] It is a crucial concept in modern music-making in India, where each *rāga* has a specific scale with a hierarchy among the tones and certain features concerning intonation and embellishment, concretized in improvisation. The different *rāgas* are most often associated with specific moods as well as with the proper time of day or season when they are to be performed, so we have every reason to expect that attunemental themes are relevant in Indian music, too.

That brings us also closer to musicological fields like ethnomusicology and musical anthropology. I will draw on studies of Indian music in these disciplines, but my investigation is focused on how alien elements are perceived and

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[15] Following most of the literature cited here, I will use Sanskrit terms, even if there are Hindi equivalents.

[16] Spitzer, op. cit., pp. 141–2, n. 3.

[17] In *Bṛhaddeśī* by Mataṅga (written ca. 500–800), *dhvani* is a keyword in a famous definition of *rāga*, but then meaning 'sound': 'That which colours the mind of the good through a specific *svara* [interval] and *varna* [melodic movement] or through a type of *dhvani* [sound] is known by the wise as *raga*.' Cf. Suvarnalata Rao, *Acoustical Perspective on Raga-Rasa Theory*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal 2000, p. 7.

comprehended. In fact, we shall see that one may have considerable knowledge of another culture – in the case of musical studies knowledge of Indian tone systems, the historical aesthetics of music and the societal function of music-making – but at the same time be alien to it in terms of attunement.

The perspective will be a Western one, not because the reception of Western music in India would be any less interesting, but since it is with necessity my own point of view. Furthermore, I will concentrate on the outer points of the attunemental process, leaving aside much of the nineteenth-century music. A fully fledged study of the interrelationship between Western and Indian music would deserve a study of its own, even in the form of attunemental auscultation. My intention is much more humble, namely to find traces of attunemental boundaries.

## When the Worlds Touched: Hindustani Music and the Western Tradition

The first great effort to understand the music of India also ranks as one of the earliest ethnomusicological articles: 'On the Musical Modes of the Hindoos' by William Jones (written in 1784 and published in an enlarged version in 1792).[18] Jones was a judge at the High Court in Calcutta, but is well known as one of the great scholars of Oriental studies of his time, translating Persian poetry, studying Sanskrit philologically and developing theories of the Indo-European languages. It is easy to take his text as sheer orientalism, an article where the author tries to give shape to and systemize an unclear past, but a past assumed to be much greater than the actual time when the investigation was made. Edward Said's general characterization of Jones in *Orientalism* would make any reader hesitant: Jones's aim is said to have been to 'gather in, to rope off, to domesticate the Orient and thereby turn it into a province of European learning'.[19] Hence, Jones would be the perfect example of a scholar who carries out a territorialization, where unknown territory is conquered and taken over.

However, it is not as simple as that. It is interesting to discover that in the introduction, when Jones differentiates between the scientific and aesthetic fields concerning music, the notion of resonance appears again and again in different contexts. He touches on theories of otology where the auditory nerves are understood as the strings of a lute. Melody is said to have an extraordinary impact on the nervous system, soothing the mind. He even speaks about music in terms of 'putting the soul in tune', quoting Milton.[20] Nevertheless, as a consequence of the scepticism in the aesthetics of his time with regard to instrumental music,

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[18] He has a central position in Joep Bor's article 'The Rise of Ethnomusicology: Sources on Indian Music c. 1780–c. 1890', *Yearbook for Traditional Music*, vol. 20 (1988), pp. 51–73.

[19] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, London: Penguin 2003 (1978), p. 78.

[20] William Jones, 'On the Musical Modes of the Hindoos', in Sourindro Mohum Tagore (ed.), *Hindu Music from Various Authors*, Calcutta: Bose 1882, pp. 125–60, p. 127.

Jones calls into question whether music alone can move the passions of a listener. So, when he starts to discuss *rāga*, he has already put in doubt the principles governing the Indian aesthetics of music. Without understanding the music being played by Indians near him, he alludes to a genuine tradition now eroded: 'the art, which flourished in India many centuries ago, has faded for want of due culture'.[21] The different ancient texts lead him to the notion of *rāga*, which is said to signify 'a *passion* or *affection* of the mind', but which he chooses to translate with a much more objective word, 'mode'.[22] Nevertheless, Jones observes that the different *rāgas* may be connected to a season, a time of day and, further, to a specific affection.

The article revolves around an empty centre: Jones acknowledges that affective characteristics were attributed to the *rāgas*, but he did not experience them in this way. His first explanation of this was to say that many of the *rāgas* were defective: 'unpleasing to the ear, others difficult in execution, and few sufficiently marked by a character of sentiment and expression, which the higher music always requires'.[23] His second explanation concerns the abilities of the modern musicians, who are said to be unable to express the appropriate passions since they do not modulate and change mode. Jones's point of departure is the setting of a poem to music, but his lack of understanding has to do not with the poem, but with the music alone. He knows that the expressiveness should be there but he cannot perceive it, so his conclusion is that the musicians no longer possess the necessary abilities. There is no better evidence of distunement than in Jones's article. He is a great scholar, with a quite passionate relation to his subject – but instead of resonance we only find reasoning.

The lack of harmonic variation was to be one of the great themes in complaints about Indian music. In a second pioneering text on Indian music, published in 1788, Francis Fowke makes a detailed, organological investigation of the *vīṇā* (actually, the *bīṇ* of North India), which he calls 'the Indian Lyre'.[24] His approach to the instrument is objective and exact; the music is much harder for him to capture. Here, again, the lack of shifting harmonies is held to be a major problem. But there are other troubles, too. First of all, Fowke discovers that the pitch is flexible:

> Indeed, the performers are fond, on any note that is at all long, of pressing the string very hard, and letting it return immediately to its natural tension, which produces a sound something like the close shake on the violin; but not with so agreeable an effect.[25]

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21 Jones, op. cit., p. 156.
22 Jones, op. cit., p. 142.
23 Jones, op. cit., p. 131.
24 Francis Fowke, 'On the Vina or Indian Lyre', in Tagore, op. cit., pp. 193–7.
25 Fowke, op. cit., p. 195.

Then, Fowke is bewildered when describing how the music sounds and how it is structured:

> I could hardly ever discover any regular air or subject. The music seems to consist of a number of detached passages, some very regular in their ascent and descent; and those that are played softly, are most of them both uncommon and pleasing.[26]

And once again the shortcomings are given an explanation that does not concern the listener himself, but the musicians who execute the music.

In general, the world of Indian music was treated better when it did not sound. When P.T. French in a catalogue of Indian instruments (published in the 1860s) comments on Hindustani music, he echoes the scepticism of Fowke: the laws of harmony have not been discovered and, as a consequence, 'all Indian music is wanting in this most essential particular'.[27] The music that he comes to hear is totally foreign to him, since he finds that all singing and playing are in *unisono*: 'It is needless to say that this inevitably produces monotony, and causes Indian music to be generally uninteresting, if not repellent, to European ears.'[28]

Contempt prevailed among scholars. In his systematic and detailed treatment of Indian music in *Histoire générale de la musique*, the illustrious François-Joseph Fétis allows himself to make sweeping statements on the intonation foreign to the European one (in the following commenting on an intonation diagram): 'In general, the music of Asian peoples has a weakness related to their sensual habits: such is the primitive cause of the small intervals of most of the nations.'[29] This mollifying tendency is even clearer in India than in Arabia, he writes. With no doubt, however, Fétis is aware of the changes that may have come about from early on when Great Britain began to dominate India, but he thinks that the earliest records of Hindustani music, made in the 1780s, had charm – despite the fact that those who notated the music complained about all the problems with intonation and strange rhythms. Therefore, Fétis notices that many travellers in India speak with disdain about songs and music they have heard, but that others give testimonies of overwhelming experiences. His conclusion is that it must depend on the musicians: referring to one of the early collectors of Indian music, William Hamilton Bird, he assumes that there must have been important musicians in India. Bird had written that there were singers who would move any listener. This is an important observation, testifying that these listeners had been struck by the singers and telling us about a partial attunement.

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[26] Fowke, op. cit., p. 197.

[27] P.T. French, 'Catalogue of Indian Musical Instruments', in Tagore, op. cit., pp. 241–73, cit. p. 266 (first published in the *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* 1864–66).

[28] French, op. cit., p. 267.

[29] François-Joseph Fétis, *Histoire générale de la musique: Depuis les temps les plus anciens jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. 2, Hildesheim: Olm 1983 (reprint of the 1869 ed.), p. 204.

Up to this point, the examples have been taken from more or less scholarly treatises of Indian music. There are not many descriptions of acts of listening, not even in fictional literature. There is, however, an opportunity to come closer to the listening of these past days, namely through the different collections of 'Hindustani airs'[30] which were gathered and sometimes published from the 1770s on. The songs had attracted some of those who had been invited to a performance of an Indian dance, *nautch*, arranged privately as entertainment for the Anglo-Indians. Often, such a performance was a combination of dance, mime and song. The Anglo-Indian listeners described the instrumental parts as boring, whereas the melodies sung by the dancers were appreciated.

Hindustani airs have attracted some attention in the literature on cross-cultural relations between Anglo-Indians and Indians,[31] even if no agreement has been reached on how to judge the impact of orientalism in the musical treatment of songs notated and arranged for domestic entertainment in Anglo-Indian homes, and later on in Britain, too. Indian musicians were invited to sing and sometimes to play, and quite often it was women who showed the greatest interest, transcribing the songs with the help of pianoforte or harpsichord, and later on professional musicians added accompaniment to make the music performable. These songs were fashionable in the upper echelons of society, and they were the fruit of collaboration between (female) amateur musicians, Indian masters, professional British musicians and both British and Indian linguists (since the texts were sometimes translated, though more often not).

In his groundbreaking study *Indian Music and the West*, Gerry Farrell writes: 'These arrangements, although inevitably inaccurate in many respects, were taken down from actual performances; they came into existence from the living tradition of Indian music, rather than from Sanskrit texts.'[32] Despite the closer relation to the musical sources mentioned by Farrell, we can distinguish a whole series of possible biases, ranging from problems with Western notation and the different stylistic ideals that influenced the notation to the cognitive patterns that were involved in the understanding of the music; and an important role was of course played by the now notorious orientalism.

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30 The spelling of the word 'Hindustani' shifts, and I have chosen the modern one.

31 Cf. Raymond Head, 'Corelli in Calcutta: Colonial Music-Making in India during the 17th and 18th Centuries', *Early Music*, vol. 13, no. 4 (1985), pp. 548–53; Bor, op. cit.; Ian Woodfield, 'The "Hindostannie Air": English Attempts to Understand Indian Music in the Late Eighteenth Century', *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, vol. 119, no. 2 (1994), pp. 189–211 and the chapter 'The Encounter with Indian Music', in *The Music of the Raj: A Social and Economic History of Music in Late Eighteenth-Century Anglo-Indian Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, pp. 149–80; Gerry Farrell, *Indian Music and the West*, Oxford: Clarendon 1997, pp. 28–44; Nicholas Cook, 'Encountering the Other, Redefining the Self: Hindostannie Airs, Haydn's Folksong settings and the "Common Practice" Style', in Martin Clayton and Bennett Zon (eds), *Music and Orientalism in the British Empire, 1780s–1940s*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2007, pp. 13–37.

32 Farrell, op. cit., p. 31.

From our perspective, all of this is interesting, but we also have to find traces of what was really heard: what was held to be significant and what was not; how could Western notation indicate elements that where hard to signify; and what was changed in the ordinary musical structure? Expressed in terms of the phenomenology of the alien, how was the order of Western music capable of bringing foreign elements into its structure, and in which way was this order changed? Are there any traces of a listener being struck by an alien element, trying to produce a musical meaning where no prior meaning was available?

According to the view on the cultural English–Indian relations put forward in the wake of Said's *Orientalism* and *Culture and Empire*, the Hindustani air can of course be seen as yet another example of appropriation tainted by racist notions. Those who have studied the airs are often more nuanced. In an excellent article on the Hindustani air, Nicholas Cook affords an alternative to the stance where eighteenth-century orientalist studies are held to be shameless appropriation, describing instead 'an innocent openness'. Hereby, Cook uses a vulnerable formulation, seeing it as a possibility with a reference made to music's 'ability to cut across conventional social categories'.[33] It is exactly this openness that interests me. It is an openness that does not guarantee any faithful rendering of a foreign tradition or any unbiased understanding of the music of another culture, but an openness that is necessary for attunemental resonance. Let us see what kind of testimonies we find.

One of the collectors was Margaret Fowke (sister of the aforementioned Francis), who in a letter to her father writes about an occasion when she wrote down airs.[34] From her description, it is clear that she had been eager to know the melody better, whereas the idea of a drone and a steady chord being the source from which the music emerges and then disappears is totally at odds with her own notion of music. The melody is something that can be extracted – indeed 'saved' – from the musical context, since the accompaniment is said to be miserable. That does not mean that Margaret Fowke tried to relinquish all traces of a foreign musical culture. At the beginning of the letter she assures her father that the melodies are represented in a accurate, even authentic way, but at the same time her description of how they were made says the opposite: 'I have often made the Musicians tune their instruments to the harpsichord that I might join their little band.'[35] Any deviation from the standard Western tuning is jeopardized when the instruments are tuned to and accompanied by a well-tempered clavier.

The most problematic aspect, however, is not questions on melody or pitch, but rhythm. The complaints through the decades have been repetitive. In his introduction to *Oriental Miscellany* (1789), a compilation of Hindustani airs, William Hamilton Bird wrote that 'it has cost him great pains to bring them into

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[33] Cook, op. cit., p. 17.

[34] Margaret Fowke's letter (11 Jan. 1785) published by Woodfield, 'Hindostannie Air', pp. 193–4.

[35] Fowke, op. cit., p. 193–4.

any form as to TIME, which the music of Hindustan is extremely deficient in'.[36] That is, he not only had problems with understanding something, but the fault was not his own but that of a lack of efficiency in the music. When the English composer Charles Edward Horn, known for his interest in folksong, wrote his preface to *Indian Melodies Arranged for the Voice and Piano Forte* (1813), he repeated Bird's complaints: 'the Airs are altogether so wild, and sometimes intricate, that it would be impossible, without extreme labour, and perseverance, to reduce them into time, or to reconcile the diversities of their meaning'.[37] What was chaotic was to be ordered.

So, how did the collectors of Hindustani airs manage? The obvious problem is that we have no sources of information about what the 'original' was like. If we start to look for traits in the transcriptions that sound as strange as possible to a Western ear, we end up in the picturesque milieu of conventional orientalism. When Farrell writes that 'the stepwise scalar structures of the majority of the songs give no hint of Indian originals, and sound rather more like Scottish folksongs',[38] he actually gives a plausible reference to a kind of model that could allow alien elements to come forth in an already known framework – namely the Scottish songs that at the time were popular not only in England but also in the Austrian-German sphere.

It is advisable to use Nicholas Cook's model for investigating the traces of Indian music in the airs, namely to single out the 'common practice style' (CPS) relevant for the specific time and place, and then compare it with the airs: 'we can use analytical means to chart the disruption of the musical hierarchies definitive of the CPS and in this way detect the impact of the Indian source'.[39] Characteristics like imitations of drones, transcriptions of embellishments and non-Western modalities may be drawn out. Bird's transcription of the love-song 'Rekhtah' (Example A.1), published in *The Oriental Miscellany*, gives a hint of a drone, but this is not sustained throughout the whole piece (observe the cadence in the first repeat) and with changing position (A is the lowest tone in the first bars and in the end of the piece, but it can be found in the middle voices, too). Farrell has commented on the *rāga* of the piece, giving different suggestions, but since the genre allows freedom in the choice of intervals concerning ascending and descending patterns, it cannot be defined – this is hardly an intrusion of a Western way of structuring the music. However, he does not say anything about the surprising shifts between C♯ (written with 𝄪) and C♮ in the last repeat, in this context a shift between major and minor – a trait that can certainly be found in European folk music, but only with Schubert

[36] William Hamilton Bird, 'Introduction', in *The Oriental Miscellany: Being a Collection of the Most Favourite Airs of Hindoostan*, Calcutta: Cooper 1789, unp.

[37] Charles Edward Horn, 'Preface', in *Indian Melodies Arranged for the Voice and Piano Forte* (1813), cited by Woodfield, *The Music of the Raj*, p. 162.

[38] Farrell, op. cit., p. 39.

[39] Cook, op. cit., p. 20. This style is, however, never defined in Cook's article; instead he compares the particular traits of the transcriptions with the necessary musical examples.

became pivotal for a strategy of ambiguity in Western art music. Perhaps it is even a sign of a microtone, *śruti*.

Example A.1 William Hamilton Bird, 'Rekhtah' from *The Oriental Miscellany* (1789)




The last interpretation is speculative, admittedly, but it is a sign of how an order can change when confronting something from outside; another is the repetitive A that is brought to normality in the cadences. Therefore, the mobility of the piece is not to be expected in a folk song arrangement, since the tonal forces behave in an unusual way. Something must be said about the spatiality, too, since we find a grouping of the pitches, but with a strong and leading bass in the cadence of the first repeat – only then the pitches are spread out. We are probably very far from the source, even if we cannot say how the music sounded when it was notated. The music sounds strange, but not because the Hindustani song is rendered in a convincing way; instead it is music between different worlds, a musical hybridization.

The moment of Hindustani airs was short. Farrell writes: 'the social intercourse between Indians and Europeans, which had allowed the collection of Hindustani Airs to take place, was a facet of a particular phase of colonialism. As the nineteenth century progressed, this level of cultural exchange between colonizer

and colonized was to diminish.'[40] When the governor-general, Warren Hastings – who had a great interest in Indian culture and music – was replaced by Charles Cornwallis in 1786, the attitude between Englishmen and Indians changed. Indians were no longer allowed to take part in political governance. Another change was the greater number of British women living in India. In the earlier days, it was almost exclusively British men who stayed in the colony, but now the equivocal *nautch* performances had acquired a bad reputation. The open space was closed.

The change of attitude had attunemental consequences, too. The possibility of resonance is dependent on relations of power and dominance: resonance is possible only when there is a reciprocal relation. When music is made into an object, when musicians are treated like inferiors, then resonance is likely to be absent. However, both relations – between a listener who opens him- or herself up to the music and a listener who treats it as an object – can be described in attunemental terms, since they answer to different dispositions. The curious collector of exotic songs, trying to be as true to the melody as possible, has opened him- or herself up to both musicians and music, even if the power relation is unequal. With a drastic change in social relations, this openness is closed. There has to be recognition of the other person as person.

To Farrell the nineteenth century meant musically that the Indian culture began to be 'recycled in the Western romantic imagination as a symbol of the mysterious East'.[41] This is an era when there was a fancy for opera, with colonial India as its scene; when Léo Delibes made an Indian counterpart to *Madama Butterfly* with *Lakmé*; when Edward Elgar composed his colonial dream *The Crown of India* with a *nautch* scene included. In the field of popular songs, Farrell describes a trend spanning Hindu love-songs to songs about Hindu headhunters. If there were any recollections at all of Indian music, it was only to bring forth a 'scent' or an 'ambiance', Farrell says.[42] Such phenomena do not lie outside the bandwidth of the attunemental investigation, but they are only distorted remnants of what we have found in the Hindustani air. The oriental phantasmagoria ruled.

## Elements of India: Collage from the Twentieth Century

Giuseppe Verdi had taken advice from Fétis when he composed *Aida*. Other composers, turning to India instead of Egypt, did not even bother to find any superficially authentic material for their exotic fantasies. We have to wait until Messiaen for a more systematic approach to different aspects of Indian music. Some other more serious approaches should be mentioned, however. The Indian classical musician Hazrat Inayat Khan – who had emigrated to the US, where he performed Hindustani music in different constellations – was invited to Paris in

40 Farrell, op. cit., p. 44.
41 Farrell, op. cit., p. 44.
42 Farrell, op. cit., p. 98.

1913 and 1914. There he met Debussy, who showed interest in the *rāgas*. Two other French composers, Albert Roussel and Maurice Delage, had profound musical experiences when visiting India – thus both of them included authentic Indian material in their compositions.[43] Key to the reception of Indian music by these twentieth-century Western composers is that they drew from it what they needed to free themselves from their traditional constraints. In what follows, I shall highlight some of the crucial moments of this development.

The rhythmical dimension of Hindustani music can be said to be the most important aspect for Western composers. It was essential for Messiaen when he started to move away from the forward rhythmical drive of the classical and Romantic styles, taking off in a direction that would lead to the total serialism of his student, Boulez. It was also essential for early minimalist composers, when they brought cyclical forms of rhythm to the foreground. Neither direction had much to do with Indian music, at least not for the average listener. At the same time, both directions led to a break with the Western tradition.

We should, however, ask ourselves why the composers did what they did. Messiaen had not shown any particular interest in Indian culture when as a student at the Paris Conservatoire in the late 1920s he found an introduction to *tāla*, the cyclic metrical pattern in Hindustani music, thanks to Lavignac's *Encyclopédie de la musique*. Only 30 years later did he refer to the affective characters and symbolism behind the names of the *tālas*, being the 120 so-called *desītālas*. First of all, we can find a technical aspect, namely the means that gave him new possibilities of manipulating and permuting a given musical rhythm.[44] The second reason for Messiaen to use the Indian system was completely different: he found a tradition where the notion of temporality was akin to his own, where the Christian idea of eternity had a counterpart in the Hindu idea of timelessness. Another name for this kind of mobility was stasis, non-movement. Paul Griffiths holds that Messiaen was fascinated by the abstract characteristics of Indian music; the composer was 'concerned with the formulae and not with any musical embodiment they might once have had, or might now retain in contemporary Indian practice'.[45]

One should always be suspicious when somebody so clearly separates the concrete sound (or practice) from an abstract thought, but it is certainly true that music like the first movements of *Quatuor pour la fin du temps* (1941) and *Turangalîla-Symphonie* (1948) do not sound 'Indian' at all, despite their borrowing

[43] On the French reception of Hindustani music in early twentieth century, see Jann Pasler, 'Race, Orientalism, and Distinction in the Wake of the "Yellow Peril"', in Georgina Born and David Hesmondhalgh (eds), *Western Music and Its Others: Difference, Representation, and Appropriation in Music*, Berkeley: University of California Press 2000, pp. 86–118.

[44] Cf. Mirjana Šimundža, 'Messiaen's Rhythmical Organisation and Classical Indian Theory of Rhythm (I)', *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1987), pp. 117–44.

[45] Paul Griffiths, *Olivier Messiaen and the Music of Time*, London: Faber 1985, p. 60.

of elements from Hindustani music.[46] It is impossible to understand the inner motivations of Messiaen without taking his Catholic faith into account, so we enter a zone where we can suppose that Catholic and Hindu notions of temporality and the sacred intersect. Messiaen did not have to change his own disposition when he discovered and reformulated the Hindustani principles.

The stakes were higher among the composers who would develop musical minimalism. The context then was the jazz scene of the 1950s when John Coltrane's modal style, influenced by Indian and Arabic classical traditions, was at its heights. La Monte Young and Terry Riley were both active as jazz musicians, and Phillip Glass heard Coltrane several times at the Village Vanguard in New York. They all continued the search for an alternative to European modernism: Young having studied with teachers deeply rooted in the Second Viennese School; Glass paradoxically moving away from contemporary European culture through his studies with Nadia Boulanger in Paris.

It was in Paris that Glass had his first direct contact with Indian music, being asked to write down Ravi Shankar's music for the musicians who were going to record the soundtrack to Conrad Rook's movie *Chappaqua* (1966). Shankar hummed the music and Glass tried to understand how to transcribe it. Since Shankar used a *rāga* that did not have many microtonal shadings, the main problem for Glass was to figure out how to treat the rhythmical aspects.[47] For Glass this meeting had an extremely important consequence as he started to focus on rhythmic structure, whereas he reduced the harmonic dimension to almost nothing.[48] In a well-informed article, Allison Welch has pointed out what the three minimalists actually found in their meeting with the Indian traditions:

> If for Young the encounter with Indian music fostered a concern with stasis, improvisation, and purity of intonation (*svara*), and for Riley a concern with improvisation and rhythmic procedures (*tāla*), then for Philip Glass the encounter stimulated insights regarding the potential for a rhythmic approach to formal structure.[49]

Both Young and Riley studied for a long time with the classical singer Pran Nath, whom Young had invited to the USA from India, and with whom they both performed. Asked about the relation between his own compositions and his interest in Indian music, Young emphasized that he tried to keep them totally

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[46] On Hindustani elements in these works, see Peter W. Schott, *Exotik in der Musik des 20. Jahrhunderts: Historisch-systematische Untersuchungen zur Metamorphose einer ästhetischen Fiktion*, Munich and Salzburg: Katzbichler 1986, pp. 98–115.

[47] Cf. Peter Lavezzoli's interview with Glass in his book *The Dawn of Indian Music in the West: Bhairavi*, New York and London: Continuum 2006, pp. 149–57, ref. pp. 140–41.

[48] Cf. his own comment cited by Lavezzoli, op. cit., p. 128.

[49] Allison Welch, 'Meetings along the Edge: *Svara* and *Tāla* in American Minimal Music', *American Music*, vol. 17, no. 2 (1999), pp. 179–99, cit. p. 191.

apart, even if he admitted that his studies in Indian music had influenced his way of composing.[50] Nevertheless, he called one of his principle works an American '*rāga*' in an interview.[51] Closer to sounding elements in North Indian music, Terry Riley's music might use both pitches of different *rāgas* and ornamentation, but even when he also includes structural features, a work like his string quartet *Mythic Birds Waltz* does not emulsify in a Hindustani sound world.[52]

But minimalism was only yet another American breakaway from the European past, and the interest in non-Western music was preceded by composers such as Henry Cowell and Lou Harrison. It goes without saying that John Cage played an extremely important role in this development. Actually, he first turned to Indian aesthetics before making Zen into a new way of listening and composing. In his search for alternatives to the expressive subject, Cage discovered the intricate system of durable emotions, *sthayibhāvas*, through his reading of *Dance of Shiva* and *The Transformation of Nature in Art* by the Indian author Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. He structured his ballet music *The Seasons* (1947) according to the Indian notion of the seasons' interrelation with cosmic powers,[53] and the same 'programme' was used in his *String Quartet in Four Parts* (1949–50).[54] By then, Cage had already composed *Sonatas and Interludes* (1948–49) for prepared piano, a major work where all the eight durable emotions are said to be expressed followed by a ninth, *śāntarasa* (silence or tranquillity).[55] However, he cannot follow the principle of expressing one emotion in every single piece, since there are 16 sonatas and four interludes – and those musicologists who have tried to figure out which emotions belong to which piece soon get lost.[56]

In some commentaries on the work, assumptions have been made that Cage even used *rāgas* and *tālas* in his composing, but at least the first relation seems wholly irrelevant since the pitches are changed or biased by the preparation.[57] However, as always one cannot be too sure about Cage's doings: he can cite sages and monks, but the phrases are always transported into the context of his

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[50] Niksa Gligo, 'Ich sprach mit La Monte Young und Marian Zazeela', interview with La Monte Young and Marian Zaseela, *Melos*, no. 4 (1973), p. 340.

[51] Edward Strickland, *American Composers*, p. 66.

[52] Welch has analysed the piece from the point of view of Hindustani elements in op. cit., pp. 186–91.

[53] Cf. James Pritchett, *The Music of John Cage*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993, p. 39–45.

[54] Cf. John Cage, 'Notes on Compositions II', in *Writer: Previously Uncollected Papers*, New York: Limelight 1993, p. 51 and Pritchett, op. cit., p. 48.

[55] Cf. John Cage, 'Notes on Compositions I', in op. cit., p. 11.

[56] For example Pritchett, op. cit., 30. Schott accepts the idea of durable emotions but never tries to sort them out, cf. op. cit., p. 119. Monika Fürst-Heidtmann tries to pick out some of the *sthayibhāvas*, but her judgment that all movements are musical *Stimmungsbilder* is not convincing. Cf. Monika Fürst-Heidtmann, *Das präparierte Klavier des John Cage*, Regensburg: Bosse 1979, p. 204.

[57] Cf. Schott, op. cit., p. 119. See also Fürst-Heidtmann, op. cit., p. 195.

own aesthetics. He subverts the meaning of the original formulation: the anti-modernism of Coomaraswamy is the opposite of Cage's convictions, but the latter can still cite the former with appreciation.[58] As early as 1946, Cage was clear about the function of borrowings from the Orient: neither transcriptions nor exotic tastes are relevant to him, but rather the 'desire to bring elements of it together with those of the Occident to create new music'.[59]

Cage's interest in Indian aesthetics and philosophy did not last long, only to the second half of the 1940s, before he continued with his explorations of Eastern thinking. Giacinto Scelsi is a composer with a much more enduring but less specific relation to the Indian sphere – tellingly, he has even said that one can of course travel to India, but India is inside, in the mind.[60] Quite a few of his works relate to Indian or more precisely Hindu culture in their titles or subtitles.[61] He never took any specific element from Hindustani music (such as the metrical or rhythmic systems like Messiaen and Glass did, or the aesthetic concepts like Cage), but identified parallels between his own musical aesthetics and foreign musical cultures – the element of improvisation and the attention to sound instead of structure.[62]

Scelsi's own contribution to the New Music scene in the second half of the twentieth century – the intense focus on the tone, on one sound – has a biographic background where his recuperation from a mental disorder was brought about thanks to his own meditative, repetitive playing of one and the same note for hours.[63] It was after this breakdown that Scelsi turned eastwards, linking repetition to Hindu practices.[64] In Chapter 5, I wrote that pieces like Scelsi's *Quattro Pezzi*

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[58] Cf. David W. Patterson, 'Cage and Asia: History and Sources', in David Nicholls (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to John Cage*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 41–59.

[59] John Cage, 'The East in the West', in op. cit., pp. 21–5, cit. p. 21.

[60] Cf. Giacinto Scelsi, *Il sogno 101*, Macerata: Quodlibet 2010, p. 276.

[61] *Aion* (1961) has a subtitle saying that the work concerns four episodes of one of Brahma's days, *Konx-om-pax* (1969) has a subtitle circling around the syllable *Om*, just like Suite No. 9 for piano (1953), and then the next Piano Suite (1953) with its point of departure in the word *Ka*, *Quattro illustrazioni* which is said to illustrate Vishnu's metamorphoses and the guitar pieces *Ko-tha* (1967), three dances for Shiva.

[62] Giovanni Giuriati points out that an ethnomusicological approach to Scelsi diminishes the composer's eccentricity. Cf. Giovanni Giuriati, 'Suono, improvvisazione, trascrizione, autorialità, Oriente, … e Scelsi: Alcune riflessioni di un etnomusicologo', in Daniela M. Tortora (ed.), *Giacinto Scelsi nel centenario della nascita: Atti di Convegni Internazionali Roma, 9–10 dicembre 2005, Palermo, 16 gennaio 2006*, Rome: Aracne 2008, pp. 263–79.

[63] Cf. Heinz-Klaus Metzger, 'Das Unbekannte in der Musik: Versuch über die Kompositionen von Giacinto Scelsi', *Musik-Konzepte*, vol. 31, 'Giacinto Scelsi' (1983), pp. 11–12.

[64] Cf. Giacinto Scelsi, 'Son et musique', in *Les Anges sont ailleurs … Textes et inédits recueillis et commentés par Sharon Kanach*, Paris: Actes Sud 2006, pp. 125–39, ref. p. 135.

*per Orchestra* are pieces of becoming, not of being.[65] In a way, they capture the opening of a *rāga* session, with the *tambūrā* setting the drone and the instrumental soloist attuning him- or herself to it. Instead of the thematic or motivic development which by then had dominated Western music for centuries, the one tone – with all its inherent dynamics, with all its flexibility, with all its centrifugal force – is exhibited. To Scelsi, the relation to Indian music was not just a parallel, but also a kind of identity. Commenting on the role of sound in music, Scelsi said that Western music had been totally occupied with the frame of music, with musical form; now it was time 'to think about music in terms of energy'.[66] The music of India was one of the traditions he invoked when saying this.

In retrospect, it seems as if the apparent anti-traditionalism of serialism in the early 1950s was in fact the last manifestation of a certain logic in Western music, focused on motivic and thematic development. Total control over the musical material then showed itself to be a dead end. As early as 1954, Pierre Boulez himself wrote about a dialectic between serialism and a momentary structure open to free choice.[67] Soon, mobile form followed in compositions by Stockhausen and Boulez. Xenakis and Ligeti turned against total serialism, composing spheres not structures. This had nothing to do with Hindustani music, of course; instead it may have had to do with a change in Western culture. The structures opened up. Afterwards, Stockhausen would compose not only *Stimmung* with a point of reference to Hindustani music, but he also embarked on his cosmological project, *Licht*, with a background in a formula composition like *Mantra* – a work on which he had commented on the arcane knowledge in India with a resonance between tones, other kinds of vibrations and the mind.[68]

It would digress much too far to even outline the great societal change here. I can only mention the growth of the global economy, the decline of the colonial system, the new educational system where universities for an elite had turned into instruments for mass-education, and the media and technology revolutions. All four changes also resulted in a new relation to authority: traditional values became obsolete, and the age-old duality between high culture and popular culture began to dissolve. Even if globalization can be said to have started when Europeans began to travel the seas to continents unknown to them, the 1960s was the first time the appearance of a global economy was a fact. Peter Sloterdijk has called this state a

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[65] In a poignant formulation Gabriele Garilli writes: 'the sound embodies from time to time a different condition through a continuous transformation of its state'. Cf. Gabriele Garilli, 'Stati della materia: Uno sguardo sul linguaggio musicale di Scelsi attraverso il *Quartetto* n. 2', in Tortora, op. cit., pp. 101–18, cit. p. 104.

[66] Scelsi, 'Son et musique', p. 131.

[67] Cf. Pierre Boulez, 'Recherches maintenant', in *Relevés d'apprenti*, Paris: Seuil 1966, pp. 27–32, ref. p. 32.

[68] Cf. Karlheinz Stockhausen, 'Mantra', in *Texte zur Musik*, vol. 4, *Texte zur Musik 1970–77*, Cologne: Dumont Schauberg 1978, p. 154–66, ref. p. 164.

'world interior of capital' and he has described how societies that earlier had been closed, governed by a cultural immune system, had now opened up.[69]

It is also the time when the peasant shoes painted by Van Gogh, treated in Heidegger's exegesis in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, found their contradistinction in Andy Warhol's *Diamond Dust Shoes* (1980), where there seems to be nothing of *Erde*, nothing of *Heimat*. It is Fredric Jameson who has juxtaposed the footwear in one of the classic articles on postmodernism, 'Postmodernism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', giving his treatment of Heidegger an ironic twist, but also forgetting the world of Warhol's work and its earth. Certainly, both dimensions are there.

Music is almost absent in Jameson's analysis of this era, even in the heavily inflated book with the same title. But even so, he mentions not only Cage but also 'the synthesis of classical and "popular" styles found in composers like Phil Glass and Terry Riley' alongside the Beatles and the Rolling Stones.[70] When in another article written during the same period Jameson sets out to describe how late capitalism eliminates 'the last vestiges of Nature' – namely 'the Third World and the unconscious' – and he describes the relation between the First and the Third World as 'the struggle between Colonizer and Colonized, where the objectifying reversal of the Look is apocalyptically rewritten as the act of redemptive violence of Slave against Master', he forgets the new relation: not between Hegel's slave and master but the new but fragile equality between postcolonial India and the West.[71] Here, the economical rise began slowly, and global culture arrived before the global economy.

In retrospect, it is easy to find a pattern for the sudden resonance of Indian music in the West. The 1960s was to be the decade when attitudes changed, and to be exact the turning point can be said to be 1966–67. We have already seen that the composers of art music were not alone. Related to the change that can be traced, investigations of modal style in jazz started in the 1950s. In popular music, things began to happen in 1965. That was the time when diverse rock groups such as The Kinks, the Yardbirds, the Rolling Stones and, of course, the Beatles started to find new sources for their music and when popular music became experimental. Among the sources was Indian music, and for a while the term 'Raga rock' was used as an emblem for the trend. Speaking in terms of what was popular, one should also include a conventional phenomenon like music business prizes: in

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[69] Peter Sloterdijk, *Im Weltinnenraum des Kapitals: Für eine philosophische Theorie der Globalisierung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2005. His trilogy on spheres is in fact a history of globalization.

[70] Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, London and New York: Verso 1991, p. 1. The article was published for the first time in 1984 in *New Left Review*.

[71] Fredric Jameson, 'Periodizing the 60s', in *The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971–1986*, vol. 2*: Syntax of History*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1988, pp. 178–208, cit. p. 207, p. 207 and p. 188.

1967 three Grammy Award-winning albums in the categories of rock, jazz and classical music were related to Indian music.[72]

The year 1968 was, of course, one of student rebellions, and I would like to suggest that the sudden Indian resonance has something to do with this turning point. In the transformation of society, a space was opened up where resonance was made possible. It seems to be beneficial to undertake an attunemental auscultation of this historical phase. One way of understanding the changes in musical aesthetics is to say that they all repeat what happened in the arts of the nineteenth century: it would then have to do only with what Said has called the idea of the 'regeneration of Europe by Asia'.[73] Messiaen using *tāla* was, according to this way of arguing, only something that could vitalize Western music. The minimalists did the same, but in a more definitive way. The jazz music of the 1940s needed a renewal, and Indian music seemed to offer not only a modal system but also another way of structuring music. In the search for new sounds in rock music, Hindustani music was only one of many sources to expropriate – when Raga rock was born, it was merely a trendy sound that was soon found to be boring. Here the Western music scenes appear to be a parallel to the economics of capitalism: new areas are exploited, and as soon as they have been used the market goes elsewhere.

Why is something perceived as impossible to understand and suddenly something attractive? There is no reason to believe that Western audiences at once started to appreciate and evaluate Hindustani music on its own terms. Instead different strata gave resonance. The teleological traits that had dominated Western classical music were no longer the only alternative. The schematic structure of popular music did not satisfy (and the new LP format made possible recordings not only of Hindustani music but also of progressive rock). The musical worlds did not emerge in the same way as they once had: the temporalities changed, as did the mobilities, the spatialities, the materialities. When the theoretical mind started to reflect upon this situation, new modalities of thinking were used. 'Intensities', 'free-floating desire' and 'repetition' were some of the terms used.

It comes as no surprise that atmosphere has been the attunemental term which has recently been most attractive within aesthetics. Here, some characteristics of Hindustani music fit very well. However, this does not mean that Indian music is better understood and appreciated, that there is any greater sensibility for the extremely intricate Indian aesthetics of music. Furthermore, it does not mean that the attunemental process that started in musical terms in the late eighteenth century has been realized in a reciprocal attunement. We can interpret the attunemental change in terms of a globalized levelling. Hereby, Klaus Held's assumption that intercultural communication may be facilitated through the social intercourse

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[72] The Beatles' *Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band* was Album of the Year, with George Harrison's *rāga*-inspired song 'Within and Without You' as one of the tracks. Duke Ellington's *Far East Suite* won Best Instrumental Jazz Performance, while Ravi Shankar and Yehudi Menuhin's album *West Meets East* won Best Chamber Music.

[73] Said, *Orientalism*, p. 115.

driven by modern economic and technical life is valid, but this communication has only to do with practicalities and superficial concerns, not *Grundstimmungen*.[74]

## The Question of Resonance

In a way, many boundaries are now gone. That which made Hindustani music almost impossible to understand from a Western point of view 200 years ago seems to have been swept away. But this dissolution of boundaries has only been a transformation leading to standardization. The mapping of these boundaries can still be made, and, furthermore, the boundaries can be lived. Through living the musical boundaries, the act of listening is enriched. How could this experiencing of boundaries be described? One way would be to understand boundary in Gadamerian terms: there is a difference between two horizons, but also the possibility of their fusion. In a much-discussed article on the politics of multiculturalism, the philosopher Charles Taylor uses Hindustani music and its relation to the art music of the Western tradition as an example where Western values have no currency:

> To approach say, a raga with the presumptions of value implicit in the well-tempered clavier would be forever to miss the point. What has to happen is what Gadamer has called a 'fusion of horizons'. We learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture. The 'fusion of horizons' operates through our developing new vocabularies of comparison, by means of which we can articulate these contrasts.[75]

This quotation captures in many ways the main themes of my aftersong. Taylor turns back to a canonical example of Western music to highlight the difference between it and Hindustani music. For this, he has been reproached by the musicologist Kofi Agawu, who wants to stress the similarities and not the differences, and who in Taylor finds another version of what Said called a European regeneration through Asia. Taylor says that it is our 'new vocabularies of comparison' that should be developed. Instead, Agawu adheres to a semiotics where 'the impulses that lie

[74] Klaus Held, 'Intercultural Understanding and the Role of Europe', *The Monist*, vol. 78, no. 1 (1995), pp. 5–17, ref. p. 4.

[75] Charles Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutmann (ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994, pp. 25–74, cit. p. 67.

behind certain expressive gestures are translatable'.[76] Therefore, according to Agawu, we only need to translate, not transform ourselves.

But both explanations are formulated in terms of understanding. Taylor speaks about new vocabularies of comparison, whereas Agawu appears to move in a direction where one and the same impulse can be represented by different kinds of signs without being changed. Even if they disagree on the question of difference, both of them want to include as much as possible within their perspective. Taylor heads for a horizon as wide as possible (but, as Klaus Held has stressed, a horizon is always limited), while Agawu wants to find out that we are living in the same world (but this world is not Held's single transcending world). We are enclosed in a meaningful world, where world means exactly 'a whole of meaning'.

But is this true when we are listening to music? The focal point should be the overlapping. The scale degrees of different *rāgas* can overlap or even be identical to those of Western major and minor scales. In its execution, a *rāga* like *sindhu bhairavī* can sometimes sound like a blues solo, and for a moment the average Western listener may find themself situated in a well-known world; but this moment is indeed momentary, not momentous – within a moment that world is gone. This instance tells us something essential about the way we listen to music. The world that emerges in a musical performance is one world. It might change; but there is nothing like a *Verschmelzung*, a fusion, with other worlds. The listener may have several competences, and different competences may be more dominant than others. However, attuned to the specific world of a *rāga* performance, the listener can for a moment step outside it into another world, in this case that of the blues, but then be thrown back into it when its mobility, its temporality, is no longer congruent or overlapping.

Thanks to our journey, taking us to India and far back in history, we have discovered much about attunemental boundaries. The attunement does not start with knowledge about a foreign culture; instead, it comes over the listener. In a moment like this, the listener does not have to understand what he or she hears. Instead, it is all about attunement to something unknown which is in conflict with the established order of self, but at the same time brings about resonance in that same self. The alien is never simply alien. However, we have also seen that the music can be closed, too, even from those who are eager to understand. The difference lies between resonance and absence of resonance, not between understanding and misunderstanding. It is question of being struck. It is also a question of beginning to understand, but it is not coterminous with understanding. Fundamental attunements, both those of our own and those strange to us, render us speechless. Afterwards we may begin to speak in a new manner, according to the way in which we have been struck.

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[76] Kofi Agawu, 'Contesting Difference: A Critique of Africanist Ethnomusicology', in Martin Clayton et al. (eds), *The Cultural Study of Music: A Critical Introduction*, New York and London: Routledge 2003, pp. 227–37, both cit. p. 234.

The example of India has shown the conditions for synchronic attunement between musical cultures. At a given point in history, the Western ear was closed to Hindustani music – with complete distunement as a consequence. At a much later point, the resonance between both musical cultures was made possible, leading to synchronic attunement. By then, the musical mind had changed in both India and the West, since the cultures had been transformed in a process that includes economical, political, hierarchical and mental traits. It is no exaggeration to presume that this attunement is not only dependent on a common global culture, where standardization and levelling rules, but also on a capacity to hear in a new way – openness instead of closedness. We should not forget that it is not just currency that can be converted, and that with a less rigid understanding of the self the conversion does not have to be complete. George Harrison was a convert, but Margaret Fowke was not.

However, this synchronic distunement appears not only in a relation between cultural spheres, but also within one and the same sphere. The example of India puts us in the position of elucidating both attunement and distunement more clearly. When a musical work or performance fails to bring about resonance, it may have to do with attunement: the reception history of Western music is full of examples of music performed without accordance to expectations and existing modes of listening. Yet, in their institution of a new world, which also can be understood as an event of truth, a new possibility of listening and understanding is opened up which may give resonance further on. Testimonies of loathing, even disgust, in musical matters – from the early reception of jazz to experimental electronica – are yet further examples of lack of resonance. Traditions, education, cultures of taste and patterns of cognition have their share in a refusal that is manifested in distunement.

As we saw earlier, the question of resonance can also be put in diachronic terms, namely in our relation to history. It is by no means self-evident that the world of today is more than distantly akin to the world of our distant past. Diachronic difference can be insurmountable, leading to distunement and deafness. Rifts, turns and upheavals in history can separate us from what once was and, accordingly, is no more. Therefore, we can be as estranged from the musical past (due to diachronic distunement) as from a contemporary musical culture to which we do not belong (due to synchronic distunement). No world appears, there is no temporality open to us, the spatiality refuses to rise, the mobility is absent and the materiality turns away from us. If that is the case, this past is actually not our past.

This is the edge of the world, and silence rules in an empty space. However, and this is vital: resonance is in need of a void. What makes us resonate does not have to be meaning. Instead, we can be struck by that strange sound; we can be struck like a string. And then the empty space turns into a resonating chamber.

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